Posted on 09/28/2002 6:08:13 PM PDT by VaBthang4
US Marine Corps Experiments With Available Technologies To Transform Air-Ground Combat
Consider the following situation. Enemy forces use decoys, deception, and their resemblance to non-combatants to avoid targeting by joint overhead surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The Joint Task Force commander elects to send in ground forces in small teams to provide discriminate targeting for engagement with precision munitions. The small teams, operating in widely dispersed units, add clarity to the operational picture and, in conjunction with tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), provide the ability to route a skillful enemy fighting on his own turf.
It may sound like the war in Afghanistan, but this description is that of the US Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's Hunter Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment conducted in the California desert during March 1997. Hunter Warrior explored how new technologies might transform future ground combat by providing unprecedented integration of ground combat forces with precision fires delivery systems through digital communications and computer-assisted decision making. Teams of infantrymen, equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite receivers to accurately report their positions as well as a variety of targeting devices, identified targets. These infantrymen transmitted calls for fire digitally to either a command center more than 150 miles away or directly to a specially equipped AV-8B Harrier aircraft through a prototype Tactical Location Designation and Hand-Off System.
Targets were verified, in accordance with the commander's intent and approved rules of engagement, and then engaged via a simulation employing a variety of air-delivered precision weapons and extended-range naval gunfire munitions. As a specific experimental objective, all communications were digital-via computer and digital radios-and all engagements were simulated in real time using computer models that tracked the opposing force's vehicle movements and assessed the probable effects of engagement. Since the targets were often moving, speed in engaging them and the accuracy of target location were critical to a successful engagement.
Afghanistan shows that we have it right; equipping Marines on the ground with GPS, laser rangefinders, and reliable communications gear can dramatically improve our ability to use precision-delivered ordnance effectively. This is especially true if Marines on the ground can transmit their calls for fire simultaneously to both the actual firing platforms and to fires coordination centers to ensure deconfliction and commander oversight. It also helps if the technology provides automatic "defaults," such as automatically identifying the observer's position through an embedded GPS receiver and the target location through a direction and range from a point of observation. Automatic defaults can help limit transposed digits in military grid coordinates or confusing the observer's location with that of the target.
Both problems occur in voice transmissions, particularly when the observer is reading a map in the dark, in the rain, or under the stress of incoming fire, exacerbated by garbled voice communications and mistakes when strike aircraft aircrews hand-write coordinates while simultaneously flying in excess of 400 miles per hour. Such an unfortunate occurrence was recently documented in news reports about a fratricide incident in Afghanistan in which an aircrew dropped ordnance at the grid coordinates of the ground observer rather than the target due to a voice transmission error.
Automatic defaults can also expedite the formulation of formatted calls for fire, reduce errors, and speed computer-assisted processing. In contrast, experience in Hunter Warrior with free form data entry resulted in a documented wide range of spellings for the HMMWV ("Humvee") combat vehicle, two of which included the letter "J."
THE PROGRAM OF RECORD
The early versions of the Target Location Designation and Hand-Off System (TLDHS) have progressed significantly from the early prototype the Marine Corps warfighting Lab used during Hunter Warrior, with improvements in both durability and effectiveness. The Marine Corps' intent is to field a common system to support forward observers, forward air controllers, naval gunfire spot teams, and reconnaissance teams.
The system consists of a modular, man-portable equipment suite designed to rapidly and accurately locate enemy ground targets. It uses a lightweight laser designator/rangefinder (LLDR) to mark targets for laser-seeking precision-guided munitions and laser spot trackers, and a target hand-off system (THS) to digitally request and coordinate fire support for artillery, close air support, and naval surface fire support. The targeting data is transmitted by a digital system compatible with the Army/USMC Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the F/A-18 strike fighter's Digital Communication System, the AV-8B's Automatic Target Hand-off System, and a variety of sensor link protocol-compliant devices and laser rangefinder digital interfaces.
The LLDR currently weighs 35.3 pounds and the THS an additional 7.5 pounds. Linked together, the system will provide a capability that is intended to meet the key performance parameters shown in Figure 1.
