Iranian Alert -- October 30, 2003 -- IRAN LIVE THREAD PING LIST

Iran is ready for freedom, now!

21 posted on 10/30/2003 9:22:59 AM PST by blackie

Iran Gov't. Angry at Journalists' Arrest

October 30, 2003
BBC News
Jim Muir

The continued detention of two Iranian journalists - arrested by US forces in Iraq while filming at a checkpoint on 1 July - has stirred mounting concern and anger in Iran.

The Iranian Government has sent an official protest to Washington through the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which handles US interests. Diplomatic relations between the US and Iran were broken after the Islamic revolution in 1979.

Iranian officials say they have also stopped issuing visas to American and British journalists wanting to visit Iran. British forces are part of the US-led coalition in Iraq.

The two detained Iranians, director Saeed Abu Taleb and cameraman Soheil Karimi, were filming for the Iranian state television's second channel when they were arrested at Diwanieh in south-central Iraq.

Coalition officials say they are being held on suspicion of spying.

Until this week, the two men's families had virtually no news of them. After a month of silence, they received forms from the International Committee of the Red Cross with the rubber-stamped legend "Safe and Well" - but no further details.

Website

But Faranak Dalpay, Saeed Abu Taleb's wife, said that this week she received another letter with a four-line message from her husband. This followed a recent visit to the two men by Iranian consular officials who were allowed to see them in the Umm Qasr prison in southern Iraq.

"Just waiting, and having no news, is what's hard for the families - for me and the children," she said.

"The main problem is knowing nothing about how they are, or what they're being accused of doing. We just don't understand. We're waiting from minute to minute for the phone to ring, or to hear some news on the TV or radio."

Saeed Abu Taleb is a well-known documentary maker with a string of pioneering films to his credit.

He filmed, edited and scripted the first Iranian film on the marine life of the Persian Gulf.

His other works include dramatic documentaries on organ transplants, and the link between Aids and drug addiction in Iran. He is also the author of a chemistry textbook for schools.

Friends and family have set up a website to campaign for their release. Their case has been strongly taken up by Iranian officials.

'On-going investigations'

British diplomats have also been engaged in behind-the-scenes efforts to press their US allies to resolve the case one way or the other.

At one stage, it was wrongly but widely reported in Iran that the two men had been handed over to British forces in Iraq, bringing additional pressure on the UK embassy in Tehran.

Officials of the US-led coalition in Baghdad denied that the two Iranians had simply disappeared into a bureaucratic black hole or were being held out of political spite.

"In the case of these journalists, there are investigations still going on," coalition spokesman Charles Heatly said.

"We were certainly very concerned about their activities, and believe that they may have been involved in espionage activities at the time of their arrest. They are being held as security internees.

"When those investigations have been completed, then a decision will be made as to whether either to bring criminal proceedings, to take any further proceedings on security grounds, or to release them," he added.

Mr Abu Taleb and Mr Karimi are among 55 Iranians being detained by coalition forces.

Iran says most of them are would-be pilgrims trying to reach Shia holy sites in southern Iraq, arrested for crossing the border illegally.

Coalition officials say they are holding fewer than 5,000 prisoners in all categories, including prisoners or war, common criminals, and security internees like Mr Abu Taleb and Mr Karimi.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3227727.stm

22 posted on 10/30/2003 2:18:23 PM PST by DoctorZIn

German Mediator to Ask Iran over Ron Arad

October 30, 2003
The Jerusalem Post
JPOST.COM

German prisoner-exchange mediator Ernst Uhrlau will travel to Iran in an attempt to obtain information on missing IAF navigator Lt.-Col. Ron Arad.

Uhrlau is expected to meet with top Iranian officials over the question of Arad's whereabouts, Channel 10 reported Thursday night.

Arad bailed out of his plane over Lebanon in 1986 and was captured by Mustafa Dirani, then security chief of the Shi'ite militia Amal. Dirani reportedly 'sold' Arad to the Iranians.

Ernst Uhrlau is the coordinator of the German Federal Intelligence and the leading German mediator between Israel and Hizbullah.

A special committee set up last year to reassess and examine the situation regarding the fate of missing IAF navigator Lt.-Col. Ron Arad has concluded that he is still alive, noting that it has not received any evidence showing otherwise.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1067489841822&p=1008596981749

23 posted on 10/30/2003 2:19:29 PM PST by DoctorZIn

Shirin Ebadi and Iran's Women: in the Vanguard of Change

October 30, 2003
openDemocracy
Nazila Fathi

Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner, returned to Tehran on 13 October to a mixed reception that is itself a symbol of the country’s deep political divisions. Where ordinary people and activists greeted her with joy and pride, pro-regime hardliners unleashed an unprecedented wave of hostility against her.

A spontaneous gathering of 10,000 people assembled at Tehran’s airport to welcome Shirin Ebadi as she flew in. They made the occasion a pro-democracy demonstration and demanded the release of political prisoners and a referendum on the future state of the country.

One of them was Shadi Sadr, 30, a lawyer and advocate for women’s rights, who said that the prize would help younger women in their campaigning. “She has become a role model for young women. When young women see what a woman from a patriarchal society has achieved they feel more confident to continue their struggle.”

Indeed, although the winning of the peace prize has made Ebadi a symbol of democracy and national pride throughout many sectors of society, she is a particular inspiration for younger, educated women. More than 60% of students accepted to universities this year were women and they are striving for equal rights with men.

