Leadership and Sacrifice at Midway June 4, 1942

In late December 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FDR met and selected Chester Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet, which at that time the public perceived as residing at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said, “Tell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there until the war is won”. Knox informed Nimitz by saying, “You’re going to take command of the Pacific Fleet, and I think you will be gone a long time”.

On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived by Catalina flying boat to take command. He did not bring any staff with him. When the door opened, he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage, punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.

He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment and confirmed the general perception was wrong. The dry-docks, repair shops, and fuel tank farm were intact. The carriers with their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive. He immediately sent submarines into Japanese waters and conducted carrier operations disrupting Japanese Initiatives. Admiral Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, “The one big thing about him was that he was always ready to fight….And he wanted officers who would push the fight to the Japanese”.

Nimitz decided some particularly good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders and apprehensions. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. He related that as head of officer personnel in Washington, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignments they wanted.

However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr., and Captain Edwin T. Layton. There intelligence unit had not unscrambled the new Japanese call signs or broken into the revised naval code to warn of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, these men later provided the key intelligence convincing Nimitz to hazard all his carriers at Midway.

For the Japanese, the battle for Midway was part of their strategy for establishing the next line of their Pacific Ocean defensive parameter. They intended to conquer Port Moresby in New Guinea, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Western Aleutians. Thereby, Australia would be severed as a base for an American counter-offensive and the northern flank of the Home Islands would be protected. Specifically, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto considered this initiative would provide the opportunity to draw out Nimitz for the decisive naval battle contemplated by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan.

This sea fight began with Chester Nimitz determined to meet the enemy in a major battle, but he faced long odds. Solid intelligence had discerned a complex plan disbursing Japanese forces, but Nimitz still had to consider the information could be a ruse, because the basic principle of U.S. intelligence that an enemy will act according to the best use of their capabilities. For Nimitz that meant giving weight to concentration as the best option. He was also troubled by the uncertainty of locating enemy dispositions expected because of storms west and northwest of Midway. In fact, weather was to play an important part in hiding Japanese carriers from detection. Both sides experienced Horatio Nelson’s admonition that “something must be left to chance; nothing is certain in a sea fight”.

His final instructions to admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher were, “In carrying out the task assigned in Op Plan 29-42, you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without the prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy”. To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering every available U.S. Navy ship achieved an order of battle for Midway, where they might be outnumbered more than three to one.

Author Gordon W. Prange compiled the order of battle for the navies. The Japanese had 4 heavy carriers, 2 light carriers, 11 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers for a total of 86 ships. The United States had 3 carriers no light carriers or battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seventeen destroyers or a total of 27 ships.

To balance the odds somewhat Nimitz had decided to make Midway Island his fourth aircraft carrier and sent every aircraft under his control forward. He crowded the island with 115 aircraft, including the untried (B-17 & B-26) and the obsolete (Vindicator & Brewster Buffalo). The Army contributed their bombers but retained its fighters to defend the Hawaiian Islands.

This abbreviated narrative now excludes the contribution of thousands, whose combined efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the carrier task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair, and inspired assessments of naval intelligence. This narrative also does not describe how paying the more bitter price for mistakes in strategic planning, tactical execution, and operational doctrines contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat. Instead, the narrative relates the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men, who in close combat attacked the four heavy carriers of the First Carrier Striking Force on June 4, 1942.

The Japanese transport group was discovered on June 3, but the next morning the curtain rose for the carrier battle. At 5:30AM the PBY patrol by Lieutenant Howard Ady radioed discovery of the Japanese carriers. Fifteen minutes later the PBY patrol by Lieutenant William Chase radioed in the clear, “Many planes headed Midway. Bearing 320 degrees distance 150 miles. These warnings enabled the remaining 66 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air. The updates provided by Ady enabled Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher to launch carrier attacks. All Midway aircraft made attacks against the Japanese carriers except for 21 Marine Brewster Buffalos and 7 Wildcat fighters dedicated to repelling the attackers.

In the ensuing Japanese attack on Midway beginning at 6:16AM, 14 of the 21 Brewster fighter pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in F2A-3’s (Brewster Buffalo) should consider them lost before leaving the ground”. Captain Francis McCarthy, flying one of the Wildcats, was also killed after shooting down one of eight Zeros attacking him and wingman Lt. Roy Corry Jr. Overall, only 10 fighters survived the fight and only two were in shape to fly again.

