Eulogy for President Reagan (touching reading)

We have lost a great president, a great American, and a great man, and I have lost a dear friend.

In his lifetime, Ronald Reagan was such a cheerful and invigorating presence that it was easy to forget what daunting historic tasks he set himself. He sought to mend AmericaÍs wounded spirit, to restore the strength of the free world, and to free the slaves of communism. These were causes hard to accomplish and heavy with risk, yet they were pursued with almost a lightness of spirit, for Ronald Reagan also embodied another great cause, what Arnold Bennett once called "the great cause of cheering us all up". His policies had a freshness and optimism that won converts from every class and every nation, and ultimately, from the very heart of the "evil empire."

Yet his humour often had a purpose beyond humour. In the terrible hours after the attempt on his life, his easy jokes gave reassurance to an anxious world. They were evidence that in the aftermath of terror and in the midst of hysteria one great heart at least remained sane and jocular. They were truly grace under pressure. And perhaps they signified grace of a deeper kind. Ronnie himself certainly believed that he had been given back his life for a purpose. As he told a priest after his recovery, "Whatever time IÍve got left now belongs to the big fella upstairs." And surely, it is hard to deny that Ronald ReaganÍs life was providential when we look at what he achieved in the eight years that followed.

Others prophesied the decline of the West. He inspired America and its allies with renewed faith in their mission of freedom.

Others saw only limits to growth. He transformed a stagnant economy into an engine of opportunity.

Others hoped, at best, for an uneasy cohabitation with the Soviet Union. He won the Cold War, not only without firing a shot, but also by inviting enemies out of their fortress and turning them into friends.

I cannot imagine how any diplomat or any dramatist could improve on his words to Mikhail Gorbachev at the Geneva summit. "Let me tell you why it is we distrust you." Those words are candid and tough, and they cannot have been easy to hear. But they are also a clear invitation to a new beginning and a new relationship that would be rooted in trust.

We live today in the world that Ronald Reagan began to reshape with those words. It is a very different world, with different challenges and new dangers. All in all, however, it is one of greater freedom and prosperity, one more hopeful than the world he inherited on becoming president.

As Prime Minister, I worked closely with Ronald Reagan for eight of the most important years of all our lives. We talked regularly, both before and after his presidency, and IÍve had time and cause to reflect on what made him a great president.

Ronald Reagan knew his own mind. He had firm principles and, I believe, right ones. He expounded them clearly. He acted upon them decisively. When the world threw problems at the White House, he was not baffled or disorientated or overwhelmed.

When his aides were preparing option papers for his decision, they were able to cut out entire rafts of proposals that they knew the old man would never wear. When his allies came under Soviet or domestic pressure, they could look confidently to Washington for firm leadership, and when his enemies tested American resolve, they soon discovered that his resolve was firm and unyielding.

Yet his ideas, so clear, were never simplistic. He saw the many sides of truth. Yes, he warned that the Soviet Union had an insatiable drive for military power and territorial expansion, but he also sensed that it was being eaten away by systemic failures impossible to reform. Yes, he did not shrink from denouncing MoscowÍs evil empire, but he realized that a man of good will might nonetheless emerge from within its dark corridors.

So the president resisted Soviet expansion and pressed down on Soviet weakness at every point until the day came when communism began to collapse beneath the combined weight of those pressures and its own failures. And when a man of good will did emerge from the ruins, President Reagan stepped forward to shake his hand and to offer sincere cooperation.

Nothing was more typical of Ronald Reagan than that large-hearted magnanimity, and nothing was more American.

Therein lies perhaps the final explanation of his achievements. Ronald Reagan carried the American people with him in his great endeavours because there was perfect sympathy between them. He and they loved America and what it stands for: freedom and opportunity for ordinary people.

As an actor in HollywoodÍs golden age, he helped to make the American dream live for millions all over the globe. His own life was a fulfilment of that dream. He never succumbed to the embarrassment some people feel about an honest expression of love of country. He was able to say "God bless America" with equal fervour in public and in private. And so he was able to call confidently upon his fellow countrymen to make sacrifices for America and to make sacrifices for those who look to America for hope and rescue.

With the lever of American patriotism, he lifted up the world. And so today, the world - in Prague, in Budapest, in Warsaw and Sofia, in Bucharest, in Kiev, and in Moscow itself, the world mourns the passing of the great liberator and echoes his prayer: God bless America.

Ronald ReaganÍs life was rich not only in public achievement, but also in private happiness. Indeed, his public achievements were rooted in his private happiness.

The great turning point of his life was his meeting and marriage with Nancy. On that, we have the plain testimony of a loving and grateful husband. "Nancy came along and saved my soul."

We share her grief today, but we also share her pride and the grief and pride of RonnieÍs children. For the final years of his life, RonnieÍs mind was clouded by illness. That cloud has now lifted. He is himself again, more himself than at any time on this Earth, for we may be sure that the Big Fellow upstairs never forgets those who remember him. And as the last journey of this faithful pilgrim took him beyond the sunset, and as heavenÍs morning broke, I like to think, in the words of Bunyan, that "all the trumpets sounded on the other side."

We here still move in twilight, but we have one beacon to guide us that Ronald Reagan never had. We have his example. Let us give thanks today for a life that achieved so much for all of GodÍs children.

1984 Dec 22 Sa

Archive (Reagan Library)
Cold War: Thatcher-Reagan meeting at Camp David (record of conversation) [declassified 2000]

Date:

1984 Dec 22 Sa

Document type:

Thatcher record

Document kind:

Transcript

Author:

Archive (Reagan Library)

Venue:

Camp David, Maryland

Source:

Reagan Library: European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records (File Folder: Thatcher Visit - Dec 1984 [1] Box 90902)

Journalist:

Editorial comments:

Each paragraph carries its own classification mark; all have been cancelled in the original document.

