The United States's long war

The message from General Peter Pace, the chairperson of the United States joint chiefs of staff, was apocalyptic. "We are at a critical time in the history of this great country and find ourselves challenged in ways we did not expect. We face a ruthless enemy intent on destroying our way of life and an uncertain future."

Pace was endorsing the Pentagon's four-yearly strategy review, presented to Congress last week. The report sets out a plan for prosecuting what the the Pentagon describes in the preface as "The Long War", which replaces the "war on terror". The long war represents more than just a linguistic shift: it reflects the ongoing development of US strategic thinking since the September 11 attacks.

Looking beyond the Iraq and Afghan battlefields, US commanders envisage a war unlimited in time and space against global Islamist extremism. "The struggle ... may well be fought in dozens of other countries simultaneously and for many years to come," the report says. The emphasis switches from large-scale, conventional military operations, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, towards a rapid deployment of highly mobile, often covert, counter-terrorist forces.

Among specific measures proposed are: an increase in special operations forces by 15%; an extra 3 000 personnel in psychological operations and civil affairs units -- an increase of 33%; nearly double the number of unmanned aerial drones; the conversion of submarine-launched Trident nuclear missiles for use in conventional strikes; new close-to-shore, high-speed naval capabilities; special teams trained to detect and render safe nuclear weapons quickly anywhere in the world; and a new long-range bomber force.

The Pentagon does not pinpoint the countries it sees as future areas of operations but they will stretch beyond the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Central and South-East Asia and the northern Caucasus.

The Cold War dominated the world from 1946 to 1991: the long war could determine the shape of the world for decades to come. The plan rests heavily on a much higher level of cooperation and integration with Britain and other Nato allies, and the increased recruitment of regional governments through the use of economic, political, military and security means. It calls on allies to build their capacity "to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges".

The Pentagon must become adept at working with interior ministries as well as defence ministries, the report says. It describes this as "a substantial shift in emphasis that demands broader and more flexible legal authorities and cooperative mechanisms ... Bringing all the elements of US power to bear to win the long war requires overhauling traditional foreign assistance and export control activities and laws."

Unconventional approach The report, whose consequences are still being assessed in European capitals, states: "This war requires the US military to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches." It adds: "We have been adjusting the US global force posture, making long overdue adjustments to US basing by moving away from a static defence in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to troublespots across the globe."

The strategy mirrors in some respects a recent readjustment in British strategic thinking but it is on a vastly greater scale, funded by an overall 2007 US defence spending request of more than $513-billion.

As well as big expenditure projects, the report calls for: investments in signals and human intelligence gathering -- spies on the ground; funding for the Nato intelligence fusion centre; increased space radar capability; the expansion of the global information grid (a protected information network); and an information-sharing strategy "to guide operations with federal, state, local and coalition partners". A push will also be made to improve forces' linguistic skills, with an emphasis on Arabic, Chinese and Farsi.

The US plan, developed by military and civilian staff at the Pentagon in concert with other branches of the US government, will raise concerns about exacerbating the "clash of civilisations" and about the respect accorded to international law and human rights. To wage the long war, the report urges Congress to grant the Pentagon and its agencies expanded permanent legal authority of the kind used in Iraq, which may give US commanders greatly extended powers.

"Long duration, complex operations involving the US military, other government agencies and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries round the world, relying on a combination of direct [visible] and indirect [clandestine] approaches," the report says. "Above all they will require persistent surveillance and vastly better intelligence to locate enemy capabilities and personnel. They will also require global mobility, rapid strike, sustained unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities. Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where US forces do not traditionally operate will be required."

The report exposes the sheer ambition of the US attempt to mastermind global security. "The US will work to ensure that all major and emerging powers are integrated as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system. It will also seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security.

Building partnerships "It will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the US and friendly countries."

Briefing reporters in Washington, Ryan Henry, a Pentagon policy official, said: "When we refer to the long war, that is the war against terrorist extremists and the ideology that feeds it, and that is something that we do see going on for decades." He added that the strategy was aimed at responding to the "uncertainty and unpredictability" of this conflict. "We in the defence department feel fairly confident that our forces will be called on to be engaged somewhere in the world in the next decade where they're currently not engaged, but we have no idea whatsoever where that might be, when that might be or in what circumstances that they might be engaged.

"We realise that almost in all circumstances others will be able to do the job less expensively than we can because we tend to have a very cost-intensive force. But many times they'll be able to do it more effectively too because they'll understand the local language, the local customs, they'll be culturally adept and be able to get things accomplished that we can't do. So building a partnership capability is a critical lesson learned.

"The operational realm for that will not necessarily be Afghanistan and Iraq; rather, that there are large swaths of the world that that's involved in and we are engaged today. We are engaged in things in the Philippines, in the Horn of Africa. There are issues in the pan-Sahel region of North Africa.