The crowd at the airport included several members of the majlis (parliament) who came to show their solidarity. “The prize has given Ebadi’s demands an international credibility now. We expect it to become difficult for the judiciary to confront her,” said Alireza Alavitabar, a professor of political science at Tehran University .

But the exuberant response at the airport was matched by the bitter denunciation of the award from partisans of the regime. One indication of their anger was that they forced university officials to cancel a ceremony in her honour scheduled to take place at Tehran’s Polytechnic University.

This was only the start. A militant newspaper, Ya-Lessarat, issued a covert death sentence against her; one member of the majlis compared her to Salman Rushdie, the British author of the book Satanic Verses, against whom Iran’s late religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini had proclaimed a fatwa in 1988; and a group of clerics from the religious city of Qom released a statement saying that the aim of Ebadi’s prize was to ridicule Islam.

“The Nobel institute has been after political gains … and has given the prize to a person who has tried to show the enlightening Islamic teachings as dark and has challenged the fundamentals of religion,” thundered an editorial in the Jomhuri-ye Islami.

A voice without fear

“This is really unusual and worrying,” Shirin Ebadi told me in her modest, book-lined office. Yet, since her return from Paris, where she heard the news of her prize while attending a conference on Iranian film, she has taken on several new cases to defend political activists and has vowed to continue her struggle for human rights. “This prize has put a heavy burden on my shoulders because I have to prove at least to myself that I deserved it,” she says. “So, I will not lessen my work but will increase it. I will never deprive myself of the honour of struggling for human rights.”

Before the 1979 revolution she had been one of the country’s first women judges, but the new Islamic Republic deemed women ‘too emotional’ for such work and demoted her to court assistant. Her campaign for human rights starts from this event.

She started her work with children. “Children are the most vulnerable group in society and their rights are widely violated. But they do not have anyone to defend them,” she says. She was the founder of the Association for Children’s Rights where she campaigned against child beating, child labour, and for government payment for the education of working children.

For twenty-five years, Ebadi has carried on her principled, professional work while refusing to become entangled in Iran’s political divisions. Now, at 56, she remains assertive, severe and fearless – probably the worst nightmare of Iran’s hardline clerics who have attempted relentlessly to confine women and limit their ability to play a full part in society.

Since her return with the prize, Ebadi has been giving constant interviews explaining how she will pursue her career. “Iran has signed major international human rights conventions and is obligated to change those (national) laws that are in contradiction to these conventions,” she says. “It is governments that always violate human rights and I will continue my fight until they respect them.”

Her bravery reminded me of December 1998. I was visiting her at her office in central Tehran and we had just heard that another dissident, Mohammad Pouyandeh, had disappeared – the fifth in ten days. The others had been found stabbed or strangled to death a few days after they were kidnapped. The last three had been members of the Writers’ Association, as was Shirin Ebadi. Her name had appeared on a blacklist that some newspapers claimed to be a death list.

She was indeed jailed in 2000 and kept in solitary confinement for three weeks for revealing a tape in which a former vigilante had confessed that members of his group had planned an assassination attempt against two reformist ministers. When asked now if she fears imprisonment, she replies: “fear is an instinct like hunger and we all know it. I have learned not to let fear prevent me from what I should do.”

Who are the hardliners?

Iran is in political limbo: conservative politicians who have opposed a more liberal society confront all those who have campaigned for human rights and democracy. Although recent elections have showed that the former enjoy less than 15% support from the people, they control most levers of power: the judiciary, army, and the ‘watchdog’ body known as the Guardian Council which has the right to veto laws it holds to be inconsistent with Islamic law or the constitution. As a result, reformist supporters of President Khatami, who came to office in 1997 with majority support, have proved incapable of advancing their reform agenda.

Many of these supporters and allies of the president have been jailed by the judiciary. The Guardian Council has prevented the majlis from approving bills that could permit more civil liberty. Some twenty journalists and many students are in jail today; more than 100 reformist newspapers have been shut down since 1998; paramilitary forces have suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations; dissident intellectuals have been murdered by a rogue group of intelligence ministry officials (Shirin Ebadi volunteered to represent the family of the first two victims, Parvaneh and Daryoush Forouhar).

These restrictions and oppressions affect everyone, but as a woman Shirin Ebadi represents a particular challenge to the hardline elements. They hold that women’s rights are incorporated by the tenets of religion, and they wish to maintain their authority in defining those rights.

Women’s status, freedom’s condition

After the 1979 revolution, Iran’s Islamic regime replaced the secular legal code with an Islamic one according to which women’s lives and their testimony are considered half of those of men’s. According to the law, women have no right to divorce but “a man can divorce his wife whenever he wishes.” After divorce, the son belongs to her mother until the age of 2 and the daughter until the age of 7. Segregation is enforced in public places and women are required to cover their hair and wear long shapeless coats.

Ebadi argues that Islam is a religion of peace and equality, and that inequality originates from culture not religion. Moreover, Islamic law should be interpreted according to modern needs; “I am against (patriarchal) culture, not Islam,” she says.

One of the most notorious cases Ebadi defended was that of Leila Fathi, an 11-year old rural girl who was raped by three men and then killed. The court ruled that since Leila’s life was worth half of the value of each man who had murdered her, her family – in so-called compensation for the death sentence imposed on them – actually had to pay blood money for the men.