The LLDR includes both a day imager with a target recognition range of 7 kilometers at a 60% probability, and a thermal imager with a detection range of 5.1 km at 70% probability and a recognition range of 2.5 km at 70% probability. The thermal imager is an especially significant improvement over Hunter Warrior's experimentation findings that showed very limited target detection or recognition during hours of reduced visibility.
The THS provides both a means for the operator to formulate his call for fire and an aid to maintain situational awareness during planning and execution. It has three mission "views" or computer screens. These can support planning or executing multiple missions simultaneously, a variety of selectable map overlays, the transmission and receipt of fire support coordination measures in overlay format, and the creation of calls for fire using a message template with operator-defined default data pre-selected.
In addition, it is programmed for both immediate and preplanned Joint Tactical Air Request processing, including automatic activation by receipt of a message reporting that an aircraft is on station. The system can support simultaneous F/A-18 and AV-8B missions, automatically learns aircraft address information through the Dynamic Updating of Network Subscriber Lists, supports aircraft tracking, and facilitates simultaneous coordination of suppression of air defense supporting arms missions while conducting close air support attacks.
The LLDR and the THS can be operated independently, and both systems separately provide needed capabilities. Accordingly, the two components can be fielded individually, and procurement decisions will be reached separately. Fielding to Marine Corps operating forces could begin as early as January 2003 for the THS and a year later for the LLDR.
ACASS
Features developed as part of Advanced Close Air Support (ACASS) experimentation may be integrated into the TLDHS program. ACASS is a parallel effort focused on supplying a technology answer to current close air support coordination shortfalls. Current procedures requiring the visual identification of aircraft during flight profiles are unreliable above 7,000 feet altitude and during periods of low visibility. In addition, the current procedures-which involve verbal 9-line briefs, and which can be corrupted by non-precise target location, garbled voice transmissions, and timing with delivery of a visible "mark" on the ground-are inconsistent with technology improvements in precision munitions and attack aircraft.
ACASS is the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's effort to explore solutions to these deficiencies. Use of off-the-shelf technology-the hand-held (2.5 lbs.) PRC-148 VHF and UHF line-of-sight Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio, a ruggedized hand-held (7 lbs.) computer, a Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation System (MELIOS DPI) with AN-PVS 17 observation system (9.5 lbs.)-produced a 19-lb. system sufficient to experiment with digital hand-off procedures.
The system requirements called for precise targeting, digital data transmission requiring no pilot input, and continuous visual presentation of the aircraft ground track. ACASS allows the forward air controller to input a 9-line close air support brief into the hand-held computer that is then transmitted to the cockpit head-up display of the AV-8B Harrier. No voice transmission, no confusion, and the exact same information on the ground as in the air. Once the forward air controller identifies the target-through four touches of the stylus to the computer screen-he or she can compose a 9-line brief providing the pilot all the information necessary to conduct the mission. The brief is then transmitted to the aircraft over the radio of the forward air controller, who can track the aircraft on the computer screen as the aircraft makes its run on the target.
As one of the forward air controllers related during a June 2000 limited technical experiment at Yuma, AZ, "The strength of the system is that the forward air controller does not have to visually acquire the aircraft. Historically, the majority of 'no-drop' runs result from late or no 'cleared hot' [message] due to late aircraft acquisition by the FAC. This system removes a substantial percentage of these wasted runs, increasing first-run bombs on target. The traditional tradeoffs made for the visual acquisition (medium- instead of high-altitude profiles, flares, or a 'squirt' [of jet fuel] at roll in; full lighting package, etc.) are no longer necessary. Additionally, bombing through the clouds, ingressing with the sun at the aircraft's back, and using infrared strip lighting at night decrease the ability of the enemy to visually acquire and engage our aircraft, resulting in increased survivability.
