Iranian Alert -- DAY 21 -- LIVE THREAD PING LIST

Hardliners described by British officials as "the forces of darkness".

Excellent information gathered by Matt in Cornyn's office....thanks!

Contrast the actions of the Iranian protesters with the sentiments of various senior U.S. officials.

"The axis of evil was a valid comment, [but ] I would note there's one dramatic difference between Iran and the other two axes of evil, and that would be its democracy. [And] you approach a democracy differently," Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage – Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2003

“I think we should be working with and supporting the civilian leadership in there that's been taking on the clerical leadership.” Senator Joe Biden (Ranking Minority, Foreign Relations Committee) – Today Show, May 27, 2003

Lugar said he would "not necessarily" want to see a regime change in Iran. "A regime change that comes through the democratic processes of Iran, through the students and the young people taking charge — how all that comes about, I don't know." Senator Richard Lugar (Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee) – Fox News Sunday, June 15, 2003

Express Chronicle (Russia): Iran steps up crackdown

Iran steps up crackdown

The Express Chronicle
By Prima News Agency

June 30, 2003

IRAN. Iranian authorities have shut down for a week the Amir-Abad campus of Tehran University ahead of the anniversary of the July 9, 1999 student uprising. Students were ordered to vacate the campus by July 7 and to lodge elsewhere till July 14. Only students who agree to collaborate with Islamic militia will be allowed in to the campus during the period. They will be given special passes.
In 1999, the Amir-Abad campus was the center of the student unrest sparked after Islamic fundamentalist vigilantes had raided the student dormitories, killing at least one person. This year, the Amir-Abad area and other neighborhoods in Tehran have been witnessing sporadic protests since June 12. Over 4,000 demonstrators were reportedly arrested in Tehran and other cities of the country during this period.

According to the Student Movement Coordinating Committee for Democracy in Iran (SMCCDI), the Iranian regime proceeds with its plan to hold show trials of the arrested demonstrators.

The SMCCDI also reported that 36-year-old Bagher Parto arrested on June 16 in Shiraz has died under torture in custody of the intelligence department of the Pasdaran Corps. Opposition sources stated that he was tortured to extract information about fellow members of Azarakhsh (Thunder), an underground opposition group, and to force him to make false televised confessions of links with the Israeli and US intelligence services.

The SMCCDI expressed concern over the fate of influential scholars from Shiraz, Ghyessar Barani and the Ghahremani brothers arrested in connection with the demonstrations.

http://www.iran-daneshjoo.org/cgi-bin/smccdinews/viewnews.cgi?category=5&id=1056995058

Another must read article by one of our favorite journalists...

Last Straw
The British should not be appeasing the mullahs of Iran.
The National Review Online 6.30.2003

By Amir Taheri

For over 150 years many Iranians have believed that nothing can happen in politics anywhere without the British having a hand.

One of the most popular proverbs in Persian reads: All is the work of the English! (Kar kar englisi hast!)

Try telling the average Persian that long gone are the days when the British Empire, often using gunboat diplomacy, could impose its wishes on weaker nations. They believe that even today, Britain, although a middle-sized power in military and economic terms, is the world's real "superpower" in terms of political chicanery and diplomatic guile.

"The Americans dance on the little finger of the English," says Ayatollah Mahmoud Janati, a leading Khomeinist. " America may be the muscle, but England is the brain!"

Not surprisingly, the visit to Tehran by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw this week, is already at the center of heated debates both among the mullahs and their opponents.

Straw is no stranger in Tehran. He is, in fact, the only prominent Western politician to have visited the Iranian capital on four occasions in less than two years. He has also written columns from some Iranian state-owned newspapers, and spent time to meet as many mullahs, inside and outside the government, as possible.

Straw became something of a hero among the mullahs last year by asserting in an article that he wrote for a Tehran paper that Israel was the principal obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East. Straw's three previous visits to Tehran were understandable for at least two reasons.

The first was that the Anglo-American Coalition needed Iran's neutrality, if not active support, in toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathists in Iraq. Straw achieved remarkable success on both occasions.

The second reason was that Straw believed that Britain needed its own direct assessment of the Iranian situation rather than relying on second hand analyses from France and Germany.

But what is the reason for Straw's current visit?

Foreign Office sources in London say he is going to Tehran to assess the situation in the light of growing unrest prompted by the opposition movement. They also say that Straw will seek to persuade the mullahs to open their nuclear program to meaningful inspection by the outside world.

