Replies

Don't rule anything out.

I don't think terrorists caused the blackout; however, a blackout would be an ideal time for a terrorist to attack other targets.

I would like to know why administration figures and authorities come rushing out with denials when you know it is really too early to speak competently about causes. It is a barbrastreisand move that builds distrust. Just say that there is no reason to think it was terrorism but that investigation is still ongoing. Claims about lightning bolts or swap gas are just insulting.

IMHO, If this was a terrorist act... the power outage would have been used as a diversion for a more sophisticated attack against us, instead of just a simple 24 to 36 hour inconvienence.

My personal opinion is that this whole power failure story has been way over blown by the 24 hour Cable NEWS outlets.

Bump! I sure don't rule anything but natural cause out ;)

So called "authorities" were on the radio, and TV as well I'm sure, denying the possibility of terrorism almost instantly. Meanwhile, hours later and into the next day there's finger pointing between Michigan and Ohio, between U.S. and Canada, theories about lightning or a fire at a power plant. If they can't figure out what happened or even where it happened how can they be so sure what didn't happen? Rushing to squash the terrorism possibility before they could really have known for sure insults the public's intelligence and damages the official's credibility.

Al Kaida are living in the stone ages. They can steal and smash things but something like this is beyond their stunted capability. Anyway, they are into mass death and destruction. They are not into "inconvenience."

Well there's this.

This is a test. This is only a test, in the event of a real emergency...

Maybe it got away from them.

Perhaps this was another Red Team attack gone amuck (as in the 1996 outage on the west coast, when "a bird hit a power line" and took out the entire northwest). That one occurred 6 months after the founding of the National Infrastructure Protection Commission, which publicly stated it would be testing national infrastructure systems.

Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared
Terrorists at Threshold of Using Internet as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say

By Barton Gellman
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, June 27, 2002; Page A01

[snip]

... Working with experts at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the FBI traced trails of a broader reconnaissance. A forensic summary of the investigation, prepared in the Defense Department, said the bureau found "multiple casings of sites" nationwide. Routed through telecommunications switches in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Pakistan, the visitors studied emergency telephone systems, electrical generation and transmission, water storage and distribution, nuclear power plants and gas facilities.

[snip]

Specialized digital devices are used by the millions as the brains of American "critical infrastructure" -- a term defined by federal directive to mean industrial sectors that are "essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government."

The devices are called distributed control systems, or DCS, and supervisory control and data acquisition, or SCADA, systems. The simplest ones collect measurements, throw railway switches, close circuit-breakers or adjust valves in the pipes that carry water, oil and gas. More complicated versions sift incoming data, govern multiple devices and cover a broader area.

[snip]

Massoud Amin, a mathematician directing new security efforts in the industry, described the North American power grid as "the most complex machine ever built." At an April 2 conference hosted by the Commerce Department, participants said, government and industry scientists agreed that they have no idea how the grid would respond to a cyber-attack.

What they do know is that "Red Teams" of mock intruders from the Energy Department's four national laboratories have devised what one government document listed as "eight scenarios for SCADA attack on an electrical power grid" -- and all of them work. Eighteen such exercises have been conducted to date against large regional utilities, and Richard A. Clarke, Bush's cyber- security adviser, said the intruders "have always, always succeeded."

Joseph M. Weiss of KEMA Consulting, a leading expert in control system security, reported at two recent industry conferences that intruders were "able to assemble a detailed map" of each system and "intercepted and changed" SCADA commands without detection.

[end of excerpt, see link above for remainder]

"We don't have any indication of blown-up equipment," Gent told Good Morning America today. "So we're almost certain that it is not terrorism of any kind."

You don't have to "blow up" computers to cause damage and outages. Gent's comment is misguided and misleading.

I am surprised that jihadis did not take advantage of the situation in NYC.

Kudos to the Bush team for breaking the back of jihadis in the US. Otherwise, how could they have passed up an opportunity like this to sow chaos. The possibilities are endless, a small bomb, multiple fires, random shootings, etc. but nothing happened.

