Posted on 04/15/2007 4:43:46 PM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
Europe's bio-threat readiness questioned
Image: European Community Europe discusses how to prepare itself in the face of bio-terrorism threats and "perversions" of science, not to mention naturally occurring bio-threats to human health.
By Brooks Tigner in Brussels for ISN Security Watch (11/04/07)
The EU must work much closer with its 27 national capitals and across the Atlantic to combat the growing threat of bio-terrorism, according to EU and US policymakers and scientists.
The European Commission aims to fire up discussion of the issue and prompt some solutions when it issues a consultative document on bio-preparedness in the coming weeks.
While Washington is pushing ahead with high levels of government spending and close public-private coordination to protect the US population against bio-attacks, policy in Europe still lacks focus and is splintered into separate national policies, despite universal concern among EU and national experts that their continent is highly vulnerable to attack. Pan-European research is just as fragmented, though current and forthcoming EU-funded projects aim to pull researchers in the same direction.
~~~~~~~~ snip~~~~~~~
There is no policy coherence in bio-preparedness in general across Europe, whether the issue is one of vaccine production, security at bio- and virological laboratories or national immunization policies.
(Excerpt) Read more at isn.ethz.ch ...
Eurasia Daily Monitor
May 16, 2007 — Volume 4, Issue 96
RUSSIA SURGING FARTHER AHEAD IN RACE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN GAS
by Vladimir Socor
Presidents Vladimir Putin, Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, and
Nursultan
Nazarbayev signed on May 12 a declaration of intent to upgrade and
expand
gas transport pipelines from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, along the
Caspian
Sea coast, directly to Russia.
At their tripartite summit in Turkmenistan’s city of
Turkmenbashi, the
presidents made public an additional declaration co-signed by Uzbek
President Islam Karimov regarding modernization of the Uzbek section of
the
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Russia gas pipeline. Karimov signed
this
quadripartite declaration on May 9 in Tashkent and did not attend the
summit
in Turkmenistan.
Both pipelines are components of the Soviet-era gas pipeline
system
known as Central Asia-Center, bound for Russia. The intent now is to
overhaul that worn-out system; restore its annual capacity to the
Soviet-era
level of 90 billion cubic meters at the Russian border by 2010; and
expand
its capacity thereafter, in correlation with Russian-led development of
Turkmen and Uzbek gas fields. As regards Kazakhstan, the Russian side
apparently counts on Western companies in that country to channel their
growing gas exports to Russia as well.
The two declarations amount to framework agreements with tight
schedules of implementation. The Kremlin wants to follow up with the
signing
of intergovernmental agreements by September 1, 2007; corporate
agreements
by the year’s end; formation of consortiums early next year, and the
start
construction work by mid-2008. The participant companies from the four
countries and apportionment of stakes among them are yet to be
determined.
But it is already clear that Gazprom would control the all phases of
the
process: field development, gas acquisition, pipeline construction, and
transit operation.
The project relies mainly on Turkmenistan’s vast gas reserves.
The two
presidential declarations make reference to the Russia-Turkmenistan
agreement of 2003 whereby Russia would buy up Turkmenistan’s gas output
almost entirely for a 25-year period, 2004 through 2028. Russian
officials
misleadingly portray that agreement as a contract (an interpretation
accepted by many unsuspecting Westerners), although it is a merely a
statement of nonbinding intent.
Under this project, the pipeline along the Caspian coast shall be
restored to its Soviet-era capacity of 10 billion cubic meters annually
by
2009-2010, to carry gas from Turkmenistan’s existing onshore production
to
Russia. The capacity shall then be expanded by another 20 billion, for
a
total of 30 billion cubic meters annually by 2016 and thereafter, to
carry
gas from offshore fields that Russia plans to develop on Turkmenistan’s
seabed.
The coastal pipeline will include two parallel lines: the
existing one
due for upgrading (dedicated to onshore Turkmen gas) and a new one to
be
built after 2010 (for offshore gas), both running via Kazakhstan to
Russia.
Russian officials expect construction work on both components of the
coastal
line to be fast and uncomplicated thanks to the already existing basic
infrastructure and land corridor allocation.
Under bilateral understandings between Putin and Berdimukhamedov,
the
Russian companies Gazprom and Zarubezhneftegaz are to explore and
develop
offshore gas and oil deposits in Turkmenistan’s Caspian sector. Lukoil
and
Gazprom already hold firm control on gas field development in
Uzbekistan.
According to Russian officials, the Turkmen side has made
available to
them the existing basic documentation on its Caspian hydrocarbon
reserves.
Russian officials anticipate that the output from Turkmenistan’s
offshore
gas deposits can be significantly supplemented by associated gas from
oil
deposits there.
During the summit, Putin underscored with satisfaction that
Russian
companies will receive production-sharing agreements (PSAs) in
Turkmenistan.
This seems ironic as the Kremlin is now refusing to sign PSAs with
Western
energy companies in Russia and is tearing up existing PSAs.
Russia already holds a near-monopoly on Turkmenistan’s existing
gas
exports. Under a contract signed in September 2006, valid for
2007-2009,
Russia is entitled to buy a volume of up to 50 billion cubic meters of
Turkmen gas annually, at a price of $100 per 1,000 cubic meters. The
price
and annual volumes are to be renegotiated by mid-2009 for the
subsequent
year(s). Gazprom bought an estimated 39 billion to 42 billion cubic
meters
of Turkmen gas in 2006.
Gazprom is also the transit operator for Turkmen gas via
Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan to the Russian border. The old Caspian coastal pipeline
via
Kazakhstan to Russia was reopened earlier this year and operates at a
rate
of some 2 billion cubic meters annually. In addition to Turkmen gas,
Russia
also imported 9 billion cubic meters of gas from Uzbekistan and 7.5
billion
cubic meters from Kazakhstan in 2006. Russia has contracted for an
aggregate
of 56 billion cubic meters of gas from the three countries for 2007.
Thus
the overall volume is stationary for now, but seems set to grow
substantially as extractive projects come on stream in the three
countries.
The plans just announced seem to exclude the Western-backed
project
for a trans-Caspian pipeline to the South Caucasus and Europe. While
Central
Asia’s gas output will grow, the new production in Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan will be supplied by Russian companies and, just like the
existing
production, will be exported to Russia.
Responding to journalists’ questions, Berdimukhamedov did not
totally
rule out the trans-Caspian project: “It is not off the table,” he said,
“it
may still be taken into consideration.” But he listed that option in
last
place among options that include expansion of the small-volume pipeline
to
Iran, a pipeline to China, and a trans-Afghan pipeline to Pakistan and
India — all of which are either stillborn or unfeasible options
(Interfax,
AP, Reuters, May 12).
Combined with Russian-led gas field development, these pipeline
projects are designed to perpetuate Russia’s monopoly on Central Asian
gas,
a strategic tool for Russian economic and political leverage on
America’s
European allies.
(Interfax, RIA-Novosti, Kommersant, Turkmenistan.ru, Turkmen
Television, May 11-15; see EDM, May 14)
—Vladimir Socor
Was Osama Right?
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117928391134704472.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries
Was Osama Right?
Islamists always believed the U.S. was weak. Recent political trends won’t change their view.
BY BERNARD LEWIS
Wednesday, May 16, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
During the Cold War, two things came to be known and generally recognized in the Middle East concerning the two rival superpowers. If you did anything to annoy the Russians, punishment would be swift and dire. If you said or did anything against the Americans, not only would there be no punishment; there might even be some possibility of reward, as the usual anxious procession of diplomats and politicians, journalists and scholars and miscellaneous others came with their usual pleading inquiries: “What have we done to offend you? What can we do to put it right?”
A few examples may suffice. During the troubles in Lebanon in the 1970s and ‘80s, there were many attacks on American installations and individuals—notably the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, followed by a prompt withdrawal, and a whole series of kidnappings of Americans, both official and private, as well as of Europeans. There was only one attack on Soviet citizens, when one diplomat was killed and several others kidnapped. The Soviet response through their local agents was swift, and directed against the family of the leader of the kidnappers. The kidnapped Russians were promptly released, and after that there were no attacks on Soviet citizens or installations throughout the period of the Lebanese troubles.
continues, a good article........
The Grand Mufti of Egypt in the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram:
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion – a “fictitious book” that “has no truth to it”; in his article he categorically denies having written the foreword to the 2003 edition of The Protocols , which was attributed to him
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/elders_of_zion_p.htm
Thanks for all your pings.
#1 of 3
Posted May-17 1:36 PM Cass, Sysop
From Cass, Sysop Posts 842 Last 7:29 PM
To All [Msg # 126349.1 ]
Jihadis Encourage Lone Acts of Terrorism
By Abdul Hameed Bakier
A new article posted on the jihadi forum alhanein.com on May 4, entitled “Supporting the Islamic State by Single-Handed Terrorism,” instructs Islamist fighters to conduct lone acts of terrorism against people and groups involved with the Iraqi government. The article is authored by a user with the name Fahid al-Hadaithi who is relatively new to the forum (his first post was in February of this year), but already has more than 500 posts attributed to his name.
...
Al-Hadaithi says, “The Islamic jihadi movements are going through great events they never dreamt of before that commenced, sequentially, right after the establishment of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders headed by Osama bin Laden, may God protect him. The events varied from hitting the [U.S.] embassies in Africa to the destruction of the USS Cole and the great event in our times [the September 11, 2001 attacks] that changed the face of the world and paved the way for the jihadi market that sells paradise in Mesopotamia.” Al-Hadaithi believes that these terrorist acts have given rise to the first Islamic state of the monotheists since the fall of the Uthman caliphate in 656 CE. In the context of al-Hadaithi’s perspective that the West is targeting Muslims across the world, al-Hadaithi encourages jihadis to target the infidels, hypocrites, apostates and those who collaborate with the enemy anywhere that they can be found.
...
When conducting individual terrorist acts, al-Hadaithi says that the mujahid fighter does not have to belong to a group physically since that could compromise his mission. While individual teams are recommended, al-Hadaithi says that the largest possible cell should include no more than five people.
...
In explaining the modus operandi of conducting individual terrorist acts, al-Hadaithi provides an example of an actual operation that occurred a year ago in an unidentified Arab country. As part of the attack, a lone jihadi elicited information from an Iraqi merchant who was heading a network of Iraqis collaborating with the government. The jihadi lured the merchant into a nightclub and killed him and his girlfriend using a gun equipped with a silencer.
...
If Islamist fighters are able to increase the number of individual terrorist acts, such as by targeting individuals and government representatives outside of Iraq, it will widen the threat posed by this movement. Consequently, these new tactics would likely radicalize the Iraq conflict further.
That jihadi forum is a scary place to browse around in.
Cass De oppresso liber.
You are welcome........
Thanks for the ping!
The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe
By, Evan F. Kohlmann
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two years, as a result of major terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, European leaders have finally become aware of a lurking extremist threat that has been brewing in dark corners across the continent for almost two decades. Western European democracies—many of whom thought that they were insulated from the threat of organized international terrorism—are discovering growing numbers of disaffected Muslim youth, hardened by scenes of televised bloodshed in the Middle East and the unwelcoming demeanor of some “native” Europeans. Frustrated by a perceived lack of social or political mobility, these men eventually become ideal recruits for the growing network of “pan-European mujahideen.”
