General Eisenhower: Remember the Road Not Taken

Townhall.com ^ | June 1, 2021 | Robert Orlando

[Kaslin]

Robert Frost’s iconic poem, memorized by generations of schoolchildren, reflects on one man’s choice between two roads that “diverged in a yellow wood.” Frost’s message was that the man’s will affected the course of his entire life. But what if the ‘choice’ was not that of a single soul but great power at war? 

Who should have the right to make that choice: The political leader or the military leader? The general can see the battle clearer than any politician but often can only see the battle and not the war. The politician may see the full scope of the war, but that scope may blind him to the fight on the ground. These conflicts have been at the heart of some of the most significant moments in history.

Arguably the most far-reaching of those decisions took place on the road to Berlin in 1945 - a decision that continues to haunt us until 2021.

On the night of April 15th, 1945, Germany, Russia, and the United States prepared for a battle that would change the future of humanity and feel its ripple today. By the time it ended, 16 days later, a Reich would fall, a free nation would falter, and a Red Menace would rise. 

General Patton tried to convince his superiors that Berlin was high stakes in the future of the West. “We had better take Berlin,” he told General Eisenhower. “And quick.” To the east, the seasoned Allies battlefield commanders demanded to fight, but the politicians denied it. In the center, the Nazi politicians demanded a war continue that the generals knew already lost. To the east, and only in the east, there was harmony. Both the generals and the politicians lusted for war. 

They committed atrocities and were ambivalent to their horrific casualties, but they possess a clear vision that allowed them to achieve their objective. If only the generals and the politicians from the West had found that harmony; what a different world it would be. 

That Eisenhower reversed himself on Berlin is clear. Though he offered three reasons why he would not let the Western Allies move into Berlin, his change of strategy is mystifying at best and dereliction of judgment at worst. To this day, Eisenhower’s rationale factors into most discussions of World War II and has caused a rift between Anglo and American scholars, mirroring inevitable disagreements between Churchill and Roosevelt.

Eisenhower’s stated reasons for holding Allied troops back from Berlin are as follows: 

1. According to the terms of the Yalta Agreement (what Churchill called a “naughty document”), signed by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt in February 1945, promised the Russians they could capture Berlin. By the end of the engagement in the European theater, the U.S. and Britain needed Russia to help hasten an end to the war with the Japanese in the Pacific;
2. The Western Allies were fatigued after years of a punishing war and there was no guarantee they could reach and conquer Berlin without massive loss of life. Berlin was a death trap; and
3. Control of the city was merely symbolic, not strategically crucial and a mess to maintain. Eisenhower would posit to Patton, “Who would want Berlin anyway?” Patton responded, “History will tell you.” Patton was right!

In 1945, America made a decision not to challenge the Soviet Union. In 2019, America is still paying for that decision. The choice made on the Autobahn in the closing hours of World War II in Europe continues to impact the world. 

At the center of this historical crossroads, one dominant question remains: Was the choice to stand down and cede Berlin to the Russians, when the Western Allies were within striking distance, a necessary choice or a monumental political blunder? 

Should a battlefield commander be allowed to overrule the orders of his commander-in-chief? A single decision can transform a life, a nation, or the world in poetry and war.

In his bestselling book, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed: “Having been handed the prize Stalin proceeded to show that he, at least, had his political priorities straight. Contravening his assurances to Eisenhower, he ordered the main thrust of the Soviet ground offensive to be aimed at Berlin, giving Marshals Zhukov and Koniev two weeks to launch an attack he had told Eisenhower would not take place until the second half of May!”

There is no question that the Allies were thwarted in their quest to take Berlin. But why? Why did Eisenhower forfeit the convictions he had held earlier? Professor, historian and author David Clay Large offers this explanation: 

“The reason Eisenhower was not prepared to dicker on Berlin was that he had come to believe that holding the Western position in the city was symbolically imperative (if militarily difficult). The alternative scenario he conjured up if the West voluntarily gave up Berlin, or was forcibly kicked out, was very dramatic. He saw the old German capital as the first of a proverbial row of dominos, which would inevitably start tumbling if the West abandoned the city.

