By David T. Pyne May 24, 2002
Note: This is a special follow-up to the three part series on the Bush-Putin Nuclear Reduction Treaty posted last week.
The soon to be signed Treaty of Moscow, which mandates that US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads do not exceed 2200 warheads, is deeply flawed and will do little or nothing to reduce the threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal to the United States. One of reasons for this is the fact that the Bush Administration did not want to sign a formal treaty with Russia for the reduction of US and Russian deployed strategic warheads and only belatedly agreed to do so as a major concession by Mr. Bush to Russian President Putin. The Pentagon remained firmly opposed to this treaty long after Bush made the decision to sign it and repeatedly tried to change the treaty language in a veiled attempt to kill it.
Ultimately, the treaty as written is purposely designed by US negotiators to be as unenforceable as possible to preserve maximum flexibility for the US to keep a small hedge of deactivated nuclear weapons which could be re-deployed within a period of several months in the event of a crisis. However, for the same reason that the treaty provides maximum flexibility to the US to get around its restrictions, it also provides maximum flexibility for Russia to avoid any real reductions to its highly potent and dangerously threatening nuclear arsenal. Accordingly, the US will have no real ability to verify that Russian warheads are withdrawn from service as required by the treaty. Whatever happened to Ronald Reagan's motto of "trust but verify?" US negotiators deliberately excluded any effective verification procedures from the terms of the treaty precisely because they do not believe the Russians can afford to maintain their nuclear arsenal at present levels for very long. They believe that the Russians will reduce their arsenal to a level between 1500-2500 warheads within the next decade or so regardless of what the US does.
These longstanding, but faulty and outdated assumptions are based upon assumed strict Russian compliance with the never-ratified START II Treaty, which would have banned all MIRV’d ICBMs that serve as the backbone of the Russian nuclear missile fleet. This new treaty poses serious challenges to the validity of those assumptions because it does not limit the number of deployed missiles or “launchers”, nor does it forbid the Russian deployment of MIRV'd ICBMs. Accordingly, the Russians are allowed to pack as many miniaturized nuclear warheads in each missile as they desire and, in fact, have expressed their intention to do so. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov confirmed earlier this week that the new treaty that the new nuclear disarmament treaty that will be signed Friday allows Russia "to load multiple warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles."
The Russians certainly have no shortage of MIRV’d missiles. Their SS-27 “Topol M”, nominally a single-warhead ICBM, has been said to have the capability to carry as many as seven to ten “miniaturized” warheads according to Russian scientists. The Russians have repeatedly threatened to MIRV these missiles if the US “broke out” of the ABM Treaty as Bush did last December. In addition, the SS-18 “Satan” ICBM, nominally a ten-warhead missile, was revealed to have the capability to carry up to thirty warheads as long ago as 1983, according to a book entitled, “How to Make Nuclear Warheads Obsolete” by Robert Jastrow. What this all means is that with the ineffective to non-existent verification provisions in the Treaty, even if Russia complies with the terms of the treaty, the US will be extremely hard-pressed to guess the actual number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the Russians. The US will also be virtually incapable of detecting Russian treaty violations. The US intelligence community is likely to continue to greatly underestimate the number of deployed Russian warheads because it will be unable to accurately determine whether Russian missiles remain MIRV’d and how many warheads are deployed in each individual missile.
This treaty does not require the destruction of even a single Russian missile or warhead although the Bush administration has signaled its intention to destroy the bulk of the thousands of strategic warheads to be withdrawn from service under the treaty. Furthermore, the treaty does not require any reductions in deployed warheads whatsoever until the treaty comes into force in 2012. Accordingly, 2011 could find Russia in possession of exactly the same arsenal of 6000 strategic nuclear warheads which she possesses today including its SS-18 and SS-24 rail mobile ten-warhead ‘monster’ missiles that she now has aimed against the US. Even when the treaty comes into force in 2012, Russia gets to keep these ‘monster’ missiles and still be in compliance. What’s worse, the terms of the treaty clearly state that the treaty expires in 2012, almost immediately after it comes into force, which means that any Russian warheads withdrawn from service that have not been destroyed may be redeployed at will back up to START I Treaty levels of approximately 6000 strategic warheads.
The Treaty of Moscow manages to retain all of the disadvantages of the unilateral nuclear disarmament measures originally proposed by President Bush and add yet another--the fact that these drastic cuts in the US nuclear arsenal will now be legally enforceable by the Russians. Considering the US historical record of meticulous compliance with past arms control treaties and the Russian record of violating every arms control treaty they have ever signed, US nuclear disarmament measures will be very difficult to reverse in a crisis once they are implemented and thousands of US strategic warheads are destroyed. Unlike the US, the Russians have expressed no intention to destroy the warheads they withdraw under the Treaty. In short, this treaty is arms control at its worst.
Copyright, David T. Pyne, 2002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- David T. Pyne, Esq. is a national security expert who works as an International Programs Manager in the Department of the Army responsible for the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East among others. He is also a licensed attorney and former Army Reserve Officer. In addition, he holds an MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. Mr. Pyne currently serves as Executive Vice President of the Virginia Republican Assembly. He is also a member of the Center for Emerging National Security Affairs based in Washington, D.C. Mr. Pyne serves as a columnist for American-Partisan.com and OpinioNet.com and as a regular contributor for Patriotist.com. His articles have also appeared on Etherzone.com.
Oh my goodness ! Everyone knows the Russians are always truthful !!!!!
NOT !!!
And then Russia saves the day with a little "former Soviet" style treaty action.
If only we had their constancy ...
Someday, I'll have to expound on their cousins, the TEL resident DF-15s in Kunming PRC, at the northern end of the new superhighway set to open within weaks, that leads down south into Thailand...
Where's the hue and cry from those that hammered us when we backed out of the Kyoto acords?
Nuclear experts warn against implementation of START II Treaty and US Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament (2/6/01)
Russian Defector Warns US against Planned Unilateral Disarmament Measures (7/19/01)
Moscow tests new missile {Designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses} (7/29/01)
Russia test-fires SS-25 intercontinental missile (10/3/01)
Russian Defense To Get New Missile... (1/15/02)
U.S. Says Russia Is Preparing Nuclear Tests (5/12/02)
Any comments? Related Links?
Didn't we pull out of START II in order to deploy the anti-ballistic missile defense system? If so, then doesn't that end any obligation on the part of the Russians to comply?