Gore 1996 Airline Commission brought to the attention of the 9/11 family members (DC Chapter Report)

This morning before the start of the 9/11 Commission hearings, Kristinn went to the hearing room to meet with some of the 9/11 family members about the 1996 Gore Airline Safety Commission.

He went down there this morning because the 9/11 Commission had not talked about the Gore Airline Safety Commission in public, and it needed to be brought to the attention of the families.

He got down there about 8:30am. The hearing room only had a few dozen people in it, a far cry from the crowds that had been there last week for White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's testimony.

Kristinn spoke with Commission Chairman Thomas Kean as he entered the room surrounded by reporters. The reporters wanted to know when President Bush and Vice President Cheney would give their joint testimony before the Commission. Kean said that he could not tell them.

Kristinn asked Kean if the Commission had covered the 1996 Airline Safety Commission, chaired by Vice President Gore. Kean said that they had. He said that it had been brought up with Vice President Gore during his testimony and that it would be covered during the FAA hearings, later.

Kristinn gave a copy of a report on the Gore Commission, with two attachments, to Kean. The report was co-written several years ago by a DC Chapter member. Of the two attachments to the report, one was the decision by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, ordering the Gore Commission to allow Victoria Cummock access to Commission documents that they denied her when she served on the Commission. The second attachment was a World Net Daily article from October 2001 reporting that Mrs. Cummock was still being denied access to classified material, in violation of the court order.

Kristinn went to the front of the hearing room and met with three of the 9/11 families. They asked for copies of the documents Kristinn had, and they commented that 9/11 would probably have been prevented if the Gore Commission's recommendations had been acted on. They knew who Victoria Cummock was, but were not well-versed in the story of her travails in the Gore Commission.

One of the family members suggested that he also speak with the Family Liason with the Commission, Ellie Hartz. Kristinn went outside the hearing room and spoke with Ms. Hartz. She accepted a copy of the documents, and they talked for a few minutes.

Kristinn explained to Ms. Hartz that while the DC Chapter of Free Republic is a partisan group and has no love for Clinton or Gore, they are also a "let the chips fall where they may" group. He said that he understood, after eight years of trying to hold Clinton and Gore accountable, how difficult it is to get the government to open itself up to accountability to the public.

They also talked about how the 9/11 family members have been conducting themselves during the hearings. Ms. Hartz acknowledged that it was becoming a problem, but that the family members were very emotionally involved. Kristinn told her that the family members are losing support from the American public because of how they have been acting during the hearings and because of what they have been saying to the media in interviews. Kristinn was trying to be as diplomatic as possible while making the point.

Another family member came up and interrupted the conversation because the hearing was about to start. Kristinn had to head off to work so he started making his way out of the building.

But on his way out he saw Michael Isikoff and gave him a copy of the Gore Commission documents.

Here is the text of the report that Kristinn made copies of and handed out this morning...

The Gore Airline Commission

In July of 1996, in the wake of the crash of TWA flight 800, President Bill Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security by executive order 13015 to convene on August 22, 1996. He gave the commission 45 days to, “study matters involving aviation safety and security, including air traffic control and to develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security, both domestically and internationally,” then present their conclusions. He named Vice President Al Gore to head the commission. By special invitation of the President, Victoria Cummock was named to the commission. Ms. Cummock lost her husband in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, some eight years prior. According to Newsday, Ms. Cummock held the reputation at the time of being “the airlines’ most tenacious foe.”

Five years prior to September 11, 2001, Gore held a press conference to announce the commission’s preliminary report that promised, “to take the strongest measures possible to reduce the risk of terrorism and sabotage to airline passengers and crews.” Gore further stated that their upcoming proposed measures will, “be put into place quickly and effectively and will help ensure that airline travel remains as safe as possible for all travelers.” A solid and factual preliminary report backed up Gore’s comments.

Ten days later, just prior to the 1996 election, Gore penned a letter to airline lobbyist Carol Hallett, promising that the commission's findings would not cause the airlines any loss of revenue. The very next day the Democratic National Committee received a check in the amount of $40,000 from TWA. Over the next two weeks Northwest, United and American Airlines donated $55,000 more.

In the next two months the Democratic National Committee pocketed over $250,000 from American Airlines. United Airlines threw in an additional $100,000. Northwest Airlines added $53,000. That’s a grand total of over half a million dollars. According to the Washington Times, Whitehouse Spokesman, Ginny Terzano offered no denial when asked whether Al Gore solicited these airline donations personally.

