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SARS OUTBREAK: Modelers Struggle to Grasp Epidemic's Potential Scope
Science Magazine | 2003-04-25 | Gretchen Vogel

Posted on 04/26/2003 10:08:13 AM PDT by Lessismore

BERLIN--As the case toll climbed steadily toward 4000 earlier this week, scientists chasing the SARS outbreak conceded that their hopes for eradicating the disease were fading. Instead, they are asking how far and how fast severe acute respiratory syndrome will spread and whether it can be contained in relatively small outbreaks. At this point, epidemiologists say they simply don't know.

"It does seem unlikely that containment measures are going to succeed in driving this virus to extinction," says epidemiologist David Earn of McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, who is working on mathematical models of the outbreak. "If that's the case, it's really just a matter of time before it spreads more widely." If the new coronavirus now known to cause SARS behaves like others in its family, it may become part of the seasonal rhythm of maladies such as colds and flu, says Ira Longini of Emory University in Atlanta. "Every year from late fall to early spring, these agents cause epidemics and then go to very low levels in the summer months," he says.

When researchers first recognized the disease, they hoped that by isolating patients and their contacts, they might halt transmission of the disease and stamp out the virus. But as the full extent of the outbreak in China became apparent--2000 cases as of 22 April--researchers acknowledged that the likelihood of reaching contacts of all those infected was remote.

To predict the course of the disease, scientists are struggling to understand two key variables, says Roy Anderson of Imperial College in London, who is working with authorities in Hong Kong to model the outbreak there. First is the disease's incubation period, the time from infection to first symptoms. Second is the route of transmission: Is the virus spread just through direct contact, through infected droplets that travel only a short distance, through environmental sources such as water or sewage, or--the most frightening but increasingly unlikely possibility--through airborne particles that can travel long distances? Answers would help researchers estimate the number of new cases each infected person is likely to cause and perhaps predict the most effective interventions to reduce the spread.

But pinpointing those variables in the early days of a new disease is a tall order. A diagnostic test that can quickly distinguish between cases of SARS and other maladies would help determine incubation time. Existing tests are not sensitive enough: A negative result does not rule out infection with the SARS virus. Researchers are optimistic that better diagnostics may soon be available, now that the disease's causative agent has been firmly established; the final evidence came last week from experiments in which monkeys infected with the coronavirus developed symptoms similar to those of human SARS patients. The same week, four labs announced independently that they had sequenced the genome of the new virus.

A more sensitive diagnostic test could also help ascertain whether there are people infected with the SARS virus who do not show severe symptoms but can still spread the disease, notes modeler Jim Koopman of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. "We don't know how much mild illness is caused by this coronavirus," he says.

In the face of so many unknowns, a preliminary mathematical analysis of the outbreak downplays one nightmare scenario: SARS does not appear to spread primarily by means of aerosols. Alan Zelicoff of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, says an analysis of reported cases shows a linear pattern, suggesting that each patient, on average, infects no more than two people. This pattern appears with diseases spread by direct contact or larger virus-laden droplets that travel only a few meters rather than by lighter airborne particles. By contrast, if a disease is transmitted by aerosols, a single person can infect an entire room by coughing, as can happen with measles and influenza, he says. "That's not the case if I have a cold and clearly not if I have SARS," says Zelicoff. If so, then simple techniques, such as frequent handwashing, can go a long way toward slowing the spread of the disease, he notes.

For now, health officials around the world are assuming the worst and pursuing aggressive strategies to quickly isolate patients and quarantine their known contacts. Anderson supports this tack, at least in the short term. "In all epidemics if you hit hard and hit early, if you're successful you might never know" what could have happened, he says.

Epidemiologists agree that the biggest unknown in any model of SARS is the situation in China. On 20 April, authorities admitted they had not reported the full extent of the outbreak and removed two top officials, the health minister and the mayor of Beijing, from their posts. But the damage had already been done. As of 22 April, scientists estimated that the outbreak had spread to more than a dozen provinces.

Even so, Martin Meltzer, an epidemiologist and modeler at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, says it's not too late to bring the global outbreak under control, even in the hardest-hit areas. "But we should not sit back and assume we'll never see it again. We have to assume SARS is now with us." What that means for world health, he says, is too early to predict.


