ON THE INTERNET:
http://www.google.com/language_tools?hl=en
http://internet-haganah.com/harchives/006780.html
Archived jihad forum thread:
s88179113.onlinehome.us/2010-02-21/ansar-re_possibilities_of_cyberterrorism-reflecting_on_detroit_and_al-khorasani/thread.html
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.5636/pub_detail.asp
March 2, 2010
“Exclusive: Islamic Extremism Linked Across the Atlantic”
Adrian Morgan
English.people.com.cn - PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6907469.html
(”Source: Xinhua”)
Home>>World >> Middle East
“News Analysis: Economy, terrorists’ next target?”
12:35, March 03, 2010
by David Harris
SNIPPET: “Western economies, with the United States at the forefront, would likely be targeted by terrorists, according to a research by an Israeli expert on terrorism.
Professor Gabriel Weimann of the University of Haifa noted that since the attacks on Washington and New York on Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist organizations have realized that enormous damage can be done to the economy and have been increasingly aiming at economically and financially heavyweight targets.”
SNIPPET: “Several of the world’s leading experts on terrorism and the Internet gave varying responses to Weimann’s research during interviews with Xinhua.
“I believe it is an accurate assessment of the situation and of the current thinking of Jihadis, in and out of the various al- Qaida-associated movements and organizations,” said Aaron Weisburd, director of the Society for Internet Research, a U.S.-based non- governmental organization, who has considered much of the same data as Weimann’s team did.
Weisburd pointed to the failed attempt last December to blow up an American plane flying from Amsterdam to Detroit with 289 passengers on board. While all involved heaved a huge sigh of relief when the device failed to detonate properly, the mission that was cheap to put together is already having a huge financial impact.
“Consider the enormous amounts of money that must now be spent on additional airport security, not to mention spending on efforts to combat the al-Qaida franchise in the Arabian Peninsula,” he said.”
Note: The following text is a quote:
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress10/healy031010.htm
Congressional Testimony
Timothy J. Healy
Director, Terrorist Screening Center
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
March 10, 2010
Good morning Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and its role in the interagency watchlisting process.
The attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, highlights the ever-present terrorist threat to our homeland. Over the past seven years, the TSC has played a vital role in the fight against terrorism by integrating terrorist information from the law enforcement and intelligence communities into a single database known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which populates the various terrorist screening systems used by the government. Following the Christmas Day attempted attack, intense scrutiny has been placed on the requirements to nominate individuals to the watchlist and particularly to the no-fly and selectee lists, which are subsets of the TSDB. These requirements, or standards, have evolved over time based on the experience of the watchlisting community and the issuance of additional Presidential Directives. Throughout this process, the TSC has remained committed to protecting the American public from terrorist threats while simultaneously protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. As our efforts continue to evolve in response to new threats and intelligence, your support provides us with the tools necessary to continue our mission.
Let me begin by telling you about the terrorist watchlisting process and how this process related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
Terrorist Nomination Process
The TSDB, commonly referred to as the terrorist watchlist, contains both international
and domestic terrorist information. The procedure for submitting information on individuals for inclusion on the terrorist watchlist is referred to as the nomination process. The nomination process is the most fundamental and singularly important step in the watchlisting process. It is through this process that individuals are added to the terrorist watchlist. Nominations originate from credible information developed by our intelligence and law enforcement partners. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies are referred to as originators in the watchlisting community because it is through their work that nominations are developed. Federal departments and agencies submit nominations of known or suspected international terrorists to the NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center) for inclusion in NCTC’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, which is the source of all international terrorist identifier information in the TSDB. NCTC reviews TIDE entries and nominates entries to TSC that include sufficient biographical or biometric identifiers and supporting derogatory information that meet the watchlisting standard described below. Similarly, the FBI collects, stores, and forwards to the TSC information relating to domestic terrorists that may not have connections to international terrorism.
When submitting a nomination to NCTC, an originator may, but is under no obligation to submit recommendations regarding specific screening systems the nomination should be exported to (e.g., inclusion on either the no-fly or selectee list). If an originator submits a nomination without a recommendation, NCTC may make an appropriate recommendation based on the totality of associated information. Recommendations made by NCTC will be passed to the TSC for final disposition.
