If properly implemented it could be good... but that’s the thing, closed source crypto is not to be trusted. If they publish the source and details of the device so it can be verified then great... otherwise beware.
NEVER trust closed-source encryption code or hardware!
The small, stand-alone crypto device is a move in the right direction though.
Only a crypto device that is in your control at all times can be trusted... thus it needs to be quite small. Such a device that could also serve as a secure firewall/router via blue tooth would revolutionize the internet.
A personal crypto device should do the following.
-Utilize both public key and XOR encryption.
-Create a reputation based local/wide area crypto currency system that does NOT depend upon the internet.
-Enable a local network using something like Meshtastic.
-Enable a long distance network using NVIS rf propagation in the HF band (roughly 3-12mhz)
-The device must have chipsets for ALL available GPS systems.. this is to enable the NVIS networking which needs the precise time/location for weak signal work.
-Enable a system which uses the URL address to create a ban-proof backup to social networks. i.e. if www.twitter.com/whoever is banned from Twitter your personal device will detect that from the data received from Twitter and automatically route your request to another site where “whoever” could still have free speech. i.e. www.Truthsocial/whoever could be where your request might be sent... there is NO way to cut off a user from accessing “whoever” even if banned.. this is very simple and easily implemented.. it’s a mystery why it has not been!
The NVIS long-range comms is SLOW by modern standards.. best for text/compressed images/compressed audio. The system works by cooperating with other users devices in real-time to assist in RF transmissions... this works despite the problem of signal cancellation of multiple rf sources but only at low data rates.
My understanding of security mechanisms is shallow, but you've opened my eyes to new layers of knowledge I need to explore.
In a sense, my question about the security of my SecurID device answers itself. The fact that one of America's largest banks uses the SecurID system to identify someone living outside America's mobile-phone operator enabled security system is proof the bank finds value there. It's also delivering value for me (the customer) because I can use banking services from outside the USA.
Moving overseas as my wife and I did two years ago automatically makes you aware of the "outer limits" of America's infotech security system.
For instance, another bank we use wants mobile phone authentication when I access their website through a Virtual Private Network.
Only when I shut off my VPN, does my bank let me go ahead and access their website to see my accounts.
We are getting social security payments sent directly to our Japanese bank. Another 100,000 Americans living in Japan also enjoy this same convenient service offered by our federal government.
And yet we are being blocked and cannot access the my Social Security information site because we cannot receive mobile SMS messages to verify who we are. Yes, we do have telephone numbers in Japan (and even an Internet based U.S. phone number) but those numbers lie outside the security blanket of US mobile phone connections.
So how does Social Security communicate with us? Well, that's the role of the Federal Benefits Unit in Tokyo, operating out of the U.S. embassy, who maintains contact with all the Americans resident in Japan through postal letters, phone calls, and on-line-submitted exchange of info and questions.