TOPICS: Editorial
KEYWORDS: fatalityrate; rate; royanderson; sars

1 posted on 04/26/2003 10:08:14 AM PDT by Lessismore
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To: FITZ
Researchers are optimistic that better diagnostics may soon be available, now that the disease's causative agent has been firmly established; the final evidence came last week from experiments in which monkeys infected with the coronavirus developed symptoms similar to those of human SARS patients. The same week, four labs announced independently that they had sequenced the genome of the new virus.

OK, I take that one back. It looks like they have definitively identified the culprit.

2 posted on 04/26/2003 10:13:45 AM PDT by Carry_Okie (California! See how low WE can go!)
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To: Lessismore
This is so eerily like the start of the AIDS epidemic in the US some 15 or 20 years ago or so, that SARS, in ten years, may infect 10s of millions and killed millions.

This is truly a global problem that needs more than just quarantines. All countries affected right now are working on identifying causes, etc...... and hopefully will come up with a cure - or a vaccine. Soon. I hope panic doesn't drive the potential for the slowing of global economic trade - although I wouldn't mind it much if we stopped trading all together with China. *s*
3 posted on 04/26/2003 10:18:25 AM PDT by bart99
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To: Lessismore
I have it on the authority of "highly educated" Mississippi State Microbiology Graduate that this SARS outbreak is nothing to be worried about. The event is overblown. We have nothing to worry about. SARS will never spread to the US like it has in China. We have nothing to fear since no one in the US has died from the disease. (SARCASM).

Epidemiologists and those that work with diseases in populations think otherwise because of the virulence and infectivity of this virus. Extreme caution and care is indicated because this virus will spread easily. Dr. Brian at the University of Tennessee has spent the last 20 years studying the Coronaviruses and lets ask him if he is worried.

4 posted on 04/26/2003 10:26:03 AM PDT by vetvetdoug
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To: vetvetdoug
Perhaps the brightest thought on SARS is that it's mortality rate is low, and here in the US we have good sanitation and medical care. I'll wager that most healthy people here who contract SARS only miss a few days work and feel terrible, as with the flu. It is the poor, dirty, overcrowded countries who will see the worst effects.
5 posted on 04/26/2003 10:36:48 AM PDT by Sender
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To: Sender; All
Actually it is the developed 'healthy' countries that will see the worst effects. Based primarily on the following factor.

SARS is primarily an economic disease! By this i mean that by itself it is not a major threat to the populace when looked at in strict medical terms .....but the trepidation stemming from fear of SARS has crippled the Hong Kong economy, thrown a wrench into the adjacent Asian fiscal systems, and in a few weeks reduced Toronto's economy but what is said to be 50%! The airline industries, tourism industries, foreign investment, certain service sectors, and basically a lot of the financial life-blood of those nations has been hit. Were SARS to hit the US ......who knows? Our economy may take a substantial hit. Most 3rd world countries do not need to worry about that. Hence the greatest danger from sARS is not how many people it kills (or such stuff) but how many industries it shuts down.

And whether this fear is legitimate or just a surge of (LOL) 'irrational exuberance' the end effect is still the same ......financial meltdown wherever SARS takes root!

6 posted on 04/26/2003 11:03:23 AM PDT by spetznaz (Nuclear missiles: The ultimate Phallic symbol.)
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To: Lessismore
Thanks for posting such an outstanding article.

For an article about what could happen if SARS is not contained go here: If SARS gets loose

It is from an epidemiologist who simply states the obvious: If SARS gets loose, a billion people could be infected fairly quickly.

7 posted on 04/26/2003 11:07:37 AM PDT by EternalHope (Boycott everything French forever.)
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To: Sender
Perhaps the brightest thought on SARS is that it's mortality rate is low,

I wouldn't call 5.9%- 10% or more low!! I'd call it rather high. The WHO guys keep upping it gradually. I'd say the brightest spot is the it doesn't seem to be airborne.