“Once Berlin went, Germany would be next, and once Germany fell, all Europe would tumble, and with Europe in Soviet hands, America would be unable to remain a democratic nation. As Eisenhower put it: “If Berlin fell, the U.S. would lose Europe, and if Europe fell into the hands of the Soviet Union and thus added it great industrial plant to the USSR’s already great industrial plant, the United States would be reduced to the character of a garrison state if it were to survive at all.” 

In other words, the loss of Berlin meant a fascist America. 

Opinions, like the leafy path in Frost’s poem, diverge. They diverged in 1945, and they do today. The consequences of allowing the Red Army to reach Berlin before the Western Allies are incontrovertible; that decision gave the Soviets a chance to establish their beachhead and rain terror on Berlin and Eastern Europe. The reasons behind the decision seemed just as clear and uncontested. But new research and the ability to look at events in a new light combine to make this author think that the world would have been a very different place if Eisenhower hadn’t called “halt.” 

There is a haunting echo of “What if” at the end of Frost’s poem: “Two roads diverged in a wood, and I took the one less traveled by And that has made all the difference.”

What if Berlin were The Road Taken, then what might have been?

[sauropod]

With our current Military leadership, I would not trust them to see the battle.

[abb]

Back when Homer_Simpson did his WW2 + 70 yrs thread, we got into a big discussion about the delay in opening up the port of Antwerp in the fall of ‘44, and how that affected the overall war in Europe. Ever since, I’ve done a bit of research on the issue.

Antwerp proper, the port, docks, cranes, etc was captured around September 1, ‘44. But the Scheldt Estuary was not, and the port remained unusable until November, after the Germans were rooted out and the mines cleared.

It was Monty’s failure to move quickly and exploit an opportunity to capture the estuary that caused the problem. Ike had written Monty a “stern letter” directing him to get the port open. A “stern letter.”

So IMO, the blame lies squarely upon Ike’s shoulders for failure to supervise Monty, and TELLING him what to do.

Remember, the logistics issue was critical at this time - gasoline, etc - because of the Allies rapid advancement.

Had that port been usable in September ‘44, the issue of Berlin would never have come up, and the war would have been over by Christmas. No Russians in Berlin, and no Batttle of the Bulge.

This was the single greatest strategic blunder by Ike and the Allies in the European Theater of Operations.

IMHO.

[shanover]

I have always believed this and was not taught in school as the end of WWII was a fairy tail of the Allies great victory and the final war to end all wars with a new world order of things. Propaganda goes both ways. I enjoy reading others who can articulate history like many on Free Republic. My bottom line is that Patton was right and I can extend that to MacArthur in the Pacific.

[abb]

One other thing. About this time, Monty had become preoccupied with Market Garden, his Grand Plan to seize the Rhine bridges. IMO, he was frantic that Patton was getting all the ink with his rapid advancement across France. He had to do “something big” to get attention.

Monty was a giant-ass f#@kup.

IMHO.

[DesertRhino]

Taking Berlin cost the Russians 81,000 dead and 280,000 wounded. I know there is a fantasy that the Nazis wouldn’t have resisted us much and would have quickly surrendered to us.
But I suspect that Robert Orlando was not a US infantryman in April of 1945.

And while fantasy war is fine, one would do well to remember that in April of 1945 the atomic bomb test was still over 3 months away. Okinawa and the Philippines battles raged on. We were facing Okinawa times 100 of e had to invade Japan.

Ike made the best move for America.

[SunkenCiv]

Thanks Kaslin.