Contributory advice and suggestions were being sought and incorporated into the draft(s) of the report by all sides of the aisle and divisions of government including intelligence agencies, transportation agencies and military personnel. The draft final form was presented to the 21 participating commissioners in January of 1997. According to the Washington Times, a significant number of security measures were removed from the proposed final draft of the report.

Victoria Cummock and CIA Director John Deutch were resolute in their opposition to the “softball” report. Gore was given no choice but to pull back the report. Reinstalled were sensible new procedures that would cost the airlines millions of dollars.

• Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans

• Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas

• Deploy existing technology

• Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs

• Complement technology with automated passenger profiling

• Certify screening companies and improve screener performance

• Aggressively test existing security systems

• Use the Customs Service to enhance security

• Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified information they need to know

• Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match

• Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to families of victims

• Improve passenger manifests

• Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence and crisis response

• Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training to countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the US

The security measures were in the final recommendation report. However, the implementation timetable was nowhere to be found.

In February of 1997, Victoria Cummock called the report “toothless.” She informed Gore that unless specific implementation dates were added in the report she would file a dissent, because the airline industry would not have to comply unless such measures were mandated.

On February 12, 1997, an open meeting was held on the commission’s final report. Gore made a point to inform Ms. Cummock that he would leave room for her dissent to the final report. NBC Dateline filmed Mr. Gore presenting the final report to President Clinton minutes later and pronouncing that the report had unanimous consent. But it didn’t.

Victoria Cummock filed suit claiming that Gore pressured her to abandon her call for counter-terrorist measures, the right to see commission files of which she was denied, and the right to file her 42-page dissent. It was her ambition to see the commission’s findings presented accurately within the final report.

Gore tried to paint Ms. Cummock, who had lost her husband in a terrorist act, as a disgruntled commissioner. In the long, drawn out and impeded discovery process, a memo was discovered from a CIA staffer who specialized in psychological profiling. According to The American Spectator, the memo stated that Cummock could be, "kept in line if she believes progress could be made" but "could become a major problem."

The Gore Commission’s final report was nothing more than playing politics for campaign contributions while intentionally ignoring obvious safety and security voids in an industry that had been a target of terrorists for over thirty years.

In mid-1999, Ms. Cummock won her case in the D.C. Court of Appeals.

Note: Kristinn added this one line to the report...

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, most if not all of the commission's recommendations were finally implemented.

Again, any typos are mine.

Now, I'm going to be late if I type any more. I really gotta go right now.

Cheers all!

Thanks. If I recall Mrs. Daschle actively lobbied against more stringent, aka expensive, security procedures, House members only, of course, not Senators.

The final report.

Gore Commission Final Report

Introduction

Americans fly more often, more efficiently, and more safely than any other people in the world. Each year, US airlines carry Americans on some 500 million trips -- 40 percent of the world's total. Fourteen of the world's twenty busiest airports are in America. Ninety eight percent of all passengers go through one of the nation's fifty busiest airports, with connection times commonly under 25 minutes.

There is absolutely no safer way to travel than on a US airline. In fact, people are far more likely to get hurt or killed driving to the airport than on the flight itself.

Nevertheless, terrorists are a real threat to American air travelers. Terrorists bombed Pan Am flight 103, killing 270 people. Terrorists plotted to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific ocean -- and killed one person in a test of their plan. In the past eight years, people took about six billion air trips world-wide; about 700 people died when bombs destroyed their airplanes.

The FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists. People and places in the USA have joined the list of targets, and Americans have joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples of the shift. The second change is that in addition to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is becoming more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc groups. Some terrorists are not afraid to die in carrying out their evil designs.

Although the threat of terrorism is increasing, the danger of an individual becoming a victim of a terrorist attack -- let alone an aircraft bombing -- will doubtless remain very, very small. But terrorism isn't merely a matter of statistics. We fear a plane crash far more than we fear something like a car accident. We may survive a car accident, but we don't have a chance in a plane at 30,000 feet. This fear is one of the reasons that terrorists see airplanes as attractive targets. And, they know that airlines are often seen as national symbols.

So when terrorists attack an American airliner, they are attacking the United States. They have so little respect for our values -- so little regard for human life or the principles of justice that are the foundation of our society -- that they would destroy innocent children and devoted mothers and fathers completely at random. We cannot and will not tolerate this, or allow it to intimidate us. We must act.

Much has been done before to bolster the security of airline travel. Clearly these measures have prevented many attackers from carrying out their cowardly deeds. But, we cannot allow that record to lull us into complacency. As the terrorist threat changes, so, too, must our deterrence and our defenses.

On July 25, 1996, President Clinton promised the American people that "we will require pre-flight inspections for any plane flying to or from the United States -- every plane, every cabin, every cargo hold, every time." The next day, the FAA issued the directives to make this happen, and today the FAA and the airlines are doing it.