8 posted on 04/26/2003 11:20:21 AM PDT by First Amendment
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To: vetvetdoug
Hey Doug,

The CDC has really made it clear that SARS is not highly contagious unless people are careless in their personal hygiene. Even if a glob of something disgusting landed on you from an infected person, it has to get pushed into your nose, mouth or eyes for you to become infected. Of course you can unknowingly become infected if you touch a contaminated surface. (so sanitize)

You know better than anyone that if one cat in a household has coronavirus, the secret to keeping the other cats healthy is seperate litter boxes. They usually don't get sick from just being together, but they do get sick from cleaning contaminated fecal matter off their fur.
9 posted on 04/26/2003 11:24:54 AM PDT by TaxRelief
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To: EternalHope
I think I am going Loop-dee-loo with your link.
10 posted on 04/26/2003 11:27:28 AM PDT by TaxRelief (Wee-ee!)
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To: Carry_Okie
MY LYING $10.00 CALUCATOR

As per your request, I do not shout anymore.

Yes I make up everything which I post with my little $10.00 calculator.

I am sure that the CDC, WHO or the Government is beyond such things. I list below what I made up with my calculator.

It has been reported, and it seems reasonable to me, that there are 50,000 deaths each year in the USA due to Influenza (Pneumonia). If this is the case then this follows by mathematics:

1. I assume that the world’s population is 6.0 billion (probably 6.4 billion, but just increase these numbers by 6.67% if you like).
2. If the world’s population is 6.0 billion, and if the USA has a population of 280 million, than the world has a population 21.429 times larger than the USA.
3. If the 50,000 figure for the USA is correct then:
4. Daily Cases And Deaths USA (Assuming a 5% mortality rate):

Daily: Cases – 2739.720 and Deaths – 136.986
Period 30 Days: Cases – 82,191.600 and Deaths – 2,739.720
Annual: Cases – 999,997.800 and Deaths – 49,999.90 (Rounding Again)

5. Daily Cases And Deaths World ( Assuming a 5% mortality rate). Probably need to increase these numbers by a factor of at least by 2 to 5 since the rest of the world has almost no health system:

Daily: Cases – 58,709.460 and Deaths – 2,935.473
Period 30 Days: Cases 246,574.800 and Deaths - 88,064.190
Annual: Cases – 21,428,952.900 and Deaths – 1,071,477.742

6. If as you suggest that the death rate is 0.01% and not the 5% which I choose as representative, then of course the number of deaths remains the same but the number of cases increases by a factor of 500. Therefore, these would be the numbers which my $10.00 calculator reveals for the Cases for the USA and the World:

Daily Cases: USA – 1,369.860.000 World – 29, 354,730.000
Period 30 Days: USA – 41,095,800.000 World – 123,287,400.000
Annual: USA 499,998.900 World – 10,714.476,450.000

7. There is one unfortunate result if I accept your number of a 0.01% death rate. On an annual basis it would exceed the USA and World population by a factor of 1.785. That’s 78.5% more than the entire population of the USA and the World. Since I have not gotten SARS or Pneumonia recently, a lot of people are in “Deep Do-Do” if you are correct. In fact they can look forward to getting sick with this “stuff” a number of times, if my calculator is correct.

8. My suggestion to you all is to see how long you all can hold you breath.

9. Cheer-e-oh, you all.

11 posted on 04/26/2003 12:05:45 PM PDT by ido_now
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To: TaxRelief
The CDC has really made it clear that SARS is not highly contagious unless people are careless in their personal hygiene.

Yeah bud this is how they handle this non infectious disease

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SARS Home > Transport of Patients >
Interim Guidance: Air Medical Transport for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Patients
April 25, 2003, 11:30 AM
Download PDF version formatted for print PDF document (116 KB/5 pages)

Introduction
The current outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) has included reports of cases in Southeast Asia, North America and Europe, and required urgent air evacuation of patients with severe illness. This guidance is intended to assist air medical transport (AMT) service providers using specialized aircraft to transport SARS patients while ensuring the safety of patients and transport personnel. It should not be generalized to commercial passenger aircraft. These interim recommendations are based on standard infection control practices, AMT standards, and epidemiologic information from ongoing investigations of SARS, including experience from air transport of patients during this outbreak.