"There's a number of different places where there are activities where terrorist elements are out there and that we need to counter them, we need to be able to attack and disrupt their networks."

Priorities The report identifies four priority areas: Defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction

Lawrence's legacy The Pentagon planners who drew up the long war strategy had a host of experts to draw on for inspiration. But they credit only one in the report: Lawrence of Arabia.

The authors anticipate US forces being engaged in irregular warfare around the world. They advocate "an indirect approach", building and working with others, and seeking "to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked.

They write: "One historical example that illustrates both concepts comes from the Arab revolt in 1917 in a distant theatre of the first world war, when British Colonel TE Lawrence and a group of lightly armed Bedouin tribesmen seized the Ottoman port city of Aqaba by attacking from an undefended desert side, rather than confronting the garrison's coastal artillery by attacking from the sea."

I don't agree with some of your terminology, for eg "radical islam." Islam IS a radical ideology

Based upon my reading of the Koran and limited understanding, I really do not disagree with you in principle. However, from a strategy perspective, an old saw (slightly modified) comes to mind: united they stand, divided they fall.

I, too, have lived in an Islamic country with no desire to repeat the experience. However, from my own experience, it appeared to me that the general populace (not the clerics or ruling class) was actually more ignorant of a great many of their belief’s tenants than I was. Additionally, there are already very real fissures and splinters (some heretical) in Islam such as Sunni’s, Shiite’s, Suffi’s, Sikh’s, etc. Add these splinters and fissures together with the fact that a large number of Muslims are functionally illiterate in Arabic (the language of the Koran from which no translations are officially authorized). As a result, it appears that an opportunity may exist to create a perception that there is a radical Islam and a moderate Islam. In such a case, perception becomes reality. Strategically, if such a perception can be fostered, it weakens the enemy and strengthens our ability to isolate and render ineffective, at least partially, the salafis influence

The claims of over 2 billion adherents world-wide is also excessive. Even islamic sites that tend to overemphasize islams importance tend to quote figures between 1.2 to 1.5 million.

The estimates to which I referred were for umma wahida. For example, there are 206 million Indoneasians, of which, 88 percent profess to be Muslim. There are also 40 million Sudanese, again, of which, a huge number are Muslim. These two numbers alone are more than the 1.2 to 1.5 million you cited. It must be remembered that not just the Arabic and Persian Muslims are involved in the conflict we are discussing.

…one must acknowledge all roads lead to mecca, as center of two of the 5 pillars of faith, and the custodians of the holy sites have their message legitimized and enforced in the eyes of the ummah.

Agreed. Such a concept could potentially make Mecca an ideal target for strategic application of retaliatory nuclear strikes if a strategy similar to mutually assured destruction (MAD) were feasible. However, if a conflict involved only a limited number of country-less Muslims and a retaliatory strike were leveled at Mecca (pardon the pun), it would surely ignite whole-scale war with the entire Muslim population of the world--- not a particularly wise strategic move.

Your real point about the salafis of Wahabbism controlling the interpretations of the Islamic faith because they are nominally in control of Mecca is not lost on me. However, to de-legitimize their influence means a competing source must be able to stand up to them. With the Wahabbi’s having the support of the House of Saud, such doesn’t seem to be in the cards any time soon.

My long term thinking has often revolved around exploiting the ummahs divisions and delegitimizing their role and the possible return of the hijaz to Hashemite control.

To you implied point of deposing the Saudis and their support for Wahabbism in favor of the Hashemite dynasty, I see it as possibly desirable in the short term but unrealistically misguided for the long term. As I am sure you know, the Hashemites were formerly in power in Iraq, and much longer ago, in Arabia, itself, and they were unable to hold power. Jordan seems to be the only place where they have been able to sustain a stable government, especially in modern times. In general, the major problem with dynastic rule in any Islamic country is that its continued existence and stability are solely dependant upon strength of personality of the current ruler. Additionally, all dynastic regimes, other than constitutional monarchies, are subject to the same problems currently evident in the House of Saud. Hence, returning the country to Hashemite rule would probably only be a temporary respite from the problems we currently see. Surely, the Hashemites would probably introduce a much more secularly oriented government, perhaps, even using Turkey as a model. Nonetheless, Wahabbism is probably too deeply ingrained on the Arabian peninsula to rooted out and it would not be long before another Ibn Saud appeared to overthrow the Hashemites.

A potentially better solution is to get the populace involved in supporting a democratically elected government. Such a move would not eliminate Wahabbism but would moderate its influence, if for not other reason (and there are potentially many others), just by the existence of Shiites and other minorities present in the voting population. Additionally, a truly democratic style government would severely curtail Sharia and eliminate dhimmi status. Of course, the predicate of the argument is a truly democratically based government--- a severe challenge in any Islamic society, especially one in which Wahabbism has been dominant for so long.