But we cannot stop there. This initial report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommends twenty specific actions that provide near-term improvements in aviation security. In the months ahead, the Commission will be working to develop additional recommendations to enhance security and safety, and on ways to modernize air traffic control.

The Commission recommends a budget amendment for fiscal year 1997 in the amount of $429.4 million to implement these recommendations.

Today's Aviation Security System

Today's aviation security is based in part on the defenses we erected in the 1970s against hijackers. It is also based on recommendations made by the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was formed in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Implementation of changes in our security system has been complicated by a relationship in which government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, technology, and potential impacts on operations and passengers. The Pan Am 103 Commission made 60 detailed recommendations directed at solving the very problems that persist today. For example, a recommendation to conduct criminal background investigations on all airline employees became mired in dispute, and Congress eventually intervened. The resulting regulation fell short of the original intent.

This Commission seeks to avoid the frustrations of the past, and believes that a key to success will be a fundamental change in the way government and the private sector carry out their responsibilities -- to replace confrontation with cooperation.

A New Government - Industry Partnership

As noted earlier, the FAA, airlines, and others have teamed to produce the safest aviation system in the world. But the changing threats to our security mandate changes in the way we mobilize to defeat them.

Government has faced similar challenges. In crucial areas such as fighting the flow of drugs in the United States, keeping toxins out of the air we breathe, getting important new cancer fighting therapies onto the market more quickly, and improving worker safety, government agencies have found new, more effective ways of achieving goals -- through partnership with industries they once saw as adversaries.

Regulatory partnership doesn't mean that government abandons its responsibility to protect the people and the public interest. On the contrary, government must keep all of its authority, ability, and resolve to enforce rules whenever needed. Those who don't play by the rules feel the full force of a government committed to fulfilling its responsibilities. The key to these partnerships is that they focus energy and resources on solving problems, not stopping progress.

Americans should not have to choose between enhanced security and efficient and affordable air travel. Both goals are achievable if the federal government, airlines, airports, local law enforcement agencies, and passengers work together to achieve them. Accordingly, the Commission recommends a new partnership that will marshal resources more effectively, and focus all parties on achieving the ultimate goal: enhancing the security of air travel for Americans.

Recommendations

1. Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement enhancements to aviation safety and security. The Commission is convinced that safety, security, efficiency, and affordability can go hand in hand if all parties work as partners. The FAA should direct its officials responsible for oversight of security procedures at the nation's 450 commercial airports to convene relevant aviation and law enforcement entities for the purpose of implementing the Commission's recommendations and further improving aviation safety and security.

At each airport, these partners will: (1) immediately conduct a vulnerability assessment; and (2) based on that assessment, develop an action plan that includes the deployment of new technology and processes to enhance aviation safety and security.

The FAA will approve these action plans on an expedited basis; procure and allocate, based on availability, new equipment; and test airports to ensure that the plans are being implemented properly.

2. Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans. Using models already developed by Sandia National Laboratory, periodic vulnerability assessments of the nation's commercial airports should be conducted. Based on the results, action plans tailored to each airport will be developed for expedited approval by the FAA.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $5.5 million

3. Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas. Currently, employees, including those with unescorted access to secure areas of airports, are not subject to such review. Given the risks associated with the potential introduction of explosives into these areas, the Commission recommends that screeners and employees with access to secure areas be subject to criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks.

4. Deploy existing technology. The Commission has reviewed numerous machines designed to detect explosives in cargo, checked baggage, carry-on bags, and on passengers. There is no silver bullet. No single machine offers a solution to the challenges we face. Each machine has its own advantages and its own limitations. Even machines that work fairly well in the laboratory need to be tested in actual use at busy airports. We recognize that the FAA has certified only one technology for baggage screening, but we believe we must get a variety of machines, including some in use in other countries, into the field. There day-to-day operators can figure out which equipment works best in what situations and combinations, and what features need to be improved. Finding the strengths and weakness of existing technology will spur industry's creativity, leading to the invention of better and better instruments. Ultimately, the goal should be to deploy equipment that can be certified by the FAA to detect explosives likely to be used by terrorists.

The Commission recommends the government purchase significant numbers of computed tomography detection systems, upgraded x-rays, and other innovative systems. By deploying equipment widely, passengers throughout the aviation system will receive the benefits of the enhancements. The Commission strongly believes it would be improper to discuss the details of such deployment, as to do so would serve only to compromise the integrity of an enhanced security system.

