Free Republic

Your "correction" is noted ... nothing sinister in your errata is there? Was that also an apology to Stinnett?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope, and take it as what you will(Thumbs up!)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
And, of course, the fact still remains - those source materials to develop the AKAGI summary are beyond public inspection.

Sixty-plus years after the Pearl Harbor attack and that summary and other materials ... remain closed.

Simple fact - much is still classified relating Pearl Harbor - and any option taken to remark on that fact - does not change that simple fact.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I guess I can end this by saying, keep those requests coming Joe!!!!

I would like to say there are SOME Inconsistencies as with any case of this size. Why wouldn't there be??

Joe: Was the question of source materials bounded by Station H or NSA or ...? Other sources ... e.g., US Navy files, ... etc., - all germane source materials.

That level of Station H ... specificity was not in my postings; but nonetheless, the question remains:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Let’s sum up Joe’s logic here. So what you seem to be saying is “I think these files exist somewhere, I think they prove something. I can’t prove it, but I think they exist, and I think they are being withheld. I can’t prove they are being withheld, nor do I understand the current source material that has been given. But I feel this is somehow the key. I clearly don’t understand the current source information and don’t want to acknowledge current articles. But that doesn’t stop me from proclaiming that this is the “blue dress!” I can’t even write a theory as to why this would even help my case because I don’t want to read or bother trying to counter the current theorys. I don’t want to listen to statements that state that the information I request does not exist."

Please read this thread to see more problems with Joe’s tortured logic.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
Why, now after sixty-plus years ... the source materials (all of the source materials) used to develop that AKAGI summary ... beyond public inspection?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Once again this question has been answered, yet you simply do not wish to hear the response.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:The question has not changed an iota. The responses have varied, however.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Why should it when you don’t want the answer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:Now it seems that documents are culled, ... , etc.

The SS LUSITANIA example is useful here. Within months of those photographs being released ... what pops out of the US government files ... her original (not a copy) cargo manifest ... clearly showing that she was carrying tons of munitions ... Had these photographs not been revealed to the public ... the US government’s stance today very likely would be ... what?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Do you dodge questions and responses with your SS LUSITANIA theories like Pearl Harbor? Do you use the same logic?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe: But thank you, especially regarding JN25 variants and “five numeral” and alike ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No prob.
>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:Has anyone told Zimmerman? Perhaps not, but if yes, page 136 (citation given) might be of interest to everyone. There is to be found, the paragraph beginning as:

“ ... One of Stinnett’s more controversial claims is that US intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code. Stinnett refers to this as the 5-Num code. However, all [my emphasis] of the other Pearl Harbor literature calls it JN 25. The ability ...”

[John C. Zimmerman, Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett’s Day of Deceit, appearing in “Intelligence and National Security,” Volume 17, Number 2, Summer 2002, pages 127-146 [A Review Essay].

Has an errata to Zimmerman's essay been published? Is not a public apology due Stinnett? What would a "historian" do here?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Let me try a correction. Over the history of ALL of the Pearl Harbor works very few authors in other Pearl Harbor literature solely refer to the code as a 5-Num” system or “Code Book D,”. The 5-Num” system or “Code Book D is a designation that later changed to JN-25. But no authors have had some sort of ridiculous tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation of “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.”
Now then has an errata to all of Stinnett's works been published? I’m guessing it would be far to large of a task for him. Is not a public apology due to us?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
Simply too many inconsistencies persist; the “little blue dress” of that AKAGI summary is but one.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yet Joe can't show any.............

For those who may have missed it.......proving that he doesn't read my posts.
Joe wrote:The question remains, and has not changed:
Why does public inspection of the source materials used to develop the AKAGI summary from 60-plus years ago, even after a myriad of FOIA requests asking for them, continued to be denied?

The post right before his :
There are NO RAW intercepts from Station H for the month of November 1941 and earlier in NSA files. All such material had routinely been destroyed in accordance with standard destruction regulations. Every piece of paper is not retained by the U.S. Navy or any government agency. Nothing is being “withheld.” This includes the basis for the Akagi and Marus reference in CPMSUM14 for 30 November 1941. Furthermore, there were no “messages” and the Akagi calling Marus.

