LBJ Tapes Teach Lesson in How to Lose War

Pointing the finger of blame over the American defeat in Vietnam once was a cottage industry for politicians, the media and the military. A case can be made against the media, exhibit A being outrageous reportage of the Tet Offensive, a stunning blow to the Viet Cong and the communist forces that was reported falsely as their victory. This gave the so-called "antiwar" movement in America its biggest argument, turned up the heat among the schoolboy Lenins on the campuses and marked the turning point against the war.

Much can be ascribed to the political cowardice of President Richard Nixon, who briefly set out to fight in Southeast Asia as we later would fight in Kuwait, but bowed down to pressure from student hoodlums and left-wing storm troopers. Had he proceeded militarily as planned, carpet-bombing Haiphong and closing its harbor, he would have cut off most of the North's war supplies. Instead he continued the battle on the communists' terms, guaranteeing defeat and the bloody betrayal of South Vietnam and its people. For all his weakness, Nixon nonetheless was clobbered by the political left and set himself up for what happened after Watergate.

This may be speculation, but there is an immutable record — President Lyndon B. Johnson's White House tapes — that points to another causative factor, ironically the same deus ex machina which toppled Poor Richard. A partial transcript, Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 — the period between the Kennedy assassination and the 1964 election — was published in 1997. I do not recall any review of the book that focused on Johnson's role in Vietnam or, for that matter, on what the tapes tell about how he bribed Senate Republican leader Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois with a few favors for which the mellifluous "Duke of Pekin" undercut Barry Goldwater's enthusiastic but unlikely presidential campaign. The commentary by the editor of the tapes for March 2, 1964 sums it up:

"During this period, Johnson privately shows himself determined, if possible, to defer irrevocable decisions on war in Southeast Asia until the 1964 election is over. Eager to win the presidency in a landslide, he wishes to appear neither soft on communism nor frighteningly ready to take the nation into a war of unimaginable cost — even if this means leaving the American people confused. … Certainly Johnson was reluctant to make that crucial decision amid the heat and pressures of a campaign, if he could help it. But his approach kept Americans from fully knowing whom and what they were voting for."

Talking to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, LBJ said: "I want you to dictate to me a memorandum — a couple of pages … so I can study it and commit it to memory … on the situation in Vietnam. … Or we could pull out and say 'To hell with you, we're going to have Fortress America. We're going home.' And here's what would happen in Thailand, and … the Philippines. …

"Or we can say this is the Vietnamese's war and they've got 200,000 men, they're untrained, and we've got to bring their morale up, and they have nothing really to fight for because of the type of government they've had. We can put in socially conscious people and try to get them to improve their own government. … I would like to have for this period, when everybody is asking me, something in my own words. I can say, 'Why here are the alternatives and here's our theory.' … How we don't say that we'll win. We don't know. We're doing the best we can. … Do you think it's a mistake to explain what I'm saying now about Vietnam and what we're faced with?"

McNamara's answer: "I do think, Mr. President, it would be wise for you to say as little as possible. The frank answer is we don't know what's going on out there."

On a later occasion, Johnson again requested that "piece of paper" so that he could answer "in his own words" the questions about Vietnam being thrown at him by the press — the halt leading the blind. To everyone with whom he discussed Vietnam, he asked for guidance and for answers. He even sought help from Robert F. Kennedy. The tapes show that his relations with Bobby, touted as a feud by the media and by his supporters, were friendly on both sides.

This indecision, this lack of understanding and LBJ's reliance on others to tell him what to do — vacillating between military action and social consciousness — is evident throughout the tapes. As the war progressed, however, the president, who diplomatically and militarily didn't know which way was up, exercised his role as commander in chief by dictating strategy and tactics almost down to the platoon level.

Is it any wonder that, in GI terms, the war in Vietnam was snafu, tarfu and eventually fubar?

To Secretary of State Colin Powell's credit, he realized in his military days that there is only one way to win a war, and that is to throw in everything you've got to ensure victory. The policy of incremental escalation, such as Johnson and McNamara followed in Vietnam, guarantees defeat.

But Vietnam now is ancient history, and there may be as little point debating the causes of our defeat as there is in reinvestigating Pearl Harbor. Still, the old men debate the lesson, with some such as Henry Kissinger and company sounding as if they remain in denial even now. As we approach a decision on Iraq, can we be sure that the lesson has been learned? Has anyone ever put it better than Gen. Douglas MacArthur when he said: "There is no substitute for victory"?

Good post. In my opinion, the Vietnam situation was as follows: In war, you either go all out to win as fast as possible, or you stand down. It is reasonable to ask people in the military to risk their lives in the former case. In the usual democrat fashion, LBJ tried to play all sides of the issue. Welfare and pork at home, a partial effort in Vietnam, and an ongoing quagmire (which we nearly won anyway). This policy allowed the "anti-war" (actually anti-American) left to gain traction, and to plant a host of false "lessons" in the minds of the young. It was also deeply and profoundly immoral.

My understanding is that McNamara devised the "hold until November" strategy, which was to give aid to the South Viets but not to commit combat troops, hoping they could stave off a commie victory until after the election, when McNamara would ask for and get authorization to send troops. That way Johnson could run in effect as a peace candidate and tar Goldwater as a warmonger.

