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BREAKING: NBC News finds Jan 30 NASA Memo showing serious concern about tile damage!
NBC News | February 3, 2003 | Jay Barbree

Posted on 02/03/2003 6:03:22 AM PST by Timesink

Developing. Watch MSNBC for latest. Internal memo shows some engineers believe there was up to a 7 1/2-inch gash from the foam breakoff at launch. Memo was serious enough to go out to all NASA centers two days before disaster.


TOPICS: Breaking News; Crime/Corruption; Government; News/Current Events; US: Florida; US: Texas
KEYWORDS: columbia; columbiatragedy; feb12003; msnbc; nasa; nbcnews; shuttle; shuttletragedy; spaceshuttle; sts107
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To: Rome2000
You seem out of touch with reality.
741 posted on 02/03/2003 5:30:43 PM PST by Howlin
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To: Burr5
but I'll bet my ass that something could have been done to save these people if NASA knew of the situation.

Just so we're straight on this, are you going on record as accusing the people at NASA of letting their friends die?

742 posted on 02/03/2003 5:34:51 PM PST by Howlin
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To: Howlin
I'm not quite sure why some people are having such difficulty with the concept that NASA screwed up big time.

This is not a perfect world and people will make mistakes.

It was an accident,not intentional, however,a decison was made by NASA brass that any possible tile damage sustained on lift off was inconsequential.

It was the wrong decison.

To say nothing could have been done is to try to avoid blame.

NASA will eventually have to admit they screwed up, and the "nothing could have been done" remark is ridiculous and insulting.

If the shuttle was up there now and NASA knew that the tiles were damaged enough to cause a possible burn up on re-entry, do you think they would have just stood around saying "nothing can be done"?

The reality is they would have tried everyhting in the book to get them back safely.

743 posted on 02/03/2003 6:00:27 PM PST by Rome2000
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To: Rome2000
They've already admitted that looking back, they were mistaken.

If the shuttle was up there now and NASA knew that the tiles were damaged enough to cause a possible burn up on re-entry, do you think they would have just stood around saying "nothing can be done"?

Are you serious? Can you be that obtuse?

But that doesn't fit with your agenda, does it?

744 posted on 02/03/2003 6:03:43 PM PST by Howlin
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To: Chad Fairbanks
You can bet the farm that on the next shuttle mission they will figure out a way to check the tiles before re-entry.

Well, come on genius, tell us how to do it...

It doesn't take a genius to figue out that US spy satellites could have taken photos of the underside of the craft.

An aviation expert on NPR said as much this morning.

And stop with the petty insults please, they are so jackass like.

745 posted on 02/03/2003 6:04:35 PM PST by Rome2000
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To: Rome2000
To say nothing could have been done is to try to avoid blame.

Unless, of course, nothing could be done.

This ain't TV.

746 posted on 02/03/2003 6:05:51 PM PST by DaughterOfAnIwoJimaVet (Eleven. Exactly. One louder.)
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To: DaughterOfAnIwoJimaVet
I cannot understand this lust for BLOOD from some of these posters.
747 posted on 02/03/2003 6:06:51 PM PST by Howlin
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To: Howlin
They've watched one too many episodes of Star Trek, it seems.. They think everything that happens has a happy ending, and that just before Captain Kirk dies, he really does say something assinine like, "It...was...fun."

This is real life, but if someone is hell bent on working himself into a lather about something he doesn't know jack about, that won't mean much to him, apparently.

748 posted on 02/03/2003 6:10:09 PM PST by DaughterOfAnIwoJimaVet (Eleven. Exactly. One louder.)
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To: Rome2000
and the "nothing could have been done" remark is ridiculous and insulting.

What could have been done? Exactly. Not dreams; something workable.

749 posted on 02/03/2003 6:10:16 PM PST by Howlin
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To: Chad Fairbanks
did Columbia have an airlock type device?
750 posted on 02/03/2003 6:11:18 PM PST by KantianBurke (Who are YOU to legislate with my hard earned $$$??)
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To: Howlin
But that doesn't fit with your agenda, does it?

My "agenda" is taking issue with the statement that "nothing could have been done".

NASA made the decison that tile damage as a result of falling insulation was not a problem.

They were apparently wrong.