END............
Your doing a wonderful job of destroying Stinnett's credibility and your own. Please keep up the good work!!;)

And the question has been answered. Its just the answer you don't want.
But, if that's the "little blue dress" I think you had better check your closet first.
As to Kahn so what is your point! We all know it wasn't called JN-25 at that time. It was LATER changed to JN25. Japanese papers even show this change.
But personally I like Budiansky commnets on this:

Start:
I should also mention here that Mr. Stinnett has some tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.” In fact the documentary record is absolutely clear that the main Japanese Navy operational code, which Mr. Stinnett refers to as the “5-Num” system or “Code Book D,” is exactly the same code system that from 1942 on was usually designated by the U.S. as JN-25. Everyone in the U.S. Navy who worked on it subsequently referred to it as JN-25, regardless of the several different earlier designations that were used.)

end................

Joe, I have some new relevent information from veteran US Navy cryptologist, Phil Jacobsen regarding much of your questions. I think we should all thank Phil for taking the time to address some of these questions.
Its best I just cut and paste here....

Start:

Re: Wilford’s erroneous reference to Station H and Radio Fingerprinting (RFP), Station H was not using RFP before Pearl Harbor. The equipment was gathering dust in the material (repair) shop after some initial brief experimentation that showed it was not an efficient means of identifying radio signals. Such information was more readily and easily obtained through normal radio operator identifications. The shortage of operators was so great that none could be spared for such an inefficient program.


There are no raw intercepts from Station H for the month of November 1941 and earlier in NSA files. All such material had routinely been destroyed in accordance with standard destruction regulations. Every piece of paper is not retained by the U.S. Navy or any government agency. Nothing is being “withheld.” This includes the basis for the Akagi and Marus reference in CPMSUM14 for 30 November 1941. Furthermore, there were no “messages” and the Akagi calling Marus.


Station King: Radio high speed “allotment” was for receiving high speed morse not RFP or anything else. Actually, it was not used there operationally. There is still one operator from that period that is alive to counter such allegations.


As to Sitka’s discovery of Kasumigara’s radio deception, this did not apply to the radio deception activities of the Sasebo and Kure naval bases where direction finder bearings on these signals by Station C caused Hypo and Cast to report carriers were still in home waters when actually they were in the North Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, Cast reported the Akagi off Okinawa on 8 December 1941 when it was some 250 miles north of Oahu, Hawaii. Absolute confirmation of radio deception activity and the fact that Cast had no idea of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor.


Sorry, but Rochefort was wrong. He, Station’s H and C were fooled by the Sasebo and Kure radio deception transmissions which provided bearings showing they were in “home waters.” Other attempts at radio deception may have been recognized but not the Sasebo and Kure transmissions on the old 1st Air Fleet’s tactical frequency of 4963 kHz. These included the “carriers” heard on 26 November 1941 and the Akagi calling Marus on 30 November 1941 (tactical frequency) heard by Station H (with Station C obtaining a bearing of 027 degrees (Sasebo) proving that it was a radio deception transmission.


As to the blacked out portions of the 1945-47 decrypts in SRH-406, thanks to Stinnett we known they primarily referred to JN-25B as the code used for such messages. Stinnett has nothing to complain about, he was given the clear version of the blacked out portions of those messages.


Why is there a presumption of what might be still in British files. Most of the information has already been opened up. Furthermore, testimony of those in charge at Singapore and Bletchley at the time say that the British were completely surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The presumption should be there is nothing in such files until they are opened.


I don’t see anything in Lietwiler’s message of 4 December 1941 except that he reported the change of the overlying cipher book from Cipher 7 to Cipher 8 as applied to JN-25B. So, they all had to start over again and it wasn’t until January 1942 that the first recorded decrypt of JN-25B was ever recorded.
End quote............

I hope this information helps.