Importance ranking:

key

Word count:

6600 words

Themes:

Foreign policy (USA), Foreign policy (USSR and successor states), Defence (arms control), Defence (general), Conservatism, Industry, Privatised and state industries, Trade, Foreign policy (Middle East), Economy (general discussions), European Union (general), Labour Party and Socialism, Foreign policy (Middle East), Terrorism, Defence (arms control), Defence (general), Foreign policy (Americas excluding USA), Defence (general), Northern Ireland

Declassified NLS F97-013 #16
By SMF, NARA, Date 5/7/00

Secret

December 28, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President [ Ronald Reagan ]
The Vice President [ George Bush ]
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Assistant Secretary Burt
Peter R. Sommer , NSC

Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Wright
Robin Butler , Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
Charles Powell , Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

December 22, 1984, Camp David
10.40am – 11.10am, Private Meeting, Aspen Lodge
11.20am – 1.25pm, Expanded Meeting and Lunch, Laurel Lodge

Private Meeting: The President and Mrs. Thatcher, Plus Notetakers:

After exchanging pleasantries, Mrs. Thatcher praised the President’s reelection, calling it a fantastic victory. She asked him how it felt to win by such an overwhelming margin. The President said it was an honor to win by such a margin and joked that someone had said there is only one thing he could ask for from Santa Claus – it was Minnesota, the only state he had lost. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the President’s victory was even more impressive given that he had so significantly changed U.S. policies. Such a wide victory was an endorsement of the President’s policies and a clear call for a continuation of these policies. She was pleased the President was keeping his same foreign policy, noting it made no sense to break-up a good team. [sic] The President agreed and observed that many serve at considerable personal and financial sacrifice. (U)

Note at foot of page 1:

[page 2 begins]

Turning to Gorbachev ’s visit to the UK, Mrs. Thatcher said he was an unusual Russian in that he was much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate, and did not stick to prepared notes. His wife [ Raisa Gorbachev ] was equally charming. The Prime Minister noted that she often says to herself the more charming the adversary, the more dangerous. Over the private lunch at Chequers, she had raised a number of pointed questions. She asked Gorbachev why the Soviet Union denies its people the right to emigrate. She had underlined that the West simply cannot understand or accept the Soviet policy of refusing people the right to leave. She contrasted the Soviet policy with the situation in the West, where many countries have had to stop people from coming in. Gorbachev replied that 89 percent of those who applied for permits to leave received them. Noting that she had no way to cross-check Gorbachev’s statistics, she told the President that Gorbachev’s claim clearly conflicted with information she receives from British Jewish groups. She commented that she had further suggested to Gorbachev that it was a sign of weakness to feel the need to keep one’s people in. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher contrasted Gorbachev with Gromyko , whom she observed would have sharply replied that emigration was an internal matter and not open for discussion. Gorbachev was not willing to debate the point, but he did allow her to discuss it without cutting her off. He also avoided the usual Soviet reaction of citing lengthy position of principle. The Prime Minister said she also questioned Gorbachev about the Soviets providing financial assistance to Britain’s striking miners. Gorbachev replied “this has nothing to do with us”. Mrs. Thatcher, however, replied that in a centrally controlled system like the Soviet Union there is no way funds could pass to British trade unions without government knowledge. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then expanded on what she called the government’s total control of the Soviet economy. She had the impression that Gorbachev, like Andropov , was an advocate of economic reform and was willing to slacken government control over the Soviet economy. Gorbachev was clearly worried, said the Prime Minister, about the Soviet Union’s poor economic performance. She had made a point to contrast Soviet control over its economy with the free societies in the West, where a number of governments have recently been elected because of their promise to restrict government interference in domestic economic affairs. Despite Gorbachev’s professions about lessening government control, in reply to her question about how does a Russian factory decide how much to produce, he said, “we tell them”. (C)

Indicating she wished to reiterate what she had told the Vice President over breakfast, Mrs. Thatcher underlined that she had told Gorbachev there is no point in trying to divide Britain from the United States. This ploy will never succeed. [page 3 begins] Britain is part of the Western Alliance of free nations and the Soviets should drop any illusions about severing Europe or Great Britain from the United States. She also told Gorbachev that she and the President have known each other since long before they assumed their current positions and dividing Europe from America is simply “not on”. (C)

Gorbachev had made a special effort, said the Prime Minister, to cite Chernenko ’s name as a source of authority for his remarks. She then turned to what she had told Gorbachev about the Geneva talks. She emphasized that the Soviet Union and the West had entirely different ways of life and government. You don't like ours, we don't like yours. But it is in our common interest – indeed it is our duty – to avoid a conflict. We in the West, including the United States, accept that there can only be real security through military balance. She had underscored to Gorbachev that the Soviets must rid themselves of the belief that the U.S. is not sincere about disarmament. Gorbachev had replied that even public documents now show that the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in the 1950’s. Mrs. Thatcher said she had replied, “of course the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union – who was preaching a political creed of world communism – what else did they expect?” And she had asked Gorbachev rhetorically if it wasn't true that the Soviets targeted the U.S. during the same period and continued to do so now. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then contrasted the Soviet Union with the U.S. which had not used its great nuclear monopoly in the immediate post-war years to seek expansion. The U.S. is a former colony and knows what it is to be dominated by others. There is no other example in history of a great power using its military strength so sparingly to advance political goals. She had also emphasized to Gorbachev that the President is an honorable man who sincerely wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union. She was struck that when she mentioned that the President had sent a personal handwritten letter to Brezhnev shortly after assuming office, Gorbachev did not appear familiar with it. She made a point of telling Gorbachev that the President had put his heart and soul into his letter and after months of silence received only a pro forma typed reply. Again, Gorbachev did not react. (C)

The President said he was pleased that, without exchanging a word in advance, Mrs. Thatcher had taken the same line with Gorbachev as he had followed in his September meeting with Gromyko. He had spoken about the communist desire to dominate the world. In reply, Gromyko suggested that the Soviets had acted with constraint since they could have, but did not send a mass of men into Western Europe after World War II. The President noted that in reply he had referred to Stalin ’s remarks that there would have been no victory without the U.S. The President also referred Gromyko to quotations from Lenin and Stalin about world domination by communism. This time, Gromyko did not reply but quickly changed the subject. (C) [page 4 begins]