Currently 10 ACASS systems are in use in I Marine Expeditionary Force located in California. The ACASS system has deployed with all three West Coast Marine Expeditionary Units. Notably, an AV-8B used its Automatic Target Hand-off System (ATHS II) moving map display to track the Navy ship USS Cole as it was towed out of the harbor in Yemen.
The current ACASS software has only been compatible with the ATHS II system and not with the F/A-18's Digital Communications System (DCS). However, software upgrades for compatibility with DCS are pending approval for experimentation. Further development is subject to decisions as to the desirability of incorporation within the TLDHS program. The Marine Corps' objective continues to be a single system.
UCATS And PTAM
Two other efforts include the Universal Combined-Arms Targeting System (UCATS) and the Precision Target Acquisition Mobile (PTAM) as offshoots of ACASS. Both are being conducted in a partnership between the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and the Office of Naval Research that supports experimentation into technology improvements in target acquisition, position location, and digital communications.
Both systems employ the same basic components for quick and accurate targeting and transmission of calls for fire using the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). For targeting, the systems use MELIOS coupled to a digital mapping and imagery interface. As in ACASS and TLDHS, both systems use embedded GPS. Both focus on shared situational awareness between the system operator and the firing system using AFATDS communications and graphical displays of unit data. In both cases, the operator can use manual voice override for time-critical messages.
The PTAM system was an outgrowth from the UCATS limited technical experiment conducted in November 2000, when operators found it difficult to use the hand-held system while in moving vehicles. The PTAM system combined UCATS targeting system with an aiming gyroscope and vehicle mount for stability when moving. Although initially intended as an inexpensive system to facilitate proof-of-concept experimentation, desirable features could be assimilated into a block II upgrade of TLDHS if the capability is deemed to be value-added.
VALUE OF EXPERIMENTATION
Experimentation with operating forces produces considerable insight into the features of a successful system. Marine Corps experimentation has shown that technology alone does not lead to a leap in capability, but equipping Marines and training them to employ technology to do things better, faster, and more accurately can give them transformational results.
In this regard, experimentation using TLDHS, ACASS, and UCATS/PTAM has provided many of the same lessons. Technology does not fully substitute for the judgment and experience of the user. For example, teams employing laser rangefinders commonly experienced range errors most likely due to returns from obstacles between the target and the observer. Experienced users who employed judgment in using the systems were less inclined to immediately use the system's findings and were more precise in employing the laser to limit intermediate returns.
In addition, users consistently had difficulty using the computer systems while on the move-even for maintaining situational awareness-in comparison with using legacy voice communications and conventional paper maps. This situation was notably resolved with the use of PTAM for vehicle-mounted Marines. However, computers that require the use of a stylus or a keyboard for data entry have operational limitations when the users are wearing gloves, are in the rain, or are on the move. Voice recognition software may be an eventual user interface for many tactical systems.
One characteristic that has overwhelmingly received rave reviews has been the reduction in the weight and size of replacement systems. For combatants on the ground-particularly those who have to carry the systems on their backs-size and weight have an operational value all their own. Even in relatively controlled experimentation environments, equipment that is heavy or large was not used when other, perhaps less capable, alternatives were available.
Similarly, technology improvements in one area require improvements in others to maximize results. For example, precision targeting does not necessarily result in first-round effects on target without the employment of an accurate supporting arm. Smooth bore mortars that deliver area barrages-rather than precision fires enabled by highly predictable ballistics-will not take advantage of improvements in target acquisition.
No matter how significant the technology improvement, the desired transformational leaps in capability occur only through corresponding changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures. The improved accuracy in target acquisition and coordination between pilot and forward air controller that result from the emerging technologies will occur only when the operators have achieved confidence in the effectiveness of the new technology and doctrine is changed accordingly. Continuing to insist that the forward air controller visually assess the pilot's angle of attack and declare him both "wings level" and "cleared hot" before he can doctrinally drop ordnance is likely to no longer be necessary in view of the new technologies. If true, then the new technologies will enable effective employment of close air support at higher altitudes and during periods of reduced visibility, thereby reducing the vulnerability of aircraft to ground fires during their attack runs.