To this day, the men have not been punished because Leila’s family has failed to raise the necessary amount even after they sold all their property. “Leila’s family lost their daughter. They are homeless now because they sold everything to seek justice. Doesn’t this money seem like a prize to the family of these men?” asks Ebadi. The law remains unchanged.

A spate of recent incidents shows how this injustice is felt at all levels of society. In July, a female photo-journalist, Zahra Kazemi, was suspiciously slain in custody; in August, a young woman received a death sentence for killing a man who had allegedly tried to rape her; four women were given suspended prison sentences merely for translating and writing secular articles about women’s rights. Reformist women in parliament suffered a major setback in August after the Guardian Council rejected a bill that would have allowed Iran to sign the United Nations Convention on Eliminating Discrimination against Women.

All this makes the Nobel Peace Prize even more significant. The lawyer Shadi Sadr sums up the feelings of many: “what is important is that this prize restores an identity and pride that has been taken away from women. The Nobel Peace Prize makes us feel vindicated after all our sufferings.”

http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/article-10-1557.jsp

24 posted on 10/30/2003 2:20:32 PM PST by DoctorZIn

Bush's Challenge: Balancing Israel vs. Iran on Nukes

October 30, 2003
MSNBC News
Michael Moran

With a deadline for Iran to open up its nuclear facilities looming Friday, the Bush administration faces a daunting challenge: ensuring that it does not sign on to any deal on Iran’s weapons that leaves Israel feeling it must act unilaterally to secure itself.

NUCLEAR POLITICS makes strange bedfellows.

Exhibit 1: China’s forceful intervention on behalf of the U.S. effort to reign in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, which Thursday won another round of multiparty talks from the reticent regime in Pyongyang.

Exhibit 2 may be even more shocking: the prospect of a nuclear Iran has caused some in Saudi Arabia’s senior military and security ranks to ruminate about the beneficial effects of an Israeli air strike on Iranian facilities.

Friday marks the official deadline for Iran to open its nuclear books, facilities and soul to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which already has started drafting a report on Iran’s compliance — or failure to comply — with the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Following a diplomatic intervention by three European Union nations (Germany, Britain and France), the Iranians began delivering documents and making promises about access to suspect sites to the IAEA, the U.N.’s nuclear regulatory organization. The IAEA report will be the center piece of the IAEA board meeting in Vienna on Nov. 20, and if Iran is deemed insufficiently cooperative, the consequences could be severe.

There is much speculation about why Iran would suddenly decide to come clean. European officials doubt that the threat of losing a lucrative free trade deal with the EU was enough to tip the scales. Indeed, according to a European parliament member who traveled to Tehran, “the main things they fear are a U.N. vote on economic sanctions, the possibility that Israel will bomb their facilities to smithereens if they don’t agree to tough inspections, and the long term threat that Saudi Arabia will feel threatened enough to go nuclear, too.”

NUCLEAR DOMINO EFFECT

For those who tend to see little difference between Muslim nations, it may come as a surprise that the Saudis would be seen as a potential enemy in Tehran. Their shared contempt for Israel, hatred of the deposed Saddam and mutual lip service to Palestinian rights have obscured their rivalry in Western eyes. But, particularly with Iraq prostrate and occupied, the fierce competition between Iran’s revolutionary brand of Shiite Islam (ala Hizballah) and Saudi Arabia’s radical Sunni Wahabbism (ala al-Qaida) has reemerged.

That alone would not be enough to prompt a nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf. Last month, however, The Guardian of London carried a report based on interviews with U.N. nuclear officials, saying that the prospect of both Israel and Iran armed with nuclear weapons had prompted a very high-level debate in Saudi Arabia about purchasing or developing a nuclear arsenal, or, more likely, signing a nuclear accord with Pakistan which would funnel Saudi money to its nuclear program in exchange for being included under Pakistan’s “nuclear umbrella.”

A Washington Times correspondent with good connections inside the Bush administration, Arnaud de Borchgrave, advanced the story further this week, suggesting the Saudis and Pakistanis have “an agreement in principle” on the funds-for-umbrella idea.

An Israeli nuclear expert, speaking to MSNBC.com on condition of anonymity, further asserted that Saudi commanders have debated the merits of sharing intelligence information on Iran’s program with the United States — all in the knowledge that it might make its way to Israeli air force targeters.

The State Department has no evidence to substantiate this, and both the Saudis and Pakistanis deny it. The Iranians, of course, deny that they have any nuclear facilities working on anything but a peaceful research program aimed at producing electricity — a position widely regarded as a lie by the world’s major powers.

http://www.msnbc.com/news/986987.asp

25 posted on 10/30/2003 2:22:07 PM PST by DoctorZIn

Al-Qaida Planned, Executed Baghdad Bombing

October 30, 2003
United Press International
Richard Sale

The United States has strong evidence that members of al- Qaida, assisted by Iranian hard-liners, was responsible for Monday's horrific series of suicide bombings in downtown Baghdad that killed about 40 people and wounded more than 200. Several serving and former U.S. intelligence officials say this is further evidence that terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden is poised to turn Iraq into a major theater of terrorist operations against the United States.

Within a 45-minute burst of coordinated savagery, four suicide bombers hit soft targets that included the headquarters of the International Red Cross and four Iraqi police stations at sites 10 miles apart, according to various U.S. officials interviewed by United Press International.

A fifth suicide bomber attempted to blow up a police station but was shot by an Iraqi policeman before he could detonate his vehicle, U.S. officials said.

