Posted on 09/14/2006 1:47:32 PM PDT by WmShirerAdmirer
TRENTON, N.J. - A Princeton University computer science professor added new fuel Wednesday to claims that electronic voting machines used across much of the country are vulnerable to hacking that could alter vote totals or disable machines.
In a paper posted on the university's Web site, Edward Felten and two graduate students described how they had tested a Diebold AccuVote-TS machine they obtained, found ways to quickly upload malicious programs and even developed a computer virus able to spread such programs between machines.
The marketing director for the machine's maker — Diebold Inc.'s Diebold Election Systems of Allen, Texas — blasted the report, saying Felten ignored newer software and security measures that prevent such hacking.
"I'm concerned by the fact we weren't contacted to educate these people on where our current technology stands," Mark Radke said.
Radke also question why Felten hadn't submitted his paper for peer review, as is commonly done before publishing scientific research.
Felten said he and his colleagues felt it necessary to publish the paper as quickly as possible because of the possible implications for the November midterm elections.
About 80 percent of American voters are expected to use some form of electronic voting in the upcoming election, in which the makeup of the U.S. House will be decided, as well as 33 Senate seats and 36 governorships.
The AccuVote-TS is commonly used across the country, along with a newer model, the AccuVote-TSx. While Felten wasn't able to test the new machine, he said he thought much of what he found would still apply.
The machine Felten tested, obtained in May from an undisclosed source, was the same type used across Maryland in its primary election Tuesday, according to Ross Goldstein, a deputy administrator with the state's Board of Elections. Goldstein said he couldn't comment on the report until he read it.
Diebold and other machine manufacturers, including California-based Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. and Nebraska-based Election Systems & Software Inc., have been the subject of lawsuits, claiming the machines are vulnerable to hacking and breakdowns that can assign votes to the wrong candidate.
Election officials in some states have also complained.
Previous studies have claimed hacking vulnerabilities with the machines. But Felten claims his study is the first time that an independent research group has obtained an actual machine and tested it extensively.
Felten and graduate students Ariel Feldman and Alex Halderman found that malicious programs could be placed on the Diebold by accessing the memory card slot and power button, both behind a locked door on the side of the machine. One member of the group was able to pick the lock in 10 seconds, and software could be installed in less than a minute, according to the report.
The researchers say they designed software capable of modifying all records, audit logs and counters kept by the voting machine, ensuring that a careful forensic examination would find nothing wrong.
The programs were able to modify vote totals or cause machines to break down, something that could alter the course of an election if machines were located in crucial polling stations.
It was also possible to design a computer virus to spread malicious programs to multiple machines by piggybacking on a new software download or an election information file being transferred from machine to machine, Felten said.
"I think there are many people out there who have the type of technical ability to carry out the sort of attacks we describe here," he said.
Felten said hacking dangers could be mitigated with better software, more restrictions on access to machines and memory cards, and paper receipts verified by the voter.
Radke said Diebold already has implemented many of those things.
This is both factually accurate and intentionally misleading.
Claims? It's pretty much proven.
Felten does have a problem in that he's been threatened with lawsuits from companies over the presentation of previous research that he's done.
Potential Democrat source FOR such machines to tamper with?
Does this mean we can go back to punch cards?
And can elections boards across the nation sue the DNC for a refund?
Seriously, electronic voting, paper receipt, put into a locked box after being verified by the voter. Not a very hard concept - a basic voting system.
Felten and graduate students Ariel Feldman and Alex Halderman found that malicious programs could be placed on the Diebold by accessing the memory card slot and power button, both behind a locked door on the side of the machine. One member of the group was able to pick the lock in 10 seconds, and software could be installed in less than a minute, according to the report.
BUT could it be done while unobserved and could it be done without trigger any internal reset codes?
I know that some PCs have a "tamper" setting to note when the last time the lid was removed.
If somebody could simply upload a program with a memory card that will reprogram the machine, we are in a lot of trouble.
It really doesn't take a rocket scientist. I've been saying the computer count can be programmed for 25+ years. Now they've got us voting by mail in Washington State, and many ballots will not be counted at all because so many people don't read the new special instructions before marking them!
Link to paper's site:
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/
If they are not networked and physical access is limited, I don't understand what the hype is all about. I worry much more about physical ballot box stuffing and in-eligible voters.
I sense this is a bogus issue meant to muddy the waters now that the Dems won't have their chads.
Yes and yes, especially by a local Dim staffer.
I know that some PCs have a "tamper" setting to note when the last time the lid was removed.
That's just a switch that trips something that can be reset by the administrator. That shouldn't be a problem given that they've figured out how to completely control the machines.
What I like best is that they put a lock on it that can be picked in 10 seconds. That's just sad. It sounds like they're using something like the cheap display counter locks you see at stores. Even a moderately good security lock should take a lot longer than that to pick. I just flat-out do not trust a company that would even think of putting such a cheap lock on a voting machine.
Thanks for the link.
Electronic voting machines should just be electronic card punchers.
Input your vote, the machine punches your card, you verify it, and feed it into a machine built by a second manufacturer, which electronically counts and securely stores the card in tamperproof cases.
Watch the video on the website: http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/
It seems pretty simple to do. It can be done in under a minute.
Put the operating system into rom that requires 256 based encryption to reprogram. Eack box gets it's own individual code and the rom chips are embedded such that thay are inacessable without dismantaling the machine.
Physical access is not that limited, and standard procedure consists of a lot of sneakernetting. If a Dim gets to just one machine, and SOP is to accumulate results on one machine before sending them up, one or many machines can be infected and all votes changed.
Get me physical access to two or more machines, and two or more of the removable media devices(the "ballots"), and I guarantee that the results can be pre-programmed across the entire network. And changed at will.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.