Posted on 01/13/2004 9:01:35 AM PST by Aurelius
Dust jackets for most books about the American Civil War depict generals, politicians, battle scenes, cavalry charges, cannons[sic] firing, photographs or fields of dead soldiers, or perhaps a battle between ironclads. In contrast our book {[url=http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=2XGHOEK4JT&isbn=0842029613&itm=7]Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War Mark Thornton, Steven E. Woodworth (Editor), Robert B. Ekelund[/url]features a painting by Edgar Degas entitled the "Cotton Exchange" which depicts several calm businessmen and clerks, some of them Degas’s relatives, going about the business of buying and selling cotton at the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. The focus of this book is thus on the economic rationality of seemingly senseless events of the Civil War – a critical period in American history.
What caused the war? Why did the Union defeat the Confederacy? What were the consequences of the War? The premise of the book is that historians have a comparative advantage in describing such events, but economists have the tools to help explain these events.
We use traditional economic analysis, some of it of the Austrian and Public Choice variety, to address these principal questions and our conclusions generally run counter to the interpretations of historians. In contrast to historians who emphasize the land war and military strategy, we show that the most important battle took place at sea. One side, the blockade runners, did not wear uniforms or fire weapons at their opponents. The other side, the blockading fleet, was composed of sailors who had weapons and guns but they rarely fired their cannons in hopes of damaging their opponents. Their pay was based on the valued of captured ships. Historians often have argued that the Confederacy lost because it was overly reluctant to use government power and economic controls, but we show the exact opposite. Big Confederate government brought the Confederacy to its knees.
Some now teach that slavery was the sole cause of the Civil War – an explanation that historians have developed in the twentieth century. However, this analysis does not explain why the war started in 1861 (rather than 1851 or 1841) and it fails to explain why slavery was abolished elsewhere without such horrendous carnage.
We emphasize economics and politics as major factors leading to war. The Republicans who came to power in 1860 supported a mercantilist economic agenda of protectionism, inflation, public works, and big government. High tariffs would have been a boon to manufacturing and mining in the north, but would have been paid largely by those in the export-oriented agriculture economy.
Southern economic interests understood the effects of these policies and decided to leave the union. The war was clearly related to slavery, but mainly in the sense that Republican tariffs would have squeezed the profitability out of the slave-based cotton plantation economy to the benefit of Northern industry (especially Yankee textiles and iron manufacturing). Southerners would also have lost out in terms of public works projects, government land giveaways, and inflation.
The real truth about wars is that they are not started over principle, but over power. Wars however, are not won by power on the battlefield, but by the workings and incentives of men who go to work in fields and factories, to those who transport, store and sell consumer goods, and most especially to the entrepreneurs and middlemen who make markets work and adapt to change. This emphasis and this economic account of tariffs, blockade and inflation, like the focus of Degas’s "Cotton Exchange" reveals the most important and least understood aspect of war.
[n-s]: In reply 429. The Ex Parte Milligan case resulted from actions taken under the act of Congress approved on March 3d, 1863, and titled "An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases."
If there was any condemning of Congress, the Supreme Court did it. I gather from ex parte Milligan that Milligan asked the following:
The prayer of the petition was, that under the act of Congress, approved March 3d, 1863, entitled, 'An act relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,' he may be brought before the court, and either turned over to the proper civil tribunal to be proceeded against according to the law of the land or discharged from custody altogether.
I don't have a copy of the particular law in question. Sounds like Milligan was arguing that under the law you cited he should have been brought to trial in a civil court, not a military one. Was Congress in error or the Lincoln Administration?
Not really. If anything you are guilty of confusion over its stated theme. The sentence you purport to contain its theme appears halfway down the page in the middle of the text - not exactly a common place for stating the purpose of an article. In reality, the purpose is explicitly stated in the opening paragraph: "The focus of this book is thus on the economic rationality of seemingly senseless events of the Civil War – a critical period in American history."
That you missed this seems to indicate a critical lapse in reading comprehension on your part. Surely you remember that lesson they normally teach in, oh, sometime around 2nd grade where they give you a paragraph and ask you to underline the topic sentence. What's even more pitiful on your part is that, in the case of this particular article, the topic was restated a second time in case somebody with obviously slower comprehension abilities such as yourself missed it the first time. From paragraph 2:
"The premise of the book is that historians have a comparative advantage in describing such events, but economists have the tools to help explain these events."
Did you see it that time, mac? The book is not specifically about the government of the confederacy as you claim. It is about the events of the war in general AS VIEWED THROUGH THE TOOLS OF ECONOMICS.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist
Let's look at some other parts of that same speech by Rehnquist, shall we?