"Do these latest attacks in Iraq remind you of anything?" said one former very senior CIA official. "Look at the Sept. 11 attacks -- in forty five minutes, the bombings of the World Trade Center and Pentagon brought the entire American continent to a standstill, the president stranded in the air on Air Force One, U.S. fighters aloft with orders to shoot down any commercial airliners that strayed from their paths, the vice president sheltering in a bomb-proof cave below the White House."

The naming by U.S. intelligence officials of al-Qaida and its sympathizers as the force behind Monday's bombings contradicted statements made Monday to another news agency by Pentagon officials who said they believed loyalists of ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein were responsible.

As UPI reported exclusively in August, members of al-Qaida along with Iraqi nationalists has joined former Baathists in a guerrilla war that was described by one administration official as "gaining in breath of personnel, sophistication of tactics, and supplies of weapons."

According to the most current CIA estimates, the core of al-Qaida/foreign fighters now totals between 1,000 and 3,000 operatives, according to another former senior CIA official.

The al-Qaida operatives come from Egypt, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and even Albania, U.S. intelligence officials said.

Many of them are coming over the border of Iran "in a flood," according to one administration analyst.

U.S. intelligence officials told UPI that the attacks were two to three months in the planning and displayed a high degree of coordination, a superb sense of targeting, and the ability to inflict mass casualties against U.S. allies at will.

One senior administration drew a dark picture and warned: "The White House had better begin to see these attacks for what they are -- extremely canny, shrewd, sophisticated, almost impossible to defend against. This is a sustained, calculated offensive being waged against us."

The attack on the International Red Cross was done by the same terrorists who on Aug. 19 bombed U.N. headquarters, causing many casualties, he said.

The Monday attacks involved advanced reconnaissance, planning, and organization of support infrastructure that probably involved Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish movement, based in the north of Iraq and supported by Iran, which has alleged ties to al-Qaida and which is now known to be in the Baghdad area, U.S. intelligence experts said.

"The problem is that al-Qaida members coming in from third countries are forging all sorts of tactical alliances with Baathists, Iraq nationalists and other groups," said former CIA counterterrorism chief, Vince Cannistraro.

One administration official said not only was Ansar al-Islam providing infrastructure support, but it was also helping to provide operational security for the attacks.

"The support system probably began running in the early spring or summer," he said.

One U.S. government analyst speculated there were probably two networks of terrorists involved using about a dozen operatives. One would have been made up of explosives experts, the other of the perpetrators. For security purposes, they would have had little contact with each other, he said.

The Defense Intelligence Agency officials said that military officials on the ground in Iraq had reports that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, working with explosives experts from Hizbollah, may have assisted al-Qaida.

Several CIA officials expressed skepticism at this saying that Hizbollah was not widely active in Iraq, but a DIA official disputed this saying: "There is a lot of indications of Iranian activity in Baghdad."

From assessing the damage, administration officials said that the bombs were expertly built. One U.S. official said: "It looks as though you had shaped charges mixed with incendiary and other accelerants that detonate right after the main blast to cause additional damage."

Another U.S. official said that the fuses of the bombs appeared to have been "very sophisticated." He added that the attack last weekend on the Al Rashid hotel displayed none of al-Qaida's characteristic expertise: "The attack on the Al-Rashid hotel was a plain old attack by former Baathist operatives with military training," he said.

Serving and former CIA officials warned that they have evidence that business contractors are slated to be the next targets of al-Qaida attacks. "The purpose of these attacks is to collapse the U.S.-led effort to rebuild Iraq.

Anyone -- Iraqis who are cooperating, businessmen -- they are all fair game."

A State Department official agreed: "Perhaps the greatest damage inflicted has been psychological. Our major goal has got to be to convince the Iraqi populace that we have the means to assure their protection and restore to them a normal, secure life. Attacks like Monday's undermine those claims, increase U.S. unpopularity and are sure to slow reconstruction."

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20031030-112603-2963r

26 posted on 10/30/2003 2:23:14 PM PST by DoctorZIn

To: Pan_Yans Wife; fat city; freedom44; Tamsey; Grampa Dave; PhiKapMom; McGavin999; Hinoki Cypress; ...

Al-Qaida Planned, Executed Baghdad Bombing

October 30, 2003
United Press International
Richard Sale

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1011133/posts?page=26#26

27 posted on 10/30/2003 2:23:54 PM PST by DoctorZIn

28 posted on 10/30/2003 2:38:46 PM PST by windchime

29 posted on 10/30/2003 2:45:12 PM PST by windchime

neoconservative hawks in Washington

How can we escape the quagmire without the matchless Theodoulou?

Let Iran "reform" away its islamofascist repression, cease its support of terrorism and provide real transparency on nuclear weapons.

We don't really need Ted Bundy's help at the rape crisis center, thank you very much.

30 posted on 10/30/2003 5:28:06 PM PST by PhilDragoo (Hitlery: das Butch von Buchenvald)

Had Clinton listened to Woolsey, 911 need never have happened.

Woolsey should replace Tenet now.

Woolsey's advice vis a vis constitutional monarchy is of interest--but how will it poll in Baghdad?

31 posted on 10/30/2003 5:47:07 PM PST by PhilDragoo (Hitlery: das Butch von Buchenvald)

Al-Qaida Planned, Executed Baghdad Bombing

Oh, but there's no al Qaeda/Iraq link--Jay Rockefeller told us.