The Joint Chiefs original estimates, before massaging by McNamara and Taylor, were pretty accurate, that 600,000 plus would be needed to win a ground victory, but the American people weren't told and it appears McNamara never even forwarded them to Johnson.

The 1964 campaign was a lie based on "hold until November" which meant Johnson was elected without any mandate to send combat troops. Johnson probably could have won anyway had he leveled with the American people about Vietnam, but his not doing so was a recipe for trouble, which he got.

When I asked many years ago why our forces did not close Haiphong Harbor, I was told that British ships used that port on a regular basis. Does any freeper know more about this? If it is true, then we have a perfect example of the hazards of deferring to 'allies.'

Could our 'allies' have been providing war materiel to the VC?

Pointing the finger of blame over the American defeat in Vietnam once was a cottage industry for politicians, the media and the military.

Actually, no. After Vietnam there was, for the most part, a Great Silence. To this day, Congress has never held hearings to determine what happened there, which might be a useful thing to know considering that a keystone of our foreign policy is "No more Vietnams."

I'm sure those who worked to get the defence contracts in the Kennedy period and worked to get the next admin to continue them must have forseen and end to the ride.
With Johson cracking under the weight of Vietnam..they knew they could only manipulate the ride a little while longer thru the Nixon admin.
Strange...we lament the politician for the historical outcome..
Meanwhile...people walk along corridors with blueprints and briefcases with contracts..whistling or humming a tune.

Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, MacNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Viet Nam.

By H.R. McMasters, a West Point graduate. I believe this is based on his Phd thesis at North Carolina, where he was doing graduate work while a major on detached duty.

An altogether invaluable account, as outlined by this review:

For years the popular myth surrounding the Vietnam War was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew what it would take to win but were consistently thwarted or ignored by the politicians in power. Now H. R. McMaster shatters this and other misconceptions about the military and Vietnam in Dereliction of Duty. Himself a West Point graduate, McMaster painstakingly waded through every memo and report concerning Vietnam from every meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to build a comprehensive picture of a house divided against itself: a president and his coterie of advisors obsessed with keeping Vietnam from becoming a political issue versus the Joint Chiefs themselves, mired in interservice rivalries and unable to reach any unified goals or conclusions about the country's conduct in the war.
McMaster stresses two elements in his discussion of America's failure in Vietnam: the hubris of Johnson and his advisors and the weakness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dereliction of Duty provides both a thorough exploration of the military's role in determining Vietnam policy and a telling portrait of the men most responsible.

I couldn't read it for more than an hour at a time...before throwing the book up against the wall and walking around the block to cool off.

There is a good argument that Clinton was our worst president ever. There might be a better one for Johnson...

To judge from the excerpt quoted, the author may be a little harder on the military that they deserve. With an impossible situation at the commander in chief level, with Johnson just trying to muddle through in typical liberal fashion, juggling various constituencies with no greater object in mind than the next election, what could military officers do? Johnson wouldn't say we're not in this to win so we're getting out before anybody else gets killed, and he wouldn't commit to what it took to win. To some extent Nixon continued with this. In fairness to Nixon, he inherited the situation and tried to get out while minizing the damage, but it took him too long. In some ways Johnson is worse than Clinton, but in the same circumstances, be assured that Clinton would likely have followed the same immoral policy of trying to please everybody while letting soldiers die.

"To judge from the excerpt quoted, the author may be a little harder on the military that they deserve."

McMaster carved up the JCS for playing games of their own with LBJ, trying to use his indecision to feather their own nests. I've often wondered what this did to McMasters' career...

The JCS was never, it appears, completely honest with LBJ -- shaving their projections and expanding their goals to fit his political exigencies and confident that, if they went along, they'd eventually get what they wanted -- a real commitment and bigger budgets.

Of course, as with Clinton, Johnson encouraged the promotion of sycophants. He wanted generals who agreed with him. He didn't want generals who were honest...

That Johnson and MacNamara earned a full measure of blame was no shock -- though, their exercise of power was far more craven and self-serving than I'd imagined. That the JCS did its share of damage was surprising to me. By McMaster's standards, the JCS failed not only the country, but the military services for whom they bore responsibility. More than anything, the book really serves as a critique of the JCS during this period. A major, you might say, was advising the brass: Never again!

An outstanding account that clarifies so many things...

Very interesting comments. Ultimately though I think responsibility falls on the CinC. The chicaneries of the generals and admirals would naturally take place in an environment where the president wanted to be told what he wanted to hear, and would promote officers who did it. If there was no leadership at the top, naturally the service chiefs would continue the normal practice of jockeying for budget relative to the other services, etc. The author is obviously disappointed that none of the officers had risen above these things, but what could they have done with such a president, other than simply resign?

"Ultimately though I think responsibility falls on the CinC....The author is obviously disappointed that none of the officers had risen above these things, but what could they have done with such a president, other than simply resign?"

You are, of course, correct. Proving once again that, when it comes to electing a President (and CinC), character and leadership are critical qualities.

I believe one of members of the JCS did, in fact, resign. But, of course, to no avail. Obviously, a president like LBJ forces otherwise outstanding men into a Hobson's choice: resign (and have no further effect on events) or play along (and hope to minimize the damage).

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