Turning to the Geneva talks, the President said since the Soviets had fared so poorly in recent months in the propaganda battles associated with disamament talks, he feared that they were looking at Geneva as mainly a propaganda forum. This is one of the reasons they launched such an attack against what has become commonly known as “Star Wars”. He emphasised that Star Wars was not his term and was clearly not what he had in mind. He continued that there has never been a weapon for which another weapon against it had not been developed. Therefore, in view of all the advances in technology, he asked for a study of new defensive systems. Its aim would strictly be to strengthen deterrence. So far, initial research has been promising and, as he had stated many times, if it proves successful he would be willing to put this new technology into international hands. The President said we are not violating the ABM treaty and have no intention of doing so. The new Strategic Defense Initiative also has a moral context. We must search for ways to build a more stable peace. Our goal is to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Chernenko now claims that this is also a Soviet goal. We have told them if they are really serious about reductions, we are ready. Gromyko had told him, said the President, that we cannot continue to sit on two mountains of weapons. The President said he replied, “let us then begin to lower and eventually eliminate these mountains”. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Gorbachev had implied returning to Geneva was not an easy decision for the Soviets. He also indicated the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals. The President replied, “we hope so”. She continued that she had emphasised to Gorbachev that Britain supports the U.S. SDI program and told him that it was not linked to a first strike strategy. (C)

The President continued that he was simply amazed how closely Mrs. Thatcher’s remarks to Gorbachev had accorded with what he told Gromyko. He had made similar points, said the President, on immigration restrictions, underscoring that these restrictions make it especially difficult for the U.S. – with its many political groups with ties to the old country – to improve relations with the Soviets. He had made it clear to Gromyko that he could better deal with the Soviets with the support of the American people. The President then returned to his concern that the Soviets will use the Geneva talks primarily as a propaganda forum. He hoped, however, that the Soviets would treat these talks seriously; as he had told Gromyko the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a joint responsibility to see that war does not happen. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that she had a special interest in learning more details about the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev had told her “tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons”. He suggested if you develop SDI the Russians would either develop their own, or more probably, develop new offensive [page 5 begins] systems superior to SDI. General Keegan (former head of USAF Intelligence), whom she had seen several times, had informed her about Soviet advances and she was interested in learning more about SDI. The President noted it was time to join the others at Laurel Lodge. (C)

The private meeting ended at 11:10 a.m.

Expanded Session in Laurel Lodge

In opening the extended session, the President said he thought it would be appropriate to quote a remark the Queen [ Elizabeth II ] had made to him during the course of the campaign. When the Queen was in Canada and he was in Michigan, the Queen had called to say she was sure there will never be a wider divide between the U.S. and Great Britain “than the river that currently divides us”. Smiling, the President and Mrs. Thatcher both agreed with the Queen’s remark. (U)

Noting that it was her first visit to Camp David, Mrs. Thatcher said it was marvellous to be here and a privilege as well. She said she and the President had discussed at some length her impressions of Gorbachev. It is clear that basic Soviet policy has not changed, but Gorbachev was both willing and able to openly discuss and debate issues. He did not cry or complain when she discussed the human rights situation within the Soviet Union. She had emphasized to Gorbachev that it would be a futile effort to try to divide Great Britain from the U.S. We have a common heritage and are part of the same Western Alliance system. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had spent an inordinate amount of time on SDI. He had asked me to tell the President to stop the militarization of outer space. She had replied that Britain supports the U.S. SDI research effort and it was the Soviets who had been the first to develop an anti-satellite capability. The West was also trying to keep up with Soviet research into laser weapons. She had told Gorbachev that there must be balance in research and the U.S. SDI research program must go ahead. (C)

Saying he wished to extend Mrs. Thatcher a special Christmas welcome to Camp David, the President said he was pleased with Mrs. Thatcher’s support for the often misunderstood SDI program. He noted that currently envisioned strategic defense weapons are not nuclear systems; many people have the mistaken impression that they are. General Eisenhower had spoken about how every advance in weapons of war is offset by another technological development. We owe it to future generations to see if we cannot develop a strategic defense that would move us away from this horrible threat of destroying the world. As he had told the Prime Minister in the private meeting, the initial research is promising, but we do not have any final answers. (C) [page 6 begins]

Mrs. Thatcher again underlined that Britain backed the U.S. research program. She said she understood that we will not know for some time if a strategic defense system is truly feasible. If we reached a stage where production looked possible we would have some serious and difficult decisions to take. There are the ABM and outer space treaties. Future technological developments and possible countering strategies must also be considered. She recalled, for example, that with the advent of heat seeking missiles the general view had been that there was no defense against them, but this proved erroneous. Avoidance devices were developed. It was her impression from her talks with Gorbachev that the Soviets were following the same line of reasoning. They clearly fear U.S. technological prowess. However, Gorbachev suggested that the Soviets would either develop their own strategic defense system or add additional offensive systems. (S)

We do not want our objective of increased security, opined the Prime Minister, to result in increased Soviet nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have served not only to prevent a nuclear war, but they have also given us forty years of unprecedented peace in Europe. It would be unwise, she continued, to abandon a deterrence system that has prevented both nuclear and conventional war. Moreover, if we ever reach the stage of abolishing all nuclear weapons, this would make conventional, biological, or chemical war more likely. Hitler won the race for the rocket; the U.S. won the race for the nuclear bomb. The technological struggle goes on, she observed. There are all sorts of decoys, jamming systems and technological developments such as making the missile boost phase even shorter. All these advances make crisis management more and more difficult. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said these comments reflect concerns. We have some real worries, especially about SDI’s impact on deterrence. The wretched press has tried to make out that we have major differences. This is simply not true, but we do feel it is unwise to conclude where we will go on SDI, before the research program is completed. At the same time we need a sound research program, if we are to maintain a balanced relationship with the Soviets. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that the President said earlier that initial indications are that a SDI program is feasible. Mrs. Thatcher said she must admit that personally she had some doubts. In the past, scientific genius had always developed a counter system. Even if an SDI system proved 95 percent successful – a significant success rate – over 60 million people would still die from those weapons that got through. She again emphasised her concern with any implication of dropping our successful nuclear deterrent strategy and stressed that it was important that we work out privately what we will say publicly about SDI. She said several points appear pertinent. We must emphasize that SDI is only a research program; and that our objective is both to maintain a military balance and to enhance, not weaken deterrence. (S) [page 7 begins]