TSC accepts nominations when they satisfy two requirements. First, the biographic information associated with a nomination must contain sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened can be matched to or disassociated from a watchlisted terrorist. Second, the facts and circumstances pertaining to the nomination must meet the reasonable suspicion standard of review established by terrorist screening Presidential Directives. Reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the determination that an individual “is known or suspected to be or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to terrorism and terrorist activities.” The reasonable suspicion standard is based on the totality of the circumstances in order to account for the sometimes fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Due weight must be given to the reasonable inferences that a person can draw from the available facts. Mere guesses or inarticulate “hunches” are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. A TSC interagency group composed of members from the intelligence and law enforcement communities issued clarifying guidance to the watchlisting community in February 2009.
TSC makes the final decision on whether a person meets the minimum requirements for inclusion into TSDB as a known or suspected terrorist and which screening systems will receive the information about that known or suspected terrorist. It is not uncommon for a nomination to have multiple recommendations throughout the watchlisting process. In the end, however, TSC works with NCTC and the originators to ensure a nomination is exported to as many screening systems as the nomination information supports.
The watchlisting and nomination process can best be described as a watchlisting enterprise because it requires constant collaboration between the originators, NCTC, and TSC. NCTC relies upon the information provided by the intelligence and law enforcement community, TSC relies upon NCTC to analyze and provide accurate and credible information, and the screening community relies upon TSC to manage that information and to efficiently export it to their screening systems.
Export to Supported Systems
Once a known or suspected terrorist is identified and included in the TSDB, TSC ensures the timely dissemination of the terrorist identity data to our screening partners. The utility of the watchlisting process is greatest when the information is efficiently disseminated to those who need it the most. The TSC’s subject matter experts, who are composed of experienced analysts and designated agency representatives, review nominations to determine whether they meet the criteria for inclusion in the screening systems supported by the TSDB. The four major U.S. government systems supported by the TSDB are: Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for passport and visa screening; Department of Homeland Security’s TECS system for border and port of entry screening; the no-fly and selectee lists used by the Transportation Security Administration for air passenger screening; and the FBI’s National Crime and Information Center’s Known or Suspected Terrorist File (formerly known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)) for domestic law enforcement screening. The criteria for inclusion in each of these systems are tailored to the mission, legal authorities, and information technology requirements of the department or agency that maintains the system. Accordingly, each of these systems contains a different subset of data from TSDB.
The TSDB exports most pertinent to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—CLASS, TECS, and the no-fly and selectee lists—are discussed below.
CLASS
CLASS is a database administered by the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular
Affairs and is used by consular officers abroad to screen visa applicants for travel to the United States. CLASS accepts nearly all records from the TSDB because minimal biographic information is necessary for visa screening. In other words, given where (overseas) and when (well in advance of travel to the U.S.), the government has time to work through what can sometimes be less than complete biographical information—time that might not otherwise be feasible in other screening situations like a routine traffic stop or a busy overseas airport where the presence of U.S. officials is often minimal. The Department of State also uses a screening system known as CLASS-PASSPORT to screen applications for U.S. passports.
The TSC aids the Department of State in identifying known or suspected terrorists through two different processes. The first is the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process, whereby individuals that are watchlisted could be identified at the time of their visa application to visit the United States. When consular officers process visa applications, checks are run in CLASS to determine whether any derogatory information exists to warrant a visa denial. If it is determined that the visa applicant is a possible match to an individual on the terrorist watchlist, the consular officer requests an SAO. The SAO request is forwarded to the TSC, where the Department of State’s subject matter experts at the TSC review the associated TSDB and TIDE records to determine whether the visa applicant is in fact the same watchlisted individual. The TSC’s only role in this process is to determine if the individual applying for the visa is the same individual on the terrorist watchlist. In the case of a positive match, the TSC forwards the information to the Department of State’s Visa Office, in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, to prepare an SAO in response to the request. The SAO is then forwarded to the consular officer adjudicating the visa, who has the authority to issue or deny visa applications. Individuals that are watchlisted at the time of their visa application could be identified through this process.
The second State Department process supported by the TSC is the Visa Revocation Program. The Visa Revocation Program was initiated after 9/11 and is designed to identify individuals who may have received visas prior to that person being identified as a known or suspected terrorist. Every day, the Department of State automatically generates a report that identifies all individuals with a valid visa that could potentially match a person in the TSDB. State officers compare information in CLASS (exported from TSDB), to existing records of visa holders in the Department of State’s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). This report is then evaluated by the State Department experts at the TSC who determine whether there is a positive match to a watchlisted individual. If there is a positive match, then the TIDE record and related derogatory information is made available to the Department of State for review. The secretary of state holds broad discretionary authority to revoke a visa. Therefore, TSC forwards the information to the Department of State’s Visa Office to determine whether to revoke the visa. Individuals that are watchlisted in TSDB after receiving their visas can be identified through this process.
