Posted on 09/16/2002 2:05:32 PM PDT by Stand Watch Listen
As rhetoric builds towards an attack on Iraq, Tim Ripley looks at competing US and Iraqi strategies.
Ever since US President George W Bush made his 'axis of evil' speech in January speculation has been rife that he would soon order an invasion of Iraq. Reports then emerged that President Bush had signed a secret 'finding' authorising the CIA to begin covert operations to overthrow the Baghdad regime. A steady rise in anti-Saddam Hussein rhetoric has continued over the summer, prompting further speculation that war was imminent. In response, the Iraqis have launched their own diplomatic moves to try to head off a US attack.Objectives
President Bush has publicly declared that the objective of 'regime change' in Iraq is to prevent international terrorist groups gaining access to Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Washington insists that a return to an old-style weapons inspection regime is not enough to satisfy it because of Baghdad's track record of lying and obstructing the United Nations Special Commission to disarm Iraq (UNSCOM) during the 1990s. In effect, President Bush is saying that the policy of deterrence and containment adopted after the 1991 Gulf war has failed and the 'Iraqi problem' needs to be solved once and for all.
As a side effect of 'regime change', the Bush administration says that the demise of the Baghdad regime will strike a blow against radical anti-Western forces in the Middle East. It is claimed, for example, that Palestinian suicide bombers are funded and supported by Baghdad, so the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime will help the peace process in Israel. Some right-wingers in Washington also view the possibility of war with Iraq as way to re-order the Middle East permanently to the USA's advantage, promoting 'regime change' in Iran, Syria and possibly even Saudi Arabia, which was named as an 'enemy of the USA' in a Pentagon briefing in July because of the kingdom's alleged support for Islamic fundamentalism. Neither President Bush nor any senior members of his administration, however, have publicly endorsed this 'superhawkish' view.
Saddam Hussein's underlying strategy is to ensure the survival of his regime. As far as he is concerned, everyday he remains in power is a victory. His aim is to try to outlast UN economic sanctions and the imposition of no-fly zones by hunkering down and not provoking a crisis. Eventually, it is hoped the USA will tire of trying to contain him and that the sanctions regime will break down, allowing Iraq to begin openly using its oil wealth to rebuild its military forces, both conventional and unconventional, to allow Saddam Hussein to assume leadership of the Arab world.
Iraq's forces
More than a decade on from their defeat in Kuwait, the Iraqi armed forces are a mere shadow of their former strength. Their material resources are considerably reduced and their lack of access to new equipment and spare parts from foreign sources has meant that the availability of its tanks, aircraft and other main weapon systems cannot be very high. Compared to the conventional forces of Iraq's neighbours and Western armies, Baghdad's forces must be classed as obsolete. They also suffer from a highly centralised command and control system, which punishes initiative by junior military commanders and rewards subservience to the regime. The Iraqi army has been in action almost continuously against Kurdish and Shia rebel groups over the past decade but it conducts little training at operating in large-scale formations against conventional opponents. The bulk of the Iraqi army is deployed to garrison and contain the southern marshes and borders of the Kurdish zone in the north, so it would need to rapidly concentrate to confront any US invasion. Iraq regularly uses its railway and road networks to move armoured formations of the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) and regular army from one front to another but these communications networks are dependent on 25 key bridges over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In time of war, these bridges could be easily destroyed by air raids, effectively immobilising Iraqi ground forces at an operational level.
One of the main advantages of the Iraqi military is its sheer mass. With some 450,000 men under arms in the RGFC and regular army and possibly another one million reservists and militia available on mobilisation, the Baghdad regime has the potential to put up a strong conventional defence of most of the country's urban centres. A big question has to be whether these forces will continue to fight if cut off from their senior commanders or Baghdad.
Iraq's 'ace in the hole' is its arsenal of WMD, which are likely to include Scud-class ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons. Most assessments of Iraq's unconventional arsenal seem to agree that the country is at least several years away from acquiring a functioning nuclear weapons capability although work on the project has restarted, according to US intelligence sources and defectors.
