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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Posted on 12/16/2002 5:38:35 AM PST by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Dec. 16, 1944 - Jan. 25, 1945 Note: Since all the mentions of this army and that army can become confusing, German units are given in italics, and American units are in normal type.  The Battle of the Bulge began with the German attack (Operation Wacht am Rhein and the Herbstnebel plan) on the morning of December 16, 1944. Two later attacks on New Year's Day 1945 attempted to create second fronts in Holland (Operation Schneeman) and in northern France (Operation Nordwind). The overall German plan is laid out in the map above (from Hugh Cole's official history "The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge", Map IX). In the original plan, three Armies (the Sixth Panzer Army [referred to by Hitler as Sixth SS Panzer Army but not formally designated as SS at the time - Cole, p. 76], Fifth Panzer Army, and Seventh Army) would attack. In a revised plan on November 1, 1944, the Sixth Panzer Army, for political reasons [Cole, p. 34], was given the official role of making the main effort and capturing Antwerp. .gif) The Fifth Panzer Army was not designated as the main force in name, but it actually had the responsibility of hitting the center of the American lines, promptly capturing the highly strategic rail and road center of St. Vith, and driving on to capture Brussels. The Seventh Army in the south was to peel off as it moved west and then turn and form a defensive line, in order to form a buffer area to prevent U.S. reinforcements from hitting the Fifth Panzer Army. In the offical order signed by Hitler on November 10, 1944, the Fifteenth Army was added [Cole, pp. 34-36]: The Fifteenth Army "was not to be employed until the Allies had reacted in force to the German attack, and in any case could not be expected to launch a large-scale attack until the Allied front east of Aachen had been drastically denuded of troops." In fact, on December 13, 1944, the US 2nd Infantry Division began an attack in the Fifteenth Army area that further nullified any effect the Fifteenth Army might have in the attack. With the exception of the critical road and rail center at St. Vith, the main towns were to be bypassed by the attacking panzer (armored) forces, so that the speed of the attack would not be slowed. Rear echelon infantry would clean out the bypassed towns. The military goal was to capture Antwerp and cut off the Allied troops to the north. The political goal was to cause division among the Allies and destroy the Allied coalition. The terrain was the dense Ardennes Forest. The weather was chilly mist and fog, so that Allied air support was nullified until December 23. (In fact, one of the German plans was named Herbstnebel or Autumn Mist.) In addition, ground visibility for the troops was often very low, due to the trees and fog. The dense forest had very few roads, none of which were large. Traffic jams on both sides of the front were a major problem for both Armies.  The only railroad on the entire front to cross from Germany into Belgium came to St. Vith, Belgium, making St. Vith, which was also a major road junction the most vital initial prize the Germans sought, in order to allow supplies to flow to support the remainder of the attack. It was no accident that St. Vith was right in the very center of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies: St. Vith had to be the main line of supply for both Armies. The German plan called for capture of St. Vith by 1800 on December 17 by Fifth Panzer Army, but the defenders held at St. Vith until late on December 21. This led the German Fifth Panzer Army Commander, Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel, to recommend to Hitler's adjutant on December 24 that "the German Army give up the attack and return to the West Wall." Manteuffel's reason for this recommendation was "due to the time lost by his Fifth Panzer Army in the St. Vith area." [Manteuffel press conference of 22 December 1964 in Watertown, NY] Hitler did not accept Manteuffel's recommendation, and the German supplies began to run out. German columns ran low on gas and ammunition well before reaching even their first major goal: the Meuse River. On December 23, the weather cleared, and Allied planes finally filled the skies in support of the besieged American troops. (Some of the GI's had wondered why they saw German planes before that, despite the conditions, but saw no American planes.)  