TECS
TECS serves as the Department of Homeland Security’s primary lookout system and receives daily exports of TSDB records from the TSC. Additionally, TECS receives non-terrorist related subject records from more than 20 federal agencies, including a wide spectrum of data, and provides alerts for a variety of law enforcement needs. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the principal owner and primary user of TECS and uses the system to screen individuals at air ports, land, and sea ports of entry. Through TECS, CBP screens against the terrorist watchlist at all 327 ports of entry and by all of the 15 pre-clearance offices located in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland. They also use the terrorist watchlist to conduct screening operations at international mail and cargo facilities. Similar to CLASS, TECS accepts nearly all records from the TSDB. For subjects in TSDB, CBP is alerted to their travel when a commercial airline forwards the passenger manifest to CBP using the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS enhances border security by providing officers with pre-arrival and departure manifest data on all passengers and crew members
No-Fly and Selectee List
The no-fly and selectee lists are unique among TSDB subsets in that they are the only subsets within the terrorist watchlist that have their own substantive minimum derogatory criteria requirements, which are considerably more stringent than the reasonable suspicion standard required for inclusion in TSDB itself. Following the creation of the TSC in 2003, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee established the initial terrorist screening nomination criteria for the no-fly and selectee lists in October 2004. At that time, the no-fly list consisted of substantive derogatory criteria that focused attention on individuals intending to commit acts of terrorism against civil aviation or the domestic homeland. Over time, that initial criteria proved to be too restrictive. Consequently, in February 2008, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee approved additional criteria that served to broaden the scope of terrorists eligible for the no-fly list. In other words, the criteria to place individuals on the no-fly list has broadened to make the no-fly list more inclusive to respond to additional terrorism threats. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General recognized the significance of the additional criteria when, in a May 2009 report, it stated, “Major security gaps have been addressed by adding no-fly criteria.”1
For international terrorists, the process to be included on the no-fly list begins, as it does with every nomination, with a federal agency nominating an individual to NCTC for inclusion in TIDE. NCTC analysts review the nomination to ensure it meets nomination criteria and then forward the nomination to the TSC. Analysts at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of the nomination, which includes a review of the derogatory information contained in TIDE and the FBI’s Automated Case System. During this process, if there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaging in terrorism or terrorist activity, the terrorist would be added to the TSDB. Placement on the no-fly list requires two components, sufficient biographical information and sufficient derogatory information. If additional information existed to satisfy any of the substantive derogatory criteria and the minimum biographic criteria for the no-fly list, the terrorist’s name would be exported to the no-fly list as well. If the analyst reviewing the no-fly nomination determines that there is insufficient information to warrant inclusion on the no-fly list, the nomination is forwarded to the TSA (Office of Intelligence and/or the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)) subject matter experts at the TSC for further analysis and a final recommendation. The TSA subject matter expert will review the nomination and all accessible derogatory information associated with the individual and apply the no-fly and selectee list criteria to that information. Based upon that review and analysis, the TSA/FAMS subject matter expert will then decide based upon that criteria whether the individual will be included on either the no-fly or selectee list.
Inclusion on the no-fly list prohibits a potential terrorist from boarding a commercial aircraft that departs or arrives in the United States. It also prohibits an airplane carrying an individual on the no-fly list from transiting United States airspace. The selectee list is used to provide the individual with a secondary screening. Currently, TSA provides the no-fly and selectee list to commercial air carriers, who are then responsible for passenger prescreening against the no-fly and selectee lists. With the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Flight Program, the U.S. government will assume the responsibility of passenger prescreening against the no-fly and selectee lists, which will improve the overall effectiveness of this process.