...Edwin Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary of War, decided that the suspects in this conspiracy should be tried, not in a regular civil court by a jury, but by a military commission, composed of senior army officers.In so doing, he went a good deal further than simply suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Trial before such a commission would raise serious questions, for example, about denial of the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The suspects were duly tried before such a commission in Indianapolis, and several were sentenced to be hanged. They appealed to the Supreme Court, which in a case called Ex Parte Milligan decided in 1866 -- more than a year after the Civil War was over, by a vote of 5 to 4 that civilians not in the military -- and that is who these defendants were -- could not be tried by a military commission so long as the civil courts were open for business.
Here we have an illustration of an old maxim of Roman law -- Inter Arma Silent Leges -- which loosely translated means that in time of war the laws are silent. All during the Civil War the courts were unable or unwilling to ride herd on the Lincoln administration's policies which seriously interfered with civil liberty. Only after the end of the war was a decision handed down which upheld that liberty.
I've cited on these threads before where a Confederate District Court took the juridiction of a case away from Confederate Military Courts. This was a case of a Confederate Court standing up to the military and protecting the rights of a civilian. Apparently didn't happen in the North until after the war.
It wasn't moot when the ruling was issued and when Lincoln chose to ignore that ruling.
But when congress did return in July, they suspended the writ
Evidently not, based on the congressional record. I pinged nolu chan because I recall him documenting the progression of the habeas corpus bills offered in 1861. IIRC not one of them passed and Congress in fact did not suspend the writ until sometime around 1863.
so I expect in the future that you will refrain from calling the subsequent actions unconstitutional
If Congress did not suspend the writ until 1863 I have no choice to call everything before that and some of the ones after it (i.e. the Milligan case) unconstitutional.
In lieu of that, I would expect an equal, or even higher level of outrage from you towards Davis and the Confederate congress for their suspension of the writ throughout the war. Not necessary. Davis followed the constitutional procedure for suspending the writ and had Congress do it. Nor was Davis' a blanket suspension of the writ handed over to military descretion like Lincoln's. It was a limited statutory suspension, and even after being enacted the state courts continued to issue writs within their own borders because the confederate view of states rights held that states shared a dual sovereignty with the national government.
BTW. Do you consider Wm. Renquist to be a leftist hag as well?
No, but he is mistaken in the case of habeas corpus. He may be a decent judge on other things but even the best judges are wrong some times. O'Conner is a leftist hag however. She is a leftist hag who has, through her actions and repeated constitutionally unsound rulings, forfeited any legitimate claim to her role as arbiter of that document no matter what her formal title and office might be. She is currently undeserving of her seat on that court and has forfeited any credentials that would otherwise entitle her to rule. She's a prime candidate for impeachment if their ever was one, and I make no reservations in saying that either.
Wrong question. Where does it say that he CAN suspend habeas corpus? The answer is nowhere.
Sure it has. That only Congress could suspend it was the unanimous position of the founding fathers. If you dispute this quote me one who says otherwise.
That only Congress can suspend it is also the standing court ruling on the only two cases to render a decision on a president who did it: In Re MacDonald of the U.S. District Court in St. Louis and Ex Parte Merryman of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Baltimore. Both of them were against Lincoln.
And that is not only my opinion, but the considered opinion of the current Chief Justice as well.
All facts considered, the current Chief Justice is simply wrong.
Where does it say that Congress can? The answer is nowhere. The Constitution says that the writ can be suspended under certain circumstances. It is silent on whether Congress is the only ones who can do it.
From what I have seen Congress did not go along with it until two years after the fact in 1863. Lincoln's original suspension of the writ was in 1861 when Congress was out of session. Had he desired to suspend it constitutionally he would have had to call Congress back in session and ask them to do it first. He did not and instead acted alone. The ensuing arrests were immediately challenged in at least two federal courts: the U.S. District Court in St. Louis and the U.S. Circuit Court in Baltimore. Both courts ruled against Lincoln. The St. Louis court order was obeyed by the general in command there for the one particular prisoner but ignored for everything else. The Baltimore court order was ignored by Lincoln entirely. In any other time of our history what Lincoln did - ignoring a federal court order for no other reason than not liking the outcome - would be an impeachable offense.
Well, what do we need him and the rest of the court for? We have you.
It appears you've caught a case of the tu quoque bug as well. You should take precautions against that sort of thing as an epidemic of it seems to be circulating among the northern camps of this region.
That said, in answer to your question: No. It was not equally bad because the confederates did not do the exact same thing.
In the even that you do not understand how or why they did not do the exact same thing, compare their methods:
NORTH:
April 1861 - Lincoln unilaterally suspends habeas corpus
May and June 1861 - two federal courts immediately strike down his exercise of this suspension. Lincoln simply ignores the court orders.