However, to fully understand the current mujahideen phenomenon in Europe, one must first recognize its proper origins. Ironically, the flourishing of local Muslim extremist movements during the 1990s came primarily not as a result of Usama Bin Laden’s progress in Sudan and Afghanistan—but, arguably, rather due to a Muslim conflict much closer to the heart of Europe. Indeed, some of the most important factors behind the contemporary radicalization of European Muslim youth can be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the cream of the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan tested their battle skills in the post-Soviet era and mobilized a new generation of pan-Islamic revolutionaries. When I spoke to Al-Qaida recruiter Abu Hamza al-Masri in London in 2002, he tried to explain to me the mindset of the first volunteers who came to Bosnia at the start of the war in 1992: “People are dedicated to the [religion]… They went to Afghanistan to defend their brothers and sisters. So, they find Afghanistan now, the destruction of war and Muslims fighting against each other.” As a result, in the aftermath of the Afghan jihadi debacle, “they want to [struggle against] something that is indisputable, which is non-Muslims raping, killing, and maiming Muslims.”1
The Bosnian conflict was cynically offered by jihad recruiters to desperate youths in many European capitals as a chivalrous escape from the drudgery of their own boring urban lives. Yet even some of the smartest and most promising members of the European Muslim community were sucked into this bizarre netherworld. “Abu Ibrahim”, a 21-year old medical student from London at Birmingham University, took a break during training in Bosnia to be interviewed for a jihad propaganda video. Brandishing an automatic weapon, he scoffed:
“When you come here, people they think, ‘when you go into Bosnia you are sitting around and there are shells coming down and they are firing everywhere around you.’ They don’t know that we sit here and we have kebab. They don’t know that we have ice cream and we have cake here. They don’t know that we can telephone or fax anywhere in the world. They don’t know that this is a nice holiday for us where you meet some of the best people you have ever met in your life. People from all over the world, people from Brazil, from Japan, from China, from the Middle East, from America, North, South, Canada, Australia, all over the world you meet people.”2
Beyond its propaganda value, Bosnia’s unique geographic position directly between Western Europe and the Middle East was the ideal jumping-off point for organizational expansion of various Muslim extremist movements into the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and even Scandinavia. Bosnia provided an environment where trained foreign Muslim fighters arriving from Afghanistan could mingle with unsophisticated but eager terrorist recruits from Western Europe, and could form new plans for the future of the jihad. No such contact had ever occurred before for groups like Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya and Al-Qaida, and it provided these organizations limitless possibilities for development and growth. After fighting for six months during the opening stages of the Bosnian war in 1992, Saudi Al-Qaida commander Abu Abdel Aziz “Barbaros” told journalists during a fundraising trip to Kuwait, “I have come out of Bosnia only to tell the Muslims that at this time this offers us a great opportunity… Allah has opened the way of jihad, we should not waste it… This is a great opportunity now to make Islam enter Europe via jihad. This can only be accomplished through jihad. If we stop the jihad now we will have lost this opportunity.”3
For their part, the European radicals inducted into the ranks of the foreign mujahideen in Bosnia were equally eager to make themselves useful. Babar Ahmad—a British Muslim currently awaiting possible extradition to the United States to face charges of running an Al-Qaida support cell in London—boasted in an early jihadi audiotape that the contributions of the new European mujahideen were “instrumental”:
“[I]nstrumental… not just to the jihad in Bosnia, but the world-wide jihad, for what they managed to achieve. And you think this is an exaggeration, but by the hands of the brothers they did many things that you wouldn’t believe. Books were translated and produced, in the front-lines, because you had the English brothers that could speak English and the Arab brothers that could speak Arabic and a bit of English, and they go together and translated books about Jihad. Now, these books are guiding other brothers back to the Jihad again. They’ve computerized whole computer networks because of their computer knowledge.”4
From the moment the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in 1992, the Bosnian Muslim government secretly tracked the arrival of foreign volunteers from Europe seeking to wage a jihad, or “holy struggle”, against the Christian Serbs and Croats. According to ARBiH military intelligence documents, “the channels for their arrival in [Bosnia] went through the Republic of Croatia, majority of them came from Western Europe and Great Britain and they have the passports from these countries. According to the operative information from the State security service, [a] large[] number of these persons were recruited and transported to the BiH area through… London and Milan, and there are some indications that some individuals also came through Frankfurt and Munich.”5 A second document from Bosnian Muslim military intelligence detailing the infrastructure of the foreign mujahideen brigade lists the names of prominent individual jihad financiers and recruiters based in Zagreb, London, Vienna, Milan, and Torino.6
The Bosnians also noticed something else about their new would-be European Muslim allies: while some genuinely sought to defend innocent Muslims, others were fleeing to Bosnia after being “expelled from their [home] countries for various reasons and they cannot return there.”7 ARBiH memoranda suggest that the Bosnian Muslim military regarded mujahideen arriving from Afghanistan and the Middle East as potentially useful, but reserved a much more skeptical attitude towards some of their idealistic and irreverent young comrades who hailed from various capitals of Western Europe. In a report written in September 1994, sources within the ARBiH Security Service Department warned that “their not providing their personal data is most probably due to possible links with [intelligence services] or having committed criminal offenses in their countries of origin, for in case their countries learnt about their stay here, they would demand their extradition.”8 A second analytical report from the ARBiH Military Security Service issued in May 1995 further noted that, “a significant number of these persons [who] entered in our country are from some West European countries and they have the citizenships and passports from those countries… After the arrival in our country, these persons are hiding their identity and as members of the unit ‘El Mudzahedin’ they submit the requests to enter the BiH citizenship… because they are the persons from the Interpol wanted circulars.”9
One of the European mujahideen cited in particular by the Bosnian Muslims for his thuggish behavior was “Abu Walid”, a medic “originally from France” who reportedly seized control of a local hospital in Zenica in July 1994 with weapons drawn and “harassed the medical staff there. Simultaneously, outside the… Center, there were ten armed members of ‘El-Mujahidin’ Unit.”10 Within months of being discharged of his duties with the foreign mujahideen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Abu Walid—better known as French Muslim convert Christophe Caze—went on to lead an infamous Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) terrorist network based in northern France known as the “Roubaix Gang.”11 Caze was eventually killed during a suicidal highway battle with local police near the Belgian border as he fled French counter-terrorism investigators in mid-1996.
Even the mujahideen themselves were critical of some of the hotheaded European volunteers recruited by Syrian Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas (a.k.a. Abu Dahdah) in Madrid, Spain for the purpose of waging jihad in Bosnia. When Barakaat telephoned a mujahideen training camp in Zenica in November 1995 to check on his new crop of students, the personnel director at the camp picked up the line and “complain[ed] about the young men who had been sent by Barakat to the camp.”12 Yarkas was finally arrested by Spanish authorities in 2001 and sentenced to a 27-year jail term for providing substantial logistical support to, among others, the 9/11 suicide hijackers dispatched by Al-Qaida.13
However, while the new European faces among the mujahideen may have caused consternation in some Bosnian government circles, generally speaking, the foreign terrorist organizations active in the region (primarily Al-Qaida, Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya, and the GIA) were pleased to benefit from the situation and use the Bosnian war as a massive engine for recruitment and financing. In December 1995, these terrorist commanders further profited from NATO’s interest in expelling the foreign mujahideen from Bosnia. Hundreds of veteran fighters, accused of brutal wartime atrocities and expertly trained in urban warfare, were readily granted political asylum in a collection of European countries, Australia, and Canada. It was a devious tactic that allowed nefarious groups like the GIA to infiltrate several Western European nations with highly skilled and motivated terrorist sleeper cells. A French report written by French counterterrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière later concluded that the “exfiltration” of significant numbers of veteran fighters from Bosnia was beneficial in the sense that it enabled the mujahideen “to be useful again in spreading the Jihad across other lands.” In fact, as Bruguière noted in his report, “among the veterans of the ‘Moudjahiddin Battalion’ of Zenica, many would go on to carry out terrorist acts following the end of the Bosnian conflict.”14
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Despite its relatively high standard of living and social equality, the United Kingdom has been and remains one of the most active bases of radical Islam across Western Europe. Certainly, it can be said that the Iranian revolution and the war in Afghanistan together started the ball rolling for the Sunni British fundamentalist movement. However, their ideas did not begin to have a wide appeal among local Muslim youths until the era of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When scenes of devastation and war crimes began to air on BBC television broadcasts, many British Muslims were shocked that such horrific events could take place in the context modern Europe without any Western intervention. It gave sudden and unexpected credence to the calls of violent radicals who suggested it was time for Muslims to start taking their personal security into their own hands. Dr. Zaki Badawi, the principal (at that time) of the Muslim College in London, acknowledged in early 1992, “Bosnia has shaken public opinion throughout the Muslim world more deeply than anything since the creation of Israel in 1948.”15
The Bosnian war caused a particularly strong backlash in the outspoken circles of indignant British Muslim college students. These educated and idealistic youths angrily protested against the persecution of fellow Muslims in Bosnia. One student, a classmate of several men who had left to seek training in Afghanistan and Bosnia, saw nothing wrong with taking up arms against the “enemies of Islam”: “You cannot turn a blind eye when Muslims are being massacred, because what will you do when it is happening on your doorstep?”16 Inside Bosnia, the 21-year old Londoner “Abu Ibrahim” criticized the “hypocrites” among his peers back in Britain who swore revenge on the Serbs and Croats, yet were too afraid to join the jihad in Bosnia: “…what we lack here is Muslims that are prepared to suffer and sacrifice. There in Britain, I see Muslims, every medical student is saying that my third year is for Islam, my third year is for the Muslims. They get their job, they get their surgery. 50, 60, £70,000 a year they’re earning. And then, no struggle, no sacrifice.” Abu Ibrahim spoke of the intense sense of satisfaction he felt fighting in the Bosnian war, as compared to the apathy of the secular Muslims who remained in London. In Britain, “I watch the TV and tears roll down my face when I see the Muslims in Bosnia, Muslims in Palestine, Muslims in Kashmir. And then I come [to Bosnia] and you feel a sense of satisfaction. You feel that you are fulfilling your duty. You feel that you are doing what the Prophet and his companions done[sic] 1400 years ago.”17 Another British recruit from south London featured on the same Bosnia jihad video sneered, “this is what they like to do in England, they like to talk, they like to talk, they like to organize… big conferences… in the London Arena… and they make a nice conference… Then, after the talk, they go back home and they sleep. They carry on watching ‘Neighbors’… They carry on watching ‘Coronation Street’… What life is this? These people talk too much… You want to see true Muslims, with unity, come to this place, and then you’ll see.”18
Even those who remained behind in the United Kingdom did their part to help the cause of the mujahideen. Young activists in the fundamentalist Muslim Parliament established a charity to support jihad in Bosnia that later became known as the “Global Jihad Fund” (GJF).19 According to its later website, the GJF was established to aid “the Growth of various Jihad Movements around the World by supplying them with sufficient Funds to purchase Weapons and train their Individuals.”20 Two months after the signing of the Dayton Accords officially ending the Bosnian war, GJF administrators announced the distribution of a new brochure entitled, “Islam—The New Target”: “Contents include… a reprint of an acknowledgement certificate from the Commander of the Bosnian 7th Corps to Muslim Parliament (on behalf of the fund). Why don’t you get a copy or many copies of the brochure for local distribution or get a master to reprint. You and your friends could use it to increase genocide awareness and Jihad awareness in your locality.”21 Two years later, following a twin Al-Qaida suicide bombing attack on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the administrators of the GJF indicated that the fund was being run by Saudi Al-Qaida spokesman Mohammed al-Massari and had found a new cause célébre in “support[ing] Sheikh Mujahid Osama bin Laden.”22 When confronted by British investigative reporters, the GJF webmaster in London admitted, “I work for two people, really… Mr. Massari and Osama Bin Laden.”23
On the battlefield in Bosnia, British-born mujahideen recruits had a noticeable and significant impact. On June 13, 1993, a British patrol of four APC’s was stopped at a roadblock near the central Bosnian town of Guca Gora.24 A group of approximately 50 mujahideen fighters, who “looked north African or Middle Eastern,” had assembled there to intercept mobile enemy troops. The frightened British soldiers told journalists later that the foreigners had long, wispy beards, Afghan-style caps, and uniforms unlike anything worn by local Bosnian guerillas.25 Though the jihadis instantly trained their rocket propelled grenade launchers and rifles at the UN vehicles, the mujahideen commander on scene—an unidentified British Muslim wearing an Afghan hat and a blue scarf over his face—addressed the British officer in charge of the patrol, Major Vaughan Kent-Payne, in perfect English and coldly reassured him, “be cool, these people won’t fire until I give them the order.”26
In the summer of 1993, the British mujahideen began to suffer their first series of combat casualties, including a Muslim convert named David Sinclair. Sinclair (a.k.a. Dawood al-Brittani) was a 29-year old employee of a computer company in the UK. After suddenly converting to Islam and adopting traditional Muslim dress, Sinclair ran into problems with senior management at his company. Within a week of wearing his new clothes to work, he was reportedly terminated. Mobilized into action, he thereupon decided to travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to join the Islamic military organization based there. In the midst of his training, he generously gave away his two British passports to Arab-Afghan “brothers in need.” Dawood refused to return to the UK evidently out of a determination to avoid living the life of an infidel. During deadly clashes with Croatian HVO forces, he was shot and killed near an enemy bunker.27
