"There have been several books written recently which cast a new light on Lee's intentions. His goal apparently was two-fold:"
First, I'm most impressed with your detailed knowledge of these matters, and much enjoy your "conversation." Seriously.
Now, I'll add what little I can, from the 2001 Bowden-Ward book (p 31):
"Ultimately, [Jefferson] Davis' decision not to strip men from Lee's army was the result of the general's cogent arguments [rehearsed at length by B-W] against such a move. In addition to voicing concerns dealing with the allocation of resources and the difficulty of getting men from Virginia to Mississippi in time to be of service, Lee asserted four other important points justifying why his army should be reinforced and mount an invasion of the North.
"First, for over a year the Army of Northern Virginia had brought unparalleled success and hope to the Southern nation with a string of remarkable victories; no other army or general had come close to delivering what he [Lee] and his men had achieved.
"Second, much of the army's battlefield prowess lay in the synergy between its commanding general and its proven combat veterans. Why, therefore, would any general, much less Lee, advocate a plan of action that denied to his side the best prospects for his country's long term goal?
"Third, the Army of Northern Virginia operated in the one theater that could do the most damage to the Northern war effort. Despite what a few members of the Confederate cabinet thought -- namely Postmaster-General Reagan from Texas -- and what a legion of other "Western Solutionists" have argued to this day, the strategically sensitive points of the North were virtually all in the Eastern Theater of operations.
"Lee understood that relieving the siege of Vicksburg in May-June 1863, desirable as that nearly-impossible goal was for the psychological well being of the South, paled in comparison to the political, psychological, and military ramifications a major victory north of the Potomac River would generate.
"A victory on the scale of Second Manassas in Pennsylvania, for example, would create more political opportunities than a string of successes in Mississippi or Tennessee -- or even Virginia. This was largely because the major psychological trigger points for the North -- which included the capital and other major cities, leading press outlets, and the foreign diplomatic corps -- were concentrated in the eastern corridor between the Potomac and New England.
"Lee had always known this. "The lives of our soldiers are too precious to be sacrificed in the attainment of successes that inflict no loss upon the enemy beyond the actual loss in battle," he had written Secretary of War Seddon on January 10, 1863. "Each victory should bring us nearer to the great end which it is the object of this war to reach."...
"Fourth, Lee was aware that the continued success of his army was key in forcing some sort of political solution upon the North. "Nothing can arrest during the present [Lincoln] administration," Lee expressed to Seddon, "the most desolating war that was ever practiced, except by a revolution among their people. Nothing can produce a revolution except systematic success on our part."
"And Lee knew the northern populace was growing weary of the war. The disaffection in various parts of the north was reported in newspapers and forwarded by spies for Lee's consideration.
"The growing fatigue north of the Mason-Dixon Line energized some Southerners, especially when coupled with word that the Lincoln administration was taking steps to ratchet up their war effort [A SURGE??] as their own people grew tired of the conflict....
"The growing unrest in the North and firm Southern resolve to the cause of independence animated Lee, who realized the political possibilities these circumstances created. If successful this year, next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the North." the general predicted to his wife on April 19, 1863. "The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis."
I think this analysis is accurate and cogent.
Who disagrees?
People in the North were getting war weary.
I think it was very fortunate that the North had victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the same week. Without those victories or worse, defeats, the will to fight could have been weakened enough to look for a peace.
I do. Lee's reasons for the Pennsylvania campaign were subject to the same level of revisionism that many of his other actions were. If you look at the correspondence between Lee and his superiors, and the recollections of Lee's subordinates at the time, then the reasons for the campaign become clearer.
First and foremost, Lee's army was in sad shape. Because of the inability of the confederate railroad system and the inefficiencies in the army quartermaster department (headed by an inept Davis crony named Lucius Northorp) the army had to live off of Virginia and it was literally starving. The state was tapped out, and the army had been on short rations most of the winter; in April the daily ration was 4 ounces of salt beef per man. In March the army was suffering from an outbreak of scurvey, of all things. The army livestock was, if anything, in even worse shape. This problem had been complicated by a drought which had hit Virginia in 1862, and the spring on 1863 had been too wet which held the promise of another poor harvest.
Lee also suffered from a lack of manufactured goods. Armies don't just run off weapons and munitions. Lee's army suffered from a lack of the basics. Everything from shoes and clothes for the men to mundane items like harnesses and curry combs and horseshoes were almost impossible to come by.
Kent Masterson Brown's book contains numerous contemporary quotes from Lee's subordinates on the invasion, and the intent was clear. Lee was on a raid. His intent, in addition to keeping Davis from frittering his army away in a vain attempt to save Vicksburg, was to take his troops into Pennsylvania for a couple of months to live off the Yankees. In addition to food, he intended to strip the countryside of every item of use to his army. Correspondence between Lee and is commanders during the pre-Gettysburg part of the campaign show a great deal of attention paid to reporting exactly what goods and supplies they had gathered to date. In the back of his mind Lee may have known that a successful campaign in the North might have a political benefit, but he also had to know that any campaign a year before the elections could well be forgotten by an election day 18 months later. He also had to know that any pitched battle in the North would also bring to an end his plan to supplying his army. So a major battle in the North was the last thing he wanted.