The President said we need to address the points Mrs. Thatcher had raised and to reach agreement on SDI, a program he called worth pursuing. He noted that experts continue to tell him that research is promising and SDI may be feasible. We have obviously not made a decision on production or deployment and these questions would have to be addressed at the appropriate time. We cannot and should not, however, continued the President, have to go on living under the threat of nuclear destruction. We must eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear weapons. My ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviets are now beginning to echo this same view. He said he told Gromyko that the U.S. is not seeking superiority, but we will not let the Soviets achieve superiority. He recognized that the Soviets have great respect for our technology. They also must be concerned about our economic strength. It will be especially difficult for them to keep spending such vast sums on defense. Such spending is in neither of our interests. (C)

The President continued that he also recognised the great losses the Soviets suffered in World War II – 20 million or more – and accepted their obsession with security. But it doesn't make sense, as my predecessor did, to propose unilateral reductions, such as cancelling the B-1 bomber. Common sense tells us that one needs negotiating tools when bargaining with the Soviets, or anyone else for that matter. We in the West have great strength – Europe alone has four times the GNP of the Soviet Union. We must deal with the Soviets from a position of strength. But we also know that in a nuclear war there would be no winners. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher interjected that this is why she had emphasized and praised the deterrence system that has worked so well for so many years. Strength is our best deterrence.

The President agreed and said he is trying to convince the Soviets that we mean them no harm. He often thought that the basic system in Russia had not changed fundamentally, i.e., that their current communist system is another form of the aristocratic system that ruled Russia under the Czar. Gandhi had once said that the Soviets believe more in survival than in communism. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that it is correct to emphasize military balance, not superiority. Balance gives us security. Making a specific reference to SDI, she said research contributes towards maintaining a military balance. We need to explain to our publics that SDI is only a research program, that it does not contravene any existing treaties and if we get to the development stage, many alternative factors will have to be considered at that time. For example, the ABM treaty may have to be renegotiated. (S)

Secretary Shultz stressed our concern is that the current situation is not balanced. The Soviets have many more offensive nuclear systems than foreseen under Salt I. The defensive side [page 8 begins] is covered under the ABM treaty, but we have essentially dropped the notion of deploying a defensive system around cities and bases. The Soviets, however, have deployed an ABM system around Moscow – that is permitted under the treaty – and now they are also devoting considerable resources toward the development of other defensive systems. For example, they have a large phased array radar under construction, which we believe is a treaty violation. The Soviets have positioned themselves to break out from the conditions imposed by the treaties. Their emphasis on defensive systems puts us in an unequal position. Our view is that there is an imbalance; our SDI research is designed to contribute to enhancing deterrence. (S)

Saying she didn't wish to debate strategic theory, Mrs. Thatcher noted that some claim SDI would be an incentive for the Soviets to produce more offensive systems and could encourage the Soviets to launch a preemptive first strike. From our point of view, said Mrs. Thatcher, deterrence remains our fundamental objective. And like you, we are fearful of the Soviets finding an excuse to walk out of the Geneva talks. (S)

Secretary Shultz interjected that we cannot just sit back and let the Soviets build up a significant advantage in defensive systems. Mrs. Thatcher said if she were a Soviet, she would take steps to improve my already significant civil defense program. (S)

At the President’s request, National Security Advisor McFarlane expanded on the U.S. SDI program. Calling Mrs. Thatcher’s questions and criticisms thoughtful and well-reasoned, McFarlane underscored that her remarks are based on the assumption that offensive deterrence in its present form can and will endure. This may not be true. In recent years the character of Soviet offensive systems has changed dramatically; they are more mobile and carry increased warheads, making verification a near impossible task. The future suggests that the Soviets will rely far more on mobile systems, as well as cruise missiles. (S)

McFarlane continued that our dilemma has been what to do to restore the strategic balance. The President has underway a significant strategic modernization program but this has encountered both moral and political difficulties, as evidenced by the M-X debate in Congress. The preferred course would be to reduce our offensive systems. As the President has stated, this is our goal and the President hopes ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons. McFarlane observed that our current dilemma – one over which the President expressed concern several years ago – is our inability to match the Soviet offensive build up. This is why the President asked us to examine other alternatives. Emerging technologies suggest that a new defensive system may be feasible. This is a searching question: can you have an absolute defense against incoming missiles, whether they be nuclear, chemical, or biological? (C) [page 9 begins]

Mrs. Thatcher wondered if a truly impervious system were possible. She asked, “is there any such thing as a perfect defense?” Could the Soviets simply not just overwhelm any defensive system with increased numbers of offensive systems? (S)

Calling the Prime Minister’s questions good ones, McFarlane replied that we are concerned about nuclear deterrence becoming unstable and our goal is to strengthen deterrence. Given technological advances – there have been some remarkable technology developments – it is prudent and responsible for the President to undertake the SDI research effort.