Indeed, British Muslims were present for some of the most important ARBiH victories of the Bosnian war, including the conquest of the Vozuca region in late summer 1995. That battle, popularly known among the Arab-Afghans as “Operation BADR”, cost the lives of dozens of foreign fighters—including “Abu Mujahid” from the United Kingdom, killed on September 10, 1995. Abu Mujahid was a recent British university graduate who had finished his studies in 1993, when the Islamic community in the UK was still in an uproar over the war crimes being committed by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He first came to the Balkans in 1993 as a humanitarian aid worker purportedly transporting food and medicine to the embattled Muslims in central Bosnia. Abu Mujahid was using his position as charity employee as a cover for other, more illicit activities: “Over the next two years Abu Mujahid hurried back and forth between Bosnia and Britain carrying valuable supplies to the brothers there. Between trips he traveled the length of Britain reaching its smaller parts in his efforts to raise money for the cause and increase the awareness among Muslims there.” Abu Mujahid returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina in August 1995 and enlisted in a jihad training camp soon after his arrival, receiving instruction from—among others—two elite Egyptian trainers imported to the region directly from Al-Qaida-run camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border. For all his anti-Western vigor, Abu Mujahid nonetheless proudly wore a G-Shock watch and U.S. Army boots. According to his teachers, he “excelled” at shooting and throwing grenades and he insisted that he would remain in Bosnia “‘until either we get victory or I am martyred’… One thing which was strange about him was that he always used to say, thinking back, I remember, maybe three, four, five times a day, he would say to me that ‘Inshallah [“God-willing”] I am going to be martyred. Inshallah, this time in Bosnia, I am going to be martyred.’”28
Following the initial assault during Operation BADR, Abu Mujahid disappeared in the fog of war. Over a week later, a mujahideen search party recovered his body from the battlefield. One of the men who found Abu Mujahid later recalled, “At that point, the thought that went through my mind was that the brother had been there, left behind when I was there in Bosnia and he intended to stay there longer than me. But only Allah knew what could he have done for him to die in such a beautiful way? And the thought that’s still in our minds, Inshaallah, may Allah accept it from him, and may the people who loved him in this life, Inshaallah join him in the next.” Abu Mujahid’s body was brought back down from the mountain and then taken in a van to the frontline base camp. The lead commander present, Abu Hammam al-Najdi from Saudi Arabia, would only allow fellow British mujahideen to go inside the van to see the remains of their departed compatriot.29
The foreign mujahideen who survived the end of the war in 1995 grew apprehensive when they discovered that the Bosnian Muslims were about to sign the Dayton Accords—“the peace of the enemy”—with the United States and Europe. British jihadi recruits were among the voices urging their commanders to wage an apocalyptic all-out terror campaign in central Bosnia targeting Western peacekeepers, the Serbs and Croats, and even other Muslims. In a direct English-language message aimed at fellow British Muslims, one mujahid fighter appealed, “the amir [commander] of the jihad… is here. And the amir of the mujahideen here says he needs more people, and more equipment, and more everything. So for the people who are sitting at home and saying that, ‘well, they don’t need people anymore’, it’s not true, it’s not true… we need as many people and as much money and everything that people can send us to help us.”30 One British Muslim guerilla recounted the discussions taking place at the El-Mudzahedin Unit headquarters in a propaganda audiotape:
“[W]hen the Americans came to Bosnia… the situation had developed in such a way that it seemed as if we were going to have to fight the Americans. And [commander] Abul-Harith [the Libyan], he turned to me and he said, ‘We will become an example for these Bosnians. We will fight for our belief and the lost land. Please Allah, will give us victory and we will defeat [the Americans] or they will kill us. But we will not flee, and we will be an example for the Bosnians.’”31
According to various accounts, on the day of December 12, 1995, several fighters had left a non-descript delivery van in the parking lot of the Zenica mujahideen base. A Bosnian police investigation later concluded that these radicals were in the final stages of “trying to rig a car bomb” when they ran into an unknown technical error, and it prematurely exploded.32 The massive and unexpected detonation killed as many as four mujahideen bombmakers and injured several other foreigners in the area. One wounded mujahid recounted, “You could feel the explosion… like a shining light… as I was on the floor, I remember seeing the face of Abul-Harith [the Libyan] as he ran to me. And he took me and put me on the stretcher… And the building that he wanted to open, it was locked. And Abul-Harith he didn’t look for the key, he just knocked the door down and took me inside.”33
In this case, as reported by both Arab-Afghan and Bosnian authorities, the deceased would-be bomber was an 18-year-old British honors student from southwest London known as “Sayyad al-Falastini.” Sayyad was born in the United Kingdom but spent most of his early youth in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When he returned to London at age 12, he soon became involved in the radical Islamic fundamentalist movement there that was recruiting young volunteers for jihad in Bosnia. At age 16, he first sought unsuccessfully to join the mujahideen battalion in the Balkans after hearing an inspiring Friday khutba (religious sermon) from an Arab veteran of Bosnia.34
However, after being elected president of the Islamic society at his college, Sayyad started to methodically plan and save his money in a fund that would finance his dreamed jihad adventure. According to the mujahideen, Sayyad possessed this instinct because he was of Palestinian descent, and therefore, there was “a background of realizing the importance of Jihad in his family.” During the summer of 1995, he left London and traveled to a Bosnian mujahideen training camp, fighting alongside his fellow comrades during Operation BADR. When combat hostilities gradually came to a halt after “BADR,” many foreign volunteers began filtering out of Bosnia and returning home, including a number of British recruits. But Sayyad was not ready to leave; his first taste of battle had exhilarated him and changed his life. Among the mujahideen, despite his young age, he was well liked and highly esteemed for his proficiency in English, Arabic, and Bosnian. Sayyad did not want the war to end, grumbling (like many of the Arabs) that the peace accords had been negotiated only “in order to halt the victories of the Mujahideen in Bosnia… For three years the world had sat back and allowed the slaughter of the Muslims to continue. But now as soon as the Muslims began to fight back and win, they ended the war.” Even in light of the Dayton agreement, Sayyad stubbornly refused to leave, and he recommitted himself to keeping the Islamic jihad alive in Bosnia. In the first few days of December, as the terms of Dayton were about to become a reality, Sayyad was torn by despair as he saw his beloved combat tour coming to an inexorable end. He angrily demanded of his fellow mujahideen, “Why are we all lost? Look at the [infidels]. Are they thinking of us and then they are laughing because they have their own state. But look at us, the Muslims, we do not even have a state yet but we continue to laugh!”35
At this point, Sayyad started to act peculiarly, as if he was readying himself for a “martyrdom” operation. He would pray all night long and continuously recite verses from the Qu`ran. Previously, he had telephoned his mother to ask her to send some money for him to visit home. Suddenly, two days before the explosion in Zenica, he called her and told her not to wire the cash as “he would not be needing it.” There is good reason to believe that Sayyad may have been preparing for an imminent role as a suicide bomber. Regardless of his intentions, on December 12, something in his plan went terribly wrong. While Sayyad stood beside the van, it prematurely detonated, shaking the entire neighborhood and thoroughly frightening nearby Croatian civilians.36 By the “official” count of Al-Qaida, Sayyad became the sixth British Islamic volunteer soldier killed in Bosnia only two days shy of his nineteenth birthday. He was buried in a ceremony attended “by over three hundred of the cream of the foreign Mujahideen fighters in Bosnia.”37 The Arab battalion later eulogized him:
“Sayyad was a brother who made Jihad his wealth and his life giving every penny of his wealth for the pleasure of Allah and eventually giving every drop of his blood for him. We ask Allah (SWT) to accept Sayyad as a martyr, to make him an example for the millions of youth in the West who have chosen this life in preference with the hereafter.”38
The shadow cast by British mujahideen volunteers in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to plague law enforcement and intelligence agencies even to this day. On September 23, 2005, 34-year old British Muslim convert Andrew Rowe was convicted and ordered jailed for 15 years by a court in the U.K. for possessing details on how to fire mortar bombs and using secret codes to facilitate terror attacks. Back during the early 1990s, Rowe dramatically changed his loose lifestyle after converting at a mosque in Regent’s Park, London—an event which Rowe said “put meaning into my life.”39 Rowe admits to traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 on a “humanitarian” mission—in reality, acting as an envoy for the foreign mujahideen. When he returned to the U.K., he even claimed government invalidity benefits for wounds suffered during an alleged mortar attack in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2003, Rowe was arrested on the French side of the Channel tunnel while carrying a bound pair of socks bearing traces of TNT, plastic explosives, RDX, and nitroglycerine. According to Crown Prosecutors, the socks were likely used “to clean the barrel of a mortar or as a muzzle protector.”40 Raids on Rowe’s various residences revealed coded documents with phrases such as “airline crew,” “explosives,” and “army base.” Investigators also found video recordings of jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden.41
ITALY
Perhaps more than any other nation in Europe, Italy played an overly dominant role in hosting the transnational infrastructure of the Bosnian El-Mudzahedin Unit during the mid-1990s. Italy was one of the very few Western European nations to provide a direct land route through Croatia into Muslim Bosnia, and—even prior to the conflict in the Balkans—was serving as an important hub for activity by various North African Islamic extremist groups, including: the GIA, Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Tunisian An-Nahdah movement. By the time of the war in 1992-1993, forces within the influential Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya had already designated Italy as one of three primary “support places” in Europe for its regional activities.42
No individual from Italy had a greater impact on the Bosnian mujahideen than former top Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya commander in southern Europe, Shaykh Anwar Shaaban (a.k.a. Abu Abdelrahman al-Masri), the late Imam at Milan’s Islamic Cultural Institute and the one-time overarching leader of Arab mujahideen forces fighting alongside the ARBiH.43 Shaaban was a well-known veteran of the Afghan jihad who (like many other Arab-Afghans) in 1991 decided he no longer felt safe in Afghanistan as it collapsed into civil turmoil.44 He sought and obtained political asylum in Italy, and was disappointed by what he found: “the Muslim community in Italy was just the same as elsewhere in Europe: asleep and busy in the worldly affairs.” Aided by a collection of Afghan war veterans and Italian Islamists, Anwar Shaaban opened a major new headquarters in a converted garage in Milan. Knowledgeable mujahideen sources have praised Shaaban’s efforts in Milan, and noted that Islamic Cultural Institute was “the center of much activity and it gained much popularity amongst the local Muslims.”45
Similarly, L’Houssaine Kherchtou, a former Moroccan member of the Al-Qaida terrorist organization, testified during the federal trial of four Al-Qaida operatives in the U.S. that Shaaban used the Islamic Cultural Institute as a critical Arab-Afghan recruiting center for young Muslim extremists living in Europe. According to Kherchtou, Shaaban had personally helped arrange Pakistani visas for him and three other mujahideen recruits who then went on to an Al-Qaida military training camp in eastern Afghanistan.46 French counterterrorism officials concluded that the ICI in Milan, under the lead of Shaaban, served an “essential role” as a command center for a variety of North African armed militant groups including Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya, the Tunisian An-Nahdah, and the Algerian GIA.47 After searching Anwar Shaaban’s office at the ICI, Italian counterterrorism police concurred that the Institute was “characterized by… a constant closeness to the activities of Egyptian terrorist organizations, especially those of [Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya], in the area of strategic and operational choices… the recruiting of mujaheddin for the Yugoslavian territories…. the establishment of a European network for the connection among fundamentalist cells… [and] logistic and operational support to the armed cells active on Egyptian soil.”48
In the summer of 1992, Shaykh Anwar Shaaban helped lead the first quasi-official Arab-Afghan delegation to arrive in Bosnia, accompanied by a number of his Italian colleagues. As the fighters themselves have testified, “Sheik Anwar was not a textbook scholar: he was a scholar who practiced what he preached and fought oppression at every level, just like the companions and the early generations of Muslims… with books in his hands and military uniform on his body. Not only did he teach but he fought as well.” In one audiotape, mujahideen representatives attempt to unravel the mysterious life of Shaaban and note that “in the footsteps of Sheik Abdullah Azzam, Sheik Anwar Shaaban carried the responsibilities of the Mujahideen regiment in Bosnia… teaching, encouraging, and inspiring the fighters, laying the same foundation in Bosnia that Shaykh Abdullah Azzam laid in Afghanistan.”49
Shaaban shuttled back and forth to his headquarters in Milan, bringing with him to Bosnia a host of veteran fighters and new recruits. In a September 1994 fax sent to a wealthy jihad donor in Qatar, Shaaban explained that he required additional funds “to finance the purchase of camp equipment for the Bosnian mujaheddin in view of another winter spent in war in former Yugoslavia.” Shaaban continued in his letter, “I’m convinced that based on today’s facts, the Islamic projects in the European countries are a priority over all general Islamic projects, especially when based on what we have seen with regard to the possibility of establishing bases in these places in order to aid Muslims all over the world.”50 Undoubtedly, Shaaban hoped to use the Bosnian war to as a means to create an unassailable garrison for North African militants in Europe. One document later confiscated in Italy seemed to endorse this strategy, explaining that “Hot Islamic questions such as Bosnia… raise the ardor of young Muslims and their desire to face the inevitable.”51 Not surprisingly, many of those that Shaaban introduced to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina became “the commanders and trainers, the cream of the Mujahideen.”52
During their subsequent investigation of Shaaban and the ICI, Italian counter-terrorism police turned up numerous pieces of evidence showing how involved Shaaban was in supporting jihad activity in nearby Bosnia. This included documents indicating that “paramilitary training activities” were “organized by the I.C.I. for those individuals who would fight on the Yugoslav territory.”53 A second undated letter from Anwar Shaaban recovered by Italian investigators details a meeting the former had in Sarajevo “with an unidentified Islamic individual who was willing to host trained Muslim guys capable of training others to use Russian and eastern firearms in order to open the door of the Jihad against Orthodox Serbs in Yugoslavia.”54 The Italians also found another handwritten sheet of paper in Arabic:
“I am sending you this film from the center of Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the land of war and the Jihad. In it there is what I succeeded in sending you, and I am very happy… In the little remembrance book there are a few pages glued together, which you must open because there are inside sections of small films that you will develop and watch… I placed the small films inside the remembrance book, between the pages, but only between some pages, not all of them… so that the Croatians may not find them and cause problems for us, because they can even decapitate; when the letter arrives, develop and number them.”55
A subsequent fax received in April 1995 confirmed that the ICI in Milan had been officially assigned the task of distributing news bulletins and conducting other “propaganda activity” on behalf of the Bosnian El-Mudzahidin Unit.56
Yet, almost immediately, Shaaban’s mission in the Balkans strayed from its purported goal of defending innocent Bosnian Muslims. In 1993, U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials began to privately express concerns that Egyptian Islamic extremists were targeting the U.S. embassy in Albania for a potential terrorist attack. According to the CIA, “Al-Gama`at members, including… Anwar Shaban… were involved in the 1993 surveillance of the U.S. embassy in Tirana.”57 The surveillance was confirmed when a suspected militant was observed driving “repeatedly around the embassy.”58 Separately, the CIA gathered telephone intercepts that included an “apparent order from overseas instructing a Muslim-charity worker to case the embassy.”59 No successful attack was ever carried out, likely as a result of close cooperation between the CIA and Albanian security officials.