This, however, is not how the mullahs see the visit. Their media claims that the British leader has come to "offer an apology" for remarks made by Prime Minister Tony Blair at the House of Commons last Wednesday. In those remarks, Blair indicated that his government regards the Iranian pro democracy movement as a serious challenge to the mullahs and worthy of support.

As the opposition movement gathers momentum in Iran, it is imperative that the United States, the European Union, and other major powers speak in unison in support of reform and democratization.

The worst thing to do is to give the impression that the major democracies are prepared to bolster the mullahs' tottering regime in the name of "dialogue" and in the hope of real or imagined economic reasons.

The idea of a dialogue with the mullahs was first circulated by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the man who served as Germany's foreign minister for in the 1980s. Genscher called his policy "critical dialogue," prompting the joke that what he meant was that when the mullahs met the Europeans for a dialogue, both criticized the United States.

The mullahs repaid Genscher by sending a mob to burn the German embassy in Tehran during a stage-managed demonstration. Then in 1992 Tehran dispatched a hit squad to murder four exile opposition leaders in Berlin. Much to Genscher's chagrin, the criminal court in Berlin issued arrest warrants for four of Iran's top leader, including the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi on charges of having organized the political murders.

The French tried their version of "dialogue critique" with the mullahs. They were rewarded with the capture of several of their citizens, and the murder of their ambassador in Beirut by terrorist gangs financed by Tehran. French Ambassador to Tehran Guy Georgy was also seized as a hostage in 1984. Throughout the "dialogue" Tehran agents murdered 17 Iranian dissidents in France and killed another 30 French citizens in various terrorist operations in Paris and other major French cites. All that ended when the French, exasperated by the bad faith of the mullahs, suspended diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic for over two years.

Now, however, France is trying to make a spectacular comeback on the Iranian scene. Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin has visited Tehran on three occasions in less than a year in the hope of promoting an alliance to counter "American designs" in Iraq and the Middle East at large.

As a show of goodwill to the mullahs, the French police have arrested hundreds of Iranian exiles living in and around Paris and told several prominent opposition leaders to leave France. The mullahs are seeking similar "gestures" from Britain.

Straw would be mistaken to go down that shameful road. The Khomeinist regime is deeply divided with a growing faction within it seeking a deal with the opposition. Straw should encourage that faction to make its move as soon as possible. He should also dispel the mullahs' illusion that they can build a nuclear arsenal without risking military retaliation by the United States.

Because many mullahs believe that the "the English" really know what they are talking about, Straw could make a positive contribution by putting the fear of god in them.

— Amir Taheri's tenth book L'Irak: Le Dessous Des Cartes, was just published by Editions Complexe, Paris. Taheri was born in Iran.

He's available through www.benadorassociates.com.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-taheri063003.asp

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail me”

"As a show of goodwill to the mullahs, the French police have arrested hundreds of Iranian exiles living in and around Paris and told several prominent opposition leaders to leave France. The mullahs are seeking similar "gestures" from Britain.

Straw would be mistaken to go down that shameful road."

Yet in another article posted here, it said that the French were "cracking down" on followers of Rajavi, the Mujahadeen Khalq. This sounded to me like a good thing.
Which side is Taheri on?

"The SMCCDI also reported that 36-year-old Bagher Parto arrested on June 16 in Shiraz has died under torture in custody of the intelligence department of the Pasdaran Corps."

A hero to his cause and fellow protesters. And one among many, I'm afraid.

Which side is Taheri on?

I am checking on this.

This just in from Banafsheh...

A Constitutional construct for the post-mullah era

By: Elio Bonazzi & Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi

Most Iranian opposition forces active overseas, including the vast majority of the Iranian political spectrum, plus the opposition movement inside Iran, appear to agree on a referendum that should be held as soon as the mullahs’ regime is toppled. Iranian citizens will have to decide their new form of government. Up until now, however, neither prominent Iranian individual, nor political force has proposed a detailed referendum question. Given the history of the country, and the composition of the Iranian political spectrum, it is likely that the referendum question will ask Iranian people to choose between some form of Monarchy and some form of Republic.

It is definitely reassuring to see such a convergence on the idea of a referendum. Iranian political forces have been extremely fragmented and divided even on insignificant issues during the past 24 years. The fact that most Iranians today agree on the referendum sends a strong signal of political maturity that cannot be ignored.