Saying SDI as she understood it seemed to suggest inherent U.S. superiority, Mrs. Thatcher added she was not convinced of the need to deploy such a system, particularly if it could eventually be knocked out by other technological advances. (S)

McFarlane commented that we need to better inform the British government on the extensive Soviet strategic defense effort. They have made great strides with their SA-10 and SAX-12 systems; the potential for what is called break-out is high. The President’s SDI program is designed to maintain the strategic balance and thereby enhance deterrence. Shultz maintained that we may be moving from a situation where we have mutually assured destruction to mutually assured defense. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher again stressed the need to work out the arguments in support of SDI and to develop a better coordinated public affairs line. (C)

McFarlane agreed and noted that there still remain several points where there is a difference of nuance. We believe that there is a strategic imbalance and the President’s SDI program can contribute to strengthening deterrence. Deterrence as we know it today may no longer meet our future needs. We are willing to negotiate and discuss strategic systems with the Soviets, but neither of us can be expected to completely restructure our nuclear forces. He reemphasized that the President’s goal is to enhance deterrence by maintaining a military balance. (C)

Noting we can say in public that we support the SDI research program and the need for military balance to maintain an effective deterrence, Mrs. Thatcher said it would be useful if someone could come to London to give her a top-level U.S. technical briefing on the U.S. and Soviet strategic defense programs. The President nodded agreement and said it was time to break for lunch. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that she would appreciate briefly discussing civil aviation before lunch. She expressed her immense gratitude for the President’s courageous decision on the Laker anti-trust case and noted her relief that this decision did not result in bad press for the President. She continued that civil [page 10 begins] aviation in general and the Laker case in particular, still posed a number of problems. During the course of the fall negotiations aimed at developing a more competitive civil aviation system, the British Government was told that the U.S. would be able to introduce legislation seeking repeal of the treble damage clause. We subsequently learned that you did not plan to introduce such legislation and believed that should you do so, Congress would reject it.

Mrs. Thatcher said that this put her government in great difficulty particularly with regard to plans to denationalize British Airways. Our efforts to make British Airways more efficient and profitable have been successful but this possible treble damage clause is hanging over British Airways like a dark cloud. It would be very difficult to denationalize British Airways in such a climate. There is still great confusion over the pricing arrangements. We had thought that Bermuda II, which has been approved by both our governments allowed for price changes if both authorities agreed. We have now learned that Bermuda II does not override U.S. anti-trust law. All this seems very unfair because the United Kingdom faces a total monopoly in the U.S. For example, British Airways can land in Houston, but cannot take passengers on to Denver. The framework for competition is not entirely fair. Moreover, the existing regulations for lowering fares are so great and complex that the last time we undertook to lower them it took three months to work it out. She repeated that U.S. action is denying her the ability to denationalize British Airways. (C)

The President replied that we are eager to make further progress on liberalizing the current aviation regime. We do feel that Congress would reject a proposal to waive treble damages. However, there are ways to lower air fares without having to face an anti-trust suit. Increased competition is in both our interests and we do favor the denationalization of British Airways. The President said it was time to break for lunch. (C)

The expanded session concluded at 12:15 p.m.

* * *

During the cocktail session before lunch, the President, Mrs. Thatcher, and Ambassador Price discussed civil aviation at some length. Both the President and Ambassador Price stressed that more competition would benefit both our countries and that there is no need to eliminate treble damages in order for our airlines to operate free of litigation in a more competitive environment. Mrs. Thatcher held firm, stating that the treble damage lawsuit hanging over British Airways made it very difficult for her to denationalize. Ambassador Price said there has not been one successful suit during the 15 years the current system has been [page 11 begins] in existence. But if this is the final roadblock to privatization, why did the British Government just not set aside an indemnity fund to protect against any possible legal loss. Mrs. Thatcher replied that her budget did not have room for such funding and once it was known that government money would be behind a settlement, this would surely open the door to a large settlement in favor of the private parties. (C)

Working Lunch

Noting it had just been discussed, Mrs. Thatcher said she wished to return briefly to civil aviation. In her view, the British simply do not have an effective framework for lowering fares without facing damaging antitrust suits. Bermuda II is not working, and treble damages pose major problems for British Airways. Secretary Shultz replied that our understanding is different. We believe adequate procedures are available under U.S. law and our Bermuda II agreement to provide protection against antitrust suits. The procedures will work and have worked. Ambassador Price added that British Airways chief executives have indicated to him that they can work within the framework of existing laws and regulations. He noted that the British government, in signing the Bermuda II agreement, knew it did not override or take the place of U.S. antitrust laws. Moreover, under the current system, there has not been one antitrust suit in 15 years when the airlines followed the established procedures. Mrs. Thatcher underlined that under the current circumstances, she would face great difficulties in trying to denationalize British Airways. (C)

Turning to the Middle East, Mrs. Thatcher said she was encouraged by her recent meeting with King Hussein , and that she personally knew the Israeli Prime Minister very well and favorably. Prime Minister Peres wants to be constructive, and if we are to get anywhere in the Middle East we should attempt to do it while he is Prime Minister. She indicated she had also told both Hussein and Peres that a new international peace conference is not feasible. The President replied that we shared Mrs. Thatcher’s view about more reasonable leadership in Israel. We have had problems with Hussein because of Congressional hesitation about arms sales of Jordan. We do not intend and could not impose an American peace plan on the Middle East. We do, however, remain committed to the positions set forth in my September 1st Middle East initiative; these positions are based on UN Resolution 242, and are fully consistent with the Camp David Accord. We seek an equitable settlement and agree that it is important to get the peace process started again while Peres is in power. [Editor’s note: paragraph not given any classification mark]

Mrs. Thatcher replied it is encouraging that the moderate Arabs are demonstrating greater unity, while the split among the radicals is deepening. Shultz said that we detect the same general trends, but noted that Saudi Arabia recently delivered [page 12 begins] another $100 million to Assad. Furthermore, Peres faces many problems – in particular, a bleak economic situation, and the unsettled situation in Lebanon, where the presence of Israeli troops poses domestic problems. Peres needs to make progress on these two vital issues if he is to establish himself as a strong leader. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher asked for a brief review of the U.S. economy. The President said he had just received encouraging news that the loan discount rate is at its lowest level in six years. Interest rates are coming down, but we must tackle the difficult deficit problem. He said he plans to introduce an austerity spending program in which he hopes to hold overall FY 86 government spending at our FY 85 level. His goal is to bring the overall deficit, as a percentage of GNP, down to four percent in 1985, and then lower it an additional percentage point per year. While the overall federal deficit is entirely too high, it is little known that our state and local authorities had a $58 million [sic] surplus last year. McFarlane added that the President faced a particularly troublesome task because what we call entitlement programs, i.e. those that are fixed, make up such a large proportion of the federal budget. Indeed, these programs are at an all-time record high. (C)