Second printing? Do you mean when Stinnett's book went from hardcover to paperback? The paperback edition includes an Afterword which refers to new documents, but, as Stinnett presents them, they seem to furnish strong support to his case. That was a couple of years ago that he added that Afterword.
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To bad he "forgot" to put in Budianksys documents.
But of cource Stinnett's "new documents" helped futher ruin his reputation.

Joe:
Was it denied that several authors, recent and past, e.g., Stinnett,
Wilford, Willey, Costello, ... , Kimmel, Greaves, ..., etc., have also noted
the obvious?
I would also point out that for many Prange, et. al., is the absolute last
word ... their error maybe.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Which is........???
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
Does my pridian highlighting the continual denial of public access to a
myriad of Pearl Harbor related documents prejudice that fact – especially
after now over sixty-plus years? In just what universe might that occur?

And where, in that factual notice of these still to be publicly inspected
materials, is there ascribed a “sinister” salient? [Admittedly, for example,
as Costello’s plead of “after 40 years,” those then becoming “after 50-odd
years,” having been made, follows perhaps some speculation. And this is
based on what, exactly? Unfortunately, as you know, Costello, as well as
Layton and Pineau have passed – so any clarification Costello cannot provide
directly via an asked question.]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Considering the line of speculation and questioning in your course, I'd say its
certain YOU suspect a "sinister" salient. No need to beat around the bush
here Joe. Just come out and say it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe
The question nonetheless remains:
Why do the raw materials used to develop the AKAGI summary ... even after
numerous and very specific FOIA requests, remain beyond public inspection?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'd say first read the article if you look closely. I'm sure there is some
good information. Second why do you consider this Akagi summary your
area of focus. Did you read the article? This pertains directly to your
requestioned information Joe, so your going to have to deal with the article
whether you like it or not. Third, I hear they is some more relevent information pending publication.
Fourth you have yet to prove this
and lastly you could of asked the same question about Budiansky’s crane file documents 5 years ago.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe
Why that specific question?

Why not, for example: (1) have none of the raw intercepts used to develop
those in SRH-406 as “Pre-Pearl Harbor Despatches ...,” been released (as
compared to the tomes of German ENIGMA/ULTRA raw materials), or (2) those
two paragraphs from the PURPLE message noted as missing Clausen’s text, and
this itself begs the question – as these two paragraphs are missing, (3) how
can it be said that say Pearl Harbor, ..., etc. was never mentioned in any
PURPLE traffic – as not all of the PURPLE traffic is within the public
domain), or (4) ... or (5) ....?
So why the AKAGI materials? Because that summary, viz., the raw materials
used in its development can help converge upon or end many extant
controversies/inconsistencies; that the summary had consequential
intelligence is beyond question.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So tell me what could possibly come out of those that would make reverse the current information. Your ONLY recource is to prove an incredibly massive forging of documents. Both you and I know that those douments arn’t going to do that for you.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

I agree that document releases have occurred since Stinnett’s text, and they
will continue to into the future. And that means ... that at some point in
time ... out will pop ... what?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
According to former NARA officals nothing that will really change anything.
But keep those requests coming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
However, it would be a mistake not to note the obvious. Within those
releases of materials is nothing specifically germane to the AKAGI question
above - the "little blue dress" metaphor.

The “ ... as to why that ...” remains an open question; and in fact, which
was the basis of this thread’s shift.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Of cource, and once you have that answered to your satifaction (you’ll move on to your next so caled blue dress)
(But its quite amusing that you still want this info., speaks volumes on your lack of understanding)

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now, if pointing to the declassification is your succor ... just say so.
[Just curious, if, for example, the photographs of the SS LUSITANIA’s cargo
(contraband - munitions making her a legitimate target in a war zone) had
not been released in the mid-1970’s, would the US government still be
denying her true cargo?]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So do you avoid information on LUSITANIA as you do PH?
But do thank you, as always.

So did you read Kahn’s review of Stinnetts book?LOL!!
It was a VERY strong attack on Stinnett's poor code research.

Sorry but my point is your same arguements were made by many authors before you. Then please look at the more recent documents that have come out of declassification process in recent years and tell me how sinister they are.