In summary, the conflict has already been joined. It is now merely a question of a winning strategy and the will to carry it out.

Thanks for the reply.

Based upon my reading of the Koran and limited understanding, I really do not disagree with you in principle. However, from a strategy perspective, an old saw (slightly modified) comes to mind: united they stand, divided they fall.

Absolutely, they know that, and we do to... right now the ummah is so fractured and divided without a caliph or caliphate giving us opportunities to play factions against each other. I'm slightly puzzled by your use of the term "umma wahida" as I interpret this to be a "united single islmaic community," one thats more applicable to historal unity than the fragmented ideological state of the ummah today. I suppose its possible some interpret this a different way, and the term sometimes gets used by those seeking to reunite the ummah under central authority.

For example, there are 206 million Indoneasians, of which, 88 percent profess to be Muslim. There are also 40 million Sudanese, again, of which, a huge number are Muslim. These two numbers alone are more than the 1.2 to 1.5 million you cited.

Sorry, typo or lapse of concentration on my part. I meant 1.2 - 1.5 billion not million, in response to the 2 billion you quoted. I cited those numbers from islamic sites and they tend to vary from between 1.2 to 1.5 billion. Bear in mind the demographics of these nations, many are young and have little understanding of islam and often many indigenous peoples who hold traditional pagan or animist beliefs get lumped in as "native muslims" as in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia. Some just rename their magic and superstitions, or call themselves Bomohs or muslims and claim inspiration from the koran so their practices and beliefs are not persecuted by authorities. Many others are claimed by islam, because of accident of birth and are not allowed to leave. Muslims oppress their own and get more muslims killed than anyone else.

Additionally, there are already very real fissures and splinters (some heretical) in Islam such as Sunni’s, Shiite’s, Suffi’s, Sikh’s, etc.

Scratch Sikhs from the list and I agree. For more on Sikhs, see what I wrote in #8 here.

OK, I will not pick at little details any further and will attempt to more constructive instead.

Lets get back to the value of mecca. I would never rule out the full scale destruction of makkah (or mecca, whatever they want to call it) but see it more of a back up plan, a plan B. IMHO, its most valuable use of the destruction of the holy sites in a way that would be to prove their mahdi seekers and their end of times prophecies are inaccurate, and to challenge the very core of their delusional belief system by taking out two of islam 5 pillars. I would not suggest threatening mecca officially, or too overtly, as if we dont carry thru with our threat, many muslims may interpret this as divine protection and it may enforce their belief in their allah. I would simply refuse to rule it out, and keep the option open as a plan B, for the very reasons you mentioned.

As for the Hashemites... I bring them up not as an ideal solution, because I dont think anyone has a perfect plan, but as a solution I'm willing to live with for the near future because IMHO, we lack a multitude of better options. Saudi Arabia is unstable. The vast majority of their population is under 30, indoctrinated on a diet of wahabbi hatred and islamic supremacy, many too lazy to contribute anything to the prosperity of their nation because they have taken up islamic studies instead.

The KSA is on shaky ground, and if free and fair elections were held, "radicals" as many call them, would makes gains. I have my doubts the House of Saud can challenge their ulema, implement the kind of religious reforms we need, introduce democracy, and continue to hold power at the same time. If and when the KSA implodes, we need to have a strategy ready. The Hashemites, having not only a claim, but the best claim on the Holy sites of the Hijaz besides the current "custodians" are best suited to retake control. The Hashemites not only have a historical claim, King Abdullah is also a "sayyid," a descendant of the mohammad tho he, his father, and grandfather are much more rational and honorable than the mad "prophet." Because of the nature of the KSA, we better have a plan to back Hashemite armies to retake the hijaz, and delegitimize the message of the current custodians.

I see it as possibly desirable in the short term but unrealistically misguided for the long term...

I tend to agree. The life span of any dynasty is indeed limited by its rulers. Islamic fundamentalism, a call for the return to pure islam and a more or less united ummah to challenge the west will always be on the cards waiting to reignite again unless islam is reformed or the ideology totally discredited and humiliated in defeat in the way fascism, Japanese imperialism and communism were. Either way islam, as we know it, should no longer exist in a way that can threaten us. Islam idelogy and its underlying obligation of expansion and territorial conquest by the sword as carried out by mohammad himself came close to wiping out western civilization in the past and we must never forget it or underestimate it.

Wahabbism is probably too deeply ingrained on the Arabian peninsula to rooted out and it would not be long before another Ibn Saud appeared to overthrow the Hashemites.

You and I are probably some of the few here who have seem what kind of government it takes to keep control and stay in power in todays islamic world and its not the kind of liberal democracy many here can relate to.

Additionally, a truly democratic style government would severely curtail Sharia and eliminate dhimmi status.