Praising U.S. economic performance, Mrs. Thatcher said that the strength of the dollar is a sign of weakness in Europe. She opined that the overall political situation in Europe is not especially encouraging. There is a socialist government in France; neither Holland or Belgium seem to be able to get their act completely together; Germany is a question mark; and the Italians lack guts. There is a socialist government in Spain; Greece is a pain in the neck and certainly no friend of the U.S.; but Portugal did have the guts to fight communism. In Great Britain, the opposition Labor Party is espousing more and more socialist causes. None of this bodes especially well for Europe, but America’s huge deficit and its need for such heavy borrowing to finance the deficit is keeping interest rates up too high. (S) [page 13 begins]

Suggesting that his major deficit problem is partially inherited, the President observed that the U.S. is paying for the consequences of 50 years of deficit spending. In all but four of those years, the Democrats controlled Congress. President Eisenhower tried to balance the budget, but we have a structural deficit. From 1965 to 1980, the federal budget became four and a half times larger; during the same period, the deficit became 38 times larger. As a famous U.S. economist, Milton Friedman said, “if you start paying people to be poor, there is going to be a lot of poor people”. He has begun implementing his goal, said the President, of reforming the welfare system. There is also much talk of unemployment, but based on what he sees in our Sunday papers there are many jobs available. Saying he had developed a habit of looking at the classified ads whenever he is in a major metropolis, he commented that the help-wanted ads in a recent Sunday Washington Post went on for 43 pages; in the Los Angeles Times, there were 69 pages of help-wanted ads. He recognized that some of the jobs offered were in the new technical fields which demanded special qualifications. However, the sheer number of want-ads suggested jobs could be found. (U)

Secretary Shultz said he wished to return briefly to the Middle East. He noted that Israel was showing some flexibility about leaving Lebanon, where the situation is compounded because the Lebanese are the agents of the Syrians. The Israelis maintain their presence because the Lebanese do not have control over their own territory and cannot guarantee a secured border. Furthermore, there is a great fear that if the Israelis leave, the Lebanese will kill each other, and some Lebanese factions have urged the Israelis not to leave. Peace-keeping and security are legitimate concerns. Mrs. Thatcher replied that UNIFIL is not fulfilling its purpose. These units do not provide protection and just sit there and get shot at. She added that she questioned the UN’s ability to provide an effective peace-keeping force. The President said that part of the problem is that the Soviets impose so many restrictions on how the UN force can be utilized. (C)

The President thanked Mrs. Thatcher for Britain’s overall cooperation in combatting terrorism and their recent help with regard to the hijacking which ended in Iran. Mrs. Thatcher said we must all heighten our anti-terrorist efforts and hoped that U.S.-UK cooperation may have had an impact on Syria. The President added that we are particularly disappointed in the lack of Syrian cooperation concerning the three U.S. citizens that have been kidnapped and are likely held in Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon. We believe the Syrians could be much more helpful than they have been. Shultz underscored the need for further progress as called for in the London Summit Declaration, and hoped ongoing work would lay the groundwork for further progress at the Bonn Summit. (S) [page 14 begins]

Returning to SDI, Shultz said he wished to reinterate that the goal of our initiative is to maintain and strengthen deterrence. We are trying to enhance survivability, and any system that would be developed would be used to defend the U.S. and its Allies. SDI is not a departure from deterrence. Mrs. Thatcher asked if it would be operative against cruise missiles. McFarlane said the short answer is yes. Part of the new technological developments are vastly improved radars which would enhance our ability to detect and attack cruise missiles. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher then circulated a brief statement she planned to make at the outset of her press conference following the lunch. She indicated that it had been worked out by our respective staffs during the course of the lunch, and wished to draw the President’s attention to four specific points. They are: (1) the U.S. and Western aim is to maintain balance, i.e., not achieve superiority, while taking account of Soviet developments; (2) SDI-related deployment, in view of treaty obligations, would be a matter for negotiations; (3) the overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence; and (4) East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security at reduced levels of offensive systems. The President replied that we agree with these points and said he hoped they would quell reports of disagreement between us. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher said she wished to say a word about the situation in Ethiopia, where Britain has tried to be of some help, mostly in providing internal air-lift. The President said he is proud of the U.S. effort, which had both a public and private component. One U.S. Congressman in particular had played a key role in helping to meet the Ethiopian needs. He gave me, said the President, a graphic description of the dire results of the famine. We are determined to continue our efforts despite a clear lack of willingness by the Ethiopian authorities to give us credit for our assustance. (U)

Turning to central America, Mrs. Thatcher said the British intended to remain in Belize; if we left, the Guatemalans would probably feel a need to express their political viritlity by invading Belize. The result of the Belizean elections had come as a great surprise, but we see the outcome as being positive. The President commented that we appreciate the continued British military presence in Belize. He then turned to Nicaragua which he said a former Sandinista leader described as a militarily occupied country. If the U.S. had the same percent of its population under arms as the Nicaraguans, we would have an armed forces of 25 million strong. Mrs. Thatcher observed that the Soviets now seemed to sending additional ships with arms. [sic] The President replied that this was true and, referring to our concern that one of these ships had contained MIG aircraft, noted the problems we encounter – partially because of periods of lost visibility – in detecting what precise cargoes these ships carry. Mrs. Thatcher called the situation “very worrying”. (C) [page 15 (last page) begins]

Mrs. Thatcher said she wished to address the situation in Northern Ireland. Despite reports to the contrary, she and Garret [sic] FitzGerald were on good terms and we are working toward making progress on this difficult question. The President said making progress is important, and observed that there is great Congressional interest in this matter. Indeed, Tip O’Neill has sent him a personal letter, asking him to appeal to Mrs. Thatcher to be reasonable and forthcoming.

