Posted on 02/24/2006 10:05:16 AM PST by bigsky
Before President Bush gets anywhere near casting his first veto to ensure that the government of the United Arab Emirates can manage elements of six U.S. ports, someone ought to put before him pages 137-139 of “The 9/11 Commission Report.”
If Bush doesn’t then cancel the UAE port deal, Congress must demand testimony from every person named in those pages and the footnotes. That includes former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet; former CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt; former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger; Gen. Hugh Shelton, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Maj. Gen. John Maher, Shelton’s vice director of operations; Gary Schroen, the CIA field officer tracking Bin Laden; “Mike,” the pseudonym the 9/11 Commission gave the U.S.’s Osama bin Laden unit chief; and, most importantly, Richard Clarke, Berger’s assistant for counter-terrorism.
Tipped Off
The story the commission tells is that Clarke made a call to a high-ranking UAE official that may have inadvertently saved bin Laden from a U.S. missile strike. The commission’s reporting strongly suggests someone in the UAE government tipped off someone in Afghanistan, protecting bin Laden.
In early 1999, the Clinton Administration wanted to fire missiles at bin Laden without risking civilian casualties. Bin Laden played into our hands. Intelligence reports from Afghan “tribals” indicated he was frequenting a small hunting camp adjacent to a larger camp outside Kandahar, Afghanistan. Here U.S. missiles could score a clean kill.
But then officials from the UAE got in the way. The commission said:
“On February 8, the military began to ready itself for a possible strike. The next day, national technical intelligence confirmed the location and description of the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. But the location of Bin Laden’s quarters could not be pinned down so precisely. … According to reporting from the tribals, bin Laden regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited the Emiratis. The tribals expected him to be at the hunting camp for such a visit at least until midmorning on February 11. Clarke wrote to Berger’s deputy on February 10 that the military was then doing targeting work to hit the main camp with cruise missiles and should be in position to strike the following morning. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation.
“No strike was launched. By February 12 bin Laden had apparently moved on, and the immediate strike plans became moot. According to CIA and Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with bin Laden or close by. Clarke told us the strike was called off after consultations with Director Tenet because the intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to Clarke as if the CIA was presenting an option to attack America’s best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable. The bin Laden unit chief, ‘Mike,’ agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill bin Laden before 9/11.
“Even after bin Laden’s departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up. The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and bin Laden. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. When the former bin Laden unit chief found out about Clarke’s call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance. Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke’s phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted. CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate. ‘Mike’ thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting bin Laden.”
Clarke Visited UAE
Footnotes spell out more details. One names the “UAE official” Clarke called: “NSC memo, Clarke, secure teleconference between UAE Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid and Clarke, Mar. 7, 1999.”
Another notes that Joint Chiefs deputy operations director Maher was incredulous the CIA would approve this call: “Maher told us he thinks it ‘almost impossible’ that the CIA cleared Clarke’s call.”
Another indicates Clarke had been in the UAE just before the contemplated strike at bin Laden and had been assured by both bin Zayid and Dubai’s leader, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid, that the UAE would help the U.S. against bin Laden. Bin Zayid even insisted UAE officials were not in Afghanistan, even though it turned out that the UAE chief of staff himself had gone hunting in Afghanistan at about the same time as the contemplated U.S. attacks. The commission said:
“Days before overhead imagery confirmed the location of the hunting camp, Clarke had returned from a visit to the UAE … His visit included one-on-one meetings with Army Chief of Staff bin Zayid, as well as talks with Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid, the ruler of Dubai. Both agreed to try to work with the United States in their efforts against Bin Laden. … On February 10, as the United States considered striking the camp, Clarke reported that during his visit bin Zayid had vehemently denied rumors that high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan. … Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that high-level UAE officials had indeed been at the desert camp. CIA memo, ‘Recent High Level UAE Visits to Afghanistan,’ Feb. 19, 1999. Gen. Shelton also told us that his UAE counterpart said he had been hunting at a desert camp in Afghanistan at about this time.”
Another footnote says that talking points prepared for DCI Tenet that March mention “the UAE being ‘tipped off’ to the CIA’s knowledge of the camp.”