Currently recommended infection control measures for hospitalized patients with SARS include Standard Precautions (with eye protection to prevent droplet exposure), plus Contact and Airborne Precautions. Respiratory protection using respirators providing at least 95% filtering efficiency (e.g., N-95) with appropriate fit-testing is recommended.

I. Air Transport of SARS Patients, General Considerations

  • SARS patients should be transported on a dedicated AMT mission minimizing crew size. There should not be any patients or passengers who do not have SARS on board. If a parent is to accompany a sick child, the parent should use protective equipment during transport as described in section IV, below.
  • If possible, a single primary-caregiver should be assigned to the SARS patient.
  • All SARS patient movement involving U.S. citizens should be coordinated with appropriate state and federal health authorities, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (24 hour response number: (770) 488-7100) and the Department of State, before movement begins. International movement of SARS patients might require special approvals by countries that will be over-flown, aircraft-servicing locations, patient rest-stop hospitals, and/or final destinations.

II. Airframe Selection and Cabin Airflow
Cabin airflow characteristics may reduce exposure of occupants to airborne infectious particles; however, based on current understanding of how SARS is transmitted, airflow alone does not provide complete protection of personnel when sharing airspace with an infectious SARS patient. N-95 (or better) respirators are recommended for personnel in any part of an aircraft that shares air (directly or through the ventilation system) with the patient-care cabin.

Fixed-wing, pressurized aircraft:

  • AMT service providers should consult manufacturer(s) of their aircraft to identify cabin airflow characteristics, including: HEPA filtration and directional airflow capabilities, air outlet location, presence or absence of air mixing between cockpit and patient-care cabin during flight, and the time and aircraft configuration required to perform a post-mission airing-out of the aircraft.
  • Aircraft with forward-to-aft cabin airflow and a separate cockpit cabin are preferred for transport of SARS patients. Aft-to-forward cabin airflow may increase the risk of airborne exposure of cabin and flight deck personnel.
  • Aircraft ventilation should remain on at all times during transport of SARS patients, including during ground delays. Aircraft that re-circulate cabin and flight-deck air without HEPA filtration should not be selected for SARS patient transport.
  • Aircraft that provide space for crew members to perform necessary personal activities (eating, drinking, handling contact lenses, etc.) in an area that does not share air with the patient-care cabin should be selected for flights likely to exceed 4 hours.

Rotor-wing, and non-pressurized aircraft:

  • In aircraft with uncontrolled interior airflow such as rotor-wing and small, non-pressurized fixed-wing aircraft, all personnel should wear disposable, N-95 or better respirators during transport of SARS patients.

III. Patient Placement
The in-flight environment might preclude the creation of a true negative pressure space; however, some aircraft designs permit a downwind zone of relative airflow isolation. The airflow of each aircraft should form the basis for litter and seat assignments. In general:

  • SARS patients should be positioned as far downwind with regard to cabin airflow as possible.
  • In AMT aircraft with vertical litter tiers and top-to-bottom airflow, SARS litter patients should be placed in the lowest position in the tier.
  • Ambulatory SARS patients should be seated next to the cabin sidewall.
  • If a non-SARS patient must be transported simultaneously with SARS patient(s), the non-SARS patient must wear an N-95 respirator during transport and should not be positioned downwind from, or within 3 feet of, the SARS patient.
  • If several SARS patients are transported, they may be moved as a group (cohorted) in an aircraft that provides appropriate airflow characteristics as described above.

IV. Infection Control
General:

  • Personnel should not wear leather or other “flight” gloves while providing patient care.
  • Eating, drinking, application of cosmetics, and handling of contact lenses should not be done in the immediate patient care area.
  • Handling or storage of medication or clinical specimens should not be done in areas where food or beverages are stored or prepared.