The primitive nature of Iraq's WMD delivery systems and strategic reconnaissance capability means that Saddam Hussein's long-range reach is limited. Pin-prick Scud strikes similar to those tried in the 1991 Gulf war would be possible but they would only be effective as 'terror weapons'. US Patriot theatre missile defence systems, and Israel's Arrow missile defence batteries, would probably neutralise many of these weapons en route to their targets. The greatest utlility of Iraq's biological weapons would probably be as port and airbase denial weapons rather than as tactical battlefield weapons because of the time they would take to inflict casualties and the huge efforts required to clean them up after any strike.
The most capable element of the Iraqi WMD arsenal is its short-range chemical weapons, delivered by artillery, rocket, aircraft or helicopter. Against static troops, ports, airbases and civilian populations, these weapons could inflict heavy casualties and severely disrupt Western military operations.
Perhaps the biggest advantage that Saddam Hussein would have if faced by an all-out US attack would be that his estimated 250,000 hardcore followers in the RGFC, the Ba'ath Party leadership and the security apparatus, would seem to have no escape route. They would be willing to fight to the death and probably have little compunction about using WMD or committing widespread war crimes against civilian populations.
US forces
In conventional military terms, the US military outclasses the Iraqis in every area. Its air, land, sea and special forces all possess superior technology, tactics and training. The most significant advantages are in mobility, communications and surveillance systems, which would give US commanders the ability to rapidly move their forces in a way that would preclude the Iraqis from effectively responding. This would enable the USA to avoid presenting a target for Iraqi chemical weapons and to devastate the Iraqi army as it tries to mass and then bypass any pockets of resistance.
A major US weakness is a lack of regional allies. Although some US planners suggest that it could strike with only bases in Kuwait and Turkey, this would limit their flexibility.
While US air and naval forces currently in the Middle East are more than capable of gaining air supremacy and prosecuting strategic air strikes against Iraq with conventional aircraft or cruise missiles, the US Army brigade currently deployed in Kuwait is not strong enough to conduct offensive operations by itself.
The USA has pre-positioned equipment in the Gulf region and at the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean to equip a corps of some 50,000 to 70,000 US Army and Marine Corps troops that would provide a potent strike force. However, once the USA begins to fly in troops to activate these equipment stockpiles, the Iraqis might be tempted to strike at Kuwait or Iraqi Kurdistan first to pre-empt the US deployment. With the US committed to 'regime change', the Iraqis might think they would have little to lose by striking first, although any pre-emptive strike by the Iraqis would give the USA and its allies the moral justification for an attack on Iraq that is currently problematic.
US options
With all power concentrated in the hands of Saddam Hussein and a handful of his family members, the Baghdad regime would appear to be vulnerable to a 'palace coup' from a disgruntled member of the inner circle.
Saddam Hussein, however, recently celebrated 33 years in power signifying that he seems to have perfected the art of personal survival. The odds therefore seem unlikely that Saddam Hussein's regime will be overthrown from within.
Foment rebellion
Outside the regime's inner circle, dissent is rife among the Iraqi population. The Kurds in the north have carved out an enclave that covers some 20% of Iraqi territory under the protection of Western airpower. In the south the Shia marsh Arabs have been fighting a protracted rebellion for more than a decade.
The Iraqi regime, however, has managed to contain these rebel movements by a variety of measures. The brutal crushing of the 1991 uprisings after the Gulf war with widespread attacks on civilians has made the Kurds very cautious about directly challenging Baghdad's forces. Western betrayals of revolts in 1991 and later in 1995-96 added to this caution.
If the USA could convince the Kurds and Shias to rise in revolt against Baghdad, they would need to attract units of the Iraqi regular army to their side to stand a chance against the RGFC. Even if the Iraqi military fragmented, the RGFC is the best equipped and motivated ground force in the country and would be likely to prevail in any action. The RGFC is very likely to use chemical weapons to put down any revolt.