It is crucial, however, that both the Iranian activist vanguard and all Iranians who care about their country and support the struggle for a free, secular and democratic Iran understand that a referendum is only the initial step towards the creation of a new Iranian State. Several fundamental decisions must be made, which will shape the future of the Iranian democracy.

The form of government (Monarchy, Presidential Democracy, Parliamentarian Democracy, etc) must be supported by an adequate electoral system. Irrespective of the form of government chosen according to the outcome of the referendum, it is very likely that the majority of Iranians want a multi-party system.

The Anglo-American electoral system is not suitable for societies that express a plurality of political formations, rather than two major parties. The winner-take-all plurality system that the US inherited from England represents only those voters whose candidates win a plurality of the votes in single-seat constituency races. Those who vote for loser candidates are not represented. The basic problem with Plurality-Majority electoral systems is the discrepancy between the percentage of votes received by a party and the number of seats in the Parliament/Congress attributed to it. In such an electoral system, a party could potentially receive millions of votes, and yet be under-represented or even not represented at all in the Parliament if none of its candidates won a direct race in at least one Electoral College. In the case of Iran, a Plurality-Majority electoral system could prevent traditional minority forces, which have been active throughout Iranian history and even more active after the Diaspora that followed the 1979 revolution, from representation in the Parliament.

On the other hand, proportional representation systems strive to reduce the disparity between a party’s share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats; if a major party wins 30% of the votes, it should win approximately 30% of the seats, and a minor party with 10% of the votes should also gain approximately 10% of the parliamentary seats. This is achieved by assigning the parliamentary seat to the winner of the Electoral College context, like in the Plurality-Majority system; the votes cast in favor of loser candidates, however, are not wasted, but accumulated nationally and used for the attribution of further seats.

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a perfect electoral system, and while proportional electoral systems are generally considered more “fair”, they introduce other problems. For instance, proportional representation systems increase the importance of political parties much more than Plurality-Majority systems. They do so by requiring that the people vote for party lists and for political parties rather than for individuals. Proportional representation usually assumes that the people vote to support political philosophies rather than to elect representatives.

A part from the more “philosophical” issues brought about by proportional systems discussed above, proportionally elected governments do have stability and governance issues. In a multi-party system, rarely one party obtains the majority of votes needed to form the government. A coalition of parties is needed to obtain the required majority. Smaller parties contributing to a coalition government can easily blackmail major parties, increasing the political price for their participation. In the worst case scenario, a smaller party initially participating in a coalition government could be tempted to break its alliance with the other parties half way through the period of office of the legislature, provoking a political crisis and potentially forcing the country to early elections.

Countries that have adopted a proportional electoral system have also put in place mechanisms to avoid the formation of an excessive number of small parties. Usually, that is achieved through the establishment of qualifying thresholds that parties must meet in order to be granted representation in the Parliament. Such thresholds can be a minimal percentage of votes that each party must obtain to gain the right to elected representatives, like in Israel where the threshold is 1.5% of the votes, or in Germany, where the qualifying threshold is 5%; in other countries, like Italy, each party must win at least one electoral college in order to achieve representation.

Most new democracies born after the collapse of communism chose proportional electoral systems; those societies had been oppressed by the tyranny of the single party system, and wanted to experience democracy to the fullest. But the eastern-European new States created after the fall of the Berlin wall “customized” the ideal of pure proportionality and adjusted it to their culture, traditions, political history and to avoid an excessive proliferation of small parties or to increase stability and governance.

The problem is that each correction or alteration to the electoral system is not politically neutral; each amendment could favor or penalize a specific party. A proportional electoral system could arguably work well in a new, multi-party Iranian society. But the amendments to the pure proportional system, necessary to ensure effective governance and to increase stability by mitigating the potential litigation between parties forming the coalition government, are likely to generate an involved debate among the Iranian opposition forces.

One more issue further complicates the creation of a new Iranian political framework. No serious Iranian or western statesman would question the territorial integrity of Iran after the collapse of the mullahs’ regime. But Iran comprises several different ethnic groups, usually geographically concentrated in specific areas, such as Kurdistan or Baluchistan. Some form of local autonomy, both at a political and at an administrative level, must be granted to those ethnic groups, to prevent civil unrest and the possible formation of break away, single-issue parties that could choose extremism as a simple way to assert their minority rights.