No Signs of Deliberate Attack in Blackout, But Possibility Not Ruled Out

Latest from those who had a front-row seat and are in a better position to know than anybody EXCEPT FirstEnergy:

From: www.aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/default.asp?dbcommand=DisplayRelease&ID=1054
AEP releases Aug. 14 transmission events timeline; automated controls prevent spread of blackouts
COLUMBUS, Ohio, Aug. 22, 2003 - American Electric Power (NYSE: AEP) today released a timeline of events and conditions detected by automated controls on its transmission grid Aug. 14 when massive amounts of power were drawn north from AEP´s grid to loads in the vicinity of Lake Erie immediately prior to the blackout that affected all or parts of eight states and eastern Canada.
"This timeline provides details of the rapid escalation of events that impacted our transmission grid, but we will not get involved in the speculation as to the cause of the abnormal power flow swings across the grid or theorize about events occurring outside our system," said Tom Shockley, AEP´s chief operating officer. "We have provided our data to the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to be included in its analysis of the blackout. Today we are discussing the data at a Department of Energy technical hearing and in a conference call with our state regulators. We also are assisting the investigators as they determine the cause of the outage.
"It´s important to note that the load and generation on AEP´s grid were in balance both before and after the beginning of the blackout. This explains how we were able to maintain grid stability after our automated controls correctly reacted to prevent the blackout conditions from cascading through our seven-state eastern grid and to protect lines and equipment from potentially extensive damage," Shockley said. "Our transmission system is a $3 billion asset that includes the world´s largest network of high-capacity 765-kilovolt (kV) lines that serve as the backbone of the East Coast´s grid. It´s a robust, well-designed system that proved its worth last week."
AEP avoided potential widespread outages when automated control systems on its transmission equipment detected abnormal operating conditions and "tripped" - or opened - lines that interconnect with FirstEnergy´s transmission grid to the north. Lines that tripped are near Canton in northeastern Ohio and Findlay in northwestern Ohio.
After a line opens or trips, it will either close again and allow power to flow. Or, if the breaker operates (opens and closes) several times and the abnormal condition is still sensed by the protection devices, the breaker will lockout, preventing power flow on the line until it is reset by an operator.
"The data indicates that our automated systems performed as designed," said Henry Fayne, AEP´s executive vice president - energy delivery. "By quickly detecting abnormal conditions on the lines and attempting to correct the conditions, the automated relay protection systems prevented the blackout from spreading onto AEP´s extensive transmission network and shielded our equipment from possible substantial damage."
When tripped by the automated control systems, a number of the lines were carrying power flows well above the summer emergency rating for the lines because of the massive amounts of power being drawn north from AEP´s system. For instance, the Canton Central - Cloverdale 138 kV line, with a summer emergency rating of 197 megavolt-amperes (MVA), was carrying 332 MVA when it tripped. The East Lima-Fostoria 345 kV line, with a summer emergency rating of 1,383 MVA, was carrying 2,000 MVA when the automated controls tripped the breaker. If a facility operates at or above the summer emergency rating the equipment can suffer thermal damage.
"It is likely that the automated controls tripped some transmission lines moments before they would have burned down because of extremely high power flows out of our system," Fayne said. "However, the load and generation on AEP´s grid were in balance at this time, which helped prevent widespread blackouts in AEP´s service territories. The size and robust capacity of our grid can handle large swings and remain stable. During this time, our transmission operators were in contact with FirstEnergy and PJM, our reliability coordinator, analyzing the situation as events developed."