The attacks by land-based planes on the Japanese carriers began at 7:48AM. First six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers lead by Navy Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling of Torpedo 8 made their attack. These were some of the new torpedo bombers that should have replaced the hopelessly outdated Devastators Lt. Cdr. John Waldron had onboard Hornet, but the Avengers were 24 hours late reaching Hawaii. The planes obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s and only two of 18 men survived to return to Midway. Ens. Bert Earnest and Radioman Harry Ferrier thereby became with Ens. George Gay the other two “lone survivors” of Torpedo 8.

Next the Army Air Corps made its first appearance. Captain James Collins lead four Army B-26 medium bombers rigged to carry torpedoes externally in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. They had to launch at less than 1,000 yards to hit 30 knot aircraft carriers with 33 knot torpedoes. Also, most torpedoes failed when released at over 50 feet and at speeds exceeding 126 mph; a speed at which this aircraft often stalled and crashed when attempting to land. Two of four planes with their 7-man crews perished, and no hits were obtained.

Marine dive bombers closely followed the B-26’s. At 7:55AM Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field at Guadalcanal was named) attacked with 16 Dauntless bombers of which 8 were lost with their two-man crews. Henderson’s crews were untrained in dive bombing tactics and again no hits were obtained.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney at 8:39AM lead 13 long range Army B-17’s over Nagumo’s position in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits on the carriers or escorts. One aircraft was damaged by a Zero and one man was injured. The Japanese were reluctant to attack the heavily armed bombers, but the ships had no trouble evading the bombs dropped nearly four miles above them.

At 8:30AM Marine Major Benjamin Norris led eleven Vindicator dive bombers to the Japanese fleet. The aircraft were considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”. These planes displayed such fragility their fabric fuselage was reinforced with 4” hospital masking tape. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy attacks, but two more were lost at sea with their two-man crews because of low fuel. By June 6 only three were flyable. The Battle of Midway was this aircraft’s only combat use. The plane was pulled from service in 1943.

Next into the battle from 9:18AM to10:15AM came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet, respectively. In all Lt. Commander Lance E. Massey, Lt. Commander Gene Lindsey, and Lt. Commander John Waldron lead 42 Devastator torpedo bombers. The squadrons had become separated from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. Waldron left the other Hornet aircraft deliberately replying to Lt. Commander Stanhope C. Ring’s order to follow him, “I know where the damn Jap fleet is. The hell with you”. Now alone these 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 300 mph Zero fighters and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire before launching at less than 1,000 yards.

In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their two-man crews were lost. Ens. George H. Gay, Jr., who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers, was the lone survivor of this Torpedo 8 attack and was rescued by a PBY the next day. The only fighters about were six from Fighting 3 lead by Lt. Commander “Jimmy” Thach that tangled with a horde of Zero fighters and lost one aircraft. Those from Fighting 6 lead by Lieutenant Jim Gray lost track of their torpedo bombers and kept circling at 20,000 feet to protect the dive bombers they never found. Eventually these fighters returned to the Enterprise in total frustration.

The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Lt. Commander Ring led Bombing 8, Scouting 8, and Fighting 8 exactly as ordered by Captain Marc Mitscher and then searched to the south until fuel was critical and each squadron proceeded independently. Lt. Commander Robert R. Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all ten aircraft had to ditch, and Ens. Mark Kelly and Ens. George R. Hill were never found. That morning there were 29 empty seats in the Hornet ready room. Fifteen seats belonged to Torpedo 8 pilots slaughtered that morning by the Japanese. The 11 were for Bombing 8 that refueled at Midway and later returned to the Hornet.

The Japanese carrier task force had withstood eight separate attacks over nearly three hours without a single hit. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet, Navy, Marine, and Army flyers pressed home attacks with 79 aircraft. Of those 58 were destroyed, 126 of 174 men perished, and no hits were obtained. While the Japanese found satisfaction in thwarting the attacks, they faced complete frustration in efforts to re-arm and spot aircraft from the hanger decks to strike the American carriers, which were discovered by their reconnaissance aircraft.

