Computer analysis measures force of blow to shuttle [10 times energy needed to rupture wing]

USA Today ^ | April 30, 2003 | Traci Watson

[jpthomas]

HOUSTON -- A computer analysis shows that the piece of debris that hit the front of space shuttle Columbia's wing during liftoff was far more powerful than the blow needed to break the material covering that part of the shuttle.

[jpthomas]

A tidbit for all the "foamologists" out there.

[Banjoguy]

..maybe it's fortuitious that NASA wasn't more closely involved in the investigation. We may eventually get to the truth about this.

[Born to Conserve]

The hole wouldn't have been visable to spy satallites, but what about a friggin camara? They could have floated a video camera out the payload bay, turned the shuttle and waited for the camera to wobble in the right direction.

If the hole had been discovered early in the mission, they could have arrainged for rescue missions to take astronauts back in other vihicals, or at least jettisened the payload, which was the heaviest the shuttle had ever returned to earth.

The administrators should be put up on charges for their negligence.

[Conspiracy Guy]

We will never get the straight skinny on this. NASA screwed up big time. Arrogance and negligence.

[Arkinsaw]

They are going to have to carry the arm on every mission.

[fooman]

Who ever poo poo ed the foamologists at NASA should admit that he is an idiot or resign.

[ironman]

I don't think that will be the solution. The arm as designed I don't think can see the underside of the craft. Seems another solution will be developed. Arm takes up unnecessary space and weight anyhow.

[texson66]

Back in the late 80's and early nineties, NASA had worked on a small "RPV" to "fly around" the shuttle inspecting the shuttle after achieving orbit.

Why didnt they develop and use it? Apparently, no method of tile repair/replacement was ever developed for on-orbit operations. Each tile (thousands)on the shuttle has to be uniquely manufactured. Leading edge damage is yet another issue.

[Enduring Freedom]

No method of repairing an item the loss of which has proved likely, and catastrophic.

Sounds like a government-run program.

The real world is different.

[ARCADIA]

The administrators should be put up on charges for their negligence.

Yes, and then kill the agency and turn the programs over to the military.

[jlogajan]

..maybe it's fortuitious that NASA wasn't more closely involved in the investigation.

NASA people are doing the investigation. They are as interested in finding the cause as anyone.

There are just way too many tinfoilers on this forum.

[Jesse]

NASA figured this out a long time ago. This is the bureaucratic response to foulups...delay the bad news as long as possible.

Even armchair physicists like me found it quite plausible that a piece of broken off foam traveling at a high relative velocity to the wing when it hit could concentrate a lot of force on tiles which have been shown on countless television documentaries to be very resistant to heat, but very delicate when subjected to mechanical forces.

I think that the engineers screwed up early on and did not calculate the forces, they just thought that foam was not enough to hurt the shuttle...like a nerf ball. What they forgot was the high relative velocity the foam achieved in the airstream within a few feet precisely because it was not very dense.

[So Cal Rocket]

An email from a former co-worker I received on 9 Feb:

Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2003 11:34:28 -0800

I asked him to check whether the temperature units are really F. I think they should be C.

The NASA boys are "backpedaling" on the original theory of debris impact .... I think they are trying build a case to protect their asses for running with faulty thermal analysis. By the way that analysis was done by Boeing ..... now, I'm sure your saying to yourself ... "hey Bill, that's your guys" ..... well Lou in a way yes, and more important NO!

Let me tell you why .... remember, I'm not on the Shuttle Program anymore ... and remember there is a reason for that .... here it is ... That guy you see on TV .. Ron Dittemore, NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager, got together (about 3 years ago) with the new (at that time) Boeing Program Manager, Mike Mott. Dittemore basically directed Mott to have Boeing's Program Management and Design Center move from California (Huntington Beach, formally Downey) to Houston. Mott being new to the Program and not wanting to piss off his counterpart (Dittemore), took off and directed all of us that our jobs would be moving to Houston within the next 2 years. Well, any of us that had been on the Program for the last 20 years and traveled to Houston frequently, knew that we didn't want to move to Houston permanently. We tried to convince the Mott's and the Dittemore's that this move would destroy the engineering skills base that had been built up over the last 20 years. This all fell on deft ears, Dittemore and Mott went on with their plan. Well, as a result Lou, out of the 1200 highly skilled Shuttle engineering personnel that had been working on the Program over the last 20 years, only 11% of those people actually moved to Houston..... Most of the people that stayed were what used to be the Program Management Office (my office) and the highly skilled sub-system managers/engineers .... including the complete debris assessment and thermal analysis team. So Lou, what I'm saying is .... after launch, there was a thermal analysis done, but it was done by a group of Boeing thermal analysis engineers that had just been recently hired (within the last year) by our Boeing Houston Shuttle Program Office (also new guys). This group of thermal analysis engineers were from either other Boeing Programs or "off the street". This was their first opportunity for this type of a Real Time debris assessment and thermal analysis since being put on the Shuttle Program. Here are some of the details "they" came up with ..... assuming a debris of 30" x 7" striking the orbiter at Mach 3.6 resulting in tile damage and re-entry skin (aluminum) temperatures of approx. 420 deg.F peak. This temperature was stated as "peak" and short in duration, resulting in a "potential" for localized wing structural damage, but NOT catastrophic. Well, as we know now Lou, that analysis was flawed ....