What documents does this currently consist of. As you known many documents since even Stinnetts book are NOW currently open to the public. I believe Stinnett even made changes to the second printing of his book to address some of these new documents.

Joe:
Also see Wilford's footnote number 74 of the same page.

Please, see also, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor the paperback edition, by Stinnett, page 202, paragraph beginning: "American intercept operators were not duped. The ruse (if it occurred) was recognized instantly. ... Radioman First Class Fred R. Thomson, the Navy's Stika (sic: Station AE) traffic chief ... Thomson detected the sham when Kasumigaura used the same transmitter for the response. ... In his oral history interview, Joseph Rochefort said that none of his officers or operators were fooled by Japanese radio deception: 'It is awfully difficult to deceive a trained counter-communications intelligence organization, awfully difficult.' ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You REALLY might want to talk to Wilford.
Wilford recognizes that certain alleged transmissions by Kido Butai units apparently were radio deception, but he surmises that "these USN intercepts could not all have represented Japanese radio deception.
Wilford, Pearl Harbor Redefined, pp. 69, 72-73

Also see article.............................
Combined, Stinnett's and Wilford's tabulations cite only four cases where U.S. Navy direction finder stations reported HFDF bearings on transmissions using old call signs of Kido Butai units after their departure from Hitokappu Bay on 26 November. Tokyo times were used and all bearings were from Station C on Corregidor, probably on 4963 kHz.19 Transmissions listed on the old "tactical frequency" (4963 kHz.) with no bearings were from Station H, Heeia, Oahu. By analyzing all the claimed transmissions by Kido Butai units from 13 November through 4 December 1941, however, it is clear that the bearings remained essentially the same, even though the Pearl Harbor attack force first transited from Saeki Bay, Kyushu, to Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles and then across the North Pacific Ocean to Hawaii.


13 November, call sign 8YUNA CV Akagi bearing 026°
22 November, call sign 8YUNA Akagi bearing 028°*
22 November, call sign SASO2 CinC 1st Air Fleet bearing 040°*
23 November, call sign 1KIRA CV Zuikaku bearing 030°
24 November, call sign 8YUNA Akagi bearing 028°
26 November tactical frequency 4963 kHz., "carriers" no bearing obtained
27 November, call signs 8YUNA Akagi and 9RUSI CV Hiryu both bearing 030°
30 November "tactical frequency" 4963 kHz., Akagi [8YUNA] no bearing obtained**
30 November, call sign 8YUNA Akagi bearing 027°**
4 December, call sign 8YUNA Akagi bearing 030°***


When the above bearings are plotted (corrected by the standard mean error [SE] from Station H records), it is clear they were radio deception transmissions from the main Japanese naval bases at Sasebo (027°), Kure (030°), and Yokosuka (039°). They were not bona fide signals from Kido Butai units or commands. (See the DF Tracking Chart.) For example, even Stinnett recognized that the 22 November transmissions (marked by single asterisks) from the Akagi and the commander-in-chief of the 1st Air Fleet should have had the same bearing instead of the 12° discrepancy noted if Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo as Commander-in-Chief 1st Fleet had been in the Akagi. In trying to overcome this obstacle to his theory, Stinnett surmised that Nagumo transited to Hitokappu Bay in the Kaga, and that it was passing Cape Inumbo at that time.20 The Kaga, however, was at Hitokappu Bay on 22 November, far westward from where the 040° bearing would indicate if it had been a valid transmission from that carrier.