32 posted on 10/30/2003 6:10:15 PM PST by PhilDragoo (Hitlery: das Butch von Buchenvald)

What's most important on the Iran issue that you all need to seriously be active about and informing others is the rift between White house and State Dept - and the fact that State is leaning towards EU policy of working out deals and negotiating with the regime - when in reality the US should be pushing for FREE REFERENDUM - A REMOVAL OF ALL POLTICAL PRISONERS - A DELIVERY OF ALL AL QUAEDA - A RELEASE OF BERKELEY PROFESSOR - and the STEPPING DOWN OF AN ILLEGITIMATE REGIME -

YOU MUST all work hard to inform others and lobby the State Dept not to make deals with the regime and do not give into Euro lobbying...

33 posted on 10/30/2003 7:45:03 PM PST by faludeh_shirazi

Friday October 31, 02:50 AM

"35 or 40" countries able to make nuclear weapons: IAEA chief

Up to 40 countries are believed to be capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons, underlining the need to reinforce and update the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei told a French newspaper.

The treaty, which came into force in 1970, has been overtaken by a world in which developing nuclear arms has become attractive not only to many countries, but also to "terrorist groups," ElBaradei told Friday's issue of Le Monde.

The number of countries believed to be able to create such weapons "is estimated at 35 or 40," he said.

"And under the current regime, there is nothing illicit for a non-nuclear state to conduct uranium-enriching activities ... or even to possess military-grade nuclear material," he said.

Should any one of them decide to break their commitment to the non-proliferation treaty, experts believe it "could produce a weapon in just a few months."

He added: "We are already on the verge of catastrophe with North Korea."

Elsewhere in the interview, ElBaradei said his agency was at work verifying Iran's nuclear programme, and said a report would be made at the next UN Security Council meeting.

To cope with the increasing risk of other countries developing nuclear arms, the agency head said a beefed-up version of the non-proliferation treaty was needed, beyond the tweaking that it went through in 1995 after the first Gulf War.

"We have to reach agreement on limiting the construction, in civilian programmes, of nuclear material for military ends by confining this to installations under multilateral control."

A "new safety system" that would treat the causes of international insecurity, not just their symptoms, also should be created that would not be based on "dissuasion, but on fairness and universality," he argued.

http://sg.search.news.yahoo.com/search/news_sg_pf?p=ukey%3A5759706

34 posted on 10/30/2003 8:45:05 PM PST by Pan_Yans Wife (You may forget the one with whom you have laughed, but never the one with whom you have wept.)

Bolton Says U.S. Is Actively Seeking to Curb Proliferation

October 30, 2003
U.S. Department of State
Washington File

"Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences," says John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

Addressing the Bruges Group in London October 30, Bolton said that "while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions, or other means."

"In situations where we cannot convince a state to stop proliferant behavior," he said, "we also have the option of interdicting shipments to ensure the technology does not fall into the wrong hands." He pointed to several U.S. initiatives to prevent proliferation, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the G-8 Global Partnership, the Dangerous Materials Initiative, and HEU [highly enriched uranium] Minimization.

The United States worked with 10 allies to develop the Proliferation Security Initiative, agreeing on a "Statement of Interdiction Principles." Today more than 50 countries have indicated that they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts, Bolton said. Additionally, PSI participants "have agreed on a series of 10 sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises to occur into 2004," he said. Already, participants have "trained for maritime interdiction operations in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific Ocean, two areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking," he added.

"Our long-term objective is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology," said Bolton. He described the G-8 Global Partnership Initiative, launched by G-8 leaders at the June, 2002, Kananaskis Summit, as an important nonproliferation achievement of the Bush administration. He also highlighted the Dangerous Materials Initiative, which was developed in response to President Bush's call at the U.N. General Assembly "to secure the most dangerous materials at their source." The United States is also working "to reduce to an absolute minimum international commerce in and unsecured storage of weapons-usable uranium throughout the world" through the HEU Minimization program, he said.

"Each of these initiatives moves us closer to a more secure world where we are able not only to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to â€˜roll back' and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states," said Bolton, who earlier noted that "Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya are aggressively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems."

In fact, "Iran is a crucial test for the international community and for the credibility and survival of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," observed Bolton. "While Iran has consistently denied any program to develop nuclear weapons, the large and still-growing number of contradictions, inconsistencies and prevarications in its shifting explanations to the IAEA demonstrate convincingly that Iran is actively concealing a weapons program," he said.

If Iran does not comply with its NPT obligations by satisfying the specific criteria laid out by the IAEA by October 31, Bolton said, "we expect the Security Council would then call on Iran to comply with IAEA demands and would use its authority to reinforce the IAEA's efforts."

Turning to North Korea, Bolton said that it also represents "a profound challenge to regional and even global stability, and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime." While the United States will continue to seek to bring about "the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs ... through diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework ... North Korea will not be given inducements to reverse actions it took in violation of its treaty commitments and other international obligations," he said.

Bolton also expressed U.S. concern over Syria's nuclear aspirations, stating that the United States will continue "to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability."

He also noted that the United States has observed Syria taking "a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces, such as allowing dual-use and military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war." Syria also permitted individuals to cross its border into Iraq "who sought to attack and kill our service members during the war," said Bolton. While Syria has curbed the flow of people and weapons into Iraq in recent weeks, "the infiltration of these fighters into Iraq continues to be a significant problem for us, and we call on Syria to stop such traffic from moving across its borders," he added.