Air and special forces support
To give any rebellion a fighting chance of success, the USA will have to provide widespread air and special forces support. This will have to be both strategic and tactical in nature. The aim of this effort will be to neutralise the RGFC and prevent it moving from its garrisons around Baghdad to Kurdish and Shia regions. Destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons production sites, storage locations and artillery units will be necessary to protect Iraq's civilian population and give them confidence to support rebels. The grounding of Iraqi bombers and helicopters would further prevent the regime striking against rebels with chemical weapons.
This is often called the 'Afghan option' because of its similarity to the US strategy used in last year's campaign against the Taliban regime in Kabul. In Iraq, this strategy would require strong support from rebel groups and the large-scale defection of Iraqi army units. To date there has been little sign that the rebels are motivated to or capable of organising a rebellion on the scale and magnitude required. The rebels, particularly the Kurds, seem to be making political demands of Washington that would be unacceptable to Turkey, which would be expected to provide the USA with airbases. It is also likely that the Kurds would request the presence of US troops in their enclave to ensure that Washington does not abandon them again if something should go wrong. In its favour, this strategy could be activated quickly, relies on in-place airpower and does not need a slow build-up of ground troops in neighbouring Gulf countries. These points emphasise the US need to have a post-war political solution for Iraq agreed before embarking on any military strike to prevent international support unraveling during any campaign.
Ground invasion
US ground invasion options are far more straightforward but would involve the risk of heavy casualties and be crucially dependent on Kuwait and other Gulf states for basing.
Two land options are believed to be under consideration by US Central Command planners. The first is an armour heavy option, involving some 250,000 US troops and three or four armoured and airmobile divisions striking from Kuwait. A British armoured force of 25,000 troops is likely to be requested to support this operation. This would involve a first phase to destroy the 100,000 Iraqi troops based around Basra and in the southern marshes. Then the force would move on Baghdad to defeat the RGFC. This option has the advantage of ensuring maximum concentration of firepower and is considered 'low risk' by US military planners. However, this strategy is dependent on extensive host nation support from Gulf states that has yet to materialise and gives the Iraqis an extended window of opportunity to conduct pre-emptive action.
The 'light force' option is more risky and replies on speed of manoeuvre rather than heavy firepower to confuse and confound the Iraqi military. Dubbed the 'inside-out' strategy, this option is believed to involve a corps level force of some 50,000 troops, comprising an armoured division backed by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Additional aviation brigades, equipped with Boeing AH-64D Longbow Apache attack helicopters, would support a deep strike towards Baghdad, from Kuwait and possibly Turkey, to engage and destroy the RGFC. With the élite forces of his regime devastated, it is hoped that Saddam Hussein and his family would flee and prompt the regular army units bypassed in border regions to defect.
While the US forces deep in Iraq would be highly vulnerable to an armored counterattack, their speed of manoeuvre would make it difficult for the Iraqis to mass forces against them. The couple of weeks required to deploy this force would make it far less likely that the Iraqis would be able to engage in any kind of successful pre-emptive action.
Continue containment
This option is reportedly the preferred option of the professional military leadership in the Pentagon, which sees the current strategy of sanctions and no-fly zones as a safer way to prevent the Iraqis from rebuilding their armed forces to levels that could threaten their neighbours. If backed by a re-introduction of UN weapon inspectors into Iraq, this option would have added effect. A ratcheting up of rhetoric and public deployment of forces around Iraq's borders would be needed to enhance the coercive effect of any new inspection regime.
Supporters of this strategy also stress that Saddam Hussein is now 65-years old and looking increasingly frail, making it very likely that he could die or become incapacitated in the near future. The Iraqi dictator's two sons have little of his skills and determination and would soon succumb to their numerous enemies. Saddam Hussein's death from natural causes would also mean the USA would not be blamed by Arab public opinion for the subsequent 'regime change', making any successor more palatable and not perceived as a 'US puppet'. Unlike all other options, this strategy is unlikely to result in widespread loss of life among the Iraqi population, in neighbouring states and among US and coalition military forces.