Furthermore, some basic research would have revealed that Nagumo was in the Akagi—not the Kaga—during that transit, further confirming that the subject transmissions were actually radio deception signals emanating from the Sasebo and Yokosuka naval bases.21 The 27 and 30 November and the 4 December transmissions would have resulted in bearings of about 041°, 046°, and 054°, respectively, instead of 027° or 030° if they were actually from the Akagi or the Hiryu. Both Corregidor's bearing of 027° on 8YUNA (Akagi) and the Station H, Heeia, intercept of the Akagi on 30 November (double asterisks) ties Corregidor's radio deception bearing pointing to Sasebo to the "tactical frequency" 4963 kHz. observed by Station H and confirms the transmissions on this frequency also were radio deception activity.22


More confirmation of radio deception is noted (triple asterisks) with the continued use of the old call 8YUNA for the Akagi on 4 December after the 1 December complete call sign change. In fact, Station Cast's report that the Akagi was located off Okinawa on 8 December after the Pearl Harbor attack was surely owing to more radio deception, this time emanating from Kure.23


Radio deception had convinced U.S. naval intelligence officials to report the Japanese carriers in "home waters," Kure, or exercising off Kyushu.24 It also tended to keep such officials from seriously considering the possibility of such a spectacular action eastward in addition to the obvious and very large southern force moving toward Southeast Asia. The latter had been determined readily from sightings and communication patterns. The relatively small U.S. naval intelligence organizations at that time were cleverly misled and were not able to predict the almost unbelievable attack, in spite of their best efforts. The revelations advanced here put to rest revisionist charges that U.S. cryptologists tracked the Kido Butai by way of radar direction finder bearings, and they confirm there never was any advance knowledge of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor.

Joe:
“The US National Security Agency (NSA) defended its failure to release information involving American cryptographic success with Japan’s naval systems.

‘It’s in the public interest,’ according to David W. Gaddy, chief historian of NSA. He explained the censorship: ‘The subject cannot be debated publicly; the government cannot disclose the basis for its position if the basis is itself part of the secret it must protect as part of it obligation to secure the public interest.’

A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the author asked the National Archives to restore the blacked-out information on the Japanese intercepts for publication in this book. The request was granted in 1987 for the author’s copies but not for the public viewing copies on exhibit at Archive II. Today, most blackouts on the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts still conceal the 5-Num code designator used by the Japanese navy. These seemingly innocuous five-number sequences continue to hold the secret to understanding Japanese communications during World War II and – far more revealingly – the secrets to American officials’ moves to obscure them.”
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So tell me about Budiansky then and what he found after 1987?? Are those sinister documents?

Did you even read post 93? Funny yet Costello doesn't believe in your conspiracy!
See his comments here...............
The final point on this is the reference to a conspiracy. The impression given that anyone who wants to revise the history of Pearl Harbor in someway believes that Franklin Roosevelt had a conspiracy going to have
Pearl Harbor attacked, that even Eleanor Roosevelt in flying goggles was piloting the lead Japanese plane into the attack. I hear from thecounsel to the Navy department the idea that there is a conspiracy.
That it was -- this was part of a conspiracy that has to be proved. That is not the conspiracy, I submit, and I submit it in the book that was produced
just before Christmas, Days of Infamy.

Joe:
One gap ... the continued denial, even after numerous FOIA requests, of public access to the source materials used to development the AKAGI summary - the raw intercepts, ..., etc. [If, my your lights, ... all in time ... everyone reading this thread will understand ...]

That is just one of the "open" gaps. Will that do?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Well no that won't do. You have been unable even BEGIN to prove this point. Or that these source materials still exist. Please read my other responces to you regarding this. However I do love your logic? A unicorn exists, I can’t prove it but the fact that I can’t find it probably proves it!! Did you read the article yet by the way? There might be some information there that could help.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe: Thank you very much for the citations ... as you offer these as the "true copy" of the orders to supercede those given in the Top Secret Operational Order No. 1, revision of November 17, 1941 (400 copies made) as found in the CA NACHI Papers, the MacArthur Archive, Norfolk, Virginia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Your “welcome”. But you can thank Stinnett for that also. He agrees SRN 116866 is indeed radio silence orders.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
Your comments, please on, from:

“A Cryptologic Veteran’s Analysis of “Day of Deceit” – a Book Review [Philip H. Jacobsen, appearing in Cryptologia, Volume 24, Issue 2, April 2002.]

“ ... when, in fact, the radio silence imposed then only meant that ships (or aircraft) are not permitted to transmit by high frequency radio, not that messages to these units cannot be sent by fleet broadcasts or that fleet units or commands that have land-line, cable, or other approved facilities available to them cannot us them. ...”