The President noted it was time to close the discussions, which he had highly valued. He added that he looked forward to seeing Mrs. Thatcher in February and understood that our staffs are arranging a date. Mrs. Thatcher thanked the President for the warm pre-Christmas reception, and said she looked forward to an early reunion. Looking at Mr. McFarlane, she reiterated her desire for a technical briefing in London on SDI. McFarlane replied that he was interested in personally giving her the briefing. (C)

The Working Lunch concluded at 1:25 p.m. (U)

[document ends]

Thank you.

The timing is appropriate.

And also to be remembered, are all Reagan's Comrades-In-Arms (ideologically) both within his administration and outside who fought valiantly for freedom against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The first anniversary for one such man approaches now:

Constantine Menges, Freedom's Quiet Warrior

By Michael Fumento

Stuka dive-bombers pounded Poland from the air as tanks and gray-uniformed infantry swarmed across the border. Europe was falling under the shadow of the Swastika. It was Sept. 1, 1939 – the first day of World War II. On that day, a son named Constantine was born to Karl Heinrich and Valeska Menges, who had fled to Turkey after being arrested for publicly opposing Hitler.

Afraid that Turkey would join the Axis, the family was on the run again. Always in fear of arrest, but unable themselves to leave, the parents sent Constantine on to America in 1943. Even then, at age four, the child somehow understood the meaning of the giant statue that rose before him as his ship entered New York Harbor. That meaning would guide him for the rest of his life.

Fast-forward now to 1961. While a college student in Prague, Constantine Menges heard that East German authorities were quickly throwing up a wall littered with machine-gun posts to enclose East Berlin and permanently trap the occupants. He hopped into his tiny VW, drove to the city, and began making shuttle runs through Checkpoint Charlie. Each time he returned with a Bug stuffed with refugees. This was the second defining moment of his life. From now on, he was a freedom fighter, regardless of whom the enemy was.

Thus, the man whom many would come to know only for his anti-communist activities became a volunteer worker in Mississippi for equal voting rights during the "long, hot summer" of 1963, a job far more dangerous than confronting East German border guards. He marched with the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in the time before King abandoned his principles. By 1968, communism was again the foe, as Menges stood side-by-side with brave Czech citizens facing down Soviet tanks.

Menges' direct action changed to policymaking when he received his doctorate from Columbia University and joined the Rand Corporation. (He later worked for numerous think tanks, including three stints at the Hudson Institute.) At Rand, he wrote the papers that gave an intellectual basis to what would become known as the Reagan Doctrine. These included "Democratic Revolutionary Insurgency as an Alternative Strategy," which argued that "communist regimes are very vulnerable to a democratic national revolution that is conducted with skill and the determination to succeed." Thence, he went into public service under both the Nixon and Ford administrations as deputy assistant for civil rights in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Menges, the superman ...

To those familiar with all his accomplishments, it may be surprising to hear that Menges was, for the most part, condemned to play the role of Cassandra to the very end of his life. Officially or otherwise, he advised every presidential administration from Nixon on. For the most part, each president had a policy of intently hearing him out – and then ignoring him. Similarly, the press would write about him, but he was repeatedly frustrated in getting them to run his writings. He last appeared in the Washington Post in 1991, the New York Times in 1979, and the Wall Street Journal never.

The Carter administration was well aware of his genius, insofar as the president's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had been one of Menges' professors at Columbia. Menges had warned Carter in 1977 that the friendly government in Iran might be overthrown, with the revolution co-opted by Islamic radicals. Two years later, this came to pass, leading to a regime that would begin the jihadist movement in which today we find ourselves in a death-grip and that directly supports the insurrection and terror in Iraq.

In 1978, he warned that Sandinista communist guerillas could seize power in Nicaragua within a year, becoming a base for subversion throughout Latin America. When the Sandinistas did so a year later, Brzezinski called him to say "You were right about Iran, and now you are correct about Nicaragua. We want your ideas on what to do now that the communists have taken over." Again, Menges provided an intellectual treasure trove; again, Carter showed no interest in treasure. Menges also told Carter about the threat slowly taking shape on a Caribbean island called Grenada – again, no action.

It was only with the ascendancy of President Ronald Reagan that Menges finally found a kindred spirit. He began as a CIA national intelligence officer under Director William Casey. To Reagan and Casey, it was as clear as it had been to Menges that President Truman's "containment" strategy was a failure insofar as communism was expanding across the globe.

"Wars of liberation" were converting autocracies in Asia and Africa into outposts of communist dictatorship that in turn fomented "wars of liberation. Latin America was becoming Castro's playground. As Menges had predicted, the Sandinistas began fomenting rebellion even before their rifles had cooled from their own victory. El Salvador seemed ripe for plucking.

Reagan, Casey and Menges all believed that an across-the-board communist threat could only be defeated if fought across the board. Morally and strategically, it was wrong to keep propping up tinhorn dictators – where the communists would pretend to support the people, America must actually do so. Those struggling to throw off the communist yoke – be it the Contras in Nicaragua or Mujahideen in Afghanistan – needed CIA advisers and material support. Finally, when necessary, U.S. forces would be directly deployed. Fears of "another Vietnam" would not dictate.

In his biography of President Reagan, author Lou Cannon described Menges as one of the president's few aides who believed "that the West should be mobilized to fight communists with their own methods." Cannon called him "one of the most forceful of these polemicists" and "a principled conservative." William F. Buckley Jr. would write that, "Constantine Menges is among the wisest and ablest of those who have sought to realize Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals."

Yet many with whom Menges worked cared little for those goals. Revved up to fight the forces of evil and repression, Menges found his immediate adversaries were denial, compromise and appeasement. White House and State Department adversaries dubbed him "Constant Menace" and "Menges Khan." Menges couldn't outflank them by pulling rank, so he did the only thing he could do: he outthought them. There were also those who were more interested in promoting themselves than quixotic ideas of freedom, and indeed today they're household names who live royally. But self-promotion, unless it led directly to the promotion of his ideas, wasn't even in Menges' lexicon.