Actions Since December 25, 2009
Before December 25, 2009, TSC did not receive a nomination to watchlist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and, as a result, he was not watchlisted in TSDB. Following the attempted terrorist attack, the president of the United States initiated a review of the facts that permitted Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board Northwest Airlines Flight 253. In his January 7, 2010 memorandum, the president concluded that immediate actions must be taken to enhance the security of the American people. These corrective actions were also required to ensure that the standards, practices, and business processes that have been in place since the aftermath of 9/11 are appropriately robust to address the evolving terrorist threat facing our nation in the coming years. As a result, the TSC was given two instructions. The first was to conduct a thorough review of the TSDB and ascertain the current visa status of all known and suspected terrorists, beginning with the no-fly list. That process has now been completed. The second was to develop recommendations on whether adjustments are needed to the watchlisting nominations guidance, including biographic and derogatory criteria for inclusion in TIDE and TSDB, as well as the no-fly and selectee lists. To do so, TSC convened its Policy Board Working Group with representation from NCTC, DHS, CIA, NSA, DOD, DOJ, DOS, and NSC to achieve interagency consensus. That process is underway and TSC is working with its interagency partners to develop appropriate recommendations for consideration by the president.
As of yet, however, there have been no formal changes to watchlisting criteria, including the criteria for inclusion on the no-fly list, since February 2008 when those criteria were last expanded. At the direction of the White House and in conjunction with NCTC, the TSC has made some temporary and limited additions to the watchlist to counter the specific terrorist threat observed on December 25, 2009. As a result, a threat-related target group was identified and individuals from specific high-threat countries already residing in TIDE or TSDB were added to the no-fly and selectee lists, or upgraded to TSDB if necessary, to prevent future attacks.
Conclusion
As the investigation into the events that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board Flight 253 continues, the TSC remains focused on fulfilling its presidential and interagency mandates to share terrorist screening information with our domestic and foreign partners. We have a standing commitment to improve our operational processes, to enhance our human capital and technological capabilities, and to continue to protect Americans from terrorist threats while protecting privacy and safeguarding their civil liberties. Terrorist watchlisting has been a vital tool in the counterterrorism efforts of the United States government and will continue to be so in the future. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. I look forward to answering your questions.
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation, OIG-09-64, May 2009.
Thanks to Dinah Lord for the ping to this thread.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2480812/posts
“Poor Decisions Haunting In Al-Awlaki Case”
Investors.com ^ | March 26, 2010 | DAVID IGNATIUS
Posted on March 26, 2010 5:48:33 PM PDT by Kaslin
Let’s hope MI5 and MI6 knows about this.
#
http://news.oneindia.in/2010/04/04/alqaeda-urges-uk-fanatics-to-build-diy-cruise-missiles.html
“Al-Qaeda urges UK fanatics to build DIY cruise missiles”
Sunday, April 4, 2010,10:30 [IST]
SNIPPET: “London, Apr 4(ANI): Fears of a terror attack during the UK General Election have been further fueled by reports that the Al-Qaeda has urged British fanatics to build DIY cruise missiles to attack passenger jets.
According to reports, an Al-Qaeda website explains how to build missiles with solid fuel engines using operating manuals for the Russian 107mm Katyusha rocket. Numerous links are also available for guides to make explosives, including C4 plastic explosive, acetone peroxide and TNT.
The same site was used to explain how to bring down a jet before former London student Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up a passenger jet over Detroit on last year’s Christmas Day.
Another recent posting shows a sophisticated computer-designed plan for a two-stage missile that would drop an explosive device on to a target by parachute.”
#
Note: Photo included.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/usborn_cleric_awlaki.php
“US-born cleric Awlaki ‘proud’ to have taught al Qaeda operatives”
By BILL ROGGIO
April 27, 2010 4:12 PM
SNIPPET: “An American-born Muslim cleric who is a senior member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has admitted to training two terrorists who carried out attacks against the US over the past six months.
Anwar al Awlaki, an American citizen who is based in Yemen and serves as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s mufti, said he was “proud” to have trained Major Nidal Hasan, the US Army doctor who murdered 13 soldiers at a deployment center at Fort Hood, Texas, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who failed to detonate a bomb on an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day.
“I am proud to have been their teacher,” Awlaki said in a videotape aired today by Al Jazeera.”
Note: The jihad forum link was made non-clickable by me.
#
Note: The following post is a quote:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2520400/posts
Washington Post Article Saved the Life of Terrorist Anwar Al Awlaki
May 24 2010 | jveritas
Posted on May 24, 2010 5:46:49 PM PDT by jveritas
In his most recent interview with an Al Qaeda media outlet terrorist “Anwar Al Awlaki” the US born Al Qaeda terrorist said that he stopped his communications when he read in the Washington Post that he is being tracked by US intelligence. He said that once he stopped his communications he left the area in Yemen where he was hiding and then this area was bombed by US airstrikes.