[Within your "time span" ...?] And this says what exactly about those “superceded” orders?

For example, what is the meaning of ‘ ... or other approved facilities available to them cannot us them. ...”

Recall the earlier citation from Jacobsen “ ... almost complete radio silence ... “ and from Langendoefer “ ... amply documented ...”

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Boy Joe talk about assumptions? Why don’t you tell me what you think it means rather than hint at it. Because that way you won’t be able to back out of it.
But here’s the whole line. I thought it reads much better that way.

Stinnett often claims carriers or fleet units must have transmitted on high frequencies when they are only seen in the headings of messages on fleet broadcasts. He does not tell his readers that many ships are tied up at docks and have landline or cable communications available to them so they do not have to use radio and the original transmissions of such messages will never be heard by foreign intercept operators. In this regard, he maintains that Admiral Yamamoto’s messages sent (while tied up at a Kure dock) to the Pearl Harbor attack force and other ships on the Tokyo broadcast violated radio silence when, in fact, the radio silence imposed then only meant that ships (or aircraft) are not permitted to transmit by high frequency radio, not that messages to these units cannot be sent by fleet broadcasts or that fleet units or commands that have land-line, cable or other approved facilities available to them cannot use them.


Does anyone else see Joe’s fractured logic. Joe deperatly tries to read what he wants into other peoples text.
If it isn’t explained to Joe then it must leave the door open to his conspiracy! Of course Joe doesn’t bother to read what else they have to say that may clear it up. Gannon, Costello anyone? LOL!!! Funny!! Reading the article would also help. http://www.usni.org/NavalHistory/Articles03/NHjacobsen12.htm

A few pages from "The Pearl Harbor Papers" are also listed

P. 186. "It has been one week under continuously security every day, earnestly observing silence without wireless since leaving Hitokappu Bay.

P. 207. "Of course, [we remained undected] naturally, we did not dispatch any wireless indications, remaining under radio silence."

P. 296. Lessons, Communications. In this operation, the strictest radio activities control had been maintained in the Task Force. ... The Task Force
used radio instruments for the first time on the day of the attack."
(These also come from other writings of Jacobsen)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
Very odd – AKAGI heard on tactical circuits ... Now, is that a "gap" or not?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
ATTENTION FOLKS HERE PROOF THAT JOE DOES NOT READ MY COMMENTS
It EVEN says from your own post (90): “The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs”
AND
See post 144 I wrote
Once again repeating Phils statements:
Commander Rochefort’s COMSUM14 of 30 November did not say that the Akagi sent any messages. In fact, the opposite is indicated. The correct quote is “The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs.” I can tell you for sure that from my experience in Comint reporting this represented the Akagi calling Marus and not sending any messages. As you will recall, some 25,000 messages from September to December 1941 were partially decrypted in 1945-47 to see if there was anything that was worth full decryption. Of that batch some 2,514 messages were fully decrypted and translated and only 188 of those pertained to Pearl Harbor in any way. Since no message from the Akagi was decrypted in this 1945-47 batch, my evaluation that the radio deception transmissions of 30 November 1941 was only the Akagi calling Maru’s makes complete sense. You might ask Jamaskin how he knows the Akagi sent an actual message on 30 November 1941.
Yea, Joe you never did answer that. How about it Joe??
Or post 107
I thought I made it clear that the Strike Force was assigned new frequencies and new call signs prior to the transit to Hitokappu Bay. The old “tactical frequency” of 4963 kHz that was mentioned being used by “carriers” on 26 November and the Akagi on 30 November had been reassigned to the radio deception program from the Sasebo, Kure (and one case the Yokosuka) naval bases. There was the dual interception on 30 November by both Station’s C and H whereby the bearing of 027 degrees (Sasebo) also equated to the Akagi’s transmission noted by Station H. Therefore, Jamaskin’s loud and repeated references to the Akagi in the COMSUM14 for 30 November is actually a radio deception transmission and did not come from the Akagi itself.