AEP had approximately 14,000 of its 5 million customers without power for several hours on Aug. 14. This localized outage, in an area near Mt. Vernon in east-central Ohio, occurred at 4:38 p.m. EDT, approximately 27 minutes after the large blackout began. Indications are that the localized outage is related to other transmission outages in Northern Ohio. Power to the customers was restored by 9:15 p.m.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS Summary of Major AEP Transmission Events 8/14/2003 Blackout - All Times EDT
3:41:33 p.m. South Canton - Star, 345kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (1,272 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 1,383 MVA) and phase to ground trip. AEP owns 0.69 miles; FirstEnergy owns 33.42 miles. Star is a FirstEnergy substation.
3:42:53 p.m. Cloverdale - Torrey 138kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (354 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 245 MVA). AEP owns 0.28 miles; FirstEnergy owns 6.86 miles. Cloverdale is a FirstEnergy substation.
3:44:12 p.m. East Lima - New Liberty 138kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (152 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 188 MVA) and phase to ground trip. AEP owns the entire line.
3:45:33 p.m. Canton Central - Cloverdale 138 kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (332 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 197 MVA). Breaker failure operation due to multiple operations of 138kV breaker "A1". (Breaker had six trip-and-close operations in less than three minutes). This forces the Canton Central - Tidd 345kV line to temporarily operate to isolate the faulted 138 kV Breaker "A1". The Canton Central -Tidd 345kV line was abnormal for 58 seconds before resuming normal operation. AEP owns 0.38 miles of Canton Central - Cloverdale; FirstEnergy owns 12.20 miles. Cloverdale is a FirstEnergy substation.
3:51:41 p.m. East Lima - North Findlay 138kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (200 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 247 MVA) and phase to ground trip. AEP owns the entire line.
4:05:55 p.m. Dale - West Canton 138kV Circuit, Line Operation - high loading (estimated load - 329 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 245 MVA). Line remains open at Dale end. AEP owns 3.57 miles; FirstEnergy owns 12.35 miles. Dale is a FirstEnergy substation.
4:08:58 p.m. Galion - Muskingum River - Ohio Central 345 kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (1,320 MVA with a summer emergency rating of 1,281 MVA). AEP owns the entire line. Galion is a FirstEnergy substation.
4:09:06 p.m. East Lima - Fostoria Central 345kV Circuit, Line trip at 2,000 MVA (summer emergency rating of 1,383 MVA) - high loading. Auto reclose is delayed by the Synchronizing Check Relay (a snapshot of data at 4:09:22 p.m. from East Lima?s protective relay showed FirstEnergy and AEP to be 104 degrees out of synchronization). Line closed successfully in 1 minute and 44 seconds. AEP owns the entire line.
4:09:22 p.m. Cloverdale - East Wooster 138kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (data not available). AEP owns 0.61 miles; FirstEnergy owns 20.39 miles. Cloverdale is a FirstEnergy substation.
4:10:41 p.m. Fostoria Central - Galion 345kV Circuit, Line Lockout - high loading (data not available). AEP owns the entire line. Galion is a FirstEnergy substation.
4:38:02 p.m. Academia - Howard 138kV Circuit - Breaker failure operation due to multiple operations of 138 kV Breaker "S" (breaker had six trip and close operations in a short time period - high loading and phase to ground trip). This caused a total outage to Academia Station interrupting approximately 14,000 AEP customers. AEP owns the entire line.
MEDIA CONFERENCE CALL American Electric Power has scheduled a media conference to discuss events related to last week?s blackout. The conference call will begin at 3:30 p.m. EDT today. The call will be broadcast live over the Internet, with audio available at http://www.aep.com/investors/webcasts/.
The call will be archived on http://www.aep.com for use by those unable to listen during the live webcast.
Minimum requirements to listen to broadcast: The Windows Media Player software, free from http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/EN/default.asp, and at least a 28.8Kbps connection to the Internet.
American Electric Power owns and operates more than 42,000 megawatts of generating capacity in the United States and select international markets and is the largest electricity generator in the U.S. AEP is also one of the largest electric utilities in the United States, with almost 5 million customers linked to AEP´s 11-state electricity transmission and distribution grid. The company is based in Columbus, Ohio.