He also said that both terrorists “Nidal Hassan” who killed 13 of our troops at Fort Hood and “Omar Farouk Abd Al Moutaleb” who had the failed terrorist attack on the Delta Detroit plane on Christmas Day 2009 were his students and that he is honored and proud that they were his students.
In his interview he called for every muslim serving in the US military to imitate what terrorist “Nidal Hassan” did and kill US soldiers.
He said that he is very proud of his role to incite violence against Americans.
The text of his video interview with “Al Malahem” which the media outlet of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula can be found on this link below which is from “al falojah” terrorist forum. It is in Arabic.
alfaloja.ws/vb/showthread.php?t=117974
Below is the translation of terrorist Anwar Al Awlaki statement regarding the Washington Post article:
Beginning of the translation
Question from “Malahem” Al Qaeda media: The Americans are saying that after Nidal Hassan attack they tighten the noose around your neck, they closed your website on the internet and now you are being chased, is that true?
Answer from terrorist Al Awlaki: Yes they closed this website after Nidal Hassan attack, I wrote on the website an article approving of what Nidal Hassan did and then after that they closed the website. After that I read an article in the Washington Post that they are monitoring my communications so I was forced to stop these communications and left the area and then after that the American bombardment occurred.
End of the translation
Quote:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2554068/posts
Treasury Designates Anwar Al-Aulaqi, Key Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
TREAS.gov - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY - TG-779 ^ | July 16, 2010 | n/a
Posted on July 16, 2010 4:09:47 PM PDT by Cindy
NOTE The following text is a quote:
July 16, 2010 TG-779
Treasury Designates Anwar Al-Aulaqi, Key Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
Treasury Targets al-Qa’ida Leader with Ties to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Anwar al-Aulaqi, a key leader for al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Yemen-based terrorist group. Aulaqi was designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224 for supporting acts of terrorism and for acting for or on behalf of AQAP. Since its inception in January 2009, AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks against Saudi, Korean, Yemeni and U.S. targets. Executive Order 13224 freezes any assets Aulaqi has under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with him.
“Anwar al-Aulaqi has proven that he is extraordinarily dangerous, committed to carrying out deadly attacks on Americans and others worldwide,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. “He has involved himself in every aspect of the supply chain of terrorism — fundraising for terrorist groups, recruiting and training operatives, and planning and ordering attacks on innocents.”
Aulaqi has pledged an oath of loyalty to AQAP emir, Nasir al-Wahishi, and plays a major role in setting the strategic direction for AQAP. Aulaqi has also recruited individuals to join AQAP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support of acts of terrorism, and helped focus AQAP’s attention on planning attacks on U.S. interests.
Since late 2009, Aulaqi has taken on an increasingly operational role in the group, including preparing Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate an explosive device aboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, for his operation. In November 2009, while in Yemen, Abdulmutallab swore allegiance to the emir of AQAP and shortly thereafter received instructions from Aulaqi to detonate an explosive device aboard a U.S. airplane over U.S. airspace. After receiving this direction from Aulaqi, Abdulmutallab obtained the explosive device he used in the attempted Christmas Day attack.
Aulaqi was imprisoned in Yemen in 2006 on charges of kidnapping for ransom and being involved in an al-Qa’ida plot to kidnap a U.S. official but was released from jail in December 2007 and subsequently went into hiding in Yemen.
“Aulaqi has sought to encourage his supporters to provide money for terrorist causes. Those who provide material support to Aulaqi or AQAP violate sanctions and expose themselves to serious consequences,” continued Levey.
Today’s action supports the international effort to degrade AQAP’s capabilities to execute violent attacks and to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat its financial and support networks. The U.S. Government will continue to work with allies to identify and take action against persons acting for or on behalf of, or providing financial and other prohibited support to, Aulaqi and AQAP.
Identifying Information
Individual: Anwar al-Aulaqi AKA: Anwar al-Awlaki AKA: Anwar al-Awlaqi AKA: Anwar Nasser Aulaqi AKA: Anwar Nasser Abdulla Aulaqi AKA: Anwar Nasswer Aulaqi DOB: April 21, 1971 Alternate DOB: April 22, 1971 POB: Las Cruces, New Mexico Citizenship: United States Citizenship: Yemen Location: Shabwah Governorate, Yemen
###
http://www.investigativeproject.org/blog/2010/07/us-designates-awlaki-a-terrorist
For The Record - The IPT Blog
Latest Posts | Archive |
U.S. Designates Awlaki a Terrorist
by IPT News • Jul 16, 2010 at 6:48 pm
SNIPPET: “He has become a recruiter of terrorists against America, and on Friday, the U.S. Treasury Department designated American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki a leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The move freezes any assets he may have here and makes it illegal for anyone in the United States to engage in any transactions with Awlaki or to provide him with material support. It has been reported that President Obama already had authorized killing Awlaki, who is connected to a series of recent attacks, including Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hasan and failed Detroit airline bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. He also called for direct attacks on American civilians.”