ANOTHER LOOK AT HUNTER WARRIOR
Hunter Warrior also considered the utility of UAVs for targeting which led to experimentation in their use to acquire targets for tactical aircraft to engage. Using the Dragon Drone UAV testbed, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab explored the use of a UAV that could be launched from a rear area on a pre-planned track that could be queried and controlled by a forward unit.
Squad leaders with the man-portable system selectively took control of the Dragon Drone camera, directed it at areas of interest, and used the pictures they received to formulate calls for fire. The advantage of this capability for small units employed in a target-acquisition role is clear. Using the UAV, sqaud leaders could look in areas outside of their view-behind a hill or in a draw-or follow-up on a target detection to ensure discriminate target identification. Marine reconnaissance teams employed the system in much the same way that Predator and other UAVs were apparently used by US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan.
Five years after Hunter Warrior, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has been experimenting with initial prototypes for the Dragon Eye backpack-deployable UAV for use by infantry units in reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition roles. This UAV and its larger version-the Dragon Warrior UAV (developed by the Office of Naval Research), which will be available for operational prototype experimentation in 2003-are an integral part of an effort by the Marine Corps to expand the UAV capabilities of tactical units.
Dragon Eye and Dragon Warrior also serve as an integral part of a concerted effort to develop a tactical version of the joint-services intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. This effort will combine UAVs, unmanned ground vehicles, ground sensors, and lightweight targeting capabilities such as TLDHS, ACASS, UCATS, and PTAM into a means to employ emerging technologies to add-from the ground up-to the fused intelligence picture that the current national and joint systems build literally from the top down.
Other experiments conducted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 in Yuma, AZ successfully explored the use of a UAV to acquire a target and transmit an image of the target digitally to an ATHS II system for weapons engagement. Use of this process demonstrated the utility of images to aid the pilot in rapidly acquiring the target and in planning an effective attack plan.
CLOSING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
Strategic- and operational-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coordination and information transfers are universally conducted digitally using high-speed computers. At the tactical level, relevant information is just beginning to be shared as data and not by traditional voice transmissions. This situation is changing rapidly, with information technologies increasingly being applied to historic battlefield functions. Target acquisition and the digital integration of forward observers and forward air controllers have the potential to revolutionize an area of air-ground combat that has undergone little fundamental change during the last 30 years. The transformation hasn't occurred yet, but we can see indications of it in the future air-ground integration that new technologies can enable.
GR2 was a FAC during "Bodyslam Iraq I" for the 101st if I remember correctly....I wonder what he thinks.
Yeah, it looks at this point that only Marine Corps/Navy aircraft are involved. I am sure something is in the works from the AF & Army sides and eventually all four services will bring their toys together in conference committee and work out a compromise giving birth to a shiney new lightweight piece of equipment that doesnt work for any of the services.
:o) Jus'joking.
Seriously....I would think eventually the software & hardware could work its way into all our birds including helos.
Prayerfully...they wont stop teaching the old math.
AFJI says: "ACASS allows the forward air controller to input a 9-line close air support brief into the hand-held computer that is then transmitted to the cockpit head-up display of the AV-8B Harrier. No voice transmission, no confusion..."
Given the quality of today's average high school graduate, do you want to bet your life that he can compose a coherent and correct nine line targeting summary on his ACASS terminal? I wouldn't.
Part of the targeting error problem is generated by using an antiquated mapping system for coordinates. Another problem is human error in inputting the data to the system (or reading it from the system).
All this can be eliminated by using a pair of today's modern binocular laser range finders coupled to a GPS and a transmitter. Put the crosshairs on the target, press the button and the range and azimuth to the target is automatically transmitted to the aircraft (or artillery) along with the senders current GPS coordinates. Return fire is directed at the GPS coordinates plus the range and azimuth data. No maps, no human input, just one computer transmitting firing data to another. As long as the soldier has a rudimentary understanding of "acquire, front sight, squeeze", he can make this system work.
Regards,
Boot Hill
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