Following is the text of Bolton's prepared remarks:

(begin text)

The New World After Iraq: The Continuing Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks to the Bruges Group
London, United Kingdom
October 30, 2003

It is a real pleasure to have the opportunity to address the Bruges Group to discuss the steps the Bush administration is taking to keep our country and our friends and allies safe from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Without question, today's greatest threat to international peace and stability comes from rogue states and terrorist groups that are unrestrained in their choice of weapon and undeterred by conventional means.

Until our Coalition took action last spring, the world faced a serious security threat with Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. Here was a dictator who, while defying 17 Security Council resolutions, had ambitions to reconstitute his weapons arsenal, had obstructed and deceived international inspectors for 12 years, had used weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against his own people, had twice invaded neighboring countries, and who had supported, and in some cases even harbored, terrorist groups. The interim report of the Iraq Survey Group shows that, as we suspected, Saddam never disarmed or disclosed as required. Dr. David Kay reports, for instance, that through interviews with Iraqi scientists and officials, the Group discovered "dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002."

Had we not eliminated Saddam's regime, he would have remained, as [National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice said earlier this month, "poised in the heart of the Middle East, sitting atop a potentially deadly arsenal of terrible weapons, threatening his neighbors and the world." Some analysts have said that not finding WMD in Iraq -- to date -- proves that Saddam was not an imminent threat, and that, therefore, our Coalition military action was not justified. These criticisms miss the mark that our concern was not the imminence of Saddam's threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable record, capabilities and intentions. President Bush specifically and unambiguously addressed this issue in his January, 2003, State of the Union message when he said: "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."

Given the right opportunity or incentive, Saddam could have easily transferred these weapons to terrorist groups or other non-state actors for their use against us, with potentially catastrophic results. For such terrorist groups, a weapon of mass destruction is increasingly a weapon of first, not last, resort, which they seek to acquire any way they can. State sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya, are aggressively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Here lies a dangerous confluence of nefarious motives, and we must prevent the one from abetting the other. As President Bush told the United Nations last month, "Outlaw regimes that possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons -- and the means to deliver them -- would be able to use blackmail and create chaos in entire regions. These weapons could be used by terrorists to bring sudden disaster and suffering on a scale we can scarcely imagine. The deadly combination of outlaw regimes and terror networks and weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away."

We acted in Iraq because we were not willing to trust our security, and the security of our friends and allies, to the supposed restraint and circumspection of a dictator committed to acquiring deadly weapons of mass destruction. Saddam's continued defiance of U.N. resolutions and continued interest in weapons of mass destruction justified Coalition action. The risks of continued inaction were simply too high. As the president said recently, "It's a new kind of war, and America is following a new strategy. We're not waiting for further attacks. We're striking our enemies before they can strike us again."

Saddam's removal from power has unquestionably improved the international security situation. We are working tirelessly with 30 other Coalition partners to allow the Iraqis themselves to build the institutions of liberty and representative government, a peaceful society that no longer diverts its resources away from its citizens and toward the pursuit of WMD. But we face significant challenges in other parts of the world from terrorist-sponsoring regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction in many forms. Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences. And while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions, or other means. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.

Iran

Let me turn to the problem of Iran. Although Iran has robust BW [biological warfare], CW [chemical warfare] and missile programs, tonight I will focus on their nuclear weapons program. Our strategy is to use bilateral and multilateral pressure to end that program, and to secure international consensus against Iran's pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. To date, two reports by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have established that Iran is in violation -- in multiple instances -- of its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Iran has consistently denied any program to develop nuclear weapons, the large and still-growing number of contradictions, inconsistencies and prevarications in its shifting explanations to the IAEA demonstrate convincingly that Iran is actively concealing a weapons program.

The United States believes that Iran's covert and costly effort to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program. Iran is trying to legitimize as "peaceful and transparent" its pursuit of nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities that would give it the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. This includes uranium mining and extraction, uranium conversion and enrichment, reactor fuel fabrication, heavy water production, and "management" of spent fuel -- a euphemism for reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium. Iran is also benefiting from international nuclear assistance for its reactor project, even while it uses such ostensibly legitimate programs to help conceal its clandestine nuclear work.

For many years, the United States has called for increased international scrutiny of Iran's nuclear program. The member states of the G-8, the European Union, the members of the nuclear supplier regimes, and other multilateral bodies have joined us in expressing the strongest concern over Iran's nuclear activities, and have called on Iran to cooperate more fully to answer all outstanding questions. The IAEA Board's September 12 resolution made these concerns clear, and required that Iran fully satisfy specific criteria by October 31 if it expects to avoid a formal finding of NPT noncompliance by the Board. It is a testimony to the effectiveness of concerted international pressure that Iran has recently been willing to promise to agree to the Additional Protocol, and has provided the IAEA with at least some additional information about its nuclear program, a positive but long-overdue step. It still remains to be seen whether these initiatives will amount to more than mere words, and even if Iran follows through with its promises, many further steps will still be required in order to prove beyond doubt that Iran is foreswearing the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

If Iran does not comply with its NPT obligations, the Board of Governors must do its duty and -- based on the facts already reported by the Director General, along with whatever else he reports next month and other information we now have -- find Iran not in compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. This would trigger a report by the IAEA to the [U.N.] Security Council. If that occurs, we expect the Security Council would then call on Iran to comply with IAEA demands and would use its authority to reinforce the IAEA's efforts.