http://www.jihadwatch.org/2010/09/plea-deal-possible-for-airline-underwear-jihadist.html
(AP)
“Plea deal possible for airline ‘underwear jihadist’”
(September 9, 2010)
http://www.investigativeproject.org/blog/2010/09/underwear-bomber-fires-attorneys
For The Record - The IPT Blog
“Underwear Bomber Fires Attorneys”
by IPT News • Sep 13, 2010 at 5:02 pm
SNIPPET: “Since his arrest, Abdulmutallab has reportedly cooperated with law enforcement officials. Through interrogations with him, the FBI has learned that the attack was plotted by radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, that Abdulmutallab was provided training and explosives in Yemen from al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; and that there are “others like me” who would be sent to carry out similar attacks.
At his hearing, Abdulmutallab ignored the advice of U.S. District Judge Nancy Edmunds and dismissed his counsel:
“I prefer to represent myself. Any representation I have, there will always be a conflict of interest…any representation I get would present me in a way that is not in my best interest.””
http://www.freerepublic.com/tag/petn/index
http://www.freerepublic.com/tag/tatp/index
#
Note: Photos and video included.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/23/eveningnews/main6895283.shtml
WASHINGTON, Sept. 23, 2010
“Creating Explosives to Stay Ahead of Terrorists
TSA Chief Shows CBS News How Failed Underwear Bomb Was Supposed to Work, Won’t Apologize for Limiting Liquids on Planes”
By Bob Orr
SNIPPET: “(CBS) New transportation security chief John Pistole began this day, like all others, with a terror update.
Pistole knows terrorists continue to plot new attacks. They nearly succeeded last Christmas Day when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to ignite a bomb concealed in his underwear as Northwest flight 253 approached Detroit.
At a Transportation Security Administration testing facility, Pistole gave CBS News an exclusive look at the type of powerful explosive used in the unsuccessful attack: Pentaerythritol tetranitrate, also know as PETN, which an al Qaeda bomb-maker had mixed with another explosive, TATP, to make the underwear bomb, reports CBS News Justice and Homeland Security correspondent Bob Orr.”
http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/204314.php
October 08, 2010
“London Univeristy Whitewashes Islamic Extremism on Campus, Ties to Detroit Bomber”
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1442.pdf
#
http://www.investigativeproject.org/blog/2010/12/new-charges-against-christmas-bomber
“NEW CHARGES AGAINST CHRISTMAS BOMBER” [Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab]
December 15, 2010, 5:10 pm
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/03/24/al-qaida-detroit-just-cheapest-flight/
(AP)
“For al-Qaida, Detroit was just the cheapest flight”
Published March 24, 2011
Associated Press
SNIPPET: “WASHINGTON – When an admitted al-Qaida operative planned his itinerary for a Christmas 2009 airline bombing, he considered launching the strike in the skies above Houston or Chicago, The Associated Press has learned. But tickets were too expensive, so he refocused the mission on a cheaper destination: Detroit.”
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/24/al-qaida-bomber-leaves-fingerprint/
(AP)
“Al-Qaida bomber leaves behind a fingerprint”
Published May 24, 2011
Associated Press
WASHINGTON –
SNIPPET: “Investigators have pulled a fingerprint of Ibrahim al-Asiri off the bomb hidden in the underwear of a Nigerian man accused of trying to blow up a plane over Detroit on Christmas Day. Counterterrorism officials say the explosives in that bomb are chemically identical to those hidden inside two printers that were shipped from Yemen to the U.S. last year.”
“Nigerian accused of Detroit terrorism plot wants interview thrown out, trial moved from Mich.”
By Associated Press, Published: August 5
DETROIT —
SNIPPET: “Abdulmutallab, 24, is charged with trying to ignite explosives in his underwear on an Amsterdam-to-Detroit flight with nearly 300 people aboard. Passengers pounced on him and put out the flames on Christmas Day 2009.”
“Detroit underwear bomb jihadist shouts “jihad” in court, demands to be judged by Qur’an only”
(September 14, 2011)