The Commission recommends that this initial equipment purchase be paid for with appropriated funds. This recommendation does not settle the issue of how security costs will be financed in the long run. That will be dealt with in our final report.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $161.3 million

5. Establish a joint government-industry research and development program. The Commission recommends the establishment of a new joint government - industry partnership whose mission will be to accelerate research and development to enhance the security of air travel.

This could be modeled on the Partnership For A New Generation Vehicle (PNGV), in which the federal government and auto makers are combining resources to develop automobiles with significantly enhanced fuel economy, safety, and reduced emissions. We propose to increase federal funding and to ask the private sector to contribute.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $20 million

6. Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs. Canines are used to detect explosives in many important areas, but only sparingly in airport security. The Commission is convinced that an increase in the number of well-trained dogs and handlers can make a significant and rapid improvement in security, and recommends the deployment of 114 additional teams.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $8.9 million

7. Assess the viability of anti-missile defense systems.. Whether or not the explosion of TWA 800 turns out to have been due to a surface-to-air missile attack, as some eye-witness accounts suggest, missile attacks have downed passenger planes in other countries, and it is a risk that should be evaluated. The Commission will continue to analyze this problem in cooperation with the Department of Defense and other government agencies.

8. Complement technology with automated passenger profiling. Profiling can leverage an investment in technology and trained people. Based on information that is already in computer databases, passengers could be separated into a very large majority who present little or no risk, and a small minority who merit additional attention.

Such systems are employed successfully by other agencies, including the Customs Service. By utilizing this process Customs is better able to focus its resources and attention. As a result, many legitimate travelers never see a customs agent anymore -- and drug busts are way up.

The FAA and Northwest Airlines are developing an automated profiling system tailored to aviation security, and the Commission supports the continued development and implementation of such a system.

To improve and promote passenger profiling, the Commission recommends three steps. First, FBI, CIA, and BATF should evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijackers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible profiling system. They should keep in mind that such a profile would be most useful to the airlines if it could be matched against automated passenger information which the airlines maintain.

Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow important intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its sources. Similar systems have been developed to give environmental scientists access to sensitive data collected by satellites.

Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on civil liberties questions that arise from the development and use of profiling systems.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $10 million

9. Certify screening companies and improve screener performance. Better selection, training, and testing of the people who work at airport x-ray machines would result in a significant boost in security. The Commission recommends development of uniform performance standards for the selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and their employees. The Commission further recommends that in developing these standards, the FAA give serious consideration to implementing the National Research Council recommendations. The Commission also recommends the purchase and deployment of SPEARS, a computerized training and testing system.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $5.3 million

10. Aggressively test existing security systems. "Red team" (adversary) type testing should also be increased by the FAA, and incorporated as a regular part of airport security action plans. Frequent, sophisticated attempts by these red teams to find ways to dodge security measures are an important part of finding weaknesses in the system and anticipating what sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt. An aggressive red team strategy will require significant increases in the number of FAA personnel currently assigned to these tasks.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $18 million

11. Use the Customs Service to enhance security. The Customs Service has many responsibilities that are parallel to the FAA's in dealing with airlines and contraband. As a law enforcement agency, Customs has authorities and tools not available to the FAA. Further, it has developed successful partnership programs with the airlines. By using the Customs Service to complement the FAA, FBI, and other agencies, the Commission believes that aviation security would be significantly enhanced.

The Customs Service has thousands of agents currently stationed at US international airports. Customs has statutory authority to search people and cargo to stop contraband from coming in or going out of the country. Customs has arrangements with most airlines to receive automated passenger and cargo manifests. These arrangements could be adapted for use in security procedures. Customs, as a law enforcement agency, has access to automated law enforcement databases that could be an invaluable tool in fighting not just drugs but terrorism. The Commission recommends that Customs upgrade and adapt its computer systems to take on this additional responsibility.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $26.6 million.

12. Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified information they need to know. The red tape of classification is getting in the way of security. There are two problems that must be solved. The first involves intelligence information about specific terrorist threats. The CIA or FBI pass the threat information to the FAA, which in turn alerts the airlines. But the information gets progressively "sanitized" to avoid jeopardizing the source. Often, airlines are just told what to do but not why they are to do it. If airlines were provided more information about the threat, they could help design more effective responses.

Corporate personnel are often cleared to know the most secret information when national security is at stake. Defense contractors with access to highly classified intelligence information are far from rare. For that matter, airline personnel were cleared to know highly classified information during Operation Desert Storm, when commercial aircraft transported 80% of our troops to Saudi Arabia.

The other classified information problem involves the airport vulnerability assessments in recommendation number 2. These assessments become classified information if they conclude that a high degree of vulnerability exists. Some people responsible for security at the airports are not cleared to receive classified information.