Iran is a crucial test for the international community and for the credibility and survival of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we stand firm together on this crucial issue, I am confident that we can preserve the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and help bring Iran back into compliance.

North Korea

With regard to North Korea, President Bush's objective is quite clear: the United States seeks the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs. We seek to bring this about, as we have said repeatedly, through diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome. Other states may yet be involved as appropriate. The North Korean nuclear program is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the DPRK. It is a profound challenge to regional and even global stability, and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

By pursuing this course, the president is determined that blackmail and bad behavior on the part of North Korea will not be rewarded. North Korea will not be given inducements to reverse actions it took in violation of its treaty commitments and other international obligations.

During the August six-party talks in Beijing, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea emphasized that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons. North Korea further isolated itself by threatening provocative actions such as nuclear tests -- adding to threats it made in April that it might build more nuclear weapons and perhaps even transfer nuclear material or weapons to third parties.

In addition to seeking a solution through multilateral diplomacy, the United States, working with other countries, has taken steps to curtail dangerous and illicit North Korean activities such as drug smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade in WMD and missiles -- activities that finance Kim Jong-il's regime, including its nuclear activities.

We should not forget, however, that -- like Iran -- North Korea's violations of international norms are hardly restricted to its pursuit of nuclear weaponry. Although the DPRK has maintained its September, 1999, self-imposed, long-range missile flight test moratorium, it has remained active in the research, development, testing, deployment, and export of ballistic missiles and related materials, equipment, and technology. During a September, 2002, meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, DPRK President Kim Jong-il stated that North Korea would maintain its missile flight test moratorium through 2003. We are concerned, however, that North Korea may be trying to circumvent its promise by cooperating in testing and development with foreign missile programs.

North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), but nonetheless has probably continued a biological warfare capabilities effort that began in the 1960s. Pyongyang's resources include a rudimentary biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological agents, and may have biological weapons available for use.

We believe North Korea has had a long-standing chemical weapons program. North Korea's chemical weapons capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. We believe it possesses a sizeable stockpile of these agents and weapons, which it could employ should there be renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's international procurement actions continue. In May, 2003, for example, German authorities intercepted 30 metric tons of the Australia Group-controlled chemical weapons precursor, sodium cyanide, bound for North Korea. In August, 2003, Taiwan authorities off-loaded 158 barrels of the controlled chemical weapons precursor phosphorous pentasulfide, from the North Korean vessel Be Gae Hong. North Korea represents a dangerous mix of repressive dictatorship, pursuit of WMD capabilities, and longstanding ties to international terrorism.

Syria

As I have recently testified to Congress, we are concerned about Syria's nuclear research and development program and continue to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the IAEA Technical Cooperation program -- that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Syria is a party to the NPT, and has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but has not yet signed or, to our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT safeguards obligations.

Since the 1970s, Syria has pursued what is now one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX. Syria is fully committed to expanding and improving its CW program, which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries. It remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. As a result, Syria will need to continue foreign procurement activities in order to continue its CW program. We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability as well.

In addition, Syria's failure to secure its border with Iraq to guerrillas and terrorists poses a continuing threat to Coalition forces in Iraq. We have seen Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces, such as allowing dual-use and military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq, volunteers who sought to attack and kill our service members during the war. Although the situation on the Syrian border has improved somewhat in recent weeks, the infiltration of these fighters into Iraq continues to be a significant problem for us, and we call on Syria to stop such traffic from moving across its borders. As Secretary Powell said last month, "I made it clear to the Syrians that to have good relations with the United States and with a liberated Iraq, they should do everything they could to make sure that the wrong sorts of people are not crossing the border to cause trouble in Iraq." The message that the Bush administration and the Congress are sending is clear: Syria must immediately change course and change its behavior on all of these fronts, or face the consequences.

New Initiatives

To roll back the proliferation activities of the rogue states, and to ensure that any of their WMD progress is not passed on to terrorist groups, the United States is employing a variety of methods, including multilateral agreements, diplomacy, arms control, threat reduction assistance, export control aid, and other means where necessary. Most importantly, we and our partners in the international community must maintain an unvarnished assessment of the proliferators, and disrupt their supply of sensitive goods and technology before it contributes to an increased WMD capability or falls into the hands of terrorists.

In situations where we cannot convince a state to stop proliferant behavior, or where items are shipped despite our best efforts to control them, we also have the option of interdicting shipments to ensure the technology does not fall in to the wrong hands. These interdiction efforts are an important addition to our comprehensive strategy to prevent proliferation. Interdiction involves identifying an imminent shipment or transfer and working to stop it. As the president noted in his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.

Proliferation Security Initiative

One of our newest and most promising counterproliferation initiatives, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), was announced by President Bush on May 31. An essential component of U.S. counterproliferation strategy is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on land. In this context, the United States and 10 other close allies and friends -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK -- have worked to develop this new initiative. Our goal is to create a more dynamic, creative, and robust approach to preventing WMD, missiles, and related technologies flowing to and from countries of proliferation concern.

The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. On September 4, after just three months, agreement on and publication of the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" was achieved. The Statement of Interdiction Principles has been shared with countries around the world. The response to the PSI and the Principles has been very positive, with more than 50 countries already indicating they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts. We are moving to establish the practical basis for cooperating on interdictions with such countries.