Shaaban’s influence also extended to a number of other Italian fundamentalist clerics, such as Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani, a volunteer fighter in Bosnia and Imam of a mosque on Massarenti Street in Bologna, Italy. Saidani had been one of a number of participants in a guerilla training course held in Afghanistan in 1993. Upon his return to Italy, he quickly convinced 30 of his local followers to enlist in the foreign mujahideen brigade active in Bosnia. He founded a front company in Italy known as Piccola Societa’ Cooperativa Eurocoop that provided seemingly legitimate work authorization permits to jihadi volunteers and veterans, allowing them to travel without hindrance to different parts of the world, including Bosnia.60 In witness testimony in the trial of conspirators convicted of involvement in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, Al-Qaida lieutenant Jamal al-Fadl discussed his trip to Zagreb in mid-1992, specifically how he had been instructed to meet with Mohamed Saidani so he could get “information about what’s going on in Bosnia” and bring this intelligence back directly to Usama Bin Laden.61
Italian law enforcement and intelligence officials grew concerned after intercepting a letter from a fundamentalist militant imprisoned in southern Italy in July 1993 discussing potential terror attacks on U.S. and French targets in the region. The seized letter appears to be one penned by Mondher Ben Mohsen Baazaoui (a.k.a. “Hamza the Tunisian”), an activist in the An-Nahdah movement and, according to an Italian police statement, “a fighter for a mujahideen unit during the ethnic conflict in Bosnia… believed to be in the front row of fundamentalist, Islamic terrorist networks.”62 Baazaoui wrote to Mohamed Saidani (the Imam in Bologna who was on close terms with both Anwar Shaaban and Usama Bin Laden) to tell him that if his prison hunger strike did not secure his immediate release, Baazaoui would commit a “homicide operation… [to] die gloriously.”63 He then pleaded with Saidani to avenge his death with a spectacular eulogy of terror: “All I can suggest to you is the French: leave not a child nor an adult [alive]. Work for them, they are very numerous in Italy, especially in the Tourist areas. Do what you will to them using armed robbery and murder. The important thing is that you succeed at sparking the flames that burn inside me against them, and this is to be a promise between you and me.”64
In November 1994, Italian authorities were even more alarmed when they learned of a new assassination plot organized by elements of the Egyptian terrorist groups Al-Jihad and Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya targeting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during a three-day diplomatic trip to Rome.65 As a result, the Italian police stepped up their efforts—particularly, their focus on Shaaban’s Islamic Cultural Institute. On June 26, 1995, in a mission codenamed “Operation Sphinx,” Italian police arrested 11 suspected members of Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya (including 10 Egyptians and 1 Palestinian) and carried out formal searches of 72 addresses across northern Italy, including Milan. The detained terrorists were charged with criminal conspiracy, robbery, extortion, falsifying documents, and illegal possession of firearms.66
One of those that Italian counterterrorism authorities were particularly seeking to arrest, Shaykh Anwar Shaaban himself, was nowhere to be found. Evidently, having been tipped off to the intentions of the Italian government, Shaaban had escaped and found asylum at his mujahideen military stronghold in central Bosnia-Herzegovina.67 Shaaban’s Bosnian exodus marked a critical period of development for the Arab-Afghan mujahideen in southern Europe. Despite all the Arab-Afghan propaganda decrying the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims—just as in Afghanistan—their participation in the war was ultimately being channeled toward an alternate purpose. By 1995, central Bosnia was more than a mere mujahideen frontline. Instead, thanks to the work of Shaaban and others, it had become a strategic foothold for Usama Bin Laden and his fanatical North African allies to help infiltrate Western Europe.
With Bosnian war hostilities drawing to a close in September 1995, Anwar Shaaban and his Italian-based Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya cohorts were free to turn their attention and resources to issues of “more critical” importance. In late September, one of the most important Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya leaders hiding in Europe—Abu Talal al-Qasimy (a.k.a. Talaat Fouad Qassem)—was captured by Croat HVO forces as he attempted to cross through Croatian territory into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within days, the Croats quietly rendered al-Qasimy through U.S. custody into the hands of Egyptian authorities. At the time, a government official in Cairo noted, “[Al-Qasimy’s] arrest proves what we have always said, which is that these terror groups are operating on a worldwide scale, using places like Afghanistan and Bosnia to form their fighters who come back to the Middle East… European countries like Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, England and others, which give sanctuary to these terrorists, should now understand it will come back to haunt them where they live.”68
The first real Arab-Afghan response to Abu Talal al-Qasimy’s arrest came on October 20, 1995, when a massive explosion shook the quiet Croatian port town of Rijeka.69 At 11:22am, a suicide bomber detonated 70 kilograms of TNT hidden in a FIAT Mirafiori parked outside the Primorje-Gorani county police headquarters.70 The mysterious suicide-bomber was killed, two bystanders were seriously wounded, and 27 other people received lighter injuries. The bomb was powerful enough to destroy the police headquarters and damage several nearby buildings, including a Zagreb Bank branch and a primary school.71 In the blast debris, Croatian police found fragments a Canadian passport belonging to the suicide bomber—who had previously been investigated by Italian counterterrorism officials for his connections to the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan controlled by Anwar Shaaban.72 The CIA later confirmed that the bomber was “a member of Al-Gama`at [al-Islamiyya].”73
A day later, Western news agencies in Cairo received an anonymous faxed communiqué allegedly from Al-Gama`at representatives, claiming responsibility for the Rijeka bombing in order “to prove that the case of Sheik Talaat Fouad Qassem… will not pass but will bring cascades of blood bleeding from Croatian interests inside and outside… You Croats will be mistaken if you think that this matter will go peacefully.”74 In their statement, Al-Gama`at representatives firmly demanded that the Croatian government “release Sheikh Qassimi and apologize formally through the media… Close the gates of hell which you have opened upon yourselves ... otherwise you will be starting a war the end of which only Allah (God) knows.”75 U.S. intelligence indicated that Anwaar Shaaban was personally responsible for overseeing the suicide bombing operation in Rijeka. The terror attack was meant to be a mere prelude to a new strategy employed by the mujahideen. As the long Balkan war began winding down, Shaaban “and other mujahedin leaders had begun planning to attack NATO forces which would be sent to Bosnia.”76 French investigators believed that the October terror attack confirmed that the military leadership of the El-Mudzahedin Unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina “was closely related to [Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya], both ideologically and in practice.”77
For several years afterwards, Croatian authorities sought other suspects believed responsible for arranging the Rijeka bombing. Witnesses, including a police guard in the headquarters parking lot, described a suspicious Mercedes driven by an Arab man that sped away from the scene just before the blast. After looking at mugshots, those witnesses were able to positively identify a wanted 36-year old Egyptian militant loyal to Al-Gama`at Al-Islamiyya named Hassan al-Sharif Mahmud Saad. Saad, who had lived in Cologno Monzese (a surburb of Milan), was a prominent figure at the Islamic Cultural Institute. He even sat on the board of trustees of Anwar Shaaban’s own Italian charitable organization “Il Paradiso.” In Italy, Saad was known to own a FIAT 131 Mirafiori with Bergamo plates, the very same vehicle later used in the Rijeka attack. As early as 1993, he was traveling back and forth between Bosnia and Italy. But everyone at the ICI mosque was aware that something was different in June 1995, when Hassan Saad packed his family and belongings in the FIAT and left permanently for Bosnia-Herzegovina. His friends at the ICI said he had gone away to join the El-Mudzahedin Unit in Zenica led by Anwar Shaaban.78
Immediately following the premature truck bomb explosion outside foreign mujahideen headquarters in Zenica in December 1995, Shaaban finally met his own violent end in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During a suspicious clash with Croat HVO forces, Shaaban and four of his closest mujahideen advisors were ritually gunned down, seemingly harkening the end of a major era in for the Arab-Afghans in Europe. But the influential network Shaaban was responsible for establishing in Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to survive and prosper long after his death. The credit for this unexpected resurgence largely goes to top Algerian mujahideen commander Abu el-Ma`ali (a.k.a. Abdelkader Mokhtari) and his reputed lieutenant Fateh Kamel (a.k.a. “Mustapha the Terrorist”). Kamel, who had lived in Canada since 1988, was originally from Algeria and spent a good part of his life in a quarter of the capital Algiers.79 His slick, polished exterior boasted a professionalism that was matched only by his pure ruthlessness. First trained in Afghanistan in 1991, Kamel came to the attention of Italian authorities while encouraging attendees at Anwar Shaaban’s Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan to join the mujahideen in Bosnia. By 1995, according to French intelligence, the El-Mudzahedin Unit in Bosnia was headed politically by Anwar Shaaban, seconded militarily by Abu el-Ma`ali, and in the third position was Fateh Kamel, in charge of the brigade’s “logistical matters” (a role that consisted mostly of coordinating the transfer of weapons, new recruits, and false documents to and from the Arab headquarters in Zenica).80 Investigators reviewing the phone records of lines serving the ICI between 1994 and 1995 found evidence of regular contacts between the triumvirate of Abu el-Ma`ali, Anwar Shaaban, and Fateh Kamel.81
French intelligence determined that Kamel and his associates had “multiple links” with “diverse Islamic terrorist organizations around the world, and particularly in Bosnia, in Pakistan, in Germany, and in London.”82 Between 1994 and 1997, Fateh Kamel moved constantly between (at least) Milan, Montreal, Paris, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Zagreb, Bosnia, Copenhagen, Austria, Slovenia, Freibourg (Germany), Morocco, Ancone (Italy), Istanbul, Belgium, and Amsterdam.83 Kamel was recorded on one occasion by Italian intelligence, discussing potential terror attacks and bragging to his henchmen, “I do not fear death… because the jihad is the jihad, and to kill is easy for me.”84 He hated the very society he lived in and cynically mocked Western attitudes towards Muslims: “And you know, the people [here] imagine a Muslim on the back of a camel, four wives behind him and the bombs that explode… terrorists, terrorists, terrorists.”85 In another communications intercept in 1996, just after the end of the Bosnian war, Kamel confided in his terrorist partners, “I prefer to die than go to jail. I almost lost my wife. I am 36 years old with a son four and a half months old. My wife is playing with him and me, I am here. I am almost a soldier.”86
The evidence in Kamel’s addressbook alone seems to confirm his role as a key liaison and coordinator between assorted European sleeper cell terrorist networks and senior Al-Qaida commanders based in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Among other numbers, Fateh Kamel had several contacts for Akacha Laidi (a.k.a. Abderrahmane Laidi, Abou Amina), a senior GIA member in the UK. One of the numbers with Akacha’s name actually reached Djamal Guesmia, a terrorist widely known to be working with both the GIA and its successor group, the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC).87 Fateh Kamel drew particularly close to loose network of units of North African immigrants and European converts to Islam who had come to aid the mujahideen during the early stages of the Bosnian war. For all intensive purposes, he became their handler, giving assistance and issuing orders on behalf of Anwar Shaaban and Abu el-Ma`ali.