Its been going on for years, and was an accident waiting to happen.

That is the truth. It obviously is not the White Houses fault, but it is certainly someones fault.

I support NASA and the space program, I often see the shuttle taking off from my bedroom window in Miami.

What is your agenda?

751 posted on 02/03/2003 6:17:56 PM PST by Rome2000
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To: TankerKC
You don't think the person doing the interview already KNEW this guy's stats and qualifications??? LOL
752 posted on 02/03/2003 6:18:04 PM PST by ET(end tyranny)
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To: Howlin
Once it had been determined the shuttle was in danger, Atlantis could have been sent up within a week. Once up in space, the ship could have sided up parellel to the Columbia, a member of Atlantis could have space walked out to the Columbia with a bag containing 7 space suits and (assuming Columbia had an airlock) then led the crew members out one by one. From there Atlantis could have flown back to earth. As NASA did not pursue this or any other line of action they must bear the burden of responsibilty for the deaths. If what I just proposed is impossible I'll step back of course.
753 posted on 02/03/2003 6:21:10 PM PST by KantianBurke (Who are YOU to legislate with my hard earned $$$??)
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To: Howlin; DaughterOfAnIwoJimaVet; Rome2000; Chad Fairbanks
Regarding 'blame', 'agendas', and your ongoing discussion:

Its not about blame, though some will try to make it that. Its about finding causes, ops practices, and design flaws/weaknesses/errors and doing what it takes to never permit the same accident to happen again. In order to do that, root causes (blame) will have to be properly placed. This is not a murder charge. But it is fessing up to even the slightest possibility that some action/inaction may have led to the failure. Admitting such failures is personally and institutionally hard for any person/organization. But for safety of future flights it is essential that the failures be identified.

Recommend reading the following post:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/835122/posts?page=19#19
754 posted on 02/03/2003 6:31:07 PM PST by Magnum44 (remember the Challenger 7, remember the Columbia 7, and never forget 9-11)
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To: KantianBurke
As NASA did not pursue this or any other line of action they must bear the burden of responsibilty for the deaths. If what I just proposed is impossible I'll step back of course.

you have it right nasa is being looked at by O'Reilly. This should get some attention!
755 posted on 02/03/2003 6:36:01 PM PST by TLBSHOW (God Speed as Angels trending upward dare to fly Tribute to the Risk Takers)
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To: KantianBurke
I am not sure if they had an airlock yet, but all the crew would have had pressure suits. At worst case, if a transfer to another vehicle were possible, a rescue vehicle (if available) could have carried suits/bags up and brought them in through the main shuttle hatch (no airlock) in the lower deck of the crew cabin. At that point the cabin could have been repressurized I would think, the crew could have suited up, and then they could ropen the htch and transfer to the rescue ship (shuttle or soyuz?)
756 posted on 02/03/2003 6:37:56 PM PST by Magnum44 (remember the Challenger 7, remember the Columbia 7, and never forget 9-11)
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To: KantianBurke
All shuttles are equipped with an airlock that allows the crew to exit into the cargo bay.

The airlock is normally located inside the middeck of the spacecraft's pressurized crew cabin. It has an inside diameter of 63 inches, is 83 inches long and has two 40-inch- diameter D-shaped openings that are 36 inches across. It also has two pressure-sealing hatches and a complement of airlock support systems. The airlock's volume is 150 cubic feet.

The airlock is sized to accommodate two fully suited flight crew members simultaneously. Support functions include airlock depressurization and repressurization, extravehicular activity equipment recharge, liquid-cooled garment water cooling, EVA equipment checkout, donning and communications. The EVA gear, checkout panel and recharge stations are located on the internal walls of the airlock.

The airlock hatches are mounted on the airlock. The inner hatch is mounted on the exterior of the airlock (orbiter crew cabin middeck side) and opens into the middeck. The inner hatch isolates the airlock from the orbiter crew cabin. The outer hatch is mounted inside the airlock and opens into the airlock. The outer hatch isolates the airlock from the unpressurized payload bay when closed and permits the EVA crew members to exit from the airlock to the payload bay when open.