The biggest test came in October 1983. A hard-line communist faction murdered Grenadian dictator Maurice Bishop, slaughtered other members of his regime, and issued a curfew directly threatening the lives of 900 American medical students studying on the island. In one of those seemingly small events that go on to shape history, Reagan had just weeks earlier appointed Menges a special assistant to the president for national security affairs.

Though the new kid on the block, Menges' knowledge of the geopolitical situation and his clear conviction that he knew exactly what must be done allowed him to outflank military and civilian leaders who wanted an "in and out" operation. He argued that for the world's most powerful military to merely overthrow a dictator supported by a tiny ragtag army and those "Cuban construction workers" would prove little; that only the establishment of a lasting democracy would provide a beacon of hope to peoples everywhere suffering under the yoke of communism.

With no time to waste, Reagan immediately launched Operation Urgent Fury – the Menges version. The first overthrow of a communist country with a free election soon thereafter thoroughly embarrassed Castro, strengthened Reagan's hand with the allies in Europe, and shook the Kremlin. "Containment" was dead – the rollback had begun. Though few knew it at the time, it was then that the Berlin Wall started to crack.

Menges' other accomplishments are far too numerous to list here, and many no doubt continue to bear a "top secret" stamp. We can only judge by the tip of the iceberg what lies beneath.

Alas, in the ensuing years Menges again became a Cassandra. To no avail, he provided then-Vice President George Bush with a detailed global anti-terrorism program that Bush found exciting and potentially effective. But ultimately, his recommendations ended up on the ash heap of history – and New York's World Trade Center. The nation spent its "peace dividend" and then elected a president with outright animosity to the military and no interest in foreign policy.

From his perch at George Washington University and then back where he would end his career, Hudson Institute, Menges tried desperately to call President Clinton's attention to the growing Islamist threat and to a specific militant named Osama bin Laden. Menges knew well Gen. George S. Patton's admonition that "Perpetual peace is a futile dream."

But Clinton was otherwise occupied. And so, almost exactly 10 years after the wall came down, America was again at war. Or, to be more precise, she finally realized she was at war. The terrorists, as Menges had constantly admonished, had already known it for years.

Now in his 60s, but still not yet at the prime of his life – a prime that indeed he would never reach – Menges fought for America on three fronts.

First, he warned of the dangers of fomenting and exploiting the guerrilla war in Iraq in order either to form a second Shiite state or at the very least turn the southern end of the country into a vassal state and keep the rest destabilized. He was mocked by his own colleagues. After all, few hatreds go back as far as that between Arab and Persian, and many Shiite Iraqis died in the war against Iran – how could Iraqi Shiia work with Iranians? Try counting the weapons and munitions boxes found in Najaf and elsewhere packed with Iranian weapons.

He warned that Hugo Chavez would subvert Venezuela's democracy with Castro's help and work with Cuba to begin anew the destabilization of Latin America. Right again. Indeed, without desperate behind-the-scenes work from Menges and others, El Salvador recently might have elected a communist government. Instead, it remains a pro-American democracy.

Finally, he had just completed the manuscript for a book titled, "China, the Gathering Threat: The Strategic Challenge of China and Russia," detailing the threat to global security that China, together with its growing relationship to Russia, poses. It will be published in the spring.

... and Constantine, the man

Sadly, if Constantine had a motto it might be: "Why can't they see!" They couldn't see because they were straight-jacketed by their biases and short-term considerations. To what extent he considered this ability to break through such psychological walls a personal blessing or curse we'll never know, but he found solace somewhere because he would remain one of the cheeriest people I've ever met.

He was also never too concerned with saving the world to not be concerned with his friends and family. He was devoutly religious, though he didn't wear his beliefs on his shoulder. And to the end, he was madly in love with his wife of 29 years, Nancy, and she with him. He and I were often both the last ones in the office and sometime late in the evening the doorbell would ring. If he didn't get it right away, I assumed he was on the phone with the ambassador to Iraq or some such, so I went to unlock the door knowing I would find her absolutely giddy in anticipation of seeing her man. He in turn always gazed upon her as if he'd just been introduced to Miss America.

It was late in the evening, two years ago, when he came into my office and politely asked, as he did even when we talked on the last night of his life and he struggled with each word, "Do you have a couple of minutes?" A friend of his, he said, had just been told he has bladder cancer. He could not conceal his nervousness, and perhaps a tinge of fear, and it was obvious that "his" friend was actually mine. He sought my help as a medical researcher and writer in what he knew could well be the final struggle in a life of combat.

This will not become an Oncology 101 course. Suffice that Constantine's tumor was caught late and one way or another, serious action was required. He wanted to find a less invasive form of surgery than the normal full bladder removal, in order to put fewer burdens on his beloved wife and take less time away from his work.

I regret that I found one, for – as I told him at the time – full removal was the established route while mere removal of the tumor should still be considered experimental. Who is to say but that the outcome might not have been the same, but I now wish I had not found that alternative. Alas, I did and this time Constantine's ability to see the future failed him.

He went into remission, but the tumor came back and spread. For the last time now, he would be the Quiet Warrior. He swore me to secrecy, as he wanted nobody's pity and he feared the completion of his work would be compromised. Then, together, we fought that tumor ... and together we lost.

Several months before the end, I told my wife he was terminal, but it seems I had forgotten to tell myself. For when that end came, I was almost as shocked as those I had promised to keep in the dark. I think he was shocked, too. When he called me that last night, he wanted me to research a couple of new doctors he was considering consulting and assembling into a team. There he was, on his deathbed, planning strategy. I was still working through the medical databases on June 11 when the Quiet Warrior, age 64, passed from this world.

Now Constantine is at peace. Yet the nation is not. We are again fighting a world war, though few dare call it such and often it seems only the enemy knows that we are truly in a death struggle.

In saluting the fallen at Gettysburg, President Lincoln declared: "It is for us the living ... to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced." People must die; ideas may or may not. There will never be another Constantine Menges, but perhaps it's enough that there was one. It is for us the living to be dedicated to the unfinished work and the ideas he so nobly advanced – or to allow them to forever rest in the soil of the adopted land he so loved.

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