Now at 10:20AM Bombing 3, Scouting 6 and Bombing 6 from the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise respectively found the carriers. They arrived over the carriers while most Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the last American torpedo bombers. The 18 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6 and Scouting 6, Lieutenant Wade McClusky as group commander, and Lieutenants Earl Gallaher and Richard Best as section leaders attacked the Akagi and Kaga. Most of Best’s section incorrectly followed McClusky and Gallaher in attacks that inflicted five hits and five near misses on the Kaga. Best and his two wingmen attacked the Akagi. The two wingmen obtained near misses, but Best’s 1,000 lb bomb exploded amongst aircraft on the hanger deck to start an uncontrollable fire.

The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm from 7:48AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes returned safely but Scouting 6 and Bombing6 lost 16 aircraft and 11 of 38 two man crews.

The Japanese turn came at 11:52AM when Yorktown radar plot reported, “Bogeys 32 miles and closing”. Despite fearful losses, the Japanese scored hits with three bombs at noon and at 2:42PM their torpedo plane attacks scored two hits and forced the Yorktown to abandon ship. The defending Combat Air Patrol lost one Wildcat compared to 22 of 30 Japanese aircraft lost to fighters and anti-aircraft fire.

There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 2:45PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 6 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers but ordered Lieutenant William E. Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling. However, there were just too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day. All three dive bombing squadrons got hits and three aircraft with crews were lost.

There were attacks before and after June 4 during the Battle of Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these four heavy carriers and the many superbly trained aircrews and technicians proved fatal to Japanese plans.

This splendid victory by Navy, Marine and Army Air Corps flyers over the First Carrier Striking Force permanently seized the initiative from the Japanese. One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many who fought in the Pacific owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed aloft, about 550 flyers closely engaged the Japanese and suffered nearly 300 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this accomplishment incredible and miraculous. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.

The Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Paul S. Dull U.S. NAVAL BASE, PEARL HARBOR, DRY DOCK NO. 2 lcweb2.loc.gov/master/pnp/habshaer/hi/hi0700/hi0748/data/hi0748data.pd

Action Report: USS Hornet (CV-8) Midway http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv8-Midway.html

Battle of Midway, Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, report of 18 June 1942 http://www.patriotfiles.com/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=1096&page=1 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv5-Midway.html

Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Serial 0133 of 8 June 1942 http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid6.htm

MK XIII Aerial Torpedo http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1035 http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.htm

Vindicator SB2U Dive Bomber http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=731

I find no evidence the planes flew with bombardiers on June 4 or had Norden bombsights.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-17_Flying_Fortress B-17 Crew Requirements and Standard Operating Procedures http://www.303rdbg.com/crewmen-missions.html

Midway Film by John ford http://video.staged.com/localshops/ww_iirare_film__midway__directed_by_john_ford

Valor: Marauders at Midway http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1986/April%201986/0486valor.aspx

The Nimitz Graybook http://usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical-Collection.aspx#items/show/849

Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hiry%C5%AB

Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Kaga

Japanese aircraft carrier Sōryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_S%C5%8Dry%C5%AB

Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Akagi

Japanese aircraft carrier Shōkaku https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Sh%C5%8Dkaku

I met a man who flew a Navy dive bomber in the Pacific and asked him how he found the carrier again. He said they were given the intended location of the carrier when they left, and each maintained a record of their courses and speeds on a note pad. I asked him about how they accounted for the wind. He said the carrier gave that to them before they left. On the way there and back they would look out the cockpit, if there were no clouds, to guess if the actual wind conformed to the carrier information. This state-of-the-art approach seemed more than a bit tenuous to me.

Probably the most important air/sea battle in modern combat. Certainly a turning point in the Pacific in WW2. All down here for the Japs after Midway though it was a brutal tough slug island hopping afterwards. Probably go down in history as the apex of the “Carrier” navy battle as aircraft carriers are becoming outdated due to missile technology. And I’m pretty sure most of the flying in those days was VFR (or deadheading), amazing what they pulled off without the advanced electronics of today. Enjoyed the post.

Another wonderful book about Midway is “Joe Rochefort’s War”.
Joe and his cryptanalyst’s saved the day, and turned the tide. Instead of being honored as a genius, he was subsequently given command of a floating drydock. Huge waste of talent and skill. Nimitz should have protected him by assigning Joe to his staff. King and the politics in the Navy Department never fully appreciated Joe and his contributions. Excellent book...enjoy.