Protective equipment and procedures:

  • Disposable, non-sterile gloves must be worn for all patient contact.
  • Gloves should be removed and discarded in designated trash bags after patient care is completed (e.g., between patients) or when soiled or damaged.
  • Hands must be washed or disinfected with waterless hand sanitizer immediately after removal of gloves.
  • Disposable fluid-resistant gowns should be worn for all patient care activity.
  • Gowns should be removed and discarded in designated trash bags after patient care is completed or when soiled or damaged.
  • Goggles or face-shields must be worn for all patient care within 6 feet of the patient. Corrective eyeglasses alone are not appropriate protection.
  • Disposable, N-95 respirators are approved for in-flight use. Personnel using N-95 respirators should be fit-tested.
  • If air is shared between the cockpit/flight deck and the patient-care cabin, cockpit/flight deck crew should wear disposable N-95 respirators.
  • For cockpit crews, aircraft aviator tight-fitting face-pieces capable of delivering oxygen that has not mixed with cabin air may be used in lieu of a disposable N-95 respirator.
  • Personal activities that require removal of respirators should not be performed in the patient-care cabin.
  • Patients should wear a paper surgical mask to reduce droplet production, if tolerated.
  • Oxygen delivery with simple and non-rebreather facemasks may be used for patient oxygen support during flight.
  • Positive pressure ventilation should be performed using a resuscitation bag-valve mask. If available, units equipped for HEPA or equivalent filtration of expired air should be used.
  • Cough-generating procedures should be avoided during transport (e.g., nebulizer treatments).

V. Mechanically Ventilated Patients

  • Mechanical ventilators for SARS patients should provide HEPA or equivalent filtration of airflow exhaust.
  • AMT services should consult their ventilator equipment manufacturer to confirm appropriate filtration capability and the effect of filtration on positive pressure ventilation.

VI. Clinical Specimens

  • Standard precautions must be used when collecting and transporting clinical specimens.
  • Specimens should be stored only in designated coolers or refrigerators.
  • Clinical specimens should be labeled with appropriate patient information and placed in a clean self-sealing bag for storage and transport.

VII. Waste Disposal

  • Dry solid waste (e.g., used gloves, dressings, etc.), should be collected in biohazard bags for disposal as regulated medical waste in accordance with local requirements at the destination medical facility.
  • Waste that is saturated with blood or body fluids should be collected in leak-proof biohazard bags or containers for disposal as regulated medical waste in accordance with local requirements at the destination medical facility.
  • Sharp items such as used needles or scalpel blades should be collected in puncture resistant sharps containers for disposal as regulated medical waste in accordance with local requirements at the destination medical facility.
  • Suctioned fluids and secretions should be stored in sealed containers for disposal as regulated medical waste in accordance with local requirements at the destination medical facility. Handling that might create splashes or aerosols during flight should be avoided.
  • Suction device exhaust should not be vented into the cabin without HEPA or equivalent filtration. Portable suction devices should be fitted with in-line HEPA or equivalent filters. Externally vented suction should not be used during ground operation.
  • Excretions (feces, urine) may be carefully poured down the aircraft toilet.

VIII. Cleaning and Disinfection

  • After transporting a SARS patient, exits and doors should be closed and aircraft air conditioning turned on at maximum capacity for several minutes in accordance with the airing time specified by aircraft-manufacturers to provide at least one complete air-exchange. Non-pressurized aircraft should be aired out with exits and doors open long enough to ensure a complete air-exchange. Blowers and high-powered fans that might re-aerosolize infectious material should not be used for airing out aircraft.
  • Cleaning should be postponed until airing out is complete.
  • Compressed air that might re-aerosolize infectious material should not be used for cleaning the aircraft.
  • Non-patient-care areas of the aircraft should be cleaned and maintained according to manufacturer’s recommendations.
  • Cleaning personnel should wear non-sterile gloves, disposable gowns and face shields while cleaning patient-care areas.
  • Patient-care areas (including stretchers, railings, medical equipment control panels, and adjacent flooring, walls and work surfaces likely to be directly contaminated during care) should be cleaned using an EPA-registered* hospital disinfectant in accordance with aircraft manufacturer’s recommendations.
  • Spills of body fluids during transport should be cleaned by placing absorbent material over the spill and collecting the used cleaning material in a biohazard bag. The area of the spill should be cleaned using an EPA-registered hospital disinfectant. Ground service personnel should be notified of the spill location and initial clean-up performed.
  • Contaminated web seats or seat cushions should be placed in a biohazard bag and labeled with the location and type of contamination for later disposal or cleaning.
  • Contaminated reusable patient care equipment should be placed in biohazard bags and labeled for cleaning and disinfection at the AMT service medical equipment section.
  • Personnel should wear non-sterile gloves, disposable gowns and face shields while cleaning reusable equipment.
  • Reusable equipment should be cleaned and disinfected according to manufacturer’s instructions.