I for one, have severe reservations of the impact of the rush to democratize islamic peoples and hold free and fair elections in nations where they have little understanding of western democratic values and equality. In malaysia, I watched in disbelief as they voted in sharia on the east coast states of Terengganu and Kelantan with popular consent, and witnessed it's impact on frightened muslims and non-muslims alike as islam undermined the very institutions that brought it to power in the first place. Islamic parties like PAS were on a roll, and it took extreme measures (echos of the Kemalist iron fist to secularize and prohibit many islamic practices in Turkey) - less than fair electoral practices for UMNO and Barisan National to stay in charge and confront them, eventually making the rulers make up a new islam "Islam Hidari" and impose it on their people without consent because they could not counter those who could simply quote from the scholars, sura and sunna to justify a purer form of islamic rule. Islam Hidari is a joke. Their own people know it. Islamic religious apartheid is the norm there, in the so called moderate islamic state, which has shed many of the laws handed down to them by the Brits. The went from a western oriented state to an islamofascist mockery of democracy under UMNO and Mahathir. Even he had to concede his powerbase to sharia and religious police in order to stay in power so I watch the evolution of Iraq with historcial examples like this in mind, and watch the roles of those such as Ayatollah Sistani with great suspicion and unease.

Im not writing off democracy of course, but see it a possible two step solution, and not as a single step solution all on its own.

I wrote a post right after HAMAS won their election (note the date) here (#48) on the "Daniel Pipes: Region not ripe for democracy" thread.

The main part I wanted to draw your attention to was this:

... I believe (I may be wrong) it was Thomas Friedman who wrote an article about about the ongoing conflict or civil war in the islamic world between those that lean towards more secular forms of society, and the "true believers" who advocate a return to islamic basics. I believe he mentioned something along the lines of pushing for democracy in saudi arabia, not because he thought it would bring in rulers who were more friendly to the west, but the opposite, because it would bring in a more extreme theocracy, which may repulse the growing youth segment of their population in the hopes they may come to their senses, along the lines of the Iranians who have grown up to reject the rule by their mullahs.

Now, I differ with Friedman some of his basic premises about islam, but thats not what I wanted to bring up, it's his (if he was indeed the author I'm thinking of) "other" option here.

Lets also put aside possible holes in this argument which appears to follow a premise of "all other variables remaining equal" and the possibility of free and fair elections producing a theocracy which effectively becomes a terrorist state who may seek to acquire biological and chemical weapons (why spend years warning the kuffar by building nuclear infrastructure first) and consider what next step of the game plan is.

What if, for example in the case of the Palestinian elections, it was Sharons intention all along to let the world see exactly what Palestinians stand for and let paint themselves into a corner. In many ways, the Palestinian case differs from the above Saudi example because of their economic reliance on Israel, and they are much more vulnerable to the overwhelming power of the IDF and the freezing of international funds. We now have a situation where the enemy can be laid seize to, starved into submission, and those who support or voted for them can see exactly how and why their ideology will fail to produce the mythical islamic Shangri La they had hoped for.

The bigger question is, is this effect of bringing democracy elsewhere in the islamic world ethically acceptable as a two step solution as opposed to an end unto itself? If free and fair elections were held in Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria etc, we know self declared "true believers" would benefit from it.

So do we take gamble and let muslims go ahead and use democracy or free and fair elections to feed themselves to the lions, so to speak, and have us all suffer the likely consequences so muslims may eventually learn the hard way that their lions (mullahs/imams) bite, maul and kill, and stop seeing islam thru rose tinted glasses and come around to understanding the realities of islamic rule like the long suffering Iranians and Afghanis because it ends up being a necessary process in both their collective societys and their individual ideological evolution?

Should we step back and return to continuing to prop up less than perfect regimes, our "friends" the "true believers" deem apostates and in league with the kuffar, turning a blind eye to the "imperfections" of the Mahathirs, Suhartos, Musharrafs and Mubaraks of the world because they are the lesser of two evils, going go back to the cold war "he may be a S.O.B, but he's our S.O.B." way of thinking that has caused us problems in the past?

Or do we face the harsh facts about islam and its founder, placing it firmly in the faces of both mulsim and our own "unenlightened" so we may honestly confront and discredit the ideology and many of its fundamental cornerstones first in the hopes we may eventually pave the way to another long term solution where they don't hang themselves and threaten to take us down with them in the process?

Anyway.. thats my $0.02.

We live in very interesting times where the Saudis have "radicalized" 80% of US mosques with their cash and wahabbi brand of salafyism (see here and here ) and have done the same in many isamic countries, constructing beautiful enormous marble cladded mosques, engaging in their dawah and controlling zakat collections. If anythings becoming remotely close to claiming the title of "mainstream" islam within the many sects and divisions, this may just be it.

For the self declared "true believers," the prophecy of the 72 sects is still playing out so I waiting to see when the muslim world will wake up an realize that islam is their own worst enemy.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.