PSI participants have agreed on a series of 10 sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises to occur into 2004. Australia organized and executed one such exercise last month in the Coral Sea that involved both military and law enforcement assets. Four PSI partners, including the United States, sent vessels to the exercise, and all PSI partners were involved in some capacity. On October 8-9, the United Kingdom hosted the first PSI air interdiction training exercise, designed to explore operational issues associated with the interception of proliferation-related trafficking in the air. And in mid-October, Spain hosted the second maritime interdiction training exercise, this one in the western Mediterranean Sea. This exercise involved concrete contributions from France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as observers from other PSI participant nations. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdiction operations in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific Ocean, two areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking. Additional training exercises will be held in the months to come, further improving our ability for interdictions.

As the PSI moves forward, we expect other countries will join in these training opportunities. President Bush has made clear that we hope to involve all countries that have a stake in nonproliferation and who have the will and ability to take necessary action to address this growing threat. Our long-term objective is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology. As the president said last month, "We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies."

It is important to note that our interdiction efforts in PSI are grounded in existing domestic and international authorities. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we can draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction; that is, the sum of our efforts may be more effective than taking action individually.

Properly planned and executed, the interception of critical technologies while en route can prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase their cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation.

G-8 Global Partnership

The G-8 Global Partnership Initiative, launched by G-8 Leaders at the June, 2002, Kananaskis Summit, is also an important nonproliferation achievement of this administration. The goal of the Global Partnership Initiative is to raise up to billion over 10 years for nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear safety cooperation projects to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

President Bush is committed to raising half of this total. Counting the U.S. contribution, the G-7 countries have pledged a little over billion to date, and Russia intends to spend about billion on its priority projects. We hope to see the remaining gap closed by the next G-8 Summit. The G-8 welcomed the participation of six additional countries -- Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland -- this past summer. The initial focus has been on projects in Russia, but we expect the Partnership to recognize additional states of the former Soviet Union as recipients in the coming year, beginning with Ukraine.

As we approach the U.S. G-8 Presidency beginning January 1, improved Russian cooperation regarding project implementation remains a challenge for the success of the Partnership. Securing Russian agreement to support effective verification measures and to provide adequate liability provisions, commensurate with those in the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement, is essential to moving forward on key nonproliferation projects. Taxation exemption and access to work sites are continuing concerns, as well as Russian delays in concluding implementing arrangements with other donor countries, impeding expenditure of their pledges.

Dangerous Materials Initiative

Yet another new initiative, the Dangerous Materials Initiative (DMI), responds to the president's call at the U.N. General Assembly last month to secure the most dangerous materials at their source. Through the DMI, the administration will work to identify gaps in the control of dangerous materials worldwide. DMI projects will help regulate, track, secure and safeguard biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological materials, as well as the know-how to make them into weapons of terror and war. To encourage international participation, we will share with our partners a menu of important projects in this area that they might support.

HEU Minimization

In the decades after World War II, large quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were exported to more than 50 countries, primarily by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Most of this material was used to fuel research reactors, and much of it still remains stored at or near these reactors under security arrangements that vary widely in quality. Since 1978, the United States has been engaged in an expanding effort to minimize international commerce in HEU, to reduce, and if possible eliminate, stockpiles of this weapons-usable material in foreign countries. Where this is not immediately feasible, it aims to improve physical protection at storage sites.

Our current efforts include a number of such programs, several of which involve close cooperation with Russia. These programs assist in the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium, and return U.S.-origin HEU from reactors in up to 41 counties for permanent disposition in the U.S. The Departments of State and Energy are fully cooperating to advance all of these programs. Our goal is to reduce to an absolute minimum international commerce in and unsecured storage of weapons-usable uranium throughout the world.

Conclusion

Each of these initiatives moves us closer to a more secure world where we are able not only to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to "roll back" and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist groups they sponsor do not acquire a shortcut to their deadly designs against us. As President Bush said this month, "After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. The danger hasn't passed.... America must not forget the lessons of September 11th." Indeed, that danger is present in a growing number of places, and we must be vigilant in recognizing -- and then confronting -- the emerging threats against our common security.

http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=October&x=20031030184556alretnuh0.3657495&t=usinfo/wf-latest.html

35 posted on 10/30/2003 8:55:54 PM PST by DoctorZIn

This thread is now closed.

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36 posted on 10/31/2003 12:16:46 AM PST by DoctorZIn

"If the United States wants better relations with Tehran, it could start by ending accusations Iran supports terrorism,..."

And if Iran wants better relations with the U.S., it should end its support of terrorism.

"Ramazanzadeh also said that Tehran would not share its intelligence on al-Qaeda with the United States. "
He added that Iran may "never" reveal the identities of its detainees, and he later clarified to AFP that "we have no programme to announcing their names"

Well, they can't make it any clearer than that. Is the State Dept listening? Your wasting your time talking to these mullahs. Next? Let's move things along. The 31st is here. TIME's UP.

37 posted on 10/31/2003 3:34:24 AM PST by nuconvert

Hey Everyone - private message me and let me know if there are other forums like free-republic also.. we need to increase the awareness to everyone of what is going on.. Any ideas?

best -
faludeh

38 posted on 10/31/2003 5:59:59 AM PST by faludeh_shirazi

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