[snip] General Patton tried to convince his superiors that Berlin was high stakes in the future of the West. “We had better take Berlin,” he told General Eisenhower. “And quick.” To the east, the seasoned Allies battlefield commanders demanded to fight, but the politicians denied it. In the center, the Nazi politicians demanded a war continue that the generals knew already lost. To the east, and only in the east, there was harmony. Both the generals and the politicians lusted for war. [/snip]

German 9th Army - Hitler s Last Army | Michael Konnar | 6 years ago | 154 views

[DFG]

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[Empire_of_Liberty]

I do not believe that even we believed that we needed Russia to deal with Japan.

The Russians were busying themselves to become involved with Japan and China towards the end of the war, and all completely against the wishes of and behind the backs of the West. They were going to grab everything they could get out of the war.

A different road in Berlin might have kept the Russians busy in the West and ended in a different and better future for China.

The author seems to think that Eisenhower was able to make this decision, himself. I am not so sure.

[DesertRhino]

“Should a battlefield commander be allowed to overrule the orders of his commander-in-chief? “

You mean like when Trump ordered us out of Syria and the generals flipped him the finger and reclassified then all as advisors or whatever and played shell games? No. Generals aren’t smart enough and this is proven by centuries of experience.
Asking a general to set national policy is like letting a 5 year old decide what’s for dinner.

[SunkenCiv]

Well put.

[SunkenCiv]

I wholeheartedly agree.

[DesertRhino]

MacArthur prolonged the pacific war and cost us tens of thousands of casualties. He was provably one of the worst generals we ever produced. His sole success was the occupation of Japan.

[Jeff Chandler]

Taking Berlin cost the Russians 81,000 dead and 280,000 wounded. I know there is a fantasy that the Nazis wouldn’t have resisted us much and would have quickly surrendered to us.

It was no fantasy. The primitive Russian soldiers were ravaging the German civilian population, engaging in the wholesale rape of even the children. The Krauts knew they could expect no such abuse from the Allies.

[Macoozie]

Civilian control of the military is a big part of what makes US different. Pres and Congress set the policies and objectives. Military blows things up, kills enemies and breaks things.(And drops candy from airplanes every once in a while.)

In doing so, it often saves many lives. Often too, many civilians are killed in the process. That’s a big part of what sucks about war.

Our PDJT kept us out of starting any new wars, as he said he would.

We control the direction of our country by our votes.
(At least it used to be that way)

Now Sleepy Xio Bei Din and Kamel-Toe get to burn the whole world down.

[libertylover]

Excellent observation and I think probably spot-on.

Of course Montgomery was planning Operation Market Garden and probably saw that more important than the opening of the port of Antwerp. That may have been his “blinders”, I don’t know.

I’m not an expert but I wonder ... If Montgomery had taken Antwerp, would the Germans have then more fully realized the dangers and beefed up their defenses in the Arnhem path of Market Garden?

From my understanding, Market Garden failed due to poor intelligence (as usual) more so than the lack of the port being open. The area was defended by much better soldiers than the “young boys and old men” the Allies thought were there.

In the end, it’s always a lot easier to Monday morning quarter back to the right answer than to be there and make the right decisions in real-time.

[Jeff Chandler]

My bottom line is that Patton was right

Patton was right every step of the war. Had Ike listened to Patton, the war would have been over long before it was, and the Soviet Army would have been destroyed.

[Sans-Culotte]

My bottom line is that Patton was right and I can extend that to MacArthur in the Pacific.

In the book I read on Patton (Patton: A Genius for War), Ike came off as little more than a diplomat who kissed the asses of the Allies every chance he got. If he had sided with Patton, and the Allies though "he is showing favoritism to a fellow American", so what? Instead he showed favoritism to the Allies. Why did he always find that preferable?

[PLMerite]

"The area was defended by much better soldiers than the “young boys and old men” the Allies thought were there."

Yes, I can only imagine the shock of the Brits and Poles dropping into Arnhem expecting just the disorganized remnants of Army Group B and instead finding 2nd SS Panzer Corps, newly trained in anti-airborne operations, waiting.

[7thson]

Please explain how MacArthur prolonged the war in the Pacific Theater?