Posted on 04/19/2010 8:02:23 AM PDT by Publius
Having laid out his ideas for raising taxes in Federalist #12, in this very short paper Hamilton now lays out his ideas for saving money, and the Union under the new Constitution is his way of doing it. Here he war-games different scenarios about how the Union might break up, and what would be the results of that breakup.
1 To the People of the State of New York:
2 As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy.
3 The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people.
4 If the states are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for – and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole.
5 The entire separation of the states into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates.
6 The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies – one consisting of the four northern, another of the four middle, and a third of the five southern states.
7 There is little probability that there would be a greater number.
8 According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain.
9 No well informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the Convention.
10 When the dimensions of a state attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
11 This idea admits not of precise demonstration because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any given number of individuals, but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.
12 Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent, and can in a manner reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
13 The supposition that each confederacy into which the states would be likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed will be strengthened by another supposition, more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the alternative to a general union.
14 If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different states, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two governments.
15 The four eastern states, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite.
16 New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy.
17 There are other obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it.
18 New Jersey is too small a state to think of being a frontier in opposition to this still more powerful combination, nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it.
19 Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the northern league.
20 An active foreign commerce on the basis of her own navigation is her true policy and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens.
21 The more southern states, from various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation.
22 They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.
23 Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy.
24 As she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the northern, confederacy.
25 This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America.
26 Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the northern confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that state.
27 Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen states will be able to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole.
28 This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
29 If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue, and if we also take into view the military establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the states would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue and liberty of every part.
Hamilton’s Critique
Hamilton makes it short and sweet. His argument can be summed up in three words: economies of scale. His point is that there are inevitable redundancies when each of several – he specifies three – regional confederacies decides to fill the necessary capacities of a sovereign state, notably that there will be three defense establishments (29), three civil lists (4), three sets of separate foreign and domestic policies, etc. Moreover, that a single national government will itself find it easier to perform, given a broader base of talent and – this is, after all, Hamilton who is speaking – revenue.
But what if there were, in fact, no ratification of the proposed Constitution? What if the country were to coalesce around three or so regional governments? There the economies of scale would be lost, to be sure, but as well there would be difficult choices ahead for the states whose allegiance might be torn between the natural alignments. Hamilton cites Pennsylvania as such a state – presently empowered by its central status in the War of Independence and the formation of the new government, and as a center of American culture fully a rival of New York or Virginia. All of that would disappear were there to be no central government, in Hamilton’s assessment, and as a result Pennsylvania would be torn between the new power centers.
A cynic, especially one from Pennsylvania, might observe that there is in this a representation of a political rivalry between that state and New York that persists to this day. Hamilton’s comparison of her potential status to that of Flanders, torn historically between France, the Netherlands and the Spanish Habsburgs, was one that would make most New Yorkers of the time nod, and Pennsylvanians fume.
Nevertheless, Hamilton’s speculation had a sound basis behind it. Pennsylvania was at that time the western border of settled America, occupying an obviously pivotal position in the expansion of the new country or countries, however that played out. Whichever direction her alliances led her, neutrality was probably not an option, and Hamilton suggests that it was likely to work to the detriment of the country as a whole.
He goes on to compare the situation of the colonies to that of the parent country, Britain, whose present population – some 8 million – availed itself of a central government that was among the most powerful and efficient in the world. The United States, should the Constitution be ratified, would consist of half that population and three times that surface area even before the Louisiana Purchase would lead to a Manifest Destiny that would encompass the greater portion of the continent.
10 When the dimensions of a state attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
11 This idea admits not of precise demonstration because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any given number of individuals, but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.
It is a revealing admission, and coming from someone displaying Hamilton’s assurance – his opponents would say “arrogance” – one is not entirely surprised to have to read between the lines to reach it. The truth was, the Founders were all in uncharted territory, and the honest among them admitted it. What could be more natural than for them to use as a model the premier representative government of the time, despite the fact that they had just concluded a protracted war to win free of that country’s grip? In plain point of fact America’s was not yet a society more numerous than Britain’s, but no one in possession of a map and even what primitive immigration statistics as existed at the time could doubt that she would soon outstrip her founding sister. Clearly, at least to Hamilton, some form of centralization would be required for this new country to take her place among her European antecedents on an equal basis. Yet Hamilton tactfully declines to remind his readers that the union of which he spoke was forged in war, and that the plucking at his sleeve was the gentle reminder from the inhabitants of Wales, Scotland and Ireland that perhaps economies of scale came at a price.