Also see my post 104, 105 which is part of link http://www.usni.org/NavalHistory/Articles03/NHjacobsen12.htm
By the way for those who read this far......this is all information that Joe refuses to acknowledge. (Sigh.......it’s like beating my head against a brick wall)

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
Do the readers of this thread consider that a "gap"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I would say the readers should find the above (AKAGI heard on tactical circuits) a HUGE “gap” in your debating skills.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe:
... 60-plus years on? What would a "historian" say ... and your definition of a "historian" is ... what?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Is 60-plus years THAT MUCH harder to believe than 55-plus years? Just wondering? At what year Joe did they become sinister documents? Was it at 58 years or 59 years?

Historian, well I guess I could look it up for you.
But again what gaps? Thank you again, as always.

No problem Joe, if you ask nicely and articulate your responces you get a lot farther. Heck, I've even shared info with Villa, via e-mail. Tim however seems closed to any dialog.

Joe one last thing for the day. Why don't you bring Stinnett to the party here. More than likely it won't happen. Remember last time we spoke (Stinnett, You Me, Others) he had to shut down his website to get rid of my (and others) posts. Seems he thought the door was shut enough to end the "ask the author" section of his website.

Joe:
Well, in that realm of “conspiracies” – your intent, not mine – as to the “door being closed” consider:

SS LUSITANIA ... Closed ... US government, starting with the Wilson Administration lied for over half-century; the "truth" eventually did came out.

USS INDIANPOLIS ... Closed ... via the efforts of an interested high school student and many of her survivors (See “In Harm’s Way” for the story), the US Navy was shown to be far from open, honest, honorable ...

USS IOWA ... Closed ... US Navy shown in very negative light

Tailhook ... Closed ... US Navy ... well is there a pattern here ...?


Hindenburg ... Closed ... Do not mix powdered aluminum in the paint to be applied to the fabric skin of a dirigible


USS LIBERTY ... Open ... so very Open

Kennedy Assassination ... Open ... interesting paths on-going
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So are you as vague on those as with Pearl Harbor. Do you duck questions and avoid answers on those topics as well?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Joe: Pearl Harbor ... Open ... as this thread has shown in so many ways ... just far too many gaps.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Really so show me. What's open??
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Realize that from those missing 25 pages from the Roberts Commission ... a pattern of missing, partial, mulitated, and ... yes, still classified materials ... surround Pearl Harbor ... this is not a coincidence ... the pattern to just too clear. [My special thanks here to LS, Tracy White, Scotts, ... for helping highlight these gaps - and in keeping the "door" to Pearl Harbor so Open. Your dialogue, especially vis-a-vis the "little blue dress" of AKAGI materials is appreciated.]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
How is the door open, please explain? What door? If you are unable to address my posts then how can you imply something is still open? Highlighting what gaps? So far you have not be able to prove anything? Your far to vague. "Missing documents" still "classified materials" hardly mean a case is still open.

Im sorry but Phils commnets got tangled with Joes so I am editing this from post 144


On July 31, 1944, Captain Goggins forwarded the COMSUM14’s for November and December 1 through 5, 1941. Station H’s Operator logs for December  logs were also forwarded to OP-20-G on that date. This was in response to Vice CNO’s message of 300843Z of July 1944. All other intercept logs and messages were routinely destroyed in accordance with standing instructions when they were no longer needed locally. There are no “missing” messages. The 2,514 fully decrypted and translated messages that were performed in 1945-47 are in the National Archives files under RG457. The 188 messages that were fully decrypted and translated in 1945-47 that pertained in any way to Pearl Harbor are included in RG457 SRH-406 and are available for all to inspect.
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Joe:
[Oh, lest I am remiss, I do assume that you do know the Prange books. Does the tenor of this message thread remove from all future dialogues on this AKAGI topic those pesky flags and lights? After all, how do you "heard" those on a tactical {radio} circuit? But, please, if for the sake of Prange's scholarship, that myth needs to be perserved ... please do.]
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Again I would like you to better explain.

Joe I stand by my statement:
"The door is never closed for a consipiracy theorist."