In 1996, following the sudden death of Shaaban in central Bosnia, Kamel suddenly began activating “Bosniak” terror units implanted in Europe, instructing them to prepare for new jihad operations to take place inside France and Italy. Between August 6-10, 1996, Kamel stayed at the Milan apartment of two GIA supporters, including Rachid Fettar, who had close ties to the masterminds of the 1995 Paris metro bombing spree. Fettar was well-placed in the GIA leadership hierarchy, considered the “heir” to the European extremist network established by Safé Bourada, the deputy-in-command of the Algerian terror cell deemed responsible for the metro bombings.88 Thus, Kamel’s visit to Fettar and his companion Youcef Tanout came with a definite purpose: to direct a terror cell in the construction and deployment of more crude gas-canister bombs like those used during the Paris metro campaign.
Kamel respected Rachid Fettar as an equal and complained to him that Tanout and the others were too reluctant to produce the explosives without elaborate and time-consuming covert procedures. “I insisted as much as I could, but there was nothing I could do. In France, we can make [the bombs], even if their destination is France. You know very well that in France, I have no problems; I return and I leave when I want, clandestinely.”89 In a discussion with the more amateurish Youcef Tanout, Kamel coldly asked, “What are you afraid of? That everything will explode in your house? Tell me at least if Mahmoud has gotten the gas canister.” Tanout meekly related to Kamel how one of his fellow cell members had sought the shelter and anonymity of a nearby deep forest in order to fabricate the required bombs. He admitted to Kamel, “I feel no shame in telling you that I am extremely afraid.”90 Evidently, Tanout’s hesitant concerns were well founded; on November 7, 1996, both himself and Fettar were arrested and their Milan apartment was searched by experienced Italian counterterrorism investigators. They discovered two 400-gram gas canisters, five remote-control transmitters, 38 metallic cylinders, and other bomb-making materials.91
Though Fateh Kamel’s gas canister terror plot in Milan never reached fruition, it provided ominous clues as to what was to develop across Western Europe in the following decade. In many ways, the early Italian-based mujahideen sleeper cells under the lead of Kamel, Anwar Shaaban, and Abu el-Ma`ali were the direct prototype for contemporary European-based North African militant networks responsible for carrying out such operations as the March 2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid, Spain. Members of Fateh Kamel’s brotherhood of fighters continue to enter and leave the Balkans even today. When Kamel’s “right-hand-man” in Bosnia—Moroccan Karim Said Atmani—was released from a French prison cell in the spring of 2005, he immediately left on a flight to Sarajevo where he was greeted at the airport by a “known commander of the Bosnian mujahideen… tied to the international Islamic terrorist movement.”92 After substantial pressure was brought to bear on local law enforcement authorities in BiH, Atmani was finally deported from the region in early 2006 and sent back home to North Africa.
SCANDINAVIA AND NORTHERN EUROPE
Even as early as the Bosnian war, the unlikely region of Scandinavia had become an important tactical base for Islamic militant groups from the Middle East. Countries like Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were perceived as tolerant and willing to grant political asylum even to militant leaders on the run from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In Scandinavia, these wanted men knew they could expect “the same freedom as [in] the US.”93 A March 1995 magazine printed by supporters of Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya noted that “influential guides” within the Egyptian jihadi movement had nonetheless been able to secure “political asylum in Norway” despite the reluctance of the Norwegian Embassy in Cairo to become involved in such proceedings.94 Even the undisputed top leader of Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya—Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman (currently serving a life sentence in a maximum security U.S. prison)—boasted in interviews with mujahideen newsletters of his numerous trips to Europe, “passing through Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and many other countries.”95
Unbeknownst to most Danes, by 1993, the city of Copenhagen was perhaps the most important safe haven for Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya in all of Europe. At the head of Al-Gama`at’s weighty delegation in Copenhagen was the legendary Shaykh Abu Talal al-Qasimy, among the first Muslim clerics involved in supporting the Bosnian jihad. Al-Qasimy was imprisoned several times by the Egyptian government both previous to and following the assassination of the late President Anwar Sadat. Shortly thereafter, he was able to use fake travel documents to escape Egypt and join the growing number of militant Muslim exiles fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan. While there, al-Qasimy “made an appointment with Jihad in the path of Allah, and… embraced the rifle.”96 During time spent in nearby Pakistan, Abu Talal al-Qasimy established Al-Gama`at’s official magazine, Al-Murabeton, and wrote most of the early issues.
In January 1993, under pressure from the U.S., the Pakistani government suddenly reversed its position on supporting the jihad in Afghanistan and ordered the closure of remaining Arab mujahideen offices in Pakistan—threatening official deportation to any illegal foreign fighters who attempted to remain in Pakistan. These displaced men faced a serious problem, because return to their countries of origin meant certain arrest, torture, and likely death. At the time, a Saudi spokesman for the Arab-Afghans in Jeddah explained in the media, “the Algerians cannot go to Algeria, the Syrians cannot go to Syria or the Iraqis to Iraq. Some will opt to go to Bosnia, the others will have to go into Afghanistan permanently.”97
According to Dr. Abdullah Azzam’s son Hudhaifa, Abu Talal al-Qasimy was forced to flee across the border into Afghanistan because he was “ordered by name to be captured and sent to Egypt by the Pakistani government.” But, “before they caught [him], [he]… got a visa to foreign countries.”98 In fact, Al-Qasimy had found political asylum in Denmark, where he continued to spread his radical message at the foreign office of Al-Murabeton in Copenhagen.99 One of the other four editors working in Copenhagen was reportedly Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement and second-in-command of Usama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida.100 Al-Qasimy was also a close friend of the Amir of the Bosnian mujahideen, Anwar Shaaban, and took an aggressive, committed, and hands-on role in the Bosnian jihad.
On April 24, 1993, Abu Talal al-Qasimy convened in Copenhagen arguably one of the most important meetings of pan-Islamic militant leaders ever to take place inside of Europe. The other participants included Shaykh Anwar Shaaban from Milan and Imam Shawki Mohammed (a.k.a. Mahmoud Abdel al-Mohamed), the firebrand cleric at the Al-Sahaba mosque in Vienna—considered by Italian intelligence at the time to be “a most important representative of Sunni radicalism in Europe” who was fixated on “the situation of the mujahiddin in the former Yugoslavia.”101 Abu Talal hoped that this “meeting of minds” would serve as the impetus for the creation of a “Shura Council of the European Union”—a coalition of like-minded Middle Eastern extremist groups with a common presence and interest in Western Europe. The “Shura Council” was to be developed as an autonomous command organism capable of “coordinating and making decisions” without consulting Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya or Al-Jihad leaders located far off in Egypt or Afghanistan. One of the main reasons for establishing a unified leadership nucleus was to fully mobilize shared resources in Europe to support nearby ongoing jihad operations in North Africa and Bosnia-Herzegovina.102 A note from the diary of Anwar Shaaban written just days before meeting Abu Talal in Copenhagen cites the collective importance of providing assistance “to the Algerian, Tunisian, Senegalese, and Bosnian brothers.”103
Like Shaaban in Milan, Abu Talal al-Qasimy used his position of prominence while in Copenhagen to establish a circle of like-minded disciples, such as Palestinian Muslim cleric Ahmed Abu Laban (a.k.a. Abu Abdullah al-Lubnani) who arrived in Denmark in 1993. Though he speaks little Danish, Abu Laban has gradually established a persona for himself as the de-facto representative of the minority Muslim community in Denmark, appearing in local media reports and in meetings with government officials. An August 2005 article in the respected Washington Post even referred to Abu Laban as “one of Denmark’s most prominent imams.”104
Yet, despite his disarming exterior, Italian intelligence recorded visits by Abu Laban to Anwar Shaaban’s ICI in Milan “many times” for “conferences” and “community prayers.”105 When news of the capture of Abu Talal al-Qasimy in Croatia filtered back to Denmark, Ahmed Abu Laban led an angry protest of 500 local Muslims in downtown Copenhagen outside the Croatian embassy. During the October 1995 protest (which included an appearance by al-Qasimy’s wife), demonstrators “raised their fists and shouted ‘Allahu Akhbar!’” In interviews with journalists, Abu Laban condemned Egypt, the United States, and Croatia as “the beneficiaries” of Abu Talal’s capture en route to Muslim forces in central Bosnia-Herzegovina.106
In early 2006, Ahmed Abu Laban re-appeared in international media after he helped provoke a new series of violent protests across the Muslim world in reaction to cartoons published in Scandinavian magazines that lampooned the Prophet Mohammed. The controversial cartoons failed to attract widespread interest among Muslims outside of Europe when they first printed in the Danish publication Jyllands-Posten during the fall of 2005. On November 18—in an interview with an Islamic press agency—Abu Laban announced that he would lead a delegation of Danish Muslims touring across the Middle East in a bid to draw pan-Islamic attention to the cartoons issue:
“A delegation will visit Cairo to meet with Arab League Secretary Amr Moussa and Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Sheikh Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi… The delegation will also visit Saudi Arabia and Qatar to meet with renowned Muslim scholar Sheikh Yussef Al-Qaradawi… We want to internationalize this issue so that the Danish government would realize that the cartoons were not only insulting to Muslims in Denmark but also to Muslims worldwide… It was decided to take such a step because it is wrong to turn a blind eye to the fact that some European countries discriminate against their Muslims on the grounds that they are not democratic and that they can not understand western culture.”107
During meetings with Muslim leaders, the delegation led by Abu Laban displayed the cartoons published by Jyllands-Posten—along with several other much more offensive items that had never actually been published in Scandinavia, including a cartoon depicting the Prophet having sexual intercourse with a dog. Other printed materials distributed in conjunction with Abu Laban’s campaign contained several other inflammatory and misleading rumors about the would-be “oppression” of Danish Muslims.108 Within weeks, as a result of Abu Laban’s relentless incitement, the cartoon controversy spun out of control, resulting in angry mobs attacking Scandinavian diplomatic facilities in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories.
Likewise, in neighboring Sweden, local cells of North African extremists who had initially organized themselves around the need to support to fellow jihadists in Afghanistan, North Africa, and the Balkans eventually developed into an elaborate regional network for terrorist recruitment, financing, and other illicit activities. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Stockholm office of a fraudulent Arab-Afghan charitable group known as “Human Concern International” (HCI) served as cover during the mid-1990s for a major covert Bosnian arms smuggling operation.109 European Muslim newsletters advertised that due to a wealth of contributions from “the increasing Muslim population in Sweden,” the HCI branch in Stockholm had already successfully “equipped the Mujahideen in Afghanistan… The organization has succeeded in gathering more than half million Kroner last year, and it has been sent to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. We are still helping the Arab youths to go to Afghanistan thus to contribute in the Jihad.”110 The newspaper Le Monde confirmed that French national police suspected that HCI’s offices in Croatia and Sweden had acted as possible “staging points” for the GIA terrorist cell responsible for a July 25, 1995 bomb attack on the Paris metro system.111 In the wake of the Paris bombing, Swedish authorities arrested and held a suspected GIA member Abdelkerim Deneche who was living in Stockholm at the time. Deneche had previously been fingered in French news media as a former employee of the HCI office in Zagreb.