America’s price of union would be paid in similar, sanguinary coin before the next century was yet two-thirds spent. Perhaps not altogether accidentally, one of the most crucial contests between the two regional powers of the time would be played out in Pennsylvania, near a town named Gettysburg.
Discussion Topic
Earlier threads:
FReeper Book Club: The Debate over the Constitution
5 Oct 1787, Centinel #1
6 Oct 1787, James Wilson’s Speech at the State House
8 Oct 1787, Federal Farmer #1
9 Oct 1787, Federal Farmer #2
18 Oct 1787, Brutus #1
22 Oct 1787, John DeWitt #1
27 Oct 1787, John DeWitt #2
27 Oct 1787, Federalist #1
31 Oct 1787, Federalist #2
3 Nov 1787, Federalist #3
5 Nov 1787, John DeWitt #3
7 Nov 1787, Federalist #4
10 Nov 1787, Federalist #5
14 Nov 1787, Federalist #6
15 Nov 1787, Federalist #7
20 Nov 1787, Federalist #8
21 Nov 1787, Federalist #9
23 Nov 1787, Federalist #10
24 Nov 1787, Federalist #11
27 Nov 1787, Federalist #12
27 Nov 1787, Cato #5
Careful. We might give the current powers some new ideas.
Actually, this exercise should give TPTB conniption fits. The last thing they want is people thinking along these lines.
In case DHS is watching, I should note that one of Robert Heinlein’s last novels is set in an Amrica that has broken up. Texas is a separate republic, and there is the Great Chicago Imperium, the “well run tyranny” of the continent.
Your hooliganism has been noted, Comrade. Please turn over your ration card...
Ratification of the Constitution was a close run thing. Among the three most powerful states, VA, MA, NY there were 583 delegates. The “Ayes” won by a total of only 18 votes.
That fact is the basis of an essay that will accompany Federalist #14 next week.
Ironic that centralization was viewed as frugal initially and now it is the hallmark of waste.
The system never really worked as intended. The 1800s were rife with panics and scandals, not the least of which involved the author of this essay. Hamilton’s vision of a strong federal government is supported by the wealth we enjoy and U.S. domination of world affairs, even with an incompetent hack like the current executive. I’ve wondered what Hamilton would think about the current state of the union. I wonder how much his opinion would depend on his position in the power structure. Some of Hamilton’s contemporaries viewed Hamilton as first and foremost for Hamilton, with the rest of the country a distant second. It is difficult to judge the man.
In Hamilton’s essay, I believe he does not properly cover the danger of foreign influences. Any one of the factions may have fallen for some “help” by Great Britain, or France, or Spain....ad infinitum.
Such a threat never materialized?
The real fear - and we'll address it in the next Federalist - is that were the country heavily regionalized instead of united there would be inevitable conflicts of interest that could be exploited by Europeans who would end up owning the middle by playing off the two sides against one another. They were very good at that, as the upcoming "Golden" Age of colonialism would prove to the dismay of everyone from Africa to Indonesia.
It was eventually the Monroe Doctrine that kept that from happening in North America (any more than it already had), which was planned by Monroe, John Quincy Adams...and the British. It seems counterintuitive but the Brits really did have some very effective strategic thinkers, and they ended up throttling the ability of their European rivals to conduct proxy wars on this continent, protecting both their Canadian and Caribbean claims.
One of the former almost brought the two sides to war shortly before the Civil War. I have to work the story of the Pig War into this because it cracks me up, and some of the names involved - George Pickett and Winfield Scott - would figure large in the big war to come on the other side of the continent. One participant reportedly said "Two great nations are going to war over what?"
Thanks!
I’m surprised that foreign influences did not win a heavier hand in the formation of the US, or in the war over secession. I appreciate the lesson!
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