Richard Clarke believed the UAE was a counter-terrorism ally then. Bush believes it now. Clarke apparently was fooled. But that, at least, was before 9/11.
Hell of a rant but I like your style...the truth be told ...but the stars in heaven are more likely to fall first.
The "911 Commission" was a circus but both parties supplied the clowns...
Let me put it this way, if you were to be suspended or banned, would you want the entire forum to know your personal business, the hows and whys and the details? We have a lot more tools at our disposal than you realize. There are things you just don't know about and we will not reveal. It's personal between the poster and management. If, after the suspension, the poster wishes to reveal what happened, that's their decision, unless they lie, then we'll step in and defend our actions. Until then, you'll have to trust Jim.
Another reason why many are opposing this deal... (from the post by Stellar Dendrite):
"Here is a partial list of terrorist organizations and individuals with Dubai, UAE ties that were designated after 9/11 by the Bush administration to have their assets frozen.
· Al Baraka Exchange LLC, Dubai, U.A.E.
· Al-Barakaat, Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Al-Barakaat Group of Companies Somalia Ltd., Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Al-Barakaat Finance Group, Dubai, U.A.E.; Mogadishu, Somalia
· Al-Barakaat Financial Holding Company, Dubai, U.A.E.; Mogadishu, Somalia
· Al-Barakat Global Telecommunications, Hargeysa, Somalia; Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Al-Barakat International, Dubai, U.A.E.
· Al-Barakat Investments, Deira, Dubai, U.A.E.
· Baraka Trading Co., Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakaat Construction Co., Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakaat Group of Companies, Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakaat International Companies (BICO), Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakaat Telecommunications Co. Somalia, Ltd., Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakat Bank and Remittances, Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakat Global Telephone Co., Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Barakat Refreshment Co., Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E. · Parka Trading Co., Deira, Dubai, U.A.E.
· Red Sea Barakat Co. Ltd., Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E.
· Jim'ale, Ahmed Nur Ali, Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, U.A.E."
Were their assets frozen? I know they did freeze quite a bit of them.
I'm reposting information from post #36 by Stellar Dendrite. I need to research it more myself.
Stellar apparently has more info about the UAE on Stellar's homepage, but that information has been temporarily sealed by FR court order for some reason.
:)
It's plain old common sense that Islamic Arabs would take the side of other Islamic Arabs whose philosophy they share. Until the port supporters take that issue head-on, without crying "racism!", the rancor will continue.
Back then Bin Laden was living in a tent. He was moving during the day and moved to a new location every night. Now he is living in a cave but moves every day. The odds of hitting his tent or cave in a missile attack are at best about 10,000 to 1. Our information is always a few hours old.. and he has always moved by the time we strike. He does not know when or where attacks are coming. He just always fears attacks from some source. Such attacks on bin Laden have been likely for years. He escapes killing or capture by constantly moving. He has been doing it for a very long time.
The only thing that surprised bin Laden by the Clinton attack was that it took bubba so long to mount one.
If our military could hit a person moving constantly and in hiding we would have used a missile to get Saddam, and one to get Bin Laden. We have tried at hundreds of times since the fighting started in Afghanistan. We bombed and used missiles on a number of places trying to get Saddam. But it took men on the ground searching possible hiding sights to find him. It will take the same thing to get bin Laden.
Back during the Clinton administration bin Laden was using cell phones to communicate. When ever he used one, he would move. He is not stupid. When someone left his camp, he then moved his camp. If the person who left was to come back they were only told a place to meet a guide who would then bring them to the new camp location. If the guide did not return in a short time they moved again.
It doesn't take much of an I.Q. to figure out how to avoid an attack or capture. Bin Laden is certainly not as dumb as those who believe this crapy report are.
Richard Clarke believes there are people dumb enough to believe him ... and Clarke is right. It would take a real non thinker to believe our military could make a hit on one try for Clinton and then fail in at least several hundred additional tries for Bush 43. WE have a 25 million dollar bounty on his head. It serves two purposes.. Peaple working with Laden try to earn it. But bin Laden moves fast enough so no one has collected it yet. But the mear fact of the 25 million puts him in a position where he can take zero chances and can trust no one.
I am reporting and ready for duty, sir!! :)
Good job, thanks.
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