After the accident, (Tuesday, I believe), my old office (at Huntington Beach) assembled the original debris assessment and thermal analysis team that have been disbursed throughout Southern California at other Boeing Facilities, now working other Programs. They received the same criteria the Houston guys had the day of launch, did their independent analysis (like they had for the last 20 years) and they came up with peak temperatures exceeding 620 deg. F for a most of the re-entry phase. As you know Lou .... aluminum flows at a much lower temp that 620 deg. F.

Getting back to what I said earlier about NASA "backpedaling" ........ if you look into what said above, Dittemore (NASA) ran with flawed thermal analysis that was done by a group of Boeing engineers (Houston) with little or no experience on real time Space Shuttle Thermal Analysis. These Boeing engineers were "in place" at Houston as a result directly because he (Dittemore) and Mott (Boeing) directed the Boeing Design Center and Program Office move to Houston. He and NASA and Boeing Management are doing whatever they can to redirect attention away from that thermal analysis that was done by the inexperienced thermal engineers rather than the guys that would have normally done it, but were no longer on the Program as a result of Dittemore's mandate to move Boeing's Design Center.

When I left the Program last July, along with most of the experienced Shuttle engineering base, most of us felt the Program was heading in a direction to have another "accident" ... but, we never thought it would happen this soon after we all left the Program.

[TheDon]

"But they say even a 10-inch-by-10-inch hole probably would not have been visible to spy satellites."

A 10 by 10 inch hole would have been quite clearly visible from a satellite based telescope. There was an amazingly clear photo of the shuttle from an earth based telescope.

[Banjoguy]

What's a tinfoiler?

The CYA gang is always present in any bureaucratic heirarchy. I call your attention to post #13. Don't confuse me with a knee jerk critic who doesn't know anything about physics. I have also worked in engineering teams.

I was under the impression that a quasi independant committee was conducting the review.

[jlogajan]

The CYA gang is always present in any bureaucratic heirarchy.

And blamethrowers abound as well.

I'm interested in causes and preventions. Other people seem more interested in claiming vast conspiracies and tarring and feathering anyone within reach.

The shuttle is a vast complicated engineering and management undertaking. Despite the blamethrower's claims that they "knew it all along", in fact none of them know anything yet. The causes are slowly being verified -- as it should be. There was never a need to "rush to judgement."

[Bloody Sam Roberts]

Seems another solution will be developed.

Already in inventory.

[jlogajan]

When I left the Program last July, along with most of the experienced Shuttle engineering base

ha ha ha. Like if there wasn't a "good" impact model before last July, if these guys had stayed on six more months there would have been. Come on -- this is classic blamethrowing. There is no correlation between the accident and the engineering relocation mentioned. It is all rant and no substance.

[bribriagain]

fyi

[TLBSHOW]

http://www.nasaproblems.com/
NASA Management Failures and Solutions
Two NASA’s
There are two NASA's... the old and the new. The New NASA is a series of management failures.
Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Operations and with Reduced Launch Costs
Why the Space Shuttle must have crew escape pods and why the New NASA has blocked any attempt to install them!
Salvaging the International Space Station
The International Space Station permanently crewed concept is operationally flawed.
Safety Oversight Failure of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
The safety office promotes NASA policy and disregards safety issues!
The NASA Administrator’s lacks management insight.
The Administrator is told only what the New NASA management wants heard.
A Space Transportation plan for the 21st Century
The New NASA management doesn't have a clue as to what's next!
“1950 DA” Another Grave Warning that must not be Ignored
We are already in another space race...and time is the unknown factor.
Request for Space Shuttle Moratorium
August 25, 2002 letter to President
Letter, explanations, and comments.