BATTLE ISLAND

popular mechanics ^ | april 2003 | JIM WILSON

[Lokibob]

 

	Larger than a city, the Joint Mobile Offshore Base will keep freedom fighters safe in hostile terrain.
	BY JIM WILSON
	Illustration by John Berkey

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Experience in constructing ultralarge vessels and deep-water offshore drilling platforms has convinced naval architects it is possible to build a floating military base by connecting individual, self-powered modules. Early in 2003, as the buildup for a war with Iraq shifted into high gear, American diplomats began calling on their counterparts in the Middle East and southern Europe. They asked a simple favor: permission to use local bases for attacks on Iraqi weapons factories and military installations. As the classified cables reporting on the lack of progress in working out agreements flowed back to the State Department, it slowly became evident that America had fewer friends than once thought. It became equally apparent that if the United States wanted sure footing for future battles against terrorism, it would have to look beyond diplomatic arrangements. And so, almost overnight, an idea that had hovered in the shadows since the mid-1990s began to make sense. If American forces could not count on friends, they would have to rely upon technology in the form of a new type of naval vessel, a mobile offshore base.

[Gorjus]

Looks like a giant sitting duck to me, but what do I know?

The question I'd like to ask is: Why bother? A conventional aircraft carrier can do the attack role, an LHA, etc. Amphibious group can do the beach attack role, and so on. Why bother joining them all together?

A potential answer is survivability. I think it's relevant that the U.S. did not lose a single fleet carrier in WWII that was launched after December 7, 1941 (Franklin came close, but made it back). Once we learned a bit about designing for damage control (Essex class was much better than Yorktown class) we had a really tough ship.

Part of that is recognizing that the best defense is a good offense, which starts a long way away with Tomcat/Phoenix and proceeds through layers and layers of active defenses. Then we add a lot of armor at the end, plus defensive measures like multiple hull construction to address torpedo attacks.

Considering the restricted mobility, and the vulnerability of the pontoon hulls to torpedo damage (a runway with the middle thousand feet sunk is not much use), it's not clear to me that this is any more survivable than a carrier battle group, nor more versatile than a carrier battle group plus amphibious group, and so on.

And then there's the cost . . . .

[Sparta]

Thanks.

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