Airlock repressurization is controllable from the orbiter crew cabin middeck and from inside the airlock. It is performed by equalizing the airlock's and cabin's pressure with equalization valves mounted on the inner hatch. The airlock is depressurized from inside the airlock by venting the airlock's pressure overboard. The two D-shaped airlock hatches open toward the primary pressure source, the orbiter crew cabin, to achieve pressure-assist sealing when closed.

Each hatch has six interconnected latches and a gearbox/actuator, a window, a hinge mechanism and hold-open device, a differential pressure gauge on each side and two equalization valves.

The 4-inch diameter window in each airlock hatch is used for crew observation from the cabin/airlock and the airlock/payload bay. The dual window panes are made of polycarbonate plastic and mounted directly to the hatch by means of bolts fastened through the panes. Each hatch window has dual pressure seals, with seal grooves located in the hatch.

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/sts_coord.html#sts_body Each airlock hatch has dual pressure seals to maintain pressure integrity. One seal is mounted on the airlock hatch and the other on the airlock structure. A leak check quick disconnect is installed between the hatch and the airlock pressure seals to verify hatch pressure integrity before flight.

The gearbox with latch mechanisms on each hatch allows the flight crew to open and close the hatch during transfers and EVA operations. The gearbox and the latches are mounted on the low-pressure side of each hatch; with a gearbox handle installed on both sides to permit operation from either side of the hatch.

Three of the six latches on each hatch are double-acting and have cam surfaces that force the sealing surfaces apart when the latches are opened, thereby acting as crew assist devices. The latches are interconnected with push-pull rods and an idler bell crank that is installed between the rods for pivoting the rods. Self-aligning dual rotating bearings are used on the rods for attachment to the bellcranks and the latches. The gearbox and hatch open support struts are also connected to the latching system by the same rod/bellcrank and bearing system. To latch or unlatch the hatch, the gearbox handle must be rotated 440 degrees.

The hatch actuator/gearbox is used to provide the mechanical advantage to open and close the latches. The hatch actuator lock lever requires a force of 8 to 10 pounds through an angle of 180 deg rees to unlatch the actuator. A minimum rotation of 440 deg rees with a maximum force of 30 pounds applied to the actuator handle is required to operate the latches to their fully unlatched positions.

The hinge mechanism for each hatch permits a minimum opening sweep into the airlock or the crew cabin middeck. The inner hatch (airlock to crew cabin) is pulled or pushed forward to the crew cabin approximately 6 inches. The hatch pivots up and to the right side. Positive locks are provided to hold the hatch in both an intermediate and a full-open position. A spring-loaded handle on the latch hold-open bracket releases the lock. Friction is also provided in the linkage to prevent the hatch from moving if released during any part of the swing.

The outer hatch (airlock to payload bay) opens and closes to the contour of the airlock wall. The hatch is hinged to be pulled first into the airlock and then forward at the bottom and rotated down until it rests with the low-pressure (outer) side facing the airlock ceiling (middeck floor). The linkage mechanism guides the hatch from the closed/open, open/closed position with friction restraint throughout the stroke. The hatch has a hold-open hook that snaps into place over a flange when the hatch is fully open. The hook is released by depressing the spring-loaded hook handle and pushing the hatch toward the closed position. To support and protect the hatch against the airlock ceiling, the hatch incorporates two deployable struts. The struts are connected to the hatch linkage mechanism and are deployed when the hatch linkage is rotated open. When the hatch latches are rotated closed, the struts are retracted against the hatch.

The airlock hatches can be removed in flight from the hinge mechanism using pip pins, if required.

The airlock air circulation system provides conditioned air to the airlock during non-EVA periods. The airlock revitalization system duct is attached to the outside airlock wall at launch. Upon airlock hatch opening in flight, the duct is rotated by the flight crew through the cabin/airlock hatch, installed in the airlock and held in place by a strap holder. The duct has a removable air diffuser cap, installed on the end of the flexible duct, which can adjust the air flow from 216 pounds per hour. The duct must be rotated out of the airlock before the cabin/airlock hatch is closed for airlock depressurization. During the EVA preparation period, the duct is rotated out of the airlock and can be used for supplemental air circulation in the middeck. There are four floodlights in the airlock.

If the airlock is relocated to the payload bay from the middeck, it will function in the same manner as in the middeck. Insulation is installed on the airlock's exterior for protection from the extreme temperatures of space.