Iraqi options
For the Iraqis, their strategic options are limited by the poor state of their military forces. At the moment the USA has yet to introduce the ground forces necessary for any military campaign into the Middle East, so the Iraqis obviously see some advantage in playing for time. This could involve trying to get the UN weapon inspectors back into Iraq to make it more difficult for the USA to gain allies for their 'regime change' campaign. As long as the USA limits itself to rhetorical attacks on Iraq, then the Baghdad regime is likely to continue to return the compliment.
However, as soon as any sort of US military deployment begins then the Iraqi response will become more unpredictable. At this point, Saddam Hussein might realise he has nothing to lose. His best chance to interrupt any US build-up would be by fomenting unrest or coups d'état in Middle Eastern countries. The most likely targets for Iraqi-sponsored unrest would be Jordan and Yemen. Jordan's vulnerability would considerably increase if there were any mass exodus of radicalised Palestianian refugees from Israeli action on the West Bank. A significant setback for the USA would be if Saddam Hussein tried to make common cause with Iran, its fellow member in the 'axis of evil'. Tehran hardliners might not like the idea of US troops occupying Iraq, while there are still US troops in Afghanistan. The presence of US troops in Iraq would completely 'surround' Iran, when added to the US presence in Afghanistan, bases in Central Asia and naval forces in the Gulf.
The next possibility is pre-emptive strikes against Kuwait and the Kurdish enclave. Iraqi troops would probably take heavy losses to US airpower, but they could inflict huge damage with chemical and biological weapons, spreading terror among the civilian population and destroying the infrastructure needed to land any invasion force. This could delay the schedule of any US invasion by several weeks or months but it might backfire and provide leverage the USA could use to mobilise reluctant allies to its cause. Thus Saddam Hussain may chose to portray himself as the victim in the eyes of the Arab world and let the USA strike first.
Once a US attack is under way, Saddam Hussein might consider his best bet is to avoid taking on US forces in open terrain but try to suck them into street fighting in built-up areas in central Iraq before making a last stand in Baghdad. This would maximise the manpower advantage of the Iraqi army and negate the US advantage in long standoff precision weapons. The longer this type of battle went on, the greater the probability that unrest in neighbouring Arab countries could work in Saddam Hussein's favour. US troops would also be more of a target for Iraqi chemical weapons when engaged in an urban battle.
Risks for the USA
In any conflict between Iraq and the USA, the latter's overwhelming material and technological superiority would appear to make the outcome a foregone conclusion. However, for Washington the options for action to achieve 'regime change' in Baghdad are fraught with risks. The main imponderables are:
- the willingness of Iraqi military units to defect from the Baghdad regime;
- the threat of action by Iraq to pre-empt a deployment of US land forces to the Middle East prior to an invasion;
- the possibility of Iran or other Middle Eastern states siding with Iraq, widening the scope of US action or undermining Washington's ability to recruit regional allies to gain access to key bases for military action against Baghdad;
- the determination of hardline supporters of the regime to fight to the last in Iraq's urban centres and the ability/willingness of the US military to root them out in bloody street fighting; and
- the use and effects of WMD by a cornered Saddam Hussein.
To be successful, the Bush administration must be able to create strategies to overcome or at least manage these risks, otherwise any attack on Iraq could go wrong and run out of control. The result of this would be heavy military and civilian casualties and/or a military stalemate. For the USA, the latter outcome would be as good as defeat and be seen in Baghdad and elsewhere in the region as a victory for anti-Western forces. The USA needs to be seen to win clearly and quickly. In 1991, President George Bush senior was able to craft a strategy and a coalition to overcome many of the same problems. It remains to be seen if his son can do the same.
Tim Ripley is a research associate at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at the University of Lancaster, UK.
Contradicting Some U.S. Officials, 3 Scientists Call Anthrax Powder High-Grade
Oh, I think having 19 sleepers rearrange the New York skyline wth box cutters, and then having more sleepers send samples of the most sophisticated aerosolizable anthrax ever made to the US government is warning enough. It's predicated on the assumption that there are intelligent people in the White House, of course. A dummy wouldn't be able to figure it out, for example.
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