Not to be outdone by their British colleagues, groups of young Algerian radicals from Sweden were also traveling directly to Bosnia seeking to physically join in the jihad against the “Christian Crusaders.” On September 19, 1993, one of these Swedish mujahideen recruits—“Abu Musab al-Swedani”—was killed in a battle with Croatian HVO forces near the central Bosnian town of Kruscica (near Vitez). According to friends, Abu Musab was born in Sweden to a Swedish mother and an Algerian father. He grew up in Scandinavia, but at age 20, suddenly developed an intense interest in studying Islam. He traveled to Saudi Arabia on a personal pilgrimage to learn Arabic and study the Islamic Shariah (religious law). During the nearly two years he spent in the Arabian Peninsula, he became a devout, fundamentalist who, upon his return to Sweden, began actively prosthelytizing his religion to others around him, including his family and relatives.112
The jihad in Afghanistan was making major international headlines during this period of the late 1980s, catching the avid attention of the pro-Islamist community in the West. Abu Musab “began to follow the news of the Muslims around the world and in particular the killing of the Muslims and their expulsion from their homes. He then understood that there is no dignity for the Muslims except through Jihad.” Abu Musab traveled to Peshawar, the “gateway to jihad,” with another young, radical Muslim who was already a member of the mujahideen. After some hesitation, he soon ventured forth into Afghanistan to seek combat training and to fight on behalf of the Islamic revolution. When the Afghan jihad ended, Abu Musab returned home to Sweden and married a Muslim woman. But, in 1992, he once again decided to make a jihadi pilgrimage—this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Abu Musab al-Swedani arrived in the region and joined up with the extremists based in the camp on Mt. Igman, under the lead of “General” Abu Ayman al-Masri.113 After surviving several months of combat, Abu Musab was finally killed by a sniper’s bullet while in the midst of a chaotic mujahideen military offensive aimed at driving Croatian forces out of Muslim central Bosnia.114 Al-Swedani’s biography and photo were later publicized in the pioneering English-language jihad propaganda film “The Martyrs of Bosnia,” produced by accused London-based Al-Qaida operative Babar Ahmad.115
As a testament to what had been achieved, when the mujahideen military campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina came to a sudden halt in September 1995, the predominantly Algerian arms smuggling and recruitment network based in Stockholm continued their ongoing activities virtually unabated. Jihad became a hot topic of discussion and a host of individuals surfaced in Scandinavia claiming to represent various Islamic extremist movements—including “Abu Fatima al-Tunisi” (a spokesman for a Stockholm-based Islamic group), and “Abu Daoud al-Maghrebi” (a Swedish-based activist working on behalf of the GIA in Northern Europe).116 Even the Nusraat al-Ansaar newsletter—the semi-official publication of the GIA’s foreign delegation in Europe—offered a correspondence address at Box 3027 in Haninge, Sweden.117
Indeed, Swedish-based militants who were initially mobilized by ongoing jihadi conflicts in Bosnia and Afghanistan were also the first to establish an official Arab-language Internet homepage for the notorious Algerian GIA, with an entire sub-section dedicated just to “terrorism.”118 These same individuals began to distribute Arabic-language jihad training manuals on the Internet, many of which have become classic documents in the online world of the mujahideen—including a lengthy book titled “The Restoration of the Publication of the Believers,” written by Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. When it was published on the Internet from Sweden, Zawahiri’s book still carried a watermark on the cover from 1996 identifying it as the property of “Muslimska Forsamilingen i Brandbergen, Jungfrugaten 413 N.B.” in the town of Haninge.119
CONCLUSIONS
To some degree, all major conflicts in the Islamic world have a bearing on Muslim social and political attitudes in Europe. Yet, the proximity of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Europe and the underlying nature of the conflict in the Balkans (pitting an embattled and forgotten Muslim minority against two larger Christian “crusader” forces) caused an infusion of European youth that no such conflict had previously seen. Bosnia became a rallying cry and the impetus for disparate groups of Islamic extremists spread across Western Europe to come together in common cause. It was a mobilization drive that simply never stopped when the Dayton Accords were signed and the Bosnian war ended.
The recent discovery of a transnational terrorist network anchored in Sarajevo—and with branches in Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom—is further evidence of the extent to which the jihad in Bosnia still influences Western European mujahideen networks. Last fall, Bosnian authorities announced a series of arrests in connection with a security sweep known as Operation Mazhar. The men taken into custody had purchased explosives and allegedly planned to carry out suicide attacks against Western targets across Europe. The leader of the cell, Swedish national Mirsad Bektasevic (a.k.a. “Maximus”) was initially based in Sweden and then traveled on to Bosnia “to plan an attack aimed at forcing Bosnia or another government to withdraw forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.”120
In a videotape recovered by Bosnian police, masked militants were shown building explosives while another individual—allegedly Bektasevic himself—explained to the camera, “This weapon will be used against Europe, against those whose forces are in Iraq and Afghanistan… These two brothers ... have given their lives to God to help their brothers and sisters. We are here and we are planning and we have got everything ready.” Mobile phone records also showed that Bektasevic was communicating with other known extremists based in Denmark and the United Kingdom.121 He was also believed to be running a recruitment operation sending young European jihadi recruits on to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.122 Moreover, at least one of the suspects arrested in Bosnia-Herzegovina in connection with the Bektasevic network was the former accountant of a financial front company run by veterans of the El-Mudzahedin Unit in Sarajevo and Zenica.
Thus, the brotherhood of radical Muslims forged as a result of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to present a formidable challenge for European intelligence and law enforcement. In the future, it is crucial for Western security agencies to pool information on the identities of any foreign nationals known to have joined mujahideen forces in the Balkans—just as they have done for Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, European nations must provide further resources and investigative support to Bosnian Muslim authorities in their drive to uproot remaining pockets of foreign extremists. Without substantial international assistance, it is doubtful that the Bosnians can alone shoulder this weighty and complex security responsibility.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A22303-2002Feb16?language=printer
Correction to This Article
A Feb. 17 article about the use of gold in al Qaeda and Taliban financing reported incorrectly that a Saudi banker, Sheikh Khalid bin Mahfouz, is a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. The report was based on congressional testimony by a former director of the CIA. The story also erred in stating that Mahfouz is under house arrest. A representative of Mahfouz also denied information attributed in the story to U.S. officials that Mahfouz was under detention in 1999 and that an audit of the Saudi bank of which he was director showed links to charities controlled by bin Laden. The representative said no such audit was conducted.
Al Qaeda’s Road Paved With Gold
Secret Shipments Traced Through a Lax System In United Arab Emirates
By Douglas Farah
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, February 17, 2002; Page A01
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — Just as the United States and its allies swept toward Afghanistan’s main cities last autumn, the ruling Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network sent waves of couriers with bars of gold and bundles ofdollars across the porous border into Pakistan.
In small shops and businesses along the border, the money and gold, taken from Afghanistan’s banks and national coffers, were collected and moved by trusted Taliban and al Qaeda operatives to the port city of Karachi, Pakistan, according to sources familiar with the events.
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Then, using couriers and the virtually untraceable hawala money transfer system, they transferred millions of dollars to this desert sheikdom, where the assets were converted to gold bullion. The riches of the Taliban and al Qaeda were subsequently scattered around the world — including some that went to the United States — through a financial structure that has been little affected by the international efforts to seize suspected terrorist assets.
This account of the flight of the Taliban and al Qaeda treasure from Afghanistan is based on dozens of interviews in Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Europe and the United States. The gold trail was described by intelligence officers, law enforcement officials, gold brokers, and sources with direct knowledge of some of al Qaeda’s financial movements, but not by Taliban or al Qaeda operatives.
The interviews offered a tantalizing glimpse into the critical yet mysterious role played by gold in the finances of al Qaeda, both before and after the Sept. 11 attacks. Gold has allowed the Taliban and bin Laden to largely preserve their financial resources, despite the military attack that battered their forces in Afghanistan, investigators and intelligence sources said.
Al Qaeda also used diamonds purchased in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, tanzanite from Tanzania and other commodities to make money and hide assets. But gold played a uniquely important role in the group’s financial structure, investigators and intelligence sources said, because it is a global currency.
“Gold is a huge factor in the moving of terrorist money because you can melt it, smelt it or deposit it on account with no questions asked,” said a senior U.S. law enforcement official investigating gold transactions. “Why move it through Dubai? Because there is a willful blindness there.”
Exempt from international reporting requirements for financial transactions, gold is a favored commodity in laundering money from drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorist activities, U.S. officials said. In addition, Dubai, one of seven sheikdoms that make up the United Arab Emirates, has one of the world’s largest and least regulated gold markets, making it an ideal place to hide.
Dubai is also one of the region’s most open banking centers and is the commercial capital of the United Arab Emirates, one of three countries that maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban until shortly after Sept. 11. Sitting at a strategic crossroad of the Persian Gulf, South Asia and Africa, Dubai has long been a financial hub for Islamic militant groups. Much of the $500,000 used to fund the Sept. 11 attacks came through Dubai, investigators believe.
“All roads lead to Dubai when it comes to money. Everyone did business there,” said Patrick Jost, who until last year was a senior financial enforcement officer in the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
Hand-Carried by Couriers
When the U.S. bombs began pounding Taliban and al Qaeda targets last autumn, the rush of gold and money out of Afghanistan intensified.
Pakistani financial authorities said that $2 million to $3 million a day is usually hand-carried by couriers from Karachi, Pakistan, to Dubai, mostly to buy gold. Late last year that amount increased significantly as money was moved out of Afghanistan, they said. Pakistani and U.S. officials estimate that about $10 million from Afghanistan was taken out by courier over three weeks in late November and early December. The Taliban fled Kabul, the capital, late on Nov. 12 and abandoned Kandahar on Dec. 7.
One of the couriers of cash and gold to Dubai was the Taliban consul general in Karachi, Kaka Zada, who took at least one shipment of $600,000 to Dubai in the last week of November, according to two Pakistani sources who witnessed him carrying the money.
In addition, U.S. and other officials said, millions more were sent through hawalas, the informal money transfer system widely used across the Middle East, North Africa and Asia that, outside of major cities, often serves as the only money transfer system. Rather than moving money through traceable mechanisms such as wire transfers, hawala brokers take a client’s money, then call or e-mail a counterpart in the area where the client wants the money delivered. The counterpart pays out the sum. When the transaction is complete, the records are destroyed.
Gold is often used by hawala brokers to balance their books. Hawala dealers also routinely have gold, rather than currency, placed around the globe.
“There are no traditional banking systems in Afghanistan or Somalia,” said Jost. “Everything is done through hawala, and gold is the fuel hawala runs on.”
U.S. investigators, led by the Customs Service, have begun poring over transactions of some of Dubai’s largest and most prestigious gold brokerages for possible links to the movement of al Qaeda or Taliban money, and have found unusual gold shipments into the United States after Sept. 11.
A Customs official said that as part of efforts to “investigate terrorist financing,” the agency was “scrutinizing movements of gold by several companies, including ARY Gold,” one of Dubai’s largest and most prestigious gold bullion and jewelry dealers.
ARY’s cramped headquarters is located in the heart of Dubai’s gold market — an area several blocks square, filled with stores that sell little else. Abdul Razzak, the Pakistani owner of ARY Gold, strongly denied knowingly doing business with the Taliban or al Qaeda.
“I am a God-fearing person, but all my life I have been afraid of religious people like the Taliban,” said Razzak. “I wouldn’t like to deal with Taliban people, and we don’t like Taliban people.
“If you say you want 100 kilos [220 pounds] of gold, I can give you that wherever you want in 12 hours. What you do with it is your business,” he said.
Razzak, who owns three of Dubai’s largest gold jewelry stores, said he imports and exports gold legally. Dubai has no restrictions on either activity, and Razzak said competitors were spreading lies about his company out of jealousy.
During two interviews here, Razzak displayed few hints that he was a powerful political and financial broker. Wearing a simple white robe, he spoke in a small office separated by a glass partition from brokers monitoring a bank of computers. On the wall were plaques commemorating his gifts to charitable causes.
In 1998, Pakistani investigators looking into government corruption found two checks, each for $5 million, allegedly paid by ARY Gold in 1994 to Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of then-prime minister Benazir Bhutto, to secure a two-year monopoly on gold imports to Pakistan. While acknowledging he held the monopoly and shipped $500 million in gold to Pakistan from 1994 to 1996, Razzak said that he had paid no bribes and that “enemies” had falsified the bank documents.
Razzak was cleared of criminal charges in Dubai but still faces charges in Pakistan from that case, Pakistani authorities said.
“Always if you are doing good business, people are jealous,” Razzak said. “Everyone, all the leaders of Pakistan, come to me for advice. We are well known and famous, and people don’t like that.”
Smuggling for Profit
In addition to using gold to hide assets, there is evidence that al Qaeda smuggled gold into Pakistan and India for profit. Smuggling gold is lucrative because the two countries have a high demand for gold and legal gold imports are taxed.
An al Qaeda manual found by British forces in Afghanistan late last year included not only chapters on how to build explosives and clean weapons, but on how to smuggle gold on small boats or conceal it on the body, British and U.S. officials said.
The officials said that the Taliban and al Qaeda moved large quantities of gold into Afghanistan after the Taliban rose to power in the mid-1990s, in part because most people in the region are more familiar with gold than foreign currencies.
The officials said the Taliban collected taxes in gold from the heads of Pakistani and Indian trucking networks that hauled cargo through Afghanistan.
Donations to al Qaeda and the Taliban from wealthy supporters were often made in gold, the officials said, and taxes on opium production, a source of revenue for both groups, were also paid in gold, according to U.S. and British officials.
Gold bullion was flown directly from Dubai to the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar on Ariana Afghan Airlines, the officials said.
“The Taliban took gold into Afghanistan because there was nothing else they could take there,” said Jost, who has studied the use of gold by terrorist groups. “The local money was worthless [and] foreign currency brings suspicion, but if you show up with gold, people know exactly what that is worth.”
For al Qaeda to operate, the gold must be easily convertible to cash, and be available around the world. For that, the organization is believed to rely on a hidden financial network across the Middle East, Pakistan and Europe, U.S. and European investigators said.