The alternative is between complete federalism, following the American model, or political unity in one National Parliament and strong regional/administrative autonomy.

Again, deciding between the two models is not politically neutral. Iranians must consider pros and cons of each model, and choose according to what is more suitable for their historical background and compatible with their political culture.

The debate on the future political and constitutional framework of a liberated Iran cannot be either neglected or postponed. Iranian opposition forces should start to seriously consider the various options and to make up their minds about what to propose after the toppling of the mullahs’ regime. Iranian opposition must buy precious time and start working on constitutional issues in order to achieve consensus on a few, fundamental ideas shared by a consistent majority within the political forces of the opposition. This sense of urgency originates from the following consideration: a power vacuum will inevitably follow after the ousting of the mullahs. Ideology-oriented minority parties, like the Tudeh or the Mujahedin parties, which organize well-disciplined militants, used to operate clandestinely, relying on an established network of dormant, but ready to reactivate cells, could try and exploit the situation to their advantage. The longer the period of power vacuum and the greater the danger of a “Bolshevik outcome”.

Given the current level of general disaffection towards the mullahs, it is very likely that the regime will crumble from within, unlike what happened in the neighboring Iraq. On the one hand, it would be a great accomplishment for the national pride of Iranians being able to get rid of the fascist theocracy with no external help; on the other hand, such an outcome would expose the country to a difficult transition phase, without American or international troops to act as the guarantor of order and democracy while the country decides on crucial aspects of its political life, like form of government and electoral system.

Iranians should work together to ensure a short and stable transition period, between the fall of the mullahs’ regime and the implementation of the new form of government decided through the referendum. Sectors of the Iranian army, led by those generals who have started dialoging with the opposition signaling their willingness to join forces with the anti-mullah movement, could fulfill the role of a neutral force that guaranties social order and prevents possible authoritarian twists, which could be attempted by the modern incarnation of the Tudeh party or by the Mujahedins during the transition phase.

What is needed, and sooner rather than later, is an agreement by most Iranian opposition forces, on a constitutional roadmap that will determine the steps necessary to drive Iran throughout the perilous journey of the next few months, in its passage from fascist theocracy to modern democracy. There are several historical examples on how to proceed in order to build the foundations of a new State. One way to accomplish this arduous task is to vote for the Referendum and at the same time for an assembly of a few hundreds legal experts who will have to write and approve the new Constitution. Such an assembly is democratically elected, and political parties, enjoying the newly found political freedom, actively campaign for candidates to the assembly. But in order to qualify, candidates must be versed in legal matters, able to understand and speak the technical language of Constitutional Jurisprudence.

The new Constitution can only be written after the Iranian people have expressed their fundamental preference on the form of government. It is likely that if a constitutional monarchy will emerge victorious from the referendum, the assembly writing the new Constitution will focus on the creation of check and balance mechanisms to prevent the constitutional monarch from progressively seizing more and more power, transforming the monarchy from constitutional to absolute; on the other hand, if the referendum decides in favor of a republic, the assembly can focus on different issues, such as the debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism.

The same assembly will also debate and approve a new electoral system. In substance, the crucial task performed by the assembly is to establish the rules of the political game. As soon as the new constitution is written and approved, general elections are called, following the rules of the new electoral system.

One of the major risks that democratic forces of the Iranian opposition face today is to be caught unprepared by a sudden demise of the mullahs without an agreement on a constitutional roadmap. Such an occurrence would delay the period of power vacuum, increasing the danger of an authoritarian twist in the worst-case scenario, or instability, looting and personal vendettas in the best-case scenario.

To mitigate the risks discussed above, as a matter of urgency Iranians should:

1) Identify and stand behind those sectors of the army able to ensure a peaceful and orderly transition

2) Agree on the necessary steps for the creation of democratic institutions, starting with a thoughtful and well formulated referendum question

The mullahs’ regime is at the end. The Western World has a chance to redeem itself for past mistakes, helping and encouraging Iranian opposition forces; the recent Iran Democracy Act, cosponsored by the US Senators Brownback, Cornyn, Coleman, Santorum, Bunning, Schumer, Inouye, Coleman, McConnell and Johnson is a step in the right direction. Other positive signs also come from Europe, where the Greek president of the EU recently sent a strong warning to the mullahs’ regime, saying that Europe’s patience towards the Iranian disregard for Human Rights is rapidly coming to an end.

