Posted on 11/19/2014 4:19:31 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Interesting. Thanks for pointing that post out.
I believe the CIA was born from WWII and originally called Office of Strategic Service (OSS). Maybe the OSS and the idea of intelligence as critical to offensive/defensive strategy was in its infancy and too new to be as effective as it needed to be (ie. getting close enough to the German command to know their intentions). Were there any results from any root-cause analyses of the cause of these inelligence failures?
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3223424/posts?page=12#12
2. I was wondering about the Ardennes myself.
3. Several days ago someone here mentioned that Patton wanted to let the Germans advance toward Antwerp so he could then "cut them up," but Ike declined.
Thanks, a little more insight. I guess the CIA called the OSS at the time was in its beginning, infant stages.
A couple of years ago I read my children several books by the author and illustrator Tomie de Paola, about his childhood in Connecticut. I was surprised to read that they begin "Christmas" celebrations in November in the late 1930s and early '40s.
The series went up to the middle years of World War II. I hope he gets through the end of the war, at least, before he dies!
The thrust of the column seems to be the Germans are nearly a spent force running out of veterans who are increasingly relying on poorly trained and inexperienced troops.
Plus, we still see a lot of "the war is won" mentality coming through comments made in and to the press.
Old men and kids.
I'd not previously seen a reference to Germany's reliance on counter-punching. I'm curious why they adopted that--I'm a complete neophyte at military strategy, so it's all new to me.
Reminds me of Monty's Market Garden folly and these football runners who prematurely start celebrating and get tackled before reaching the end zone.
I have seen references to the concept previously, probably in other Baldwin pieces. We have seen the counterattack used repeatedly in the Eastern Front. We saw it in the West after Patton had broken out of Normandy when Hitler ordered a counterattack in the Mortain area, intended to cut Patton off from his logistical base. It had no chance.
We saw so much euphoria during the Pursuit after the Normandy Breakout and understandably so. But after Market-Garden largely failed the Germans have engaged us in hard fighting in the Scheldte, Aachen and the Hurtgen Forest and at Metz. That should be sobering people up who hoped the War would be over by Christmas. Christmas will be very different this year.
Do you suppose that, instead of being Germany’s preferred strategy, counter-attacking is simply all they saw themselves as capable of? That is, marshaling sufficient force for a major offensive was impractical when fighting a two-front war, where the other (eastern) front was requiring the bulk of resources and personnel. In other words, a necessity rather than a preference?
In theory, once the attacker was sufficiently attrited by pushing into the defense in depth and had not yet organized its own defenses the counterattack would catch the attacker when vulnerable, inflict considerable casualties and restore the line, possibly allowing the defenders to go on the offensive.
So, it was not an act of desperation, but a critical means of the defense maintaining the initiative. This is the defense Von Runstedt and Rommel wanted to run in Normandy that Hitler refused to allow.
Hmm? Nimitz says B-29s left for Tokyo at 202032Z. If my UTC to local time calculation is accurate, Nimitz says the planes left at 10:20am Saipan time.
Baldwin is thinking of battalion or regiment sized counterattacks. He doesn’t think the Germans are capable of more. Interesting that in the past two weeks, he’s overestimated the remaining fighting power of the Imperial Japanese Navy and underestimated it for the Wehrmacht.
I want to echo your comment about the Combined Fleet webpage. It is one of the finest historical resources on the internet.
The Germans always tried this doctrine at the tactical level and are still doing it with differing amounts of success. A local counterattack cut up an American battalion of the 28th Division at Schmidt a week or two ago.
The doctrine worked well at the operational level for von Manstein at the Third Battle of Kharkov in February 1943 in the vast spaces of the East, where neither side had air supremacy. Rommel realized that while the doctrine could still work at the tactical level, allied air power would negate it at the operational level. And what Rommel didn’t realize is that where air power can’t intervene, American artillery will.
I vaguely recall Walter Cronkite reminiscing in an interview shortly before he died about being given a tour of an artillery unit somewhere in Europe during WWII. The unit was preparing a time-on-target fire against a German held village. The CO asked Cronkite if he would like to commence fire, Cronkite said yes and the CO told him to press this button. Cronkite pressed the button.
Thanks for your informative reply.
Actually Patton said let them march to Paris. Ike did not bite.
Got it. Thanks.
The awful weather is helping the Germans right now. It seems day after day we read the air force was grounded someplace.
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