I have had that on my list for a while.

One of the most fascinating books I have ever read on the subject was “Shattered Sword” that really filled in a lot of what what going on over in the IJN during that battle, the differences in the way carrier operations were conducted, damage control...radio communications(!!!), Combat Air Control, and even anti-aircraft techniques.

Simply astonishing, and I consider myself well read on the subject, and there was so much I didn’t know.

Balls of Steel indeed. Those were men.

Funny, I very much enjoyed the recent movie iteration of “Midway” (though I likely would have liked it even more if they had exhumed James Cagney and brought him back!)

I had read enough and knew all about Aviation Machinist Mate Bruno Peter Gaido who jumped into a parked SBD on the flight deck to fire at a plunging Japanese aircraft, which sliced his aircraft in half! When I saw the movie, walking out I heard someone say (a younger person) “That can’t be for real...”

I had to laugh at that. It was like the time I walked out of seeing Apollo 13 in the movies, and a young teenage couple were in front of us and the girl said “I’m glad the movie ended that way!” as if it didn’t actually happen in real life...:)

Our history seems unbelievable sometimes. How far we’ve fallen since then. If those sailors and soldiers and aviators could see the future 2020, they would have never believed it. It seems to me that their sacrifice has been for nothing. As of now, all of the wars, all of the sacrifices and deaths since the nation’s inception were all for nothing. Although it wasn’t the Redcoats, or the Nazis or Imperial Japan that won, the damned Communists have won after all.

Huge red oak on my property, well over a hundred years old died last summer. Heartbreaking that it died on my watch. Just like the country.

I was surprised that they showed the captured American pilots being shoved into the ocean with the weights tied to them, the way things are now, and all. Many Americans today know nothing of that.

I enjoyed the movie with the CGI-I could never get over the old “Midway” movie, I would watch it and think “Oh, come on. That is an Essex class carrier...”

I know you have to suspend criticism sometimes, but I could never look past it.

"I had read enough and knew all about Aviation Machinist Mate Bruno Peter Gaido who jumped into a parked SBD on the flight deck to fire at a plunging Japanese aircraft, which sliced his aircraft in half! When I saw the movie, walking out I heard someone say (a younger person) “That can’t be for real...”

Back when DVDs were cutting edge technology, I bought a copy of, "A Bridge Too Far," which had some added features including a, "making of," documentary. In the film, Anthony Hopkins plays LTC John Frost who commanded the battalion of British paratroopers that went, "a bridge too far," and got trapped in Arnhem. The real John Frost was hired as a technical consultant for the film.

In an interview with Hopkins he related how in one scene he had to run across a street between a house the British had fortified, and a train station being used as a field expedient hospital for his wounded. The street was covered by German fire, and so Hopkins ran, ducking and dodging across the street. The real John Frost intervened, scolding Hopkins and telling him no British office worth his measure would ever let his soldiers see him ducking and dodging like that as it would induce panic. Frost stated that if they wanted to portray the scene as it actually happened, Hopkins should walk upright, move quickly, smartly and directly to where he intended to go, oblivious to the bullets and explosions around him.

The film makers rejected the reality suggested by Frost under the assumption the audience would not believe it.

LOL, that reminds me of a scene I read about in “Colder Than Hell” about the Chosin Reservoir campaign, and a 6’5” Lieutanant (Joseph Owen) wanted to duck to the ground under fire, but he was near a Chinese American officer (Chew-En Lee) who probably stood a foot shorter than him, and had a habit of bravery in the face of fire that others thought insane, even as he wore large multicolored panels over his shoulders (that were used to help identify his troops as friendly to pilots providing air support) because he thought it helped his own troops to recognize him better, and that was important to him.

Chew-En Lee had a chip on his shoulder about being an Asian Marine officer, and felt he had to show leadership to prove he was as good as anyone.

Lt. Owen and Chew-En Lee were standing in the open with fire popping the dirt all around him, and Owen wanted to hit the dirt in the worst way, but Chew-En Lee was just adamant about standing there with those bright panels draped all over him...:)

So he stood there too, all 6’5” of him bent at an angle ready to dive to the deck but..unable to.

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The Battle of Midway - Animated