William F. Wechsler, who monitored bin Laden’s finances at the National Security Council during the last two years of the Clinton administration, told Congress in September that bin Laden initially rose to prominence for building “a financial architecture that supported themujaheddin in Afghanistan against the Russians.”
“It’s this financial architecture that continued with him when he turned to terrorism, and it’s this financial architecture that is at the heart of how al Qaeda today gets its finances,” he said.
Much of that architecture, according to French, Pakistani and American investigators, is modeled on the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). BCCI was founded by Pakistanis and bankrolled largely by leaders of the UAE. In the 1980s it was used to launder drug money, harbor terrorist funds and buy illegal weapons. Its collapse in 1991 was a major global financial scandal.
The CIA used BCCI to funnel millions of dollars to the fighters battling the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Bin Laden had accounts in the bank, U.S. officials said. The bank also specialized in dealing in commodities such as diamonds and gold.
The BCCI Model
A 70-page French intelligence report, prepared for Parliament in October and obtained by The Washington Post, outlined some details of this network. “The financial network of bin Laden, as well as his network of investments, is similar to the network put in place in the 1980s by BCCI for its fraudulent operations, often with the same people (former directors and cadres of the bank and its affiliates, arms merchants oil merchants, Saudi investors),” the report said. “The dominant trait of bin Laden’s operations is that of a terrorist network backed up by a vast financial structure.”
A senior U.S. investigator said U.S. agencies were looking into these ties because “they just make so much sense, and so few people from BCCI ever went to jail. BCCI was the mother and father of terrorist financing operations.”
The report identifies dozens of companies and individuals who were involved with BCCI and were found to be dealing with bin Laden after the bank collapsed. Many went on to work in banks and charities identified by the United States and others as supporting al Qaeda.
The French report highlighted the role of Saudi banker Khalid bin Mahfouz, a former director of BCCI, whose sister is married to bin Laden. In 1995 bin Mahfouz paid a $225 million fine in a settlement with U.S. prosecutors for his role in the BCCI scandal and went on to serve as director of the National Commercial Bank, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest.
But in April 1999 bin Mahfouz was placed under house arrest in a hospital in Taif when Saudi officials, at the urging of the United States, audited his bank and found that millions of dollars were being funneled through the bank to charities controlled by bin Laden, U.S. officials and the French document said.
While retaining shares in the bank, the report said, bin Mahfouz no longer directs the institution and remains under house arrest. In the past he has denied ties to terrorist activities. U.S. intelligence officials said Washington pushed for the audit of bin Mahfouz’s bank but was never allowed to question him.
Saudi officials “weren’t willing to let us talk to him,” said one U.S. source with direct knowledge of events, “and we asked at a very senior level.”
U.S. and European investigators said it is al Qaeda’s ability to tap into commodities such as gold, and to move its resources through both the hawala system and banking structures, that makes it so hard to disrupt.
Dubai’s links to suspected terrorist financing and money laundering have long been a point of contention between the United States and the United Arab Emirates.
“There is no question the UAE was used by terrorists, the question is why,” said a U.S. official. “It is no more lax and unregulated than many places. The answer is, Dubai is so damn convenient.”
Three former Clinton administration officials said that two senior U.S. delegations went to the emirates, one in July 1999 and one in January 2000, to press for measures against terrorist financing. “We got exactly nowhere,” said a participant in one of the meetings.
A spokesman for the UAE Ministry of Information said the “visits and requests from the U.S. in 1999 and 2000 represented a part of the normal exchange of information . . . aimed at enhancing cooperation and tackling issues of mutual concern.”
Since Sept. 11, U.S. officials said, the emirates have been much more cooperative on tracing suspect finances and last month enacted the most stringent money laundering laws in the region.
U.S. investigators acknowledge they have been slow to focus on the trail of gold and the hawala network. While a handful of investigators had been urging that more attention be paid to those areas, they were largely ignored because the concepts are so foreign to the Western way of doing business, current and former officials said.
Wechsler, the former National Security Council official, said that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence know “virtually nothing” about how the hawala system operates and its relationship to gold.
“We don’t know where the hawalas are, we don’t even have an order of magnitude on how much money they move,” Wechsler said. “We don’t know how much it costs to be bin Laden. All I can say is, it costs millions and millions of dollars.”
Researcher Robert Thomason in Washington and special correspondent Kamran Khan in Karachi contributed to this report.
US pays Pakistan $1 billion a year to fight terror, as country cuts patrols RAW STORY
Published: Saturday May 19, 2007
“The United States is continuing to make large payments of roughly $1 billion a year to Pakistan for what it calls reimbursements to the country’s military for conducting counterterrorism efforts along the border with Afghanistan, even though Pakistan’s president decided eight months ago to slash patrols through the area where Qaida and Taliban fighters are most active,” the NEW YORK TIMES will report in Sunday editions, according to a copy of the article advanced to RAW STORY. Excerpts.
#
The monthly payments, called coalition support funds, are not widely advertised. Buried in public budget numbers, the payments are intended to reimburse Pakistan’s military for the cost of the operations. So far, Pakistan has received more than $5.6 billion under the program over five years, more than half of the total aid the United States has sent to the country since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, not counting covert funds.
Some American military in the region has recommended that the money be tied to Pakistan’s performance in pursuing al-Qaida and keeping the Taliban from gaining a haven from which to attack the government of Afghanistan. American officials have been surprised by the speed at which both organizations have gained strength in the past year.
But Bush administration officials say no such plan is being considered, despite new evidence that the Pakistani military is often looking the other way when Taliban fighters retreat across the border into Pakistan. There is also at least one American report that Pakistani security forces have fired in support of Taliban fighters attacking Afghan posts.
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/US_pays_Pakistan_1_billion_year_0519.html
Davey, I suspect there is another slant to this story, it is true that we still pay Pakistan.
It is important to keep the leader they have, so in effect he is being bought, to keep out someone who is full force against the U.S. [my opinion].
That is the way politics are.
Often I want to tell them all no more money, as far as I know, we are still giving Russia money...........to develop protection for their nuclear supplies, was one of them.
It is a big crooked game, again in my opinion.
I would vote to bring home all our troops, develop the weapons we need and watch the rest of the world kill themselves off, fighting each other, or attempting to enter our land.
Let Americans travel in America, or if they hate us, then get the hell out.
No, I do not think that those fussing fools that are so worried about the rest of the world, really care much for America, they want us to be a third rate country, with only the elites enjoying our riches.
Whoops, guess that last nap , didn’t help my mood much.
Maybe I will go on the warpath, and start scalping some of the fools, that have taken over the Native American’s land.
http://www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=2375
Mamun reveals more…
Interrogation report
Giasuddin Al Mamun, controversial businessman, continues in his revelations of corruption, of how he used his contacts to build his empire of wealth.
A PROBE Report
[This looks like an expose on someone, but I am not sure that I understand it all. granny]
From New Nation Online Edition
*56 private, local campuses of foreign varsities ‘illegal’: Students face
uncertainty, panicked about career
*By Staff Reporter
Sat, 12 May 2007, 13:55:00
The University Grants Commission (UGC), the apex monitoring body of the
higher education in the country, has published a list of 56 private
universities or local campuses of foreign universities operating in the
country illegally.
As a result, some 12,000 students studying at these universities are now
facing serious uncertainty about their academic future.
However, the authorities of these universities expressed strong disagreement
with the UGC’s list and they are also yet to receive the list.
In a notice, the Private University Department of the UGC said 56 illegal
private universities and local campuses of foreign universities are: 1.
World University of Bangladesh,
2. Mantrust University of Information Technology at Banani,
3. Headway Institute of Bangladesh at Dhanmondi,
4. GESA Bangladesh,
5. El Dorado Centre for Management Development at Dhanmondi,
6. Maple Leaf International Centre for Higher Studies,
7. Institute of Law, Information, Agriculture and Development Services Ltd,
8. World Institute of Business and technology,
9. Foreign Education Service Bangladesh,
10. Global Institute of Research Management,
11. The International University,
12. West Coast University of Panama,
13. Royal Roads University of Canada,
14. Cambrian College of Canada,
15. The Law Tutors,
16. Sofa Ed Ltd,
17. University of Luton,
18. University of North America,
19. Assumption University of Thailand,
20. Daffodil Institute of Information Technology,
21. Institute of Business and Information Technology of Sylhet,
22. SAFS International,
23. Bangladesh Institute of Art, Design and Technology,
24. CAT ACCA Princeton University,
25. Central Institute of International Technology,
26. Victoria University USA, Dhaka,
27. Australian National University, Khulna,
28. North American University at Lalmatia, Dhaka,
29. Green Valley University at Panthapath, Dhaka,
30. IBAIS, 31. Victoria University Study Centre,
32. Newcastle Law Academy,
33. Neural Institute of Management and Information Technology,
34. Perdana College of Malaysia at Gulshan,
35. Australian Institute of Business Technology,
36. The Progressive Metrocracy,
37. James Cook University,
38. University of Balarat,
39. University of Honolulu,
40. University of New Castle,
41. IBCS Primax Limited,
42. British School of Law,
43. Atlantic National University,
44. Bhuiyan Academy Dhaka Centre for the Law and Economics,
45. University of Olengo Australia,
46. Peace Blend University of Science and Technology,
47. Neural Systems Ltd,
48. Unique Computing Rajshahi,
49. Asian Centre for Management and Information Technology,
50. SRGB-AEC Centre for Business Studies,
51. Victoria University USA, Chittagong,
52. Panama University Khulna,
53. Bhuiyan Institute of Technology,
54. Atlantic National University at Jhigatola, 55.
The UGC sources said these 56 local and foreign universities have been
operating their academic activities without the prior approval of the UGC.
Since these universities have been running illegally, the UGC has informed
all concerned that according to the Section 6 of the Private University Act
1992 and the Private University Act (Amendment) 1998, no private
universities or local campuses of foreign universities either be set up or
run their academic activities without necessary licences from the Bangladesh
government.
The UGC further asked these private universities and institutes not to give
admission to any subject, course, department or faculty.
Sajal Ahmed, a student of information technology at IBCS-Primax Ltd told The
New Nation yesterday that their authorities told them that the UGC had
served such notices twice earlier, but did not take any step later.
“But, we are now facing great uncertainty and deep frustration. We are also
confused thinking what awaits for our fate. We don’t know what to do. We got
admitted to this private university spending a huge amount of money. Now how
we will face our parents,” he asked.
Shahed Alam, another student of BBA of Dhaka Campus of Victoria University
USA, said he got admitted to the University spending as much as Tk 4.5 lakh.
“I have learnt that this University has been set up illegally. Why the UGC
did not take necessary steps when these universities were set up and started
admission of students? Who will give back my money and time that I had lost
if this university is closed down now,” he also asked.
An official of Daffodil Institute of IT said they did not receive any notice
from the UGC asking them to close down although their institution has been
termed as ‘illegal.’
Meanwhile, SM Abu Taslim, Registrar of Bhuiyan Academy said they do not
issue any certificate in the name of their institution after completion of
the courses. “Rather, University of London issues certificates on law taking
examinations through the British Council,” he said.
“We just give guidelines and provide coaching to students. There are 450
students studying at Bhuiyan Academy. Some 150 new barristers have been
produced here so far. Students are still getting admission here,” he said.
Taslim also said they know about the notice of the UGC. “But, we have been
running our affairs for the last 18 years. If the UGC terms us illegal, they
should talk to the British Council first instead of us,” he said.
Source: http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/printer_36039.shtml
“Innovation distinguishes a leader from a follower” - Steve Jobs
Sayeed Rahman
Founder BANGLA IT
http://www.banglait.org
Above is the part of thread, with comments.
Below is 38 pages of reports, which I will post to all, a quick read makes me think we do not want to loose this one.
Davey, lots to google here, also the jihad and russian aspects:
This is the html version of the file
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/AsianOrgCrime_Canada.pdf.
G o o g l e automatically generates html versions of documents
as we crawl the web.
To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url:
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:X0amT4-D1dsJ:www.loc.gov/rr/frd/...
Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor
responsible for its content.
These search terms have been highlighted: number chinese
criminals living canada
http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/aboutus/congress/testimonies/2001
4Jack Kelly, “Quick, Easy Crossing a Thing of the Past at Canadian Border,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 14, 2001. 5Sean Robinson, “Northern Border
Exposure; Increased Presence of Terrorists in Canada, Staffing Shortage at
U.S.Border Patrol a Bad Combination,” The News Tribune [Tacoma], September
29, 2002. 6Jeffrey Robinson, The Merger: How Organized Crime Is Taking Over
Canada and the World (McClelland & Stewart Inc: 1999), 58.