Iranian opposition forces have the duty to respond to this historical call, rising to the occasion and unify and reach consensus at least on the constitutional roadmap. This is not a naïve call to set aside the profound differences that characterize the political forces of Iranian opposition. There will be plenty of chances for real political debate and struggle on social and governmental issues, after the toppling of the IRI; what is needed today, however, is minimal consensus on a limited set of “rules of the game”, that will drive the democratic process towards a new Iran.

Most Iranians Want Political Change, Even With Foreign Intervention - according to the hardliners!

Radio Free Europe ^ | 6.30.2003 | William Samii
Posted on 06/30/2003 4:08 PM PDT by DoctorZIn

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/938314/posts

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail me”

Very thoughtful piece.

Which side is Taheri on?

I am checking on this.

He is merely pointing out the hypocracy of the french government. france (not capitalized on purpose) has given the group immunity for years, they have given their leader refugee status, and now, all of a sudden, they decide to crack down on them. They are only doing it to impress the mad mullahs.

Got the french hypocracy part.
It's the Straw part that bothered me.
Okay. Reread several times.
Got the Straw part.

Foreign Arabic culture destroying Persian culture in Iran--but WHY?

IranianVoice ^ | 6/30/03 | IranianVoice
Posted on 06/30/2003 9:40 PM PDT by freedom44

Why does my country uses Arabic symbols for my country's flag. I thought Iran’s symbol was lion.

Iran is famous for its cat (lion) but I am using Arabic swords for my country's symbol, why?

Every country uses an indigenous symbol, for example America uses the eagle. why is not my country uses lion for my flag?

Why does the color of my country's flag resemble what Arabs use? I know Iran is very colorful country but I have chosen black, why?

Why are women in my country treated as second class citizens? Zardushti religion treated my mother and my sisters as equal to my father and my brothers, why did I change this?

Why do I approve my 9 year old sisters this past 1400 years be so inhumanely treated and agreed to let my father give my baby sisters away to grown men to have sex with and horrify the little girls?

Why are all newspaper headlines in my country writes about Arab problems and Palestinians?

Why is it in my country there are so many poor people and the poverty level is 200 times higher than during Shah?

Why are there so many prostitutes in my country?

Why do so many countries call me a terrorist and I am not welcomed in any foreign country?

What happened to my country’s ancient historical sites and why is Persapolis deteriorating?

Why does this government pay attention to post Islamic historical sites but not to Sassanid or Hakhamaneshian’s historical sites and why are these sites deteriorating?

Who was Khomeini? - was he Iranian or cared about Iran?

Why did Khomeini reply “HITCHI” (NOTHING) upon arriving from exile and asked how he felt?

If this question was asked of anyone loving Iran and Iranians at least would have replied “great to be back in my country”.

Why are my country's national resources spent on Palestinians instead of my country and why does Iran have to ask foreign counties money for earthquake victims? But have money to spend on Arab victims?

Why is it my country has laws that do not belong to Iran and did not originate in Iran or are suitable for Persian way of life?

Why did I revolt against shah? Was it because shah was bad for Iran or Arabs?

You know, shah was very powerful in the region and no Arab country dared to call “Persian Gulf” an “Arabic Gulf”. Yes my brothers and sisters Persian Gulf is called “Arabian Gulf” today in Arab world.

Did I revolt against shah to make things better for myself and my country? Or did I do it to give the control of my country and its treasures to those who are related to Arabs and those who are Arab sympathizers?

Why is this present regime against any Iranian customs, tradition, and ceremonies and against our 3000 year old New Year celebration and anything not related to Islam is forbidden or discouraged?

Why do we have to mourn everyday for Islam and those died 1400 years ago? You know mourning makes people depressed, and we do it almost everyday, why?

Why do we have to behave, speak, think, write, govern, teach, learn, spend life in our homes and in public that has Arabic origin and is strange to iran?

Why do we have to live in the shadow of Arabs and their world?

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/938440/posts

Iranian Alert -- DAY 22 -- LIVE THREAD PING LIST

Live Thread Ping List | 7.1.2003 Posted on 07/01/2003 12:04 AM PDT by DoctorZIn

The UN: Run by Dictators, for Dictators!