I do. Lee's reasons for the Pennsylvania campaign were subject to the same level of revisionism that many of his other actions were. If you look at the correspondence between Lee and his superiors, and the recollections of Lee's subordinates at the time, then the reasons for the campaign become clearer.
First and foremost, Lee's army was in sad shape. Because of the inability of the confederate railroad system and the inefficiencies in the army quartermaster department (headed by an inept Davis crony named Lucius Northorp) the army had to live off of Virginia and it was literally starving. The state was tapped out, and the army had been on short rations most of the winter; in April the daily ration was 4 ounces of salt beef per man. In March the army was suffering from an outbreak of scurvey, of all things. The army livestock was, if anything, in even worse shape. This problem had been complicated by a drought which had hit Virginia in 1862, and the spring on 1863 had been too wet which held the promise of another poor harvest.
Lee also suffered from a lack of manufactured goods. Armies don't just run off weapons and munitions. Lee's army suffered from a lack of the basics. Everything from shoes and clothes for the men to mundane items like harnesses and curry combs and horseshoes were almost impossible to come by.
Kent Masterson Brown's book contains numerous contemporary quotes from Lee's subordinates on the invasion, and the intent was clear. Lee was on a raid. His intent, in addition to keeping Davis from frittering his army away in a vain attempt to save Vicksburg, was to take his troops into Pennsylvania for a couple of months to live off the Yankees. In addition to food, he intended to strip the countryside of every item of use to his army. Correspondence between Lee and is commanders during the pre-Gettysburg part of the campaign show a great deal of attention paid to reporting exactly what goods and supplies they had gathered to date. In the back of his mind Lee may have known that a successful campaign in the North might have a political benefit, but he also had to know that any campaign a year before the elections could well be forgotten by an election day 18 months later. He also had to know that any pitched battle in the North would also bring to an end his plan to supplying his army. So a major battle in the North was the last thing he wanted.
"I do. Lee's reasons for the Pennsylvania campaign were subject to the same level of revisionism that many of his other actions were."
Your argument about Lee's shortage of basic supplies is correct, of course, and undeniably part of his thinking.
But surely you would grant that Lee also had higher strategic goals, and surely you would respect LEE'S OWN WORDS as not being necessarily the result of modern historical revisionism?
Please note how much of the following argument comes straight from Lee himself:
"The lives of our soldiers are too precious to be sacrificed in the attainment of successes that inflict no loss upon the enemy beyond the actual loss in battle," Lee had written Secretary of War Seddon on January 10, 1863.
"Each victory should bring us nearer to the great end which it is the object of this war to reach."
"Nothing can arrest during the present [Lincoln] administration," Lee expressed to Seddon, "the most desolating war that was ever practiced, except by a revolution among their people. Nothing can produce a revolution except systematic success on our part."
"And Lee knew the northern populace was growing weary of the war. The disaffection in various parts of the north was reported in newspapers and forwarded by spies for Lee's consideration.
"The growing fatigue north of the Mason-Dixon Line energized some Southerners, especially when coupled with word that the Lincoln administration was taking steps to ratchet up their war effort [A SURGE??] as their own people grew tired of the conflict....
"The growing unrest in the North and firm Southern resolve to the cause of independence animated Lee, who realized the political possibilities these circumstances created.
"If successful this year, next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the North." the general predicted to his wife on April 19, 1863.
"The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis."
Yes, some have argued here that General McClellan was not REALLY the "peace candidate," that he would not REALLY have agreed to a negotiated settlement. But I wonder how much of that argument is just hindsight, knowing of the great northern victories in 1863 & 1864?
While it's clear that Lee's most immediate and pressing need was resupply, due to the complete and utter inadequacy of Confederate logistics, Lee was always thinking about the larger implications of every move he made - strategically, politically, diplomatically, etc.
Necessity is the mother of invention, and was especially in Lee's fertile mind. Lee did not want to fight a major battle on Northern soil: he hoped to take Harrisburg, sever its rail and telegraph lines and seize all its military stores. Even after the battle of Gettysburg started against Lee's direct orders, JEB Stuart was still involved with Harrisburg, which he believed to be the goal of the campaign.
On the question of a President McClellan recognizing the Confederacy:
That would never have happened. As I said above, McClellan's only concern was preserving the Union. He would have made any kind of humiliating and unwise concession as long as the South was willing to nominally remain within the Union. McClellan was obsessed with how history would view him, and there was no way in hell that he would be willing to be remembered as the president who agreed to break up the Union. McClellan would have agreed to any terms short of disunion.
There was a peace party in the North, but there was no separation party in the North - just a scattered band of malcontents like Vallandigham, who was already completely discredited as a crank before Gettysburg.
On the question of guerrilla warfare:
There are two basic command structures for such a campaign: one with a chain of command and one of independent cells with no chain of command.
Stand watie is arguing that Lee's decision to not assume command of such a guerrilla campaign was the only reason why such a guerrilla campaign did not materialize and win the war.
In fact, both kinds of guerrilla command structures emerged after Lee's surrender.
There was Hood's attempt to put together a guerrilla army with a chain of command, which failed.
There was Gordon's attempt to put together the KKK as a secret guerrilla army with a chain of command, which also failed. By 1869, the Klan was already portraying itself as a patriotic organization loyal to the federal government, in the craven hope that federal troops, would not crack down on it.
And there was also the attempt to create a guerrilla movement without a chain of command based on local units independent of any overarching command structure. Like Quantrill's raiders, Bloody Bill Anderson, The James and Younger Gang, etc. Anderson didn't even survive the war and Quantrill only survived it by weeks.
Lee was not necessary for the founding or inspiring of a guerrilla movement. Such a movement had extremely popular, capable and effective prospective leaders in Hood and Forrest, and the KKK's founding shows how many willing accomplices they would have had.
By 1869, all these flames of continuing guerrilla struggle were extinguished, and they were extinguished after a career than never threatened to alter Northern public opinion in the slightest about the advisability of prosecuting the war or punishing traitors.
The notion that a guerrilla force can live off the kindness of a willing populace is also a myth. Guerrilla movements sustain themselves by shaking down and robbing the local populace, and bribing local opinion leaders when their activity becomes too egregious.
A perfect example is the Confederate guerrilla unit known as the James Gang. They sustained themselves through robbery and murder, justifying their terrorist activities as political blows for freedom through their newspaper lackey Johnny Edwards. They attempted a raid on the North, namely on St. Paul/Minneapolis - they were stopped cold in Northfield and never tried again.
Eventually, James was killed by one of his confederates for cash.