July 1861 - Lincoln reconvenes Congress, explains his suspension, and asks them to affirm it ex post facto (which is also unconstitutional). Congress takes up consideration of suspension bills but fails to act.
August and September 1862: Lincoln extends the realm of his habeas corpus suspension unilaterally and without authorization from Congress.
March 1863 - Congress finally adopts legislation affirming the suspension habeas corpus. The suspension had been in place for almost two years by then. SOUTH:
October 1862: Confederate Congress acts constitutionally to suspend habeas corpus, but only for the national government (The act itself states "but such suspension shall apply only to arrests made by the authorities of the Confederate Government, or for offences against the same."). State courts are immediately recognized to still possess the authority to issue writs.
June 1863: North Carolina Supreme Court establishes a precedent by issuing writs of habeas corpus to individuals being held under the September 1862 draft act.
See the difference yet? The north suspended habeas corpus unconstitutionally and maintained that unconstitutional suspension in violation of standing court order for almost two years before enacting it properly. The south suspended habeas corpus constitutionally through its Congress, and even then did so only in a limited sense because they still permitted state courts to issue writs in their own jurisdictions.
The last time I checked, a ruling of the U.S. Circuit Court that is not appealed stands as the law of the land. Lincoln never appealed Merryman, thus it is the current and highest standing precedent on the matter. Theoretically, another case could emerge in the future where the Supreme Court rules differently overturning this precedent, but to do so they would have to shun both the precedent and the unanimous evidence of the founding fathers. Not that they aren't capable of that sort of thing nowadays...
Put it to a vote on this forum and I have little doubt that the majority would pick me over the current sodomy-supporting, affirmative action endorsing, McCain-Feingold loving majority on the U.S. Supreme Court any day. But that in itself is not the issue at hand. The issue is whether or not Rehnquist is right or wrong, and I am saying without reservation that regardless of whatever position he may hold William Rehnquist, on the issue of habeas corpus, is simply wrong. He is wrong because his position defies the unanimously asserted view of the founding fathers and all standing court precedents since then. If you or he do not like that fact, tough.
Article I, Section 9, which falls under the rule of Article I, Section 1 placing it within the authority of Congress.
The Constitution says that the writ can be suspended under certain circumstances. It is silent on whether Congress is the only ones who can do it.
Wrong. Article I, Section 1 states "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Article I, Section 9's habeas corpus clause is "herein granted" under Article I. Thus it is "vested in a Congress of the United States." Not a single founding father thought anything different when they drafted that clause. Once again if you deny this, quote one for me and prove that I'm wrong.
Rehnquist is in the minority.
"The privileges and benefit of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government, in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding months." - Charles Pickney, announcing the proposal to limit the suspension of habeas corpus, Constitutional Convention, 1787
"The people by adopting the federal constitution, give congress general powers to institute a distinct and new judiciary, new courts, and to regulate all proceedings in them, under the eight limitations mentioned in a former letter; and the further one, that the benefits of the habeas corpus act shall be enjoyed by individuals." - Richard Henry Lee, Anti-Federalist #16, "Federal Farmer"
"In the same section it is provided, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may require it." This clause limits the power of the legislature to deprive a citizen of the right of habeas corpus, to particular cases viz. those of rebellion and invasion; the reason is plain, because in no other cases can this power be exercised for the general good." - Robert Yates, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Anti-Federalist #9, "Brutus"
"The safest and best restriction, therefore, arises from the nature of the cases in which Congress are authorized to exercise that power [of suspending habeas corpus] at all, namely, in those of rebellion or invasion. These are clear and certain terms, facts of public notoriety, and whenever these shall cease to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily cease also." - Judge Francis Dana, presenting the Constitution to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention
"In the United States, it can be suspended, only, by the authority of congress; but not whenever congress may think proper; for it cannot be suspended, unless in cases of actual rebellion, or invasion. A suspension under any other circumstances, whatever might be the pretext, would be unconstitutional, and consequently must be disregarded by those whose duty it is to grant the writ." - St. George Tucker, Commentaries, 1803
"The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature. But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case. If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide." - Justice John Marshall, writing for the majority in Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout, United States Supreme Court, 1807
"Those respecting the press, religion, & juries, with several others, of great value, were accordingly made; but the Habeas corpus was left to the discretion of Congress, and the amendment against the reeligibility of the President was not proposed by that body." - Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 1821
"The Constitution seems to have secured this benefit [habeas corpus] to the citizen by the description of the writ, and in an unqualified manner admitting its efficacy, while it declares that it shall not he suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require it. This writ is believed to be known only in countries governed by the common law, as it is established in England; but in that country the benefit of it may at any time be withheld by the authority of parliament, whereas we see that in this country it cannot be suspended even in cases of rebellion or invasion, unless the public safety shall require it. Of this necessity the Constitution probably intends, that the legislature of the United States shall be the judges. Charged as they are with the preservation of the United States from both those evils, and superseding the powers of the several states in the prosecution of the measures they may find it expedient to adopt, it seems not unreasonable that this control over the writ of habeas corpus, which ought only to be exercised on extraordinary occasions, should rest with them. It is at any rate certain, that congress, which has authorized the courts and judges of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases within their jurisdiction, can alone suspend their power" - William Rawle, "A View of the Constitution of the United States of America," 1826