Slowly but surely the Allies -- from the North, the West, and the South -- closed the salient, the Bulge. The First US Army troops from the north met the Third US Army troops from the south at Houffalize, Belgium on January 16, 1945. St. Vith was recaptured on January 23, 1945. The ending date of the Bulge is considered as January 25, 1945, since this was the date on which the lost positions were officially thought to have been completely regained. In fact, as a series of letters in the VBOB "Bulge Bugle" have noted, some positions were not regained until after January 25, 1945. In the largest battle ever fought by the U. S. Army, with 600,000 GI's involved, it is difficult to place one unit or location ahead of another in importance. But the reality is that two crucial stands at the front lines are what really doomed the German attack to certain failure: Holding the Northern Shoulder: The 99th Infantry Divsion and the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion bore the brunt of the Sixth Panzer Army attack on Day 1, and they held most of their ground, creating what would become the northern shoulder. (Keep in mind that the southern shoulder was one that the Germans themselves intended to form with their Seventh Army -- which they pretty much succeeded in doing.) Holding St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division and the 106th Infantry Division, with elements of the 9th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division, held St. Vith four days beyond the German timetable. Even the German Fifth Panzer Army commander recognized that the attack was doomed as a result.  It is significant to note that the 7th Armored Division was near Aachen, Germany when the German attack began. The 7th Armored Division had to move 60-70 miles to the south on Day 2. If the 99th Infantry Division and 291st Engineer Combat Battalion had not held on the northern shoulder, the 7th Armored Division never would have reached St. Vith. Even when the 7th Armored Division had reached St. Vith, it was the troops on the northern shoulder and the newly arrived 82nd Airborne Division that kept a very narrow escape route open for the virtually surrounded defenders of St. Vith. But once the defense of St. Vith was set up, that defense also bolstered the defense of the northern shoulder, as both defenses forced the German columns off of their planned routes and led to considerable congestion as the Gemran columns were then funneled in between the northern shoulder and the St. Vith salient. But what about Bastogne? In popular thinking, the Battle of the Bulge is synonymous with the Battle of Bastogne. This is very unfortunate, since it ignores the real military keys (holding the northern shoulder and holding St. Vith) to the defeat of the Germans. Journalists hungry for some sign of American success at stopping the German onslaught played up the defense of Bastogne, where Gen. Anthony McAuliffe (101st Airborne Division) said "Nuts" to a German surrender demand and where the Third US Army (10th Armored Division) broke through the German Seventh Army's buffer to reach the surrounded town on Day 3 of the Battle of the Bulge. This was truly heroic stuff. But from a military strategy point of view (and this can easily be seen on the map above), while Bastogne was a strategically important major road junction for sustaining the attack, it was on the periphery of the attack and well behind the initial front lines. The German plan was to have the panzers bypass Bastogne and let the later echelons of infantry and artillery units clean it out. And the panzers did succeed in bypassing Bastogne, so that their plan in that sector was on schedule. As a source for rallying U. S. spirits, the defense of Bastogne and McAuliffe's "Nuts" were a success. But from a strategic perspective, the German fate had already been sealed at St. Vith, when they could not take that critical supply center on Day 2 - nor on Days 3, 4, 5, and most of 6. Bastogne did not become surrounded by forces intent on taking it until the night of December 21, Day 6 of the Battle of the Bulge. And the famous "Nuts" did not come until December 22, Day 7. Heroic as the deeds of the defenders of Bastogne were, the defense of Bastogne is a very important secondary element but not one of the true strategic keys to the German failure. 
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While my hat is off to Battle of the Bulge vets, lets not forget that another battle was raging on the other side of the world. Sometime before Christmas, 1944, my father was listed as MIA on Leyte, P.I. His family got word of this when their Christmas package was returned with the news. Most of his company was annihilated be he and a few others were recovered alive. I have his V-mail letter explaining that he was hospitalized on 3 Jan 45. He was with the 32nd Infantry divison. Actually, this marks the 60th anniversary of that outfit's terrible campaign in Buna, New Guinea (Dec 42). My father joined the 32nd as a replacement in April 43.
Jim survived also and went on to a career as a long-haul trucker - St. Louis to Cincinnati to Indianapolis to St. Louis - for the next 30 years.