Page 9
Library of Congress - Federal Research Division Asian Criminal and Terrorist
Activity in Canada5trade. Despite this requirement, the region is used as an
illegal border crossing for Asian organized crime groups, among others and,
therefore, constitutes one of the primary gaps in border security.7Although
U.S. and Canadian authorities have the right to inspect the land for illegal
contraband or persons crossing without permission, this right is often not
exercised. Instead, a militant group of Akwesasne, equipped with stockpiles
of small arms, acts as defenders of the land, exercising control over the
individuals entering their territory.8The group receives its funding almost
exclusively from the proceeds of criminal activities. The Walpole Island and
the Niagara area also continue to be used by Asian organized crime groups as
a convenient route to smuggle both contraband and people across the border,
due to its geographic location between Ontario and Michigan at the mouth of
the St. Clair River.9Immigration and Refugee Policy Canada’s immigration
policy and entrepreneur program allow foreign nationals to enter the country
with relative ease and become Canadian residents, thereby positioning
themselves for easy access to the United States. Each year approximately
300,000 people are allowed entry into Canada, twice the number per capita
that the United States allows in.10In addition, few restrictions apply to
countries of origin for persons seeking entry into Canada. Unlike the visa
waiver program in the United States, which grants entry without a visa to
residents of only 27 countries, Canada grants visa-free entry to residents
of nearly 60 countries. This number includes Greece, Mexico, South Korea,
and Saudi Arabia. Canada relies on paper identification for immigrants,
forged versions of which are available on the black market for roughly
$1,000.11Those found to be misrepresenting themselves at the border do not
face any ban. They are merely turned away and can attempt to re-enter the
country immediately.12Asian criminal groups, especially those from China,
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, as well as terrorist 7LaVerle Berry, Russian
Organized Crime and the Global Narcotics Trade (Washington: Library of
Congress, Federal Research Division), March 2002. 8Ibid. 9Criminal
Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada
2001, Website:
http://www.cisc.gc.ca/AnnualReport2001/Cisc2001/coverpage2001.html
10John
Berlau, “Canada Turns into Terrorist Haven,” Insight on the News
[Washington], June 24, 2002. http://www.insightmag.com/news/254290.html
11Jim Lynch, “A New Bond at Border,” The Oregonian [Portland], October 28,
2001, A1.12Ibid.
Page 12
Library of Congress - Federal Research Division Asian Criminal and Terrorist
Activity in Canada8Halifax, and 54 percent of the dock workers at the
Charlottetown port had criminal records.24In addition, several ports do not
have adequate identification requirements for employers nor do they have
adequate security fencing. Organized crime groups reportedly exercise great
control over Canadian ports and have been cited as major conduits for drug
smuggling, the export and import of stolen automobiles, and the theft of
cargo. Officials fear that terrorists could use the ports to smuggle a
weapon of mass destruction into the country.25The committee additionally
reported that the Chrétien government had been receiving warnings on the
state of Canada’s ports for six years, but continued to ignore the advice of
law enforcement officials. Effects of September 11The terrorist attacks on
the United States in September 2001 were a catalyst for bringing the issues
of Canadian immigration policy and U.S.-Canadian border security to the
forefront. In October 2001, Canada implemented its Anti-Terrorism Plan, and
in December 2001 its Anti-Terrorism Act entered into force. Among other
things, these two initiatives are designed to prevent terrorists from
getting into Canada, secure the U.S.-Canada border, identify terrorist
activities, and detect and deter the financing of terrorist
activities.26Subsequent changes to the Canadian Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act in June 2002 seek to remove some of the heretofore less
stringent refugee policies by allowing for the removal of security threats
sooner and the imposition of harsher penalties for people smuggling, as well
as for people using or selling forged documents. US$200 million has been
allocated to improve the screening of foreigners.27The Canadian Budget 2001,
passed in December 2001, allocates CDN$7.7b over the next five years to
provide funding for these initiatives. Other initiatives include the
Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration and accompanying Action Plan for
Creating a Secure and Smart Border, signed on December 12, 2001, and
designed to protect the CDN$1.9 billion dollars garnered daily from
legitimate border trade while ensuring its security from illicit activities.
24James Baxter, “Current Senate Report Said To Confirm 1996 Warnings on
Canadian Port Security,” National Post [Toronto], March 19, 2002 (FBIS
Document EUP20020304000245).25Allan Thompson, “Canadian Senate Report Says
Ports ‘Fertile Ground’ for Terrorists, Notes Workers’ Criminal Records,” The
Toronto Star, March 2, 2002 (FBIS Document EUP20020304000245). 26Canada
Embassy in Washington, “Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September
11th,” Washington, D.C.: 2003.
http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/backgrounder-en.asp
27Berlau.
31Ibid. 32Yiu Kong Chu, The Triads as Business
(New York: St. Edmundsbury Press 2000).
34Chu, 119. 35Hill. 36Criminal
Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime Canada (
Ottawa: 2002).
http://www.cics.gc.ca
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/648/intro.htm
38Criminal Intelligence
Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime Canada (Ottawa: 2001).
http://www.cics.gc.ca
39Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Criminal
Intelligence Program, “Drug Situation in Canada - 1999” (Ottawa: 2000).
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca
40Ibid. 41Ibid. 42Chu, 119.
Page 17
Library of Congress - Federal Research Division Asian Criminal and Terrorist
Activity in Canada13exemplifies the lack of triad control over the drug
trafficking industry. Approximately 430,000 tablets of ecstasy with a value
of US$30m were discovered heading toward Australia; this cache was the
second largest seizure of amphetamines ever recorded.43Although one of the
men arrested reportedly had links to the Sun Yee On triad, the ecstasy
movement was not a triad operation. From the magnitude of this seizure it is
apparent that international crime syndicates have real power in the drug
trade, despite only tangential identification with a major triad. It is not
uncommon for a member of one triad to team up with another triad member and
work for the leader of a heroin smuggling group who is not a member of any
triad at all.44The situation is viewed as a private business transaction.
Still, triad membership can be essential for purposes of networking and the
development of criminal relationships based on trust. It should also be
noted that no consensus exists on the degree of triad involvement in the
Canadian drug trade, and some officials believe that the triads control the
market.45Heroin-Related Activity Affecting U.S. and Canadian Interests:
1999-2002 Heroin from Southeast Asian and China has been entering Western
Canada for many years on its way to North American markets. In January 1999,
The Vancouver Sun reported the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP)
seizure of 70 kilograms of heroin in Richmond Country and two Mercedes Benz
automobiles, one in Toronto and one in Vancouver. Five people connected to
the seizure were arrested in Toronto, Richmond County, British Columbia, and
Hong Kong. According to the report, the police claimed that those arrested
were part of a major organized crime group that was stockpiling Golden
Triangle heroin in Vancouver before shipping it out to points throughout
North America.46In June 1999, the RCMP broke up a global drug smuggling
syndicate that was controlled out of Hong Kong and trafficked heroin from
the Golden Triangle. With profits estimated in the multimillions, the group
shipped narcotics to Vancouver, where triad groups in Canada then
transported the heroin to the rest of the North American market. The drug
smuggling syndicate was discovered in December 1997; Vancouver detectives
reported that it had been in operation for a number of years prior to its
discovery. 43Neil Mercer, “$30 M Drug Seizure Cracks Crime Syndicate,” The
Sydney Morning Herald, October 18, 2001. (Lexis Nexis Document) 44Chu, 110.
45”Wa Link to Triad Confirmed,” The Bangkok Post, December 22, 2000. 46David
Hogben, “Warehouse in Richmond Yields 70 Kilos of High-Grade Heroin: Arrest
of Five a Major Blow toOrganized Crime, Police Say,” The Vancouver Sun,
January 20, 1999, B1. (LexisNexis Document)
50Shannon Kari, “Mother, 50, Sentenced to 17
Years for Smuggling Heroin, Amphetamines: Son, 22, Confesses toLesser
Charge,” The Ottawa Citizen, June 1, 2002. (LexisNexis Document)51Andy
Ivens, “14 Years for Trafficker Nabbed in Heroin Bust, “ The Vancouver
Province, February 2, 2001.
53Fabian Dawson, “Drug Couriers Linked to Vancouver Jail,” The Vancouver
Province, November 10, 2002. 54”Asian Organized Crime,” International Crime
Threat Assessment, 2000.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270chap3.html#r14
55Susan McClelland,
“Inside the Sex Trade: Trafficking in Foreign Prostitutes Is One of the
Fastest-Growing Illicit Activities in the World. Welcome to a Hidden
Canada-and Lives of Quiet Desperation,” Maclean’s [Toronto],December 3,
2001. (Library of Congress InfoTrac OneFile)
57Lynn McDonald, Migrant Sex Workers from Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union: The Canadian Case(Toronto: Center for
Applied Social Research, University of Toronto), November 2000.
http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/0662653351/index_e.html
and United States
Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2001
(Washington: 2001).
http://www.state.gov
58”Asian Organized Crime,”
International Crime Threat Assessment, 2000.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270chap2.html#r14
59Susan Martin,
“Dreams Ending in Nightmares,” Newsday, March 11, 2001. 60Amy O’Neill
Richard, International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A
Contemporary Manifestation ofSlavery and Organized Crime (Center for the
Study of Intelligence), November 1999: 13. 61Ibid.
http://www.fordfound.org/publications/recent_articles/asian_american_...
65Congressional
Research Service, CRS Report for Congress. Trafficking in Women and
Children: The U.S. andInternational Response, March 18, 2002.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf
66Richard, 7.
67Richard, 8. 68Richard, 7.
Library of Congress - Federal Research Division Asian Criminal and Terrorist
Activity in Canada20Canada. Asian organized crime groups have worked with
East European, East Indian, and Nigerian-based organized crime groups in
this counterfeit card industry.75Although South America and Mexico are
emerging as centers for producing counterfeit credit cards in the Western
Hemisphere, ethnic Chinese crime groups with operations in major commercial
centers in East Asia, particularly Hong Kong and North America, are most
often identified with fraudulent credit card activity. In 1999, police
raided a counterfeit credit card manufacturing syndicate in southern China;
the raid resulted in the seizure of thousands of fraudulent cards, uncut
blank credit cards, magnetic strips, issuer holograms, encoders, laptop
computers, and extensive manufacturing equipment. Investigations revealed
that the schemestretched to Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Bangkok, Canada,
Honolulu, and Buffalo, N.Y.76On January 12, 2001, Canadian authorities
uncovered one of the largest counterfeit credit card operations in Canadian
history. Police located an “entire operational credit card factory,” which
had been in operation in Vancouver residences since 1994, and had the
potential for fraud estimated at over CDN$200 million dollars.77Surplus
counterfeiting equipment located at the “factory” would have potentially
produced over CDN$1 billion worth of counterfeit credit cards.Authorities
determined that equipment for the factory had been brought in from
California, and that information “skimmed” from legitimate credit cards was
being transferred to Vancouver by fax and subsequently sold to the
counterfeit credit card factory. Twelve people with connections to the Big
Circle Boys subsequently were charged with multiple offenses. The technique
ofskimming has become widespread in recent years.78 Asian organized crime
groups in Calgary and elsewhere in Alberta also are involved in the
production and distribution of counterfeit credit cards via networks
throughout North America. In early 2002, a 15-month operation disrupted a
huge Asian-based counterfeit credit card ring with connections in 34
countries. Eight counterfeit card factories were identified in Toronto,
Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver. Authorities determined that the Big Circle
Boys 75Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized
Crime Canada (Ottawa: 2002).
76”Asian Organized
Crime,” International Crime Threat Assessment, 2000.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270index.html
77Organized Crime Agency
of British Columbia. Press Release, 1.5 Million Dollars in Counterfeit
Credit Cards Recovered, January 25, 2001. http://www.ocabc.org/
78”Twelve
People Charged in Major Fake Credit Card, Drug Smuggling Ring,” Canadian
Press Newswire, July 3, 2002. (LexisNexis Document)
84”Asian
Organized Crime,” International Crime Threat Assessment, 2000.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270chap3.html#r14
85Mark Heinzl,
“Organized Crime Begins Using Canada as a Base for Operations Ranging From
Drugs to Car Theft,” Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1998, A12. 86Bill Wallace,
“Chinese Crime Ring Muscles In,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 1, 1997.
87Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, “A
Quarterly Summary, January to March2002” [Toronto]. Website:
http://www.yorku.ca/nathanson/
88Criminal Intelligence Service Canada.
Annual Report on Organized Crime Canada (Ottawa: 2002).
http://www.cics.gc.ca
91Kirsten Lindberg, “Emerging Organized Crime in
Chicago,” International Review of Law, Computers &Technology, July 1998.
92John Pomfret, “Made Man in China Has Gangland Ties, Party Pals,” Seattle
Times, January 21, 2001, A16.
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