The Commission recommends that the FAA arrange for appropriate airline and airport security personnel to be cleared to address this problem.

13. Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match. Matching bags to passengers ensures that the baggage of anyone who does not board the plane is removed. Full bag match ensures that no unaccompanied bag remains on board a flight.

Manual and automated systems to conduct full bag match have been employed in international aviation for several years, but need additional work to ensure they can be phased into domestic airline operations. The Commission recommends implementing full bag match at selected airports, including at least one hub, within sixty days to determine the best means of implementing the process system-wide.

14. Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to families of victims. The tragedy of losing a loved one in an aviation disaster can be unnecessarily and cruelly compounded by disjointed or incomplete information in the aftermath of the incident. At the Commission's urging, the President is directing the National Transportation Safety Board to take the lead in coordinating provision of services to families of victims. The NTSB will work with the Departments of State, Defense, Transportation, Health and Human Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and private organizations like the Red Cross.

15. Improve passenger manifests. The Commission believes that Section 203 of the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, which requires airlines to keep a comprehensive passenger manifest for international flights, should be implemented as quickly as possible. While Section 203 does not apply to domestic flights, the Commission urges the Department of Transportation to explore immediately the costs and effects of a similar requirement on the domestic aviation system.

16. Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to crisis response. The Commission recognizes the vital role that the FBI plays in fighting terrorism against Americans, and recommends that the agency's ability to assess vulnerabilities, gather and analyze intelligence, and conduct forensic investigations be augmented.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $146.6 million

17. Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training to countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the US. The Commission believes that it is important to raise the level of security at all airports serving Americans. Assisting foreign countries through training in explosive detection, post-blast investigation, VIP protection, hostage negotiation, and incident management is an important means of achieving this goal.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $2 million

18. Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and require their use. The use of taggants can be a critical aid when investigating explosions on aircraft and in bringing terrorists to justice. The Commission recommends that remaining issues relating to the use of these taggants, including the analysis of black and smokeless powder, be resolved as quickly as possible, and that requirements for the use of taggants then be put into place. Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $21.3 million

19. Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection training programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel. The Commission believes that law enforcement agencies with expertise in explosives detection can provide valuable training to those involved in aviation security.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $1.8 million

20. Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide information on explosives crime. The Commission recommends that a central clearinghouse be established to compile and distribute important information relating to previously encountered explosive devices, both foreign and domestic.

Recommended FY 97 amended budget request: $2.1 million

CONCLUSION

On July 25, 1996, President Clinton directed Vice President Gore to establish the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. The President asked for a report in 45 days on how to deploy the latest technology to detect the most sophisticated explosives. This report meets that request. It goes further to recommend non-technology improvements, primarily the shift from an adversarial relationship between government and industry to a new consortium, a partnership that will be the framework for our future recommendations.

The future agenda of the Commission will include the long-term financing of security equipment and operations, and a thorough investigation of issues involving safety and air traffic control. We propose to hold an international conference to help us investigate the important and complex challenges we face in each of the three areas we are charged to examine.

Among the issues that will be considered are:

· the deployment of advanced voice and data recorders
· the impact of new technologies such as global positioning systems on air traffic control
· synthetic vision and advanced sensors
· accelerating the development of terrain avoidance warning systems based on digital mapping
· the use of new composite materials in making aircraft both stronger and cheaper to maintain
· aging aircraft safety
· new ways to detect and defend against exotic new threats terrorists may employ, like chemical and biological agents
· human factors, and
· changing economic pressures and influences in the airline industry

In all our endeavors, we will seek non-intrusive ways to assure Americans that air travel is safe and secure so that our traditional regard for individual liberty and privacy is also assured.

Earlier in this report, we stated that we seek to avoid the frustrations of the past with regard to improving aviation security. Toward that end, these initial recommendations are focused on steps that can be taken immediately and that will enhance the security of travelers right away. Many of the recommendations do not require legislation; they can be implemented through administrative action. Some steps require Congressional action. We urge the President to submit any legislation necessary to implement these recommendations, and we urge Congress to enact required changes promptly.

The Commission will issue its final report by February 1, 1997.

THE WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY

Chairman: Vice President Al Gore
Lt General (Ret.) James A. Abrahamson
Jesse Lee (Jack) Beauchamp
Antonia Handler Chayes
William Coleman Jr.
Victoria Cummock
John Deutch
Kathleen Flynn
Louis Freeh
Jim Hall
Brian Michael Jenkins
Ray Kelly
Jack Lew
General (Ret.) Mike Loh
Bradford W. Parkinson
Federico Peña
Laura D'Andrea Tyson
Carl W. Vogt
George H. Williams

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.