The third person I knew well was Eberhart Reimers. He was on "the other side". As a 15 year old auxiliary trooper in the German Infantry he found himself in a foxhole with another young man his age. An artillery burst turned his companion into a red mist. His view was that wherever the Germans had a rifle the Americans had an artillery piece. He later went on to get his college education and emigrated to Cleveland. At the age of 50 he completed a Doctorate at University of Tokyo. You could turn him 15 years old again by asking about the Bulge.
My uncles would become 25 years old when asked about the Bulge.
All of the men there saw more death than any human being should.
The 2nd Armored "Hell on Wheels" Division moved 100 miles south in one night under highest security (no lights on icy roads) and met the German spearhead (2nd Panzer Division) as it approached the Meuse. In the ensuing battle (it peaked on Christmas Day) the Panzer Division was destroyed.
"Trench foot, too, inflicted more than its share of casualties as the malady hit the 90th with epidemic force. Men limped into battle on senseless swollen feet. Some were carried to their weapons. P-47's of the XIX Tactical Air Force joined the fight, but not with guns or bombs. They came in low, swooped over the area at tree top level, and dropped their freight with heartening accuracy...medical supplies for the wounded and sick."
The above quote comes just days before the Battle of the Bulge, as the 90th fought to cross the Seigfried Line.
"December 15th, and the Division, fighting along the narrowest zone in its combat history, had made only minor penetrations into the Siegfried Line. Casualties due to wounds, sickness, exposure and trench foot, were wreaking havoc. Therefore, it was determined to storm into Dillingen itself, occupy the city as a stronghold, and then cross the Prims River, turning south to make contact with the 95th Division, still severely engaged in Saarlautern. The infantry, aided as usual by the effective support of armor and accurate artillery fire, pushed across the railroad tracks and reduced staunchly defended pillboxes which faced them in profusion.
In the fighting that followed, the 90th pushed resolutely into the city of Dillingen, clearing block after block of the enemy. The densest portions of the Siegfried Line had been successfully negotiated, and Dillingen was in process of falling to the 90th. House by house and room by room the 90th pushed through the city. In spite of the fact that no bridge had been built to span the Saar River, the Division had succeeded in crushing one by one the defenses that constituted the "invincible" Siegfried Line. The shadow of the 90th had fallen squarely on the heartland of Germany.
"And suddenly the picture changed. In the north, in Luxembourg and Belgium, General von Rundstedt hurled his best divisions into a final counteroffensive. Before the fury of the attack the American lines bent back. In the Moselle-Saar triangle another enemy assault was in preparation. The spearheads acrosss the Saar were exposed and vulnerable. In view of these rapidly altering developments, the 90th was ordered to disengage, to return its forces to the west bank of the Saar.
"Never before in the history of the Division had it disengaged, and its first experiene was fraught with difficulty and danger. Only one ferry, one footbridge and few assault boats were available for the maneuver that was to move the entire Division across the river under enemy observation.
"On December 19th the withdrawal began. As the troops retired they destroyed all equipment which might possibly be of aid to the enemy, mined the areas they abandoned and moved slowly westward. For three days the operation continued, while the enemy remained in complete ignorance of what was occurring. "Crews, working on the bridge and ferry sites, performed miracles in moving vehicles and armor across the Saar. roads on the eartern side became impassable, and each vehicle required winching through the mud and over the steep banks. Enemy artillery destroyed the ferry, and with only a few hours remaining in which to complete the withdrawal, 25 armored vehicles remained on the wrong side of the river. In the darkness and in the freezing waters, under continuous shelling the men at the river slaved through the night to salvage what they could. Only the wrechage of six vehicles remained as a prize for the Germans when the withdrawal was completed. "And so the crossing of the Saar was successfully accomplished, the Siegfried Line Cracked, and another triumph almost with the grasp of the 90th. But the fortunes of war had not entirely erased the Division's achievements at Dillingen. For now the men of the 90th knew that the Siegfried Line could be broken, and they knew also that if they had done it once they could do it again."
This is the first time I have seen the details of the massacre. Sad. --- Can you sent this to Senator Clinton, so she can learn some valuable history ?
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