"It would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body." - Justice Joseph Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States," Book 3, Chapter XXXII, § 1336, 1833
"And who could hold for a moment, when the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended by the legislature itself, either in the general government or most of the States, without an express constitutional permission, that all other writs and laws could be suspended, and martial law substituted for them over the whole State or country, without any express constitutional license to that effect, in any emergency? Much more is this last improbable when even the mitigated measure, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, has never yet been found proper by Congress, and, it is believed, by neither of the States, since the Federal Constitution was adopted." - Justice Levi Woodbury, dissent in Luther v. Borden, United States Supreme Court, 1849
"With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language too clear to be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatever for supposing that the president, in any emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the judicial power. He certainly does not faithfully execute the laws, if he takes upon himself legislative power, by suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and the judicial power also, by arresting and imprisoning a person without due process of law." - Justice Roger B. Taney, Ex Parte Merryman, US Circuit Court of Appeals, 1861
"There has been much discussion concerning the question whether the power to suspend the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" is conferred by the Constitution on Congress, or on the President. The only judicial decisions which have been made upon this question have been adverse to the power of the President.Still, very able lawyers have endeavored to maintain -- perhaps to the satisfaction of others -- have maintained, that the power to deprive a particular person of the "privilege of the writ," is an executive power. For while it has been generally, and, so far as I know, universally admitted, that Congress alone can suspend a law, or render it inoperative, and consequently that Congress alone can prohibit the courts from issuing the writ, yet that the executive might, in particular cases, suspend or deny the privilege which the writ was designed to secure. I am not aware that any one has attempted to show that under this grant of power to suspend "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," the President may annul the laws of States, create new offences unknown to the laws of the United States, erect military commissions to try and punish them, and then, by a sweeping decree, suspend the writ of habeas corpus as to all persons who shall be "arrested by any military authority." I think he would make a more bold than wise experiment on the credulity of the people, who should attempt to convince them that this power is found in the habeas corpus clause of the Constitution. No such attempt has been, and I think none such will be made. And therefore I repeat, that no other source of this power has ever been suggested save that described by the President himself, as belonging to him as commander-in-chief." - Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, "Executive Power," 1862
"Big Confederate government brought the Confederacy to its knees."
I can't really help it if you are unable to grasp the concept of theme in literature. Or perhaps your persistant historical myopia makes this particular theme undigestable (lol). However, you may wish to communicate directly with the two authors about their placement of the unifying concept of their work in this article.
Sounds like a pretty good read too.
Theme? Hardly. It was a single sentence offered as one single example of the book's contents. It appeared halfway through the article and well after the authors had twice explicitly identified the topic of their book: the events of the civil war as viewed and analyzed through the tools of economics or, as the title says, "The Economics of the Civil War."
Face it, mac. The questioned asked you for the topic of the article and you picked the wrong sentence as your answer. I will further note the high likelihood that you were led to choose the sentence that you did out of a strong personal bias against the south and a desire to see it criticized to the point that you will seize upon a criticism and emphasize it to the neglect of the vastly more relevent material amongst which it sits. This suspicion is supported by the fact that you chose it from a location halfway through the article's text and in spite of the authors not once but twice informing you that the correct answer was another one located in the opening paragraphs.
Hmm, not too good with discrete concepts are you?
Perhaps you should undergo some thematic appreciation testing to determine what the problem might be. (lol).
Rehnquist is in the minority.
The Chief Justice is willing to allow for the exigencies of the situation.
That is why your examples don't speak to the sitiation, and your attitude is blatantly unfair.
But it's obvious you don't care about fairness --- you've seen the words of the Chief Justice before.
Walt
Wrong. Article I, Section 1 states "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Article I, Section 9's habeas corpus clause is "herein granted" under Article I. Thus it is "vested in a Congress of the United States." Not a single founding father thought anything different when they drafted that clause. Once again if you deny this, quote one for me and prove that I'm wrong.
1. The suspending of the Writ is not a legislative power.
2. Not a single founding father thought that the Union was frangible either.
The absurdity of your position will be manfest to anyone who can think. Under your interpretation, the Writ could only be suspended when Cnngress was in session. In 1861, Congress had adjourned in the early spring was was not due to come back until Decmeber
Emergencies don't follow a schedule.
Walt
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