For Spacelab pressurized module missions, the airlock remains in the crew compartment middeck, and a tunnel adapter that mates with the airlock and the Spacelab tunnel is installed in the payload bay.

The airlock tunnel adapter, hatches, tunnel extension and tunnel permit the flight crew members to transfer from the spacecraft's pressurized middeck crew compartment to Spacelab's pressurized shirt-sleeve environment.

In addition, the airlock, tunnel adapter and hatches permit the EVA flight crew members to transfer from the airlock/tunnel adapter in the space suit assembly into the payload bay without depressurizing the crew cabin and Spacelab.

The Spacelab tunnel and Spacelab are accessed via the tunnel adapter, which is located in the payload bay and is attached to the airlock at orbiter station Xo 576 and the tunnel extension at X o 660. The tunnel adapter has an inside diameter of 63 inches at its widest section and tapers in the cone area at each end to two 40-inch- diameter D-shaped openings 36 inches across. A 40-inch- diameter D-shaped opening 36 inches across is located at the top of the tunnel adapter. Two pressure-sealing hatches are located in the tunnel adapter, one in the upper area of the tunnel adapter and one in the aft end of the tunnel adapter. The tunnel adapter is a welded structure constructed of 2219 aluminum with 2.4- by 2.4-inch exposed structural ribs on the exterior surface and external waffle skin stiffening.

The hatch located on the middeck side of the airlock is mounted on the exterior of the airlock and opens into the middeck. The hatch isolates the airlock from the crew cabin. The hatch located in the tunnel adapter's aft end isolates the tunnel adapter/airlock from the tunnel extension, tunnel and Spacelab. This hatch opens into the tunnel adapter. The hatch located in the tunnel adapter at the upper D-shaped opening isolates the airlock/tunnel adapter from the unpressurized payload bay when closed and permits the EVA crew members to exit from the airlock/tunnel adapter to the payload bay when open. This hatch opens into the tunnel adapter.

The hinge mechanism for each hatch permits a minimum opening sweep into the tunnel adapter or the spacecraft crew cabin middeck. The airlock crew cabin hatch in the middeck is pulled/pushed forward to the middeck approximately 6 inches. The hatch pivots up and right. Positive locks are provided to hold the latch in both an intermediate and a full-open position. A spring-loaded handle on the latch hold-open bracket releases the lock. Friction is provided in the linkage to prevent the hatch from moving if released during any part of the swing.

The aft hatch is hinged to be pulled first into the tunnel adapter and then forward at the bottom. The top of the hatch is rotated towards the tunnel and downward until the hatch rests with the Spacelab side facing the tunnel adapter floor. The linkage mechanism guides the hatch from the closed/open, open/closed position with friction restraint throughout the stroke. The hatch is held in the open position by straps and Velcro.

The upper (EVA) hatch in the tunnel adapter opens and closes to the left wall of the tunnel adapter. The hatch is hinged to be pulled first into the tunnel adapter and then forward at the hinge area and rotated down until it rests against the port wall of the tunnel adapter. The linkage mechanism guides the hatch from the closed/open, open/closed position with friction restraint throughout the stroke. The hatch is held in the open position by straps and Velcro.

The hatches can be removed in flight from the hinge mechanisms via pip pins, if required.

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/sts_coord.html#sts_body

757 posted on 02/03/2003 6:38:46 PM PST by Rome2000
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To: Magnum44
Admitting such failures is personally and institutionally hard for any person/organization. But for safety of future flights it is essential that the failures be identified.

Well put.

758 posted on 02/03/2003 6:40:22 PM PST by Rome2000
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To: Rome2000
if I'm understanding the information you just presented me correctly then they could have been saved by the manner which I took me less than a minute to formulate and knowing only te basics surrounding the ship's capabilities. If so a number of NASA top brass should be sh*tcanned ASAP. And yes blood is on their hands.
759 posted on 02/03/2003 6:42:41 PM PST by KantianBurke (Who are YOU to legislate with my hard earned $$$??)
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To: Magnum44
I had already read that and I agree with you.

Regarding the ongoing discussion, "we" are not the ones trying to assign the blame before all the facts are heard.

760 posted on 02/03/2003 6:43:20 PM PST by Howlin
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