IX. Logistical Planning and Post-Mission Follow-Up

  • Sufficient infection control supplies should be on board to support the expected duration of the mission plus additional time should the aircraft experience maintenance delays or weather diversions.
  • Flight planning should identify emergency or unexpected diversion airfields, and coordinate with authorities in advance.
  • Upon mission termination, the AMT team should provide the following information to their medical director: mission number/date; address of the team/aircraft basing; duration of patient transport; names, contact information, and crew positions (including estimated duration of direct patient care provided) of mission personnel.
  • AMT services should designate individuals responsible for performing post-mission monitoring of mission personnel and reporting results to the AMT service medical director.
  • Mission personnel should be monitored (directly or by telephone) at least once daily for 10 days for evidence of fever or respiratory illness that would require evaluation and follow-up.

* There are no disinfectant products currently registered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) specifically for the inactivation of the newly identified viruses associated with SARS. However, related viruses with physical and biochemical properties similar to the possible SARS agents are known to be readily inactivated by EPA-registered chemical germicides that provide low- or intermediate-level disinfection during general use.

X. Ground/In-Flight Emergency Procedures
AMT service providers should have a written plan addressing patient handling during in-flight and/or ground emergency situations. Activities such as donning life vests and litter-patient emergency egress may create special exposure risks. Use of N-95 respirators must be weighed against time constraints and on-board emergency conditions (e.g., smoke in the cabin, sudden cabin decompression). Gowns and latex gloves represent a fire/flash hazard and should not be worn during ground or in-flight emergency situations.

Acknowledgements:
This guidance was prepared in cooperation with and with contributions from:

United States Department of Defense

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC)
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF)
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)

United States Department of State
Commission on Accreditation of Air Medical Transport Services (CAMTS)
Aerospace Medicine Association (AsMA)
Air Medical Physician Association (AMPA)

 


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Tell me are the hospital workers in Toronto that are getting this virus stupid?

How about the fact that hospitals are being quarantined because it is spreading like wildfire inside them despite the staff's best efforts. Maybe they are licking the secrections of the patients or getting deep wet kisses.

It may be that it is only incredibly contagious in its final stages, but this disease is HIGHLY contagious.

12 posted on 04/26/2003 12:30:09 PM PDT by Nov3
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To: ido_now
Excuse me, what does your post have to with mine in #2 on this thread? All I said here was that the information in the article suggests that SARS has been confirmed to be the suspect coronavirus by laboratory experiment. That was news to me.

I don't specifically recall posting anything to you, nor have I posted an estimated death rate for SARS. Please explain.
13 posted on 04/26/2003 1:11:29 PM PDT by Carry_Okie (The environment is too complex and too important to be managed by politics.)
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To: Carry_Okie
Sorry, but I was only replying to a thread, which is "multi-thread" now.

I was not replying to anything that you said in particular.

Please excuse.
14 posted on 04/26/2003 2:56:23 PM PDT by ido_now
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To: TaxRelief
I think with all of the information available from other sources is that the CDC is all wet(the CDC is the same arrogant organization that refused to listen to a veterinarian when he told them that GRIDS was likely a sexually transmitted immunodeficiency virus and this was two years before they discovered the cause). Why are the hospital workers in Toronto that used barriers(masks, gowns, gloves, handwashing)coming down with SARS? I do not believe that the hospital workers in Toronto were careless with their personal hygiene. This virus is infectious (from all of the information that I have read it appears readily apparent). FIPV will usually go through an entire cat family sooner or later, it is highly infectious and I would not recommend commingling known disease expressive cats with apparent healthy cats.

Thanks for your response and thoughts.

15 posted on 04/26/2003 6:55:31 PM PDT by vetvetdoug
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