Regarding a hypothetical designer, would it be all right with you if we confine ourselves to biological evolution here — since the title of this thread is "Darwin's Doubt?" I'd just like to take a look at this hypothesis, which Thomas Nagel explores so well in his book. For Nagel, an atheist, the "designer" cannot be an intelligent agent. He prefers to acknowledge that there is "bias" in nature — for the world we see all around us, especially including biological organisms, is extremely unlikely to be the outcome of pure chance — which may be of two kinds: intentional bias (theism) or non-intentional bias (the "biasing" introduced into nature by the sheer existence of physical laws).
Given the extraordinary "fine tuning" of the universe which makes biological life possible, or extremely likely to occur, the idea of "bias" becomes useful, especially in light of the fact that there is no principle in pure chance that could lead to the fine tuning.
This is the main hypothesis seemingly endorsed by a majority of evolutionary biologists today, though a minority still cling to the "pure chance" argument. Iris Fry calls the latter the “Almost a Miracle Camp,” which includes such distinguished scientists as Francis Crick, Ernst Mayr, and Jaques Monod (Crick and Monod are both Nobel Laureates). These men appear to be content with the idea that life arose by pure chance even if the probability of this having happened is extremely remote. (So I prefer to call them "The Bitter Enders.")
Leaving those folks aside, in Mind and Cosmos, Nagel writes:
The evolution of mind is part of a single long process of evolutionary descent. It is the latest stage in the evolution of physical organisms, some of whom are now governed largely by thought. If we are skeptical about an intentional (theistic) explanation of the existence of reason, and can't make sense of a causal reductionist one, it is natural to speculate that some tendencies in this direction have been at work all along. If physics alone or even a non-materialist monism can't account for the later stages of our evolutional history, we shouldn't assume it can account for the earlier stages. Indeed, when we go back far enough, to the origin of life — of self-replicating systems capable of supporting evolution by natural selection — those actually engaged in research in the subject recognize that they are very far from even formulating a viable explanatory hypothesis of the traditional materialist kind. Yet they assume there must be such an explanation, since life cannot have arisen purely by chance....At this point in the book, Nagel cites Roger White, a colleague and professor of philosophy at M.I.T. I found the quotes of White so interesting, I went looking for the relevant paper — and found it: Does Origins of Life Research Rest on a Mistake?
...But the hypothesis of intentional design [SI — see below] is ruled out as unscientific. So it seems natural to conclude that the only way left for life not to be a matter of chance is for it somehow to be made likely by physical law.
Some useful notation at this point:
C = pure chanceHere's White:
S = physical outcome as the effect of bias
BI = intentional bias (i.e., intelligent designer, i.e., God)
BN = nonpurposive bias introduced by the principles of physics and chemistry.
[T]he line of reasoning ... is something like the following. That molecular replicating systems appear to be designed by an agent is sufficient to convince us that they didn’t arise by chance. But in scientific reasoning, non-intentional explanations are to be preferred, if possible (some would say at all costs), to intentional ones — hence the motivation to find a non-intentional explanation of life.Thus we have three possibilities: chance, creationism, and directionless physical law. Earlier in the paper, White had observed:
It should be clear however, that even granting the appropriateness of a preference for non-intentional explanations, this line of reasoning is confused. In general, if BI raises the likelihood of S, then S confirms BI to at least some degree, and may thereby disconfirm C. But it does not follow that S confirms BN one iota. S confirms BN only if BN raises the likelihood of S. If the reason we doubt the Chance Hypothesis is that we suspect that life is due in part to intelligent agency, this by itself gives us no reason to expect there to be a non-intentional explanation for life. If on reflection we do not find the hypothesis of intentional biasing acceptable, then we are left with no reason at all to doubt that life arose by chance.
What makes certain molecular configurations stand out from the multitude of possibilities seems to be that they are capable of developing into something which strikes us as rather marvelous, namely a world of living creatures. But there is no conceivable reason that blind forces of nature or physical attributes should be biased toward the marvelous.It appears that White is not averse to the BI (intelligent design) hypothesis. But Nagel has reservations, which basically boil down to: Intent implies purpose. Whose purpose? is his question.
Nagel is aware that of the three hypotheses, only one — BI — is teleological in character. That is, it implies goal direction.
Now teleology has been banished from science since the 17th century. Nagel wants to restore it — but as a naturalistic teleology in which teleological laws would assign higher probability to steps on paths in state space that have a higher "velocity" toward certain outcomes. "They would be the laws of self-organization of matter, essentially — or of whatever is more basic than matter....some laws of nature [yet to be discovered] would apply directly to the relation between the present and the future, rather than specifying instantaneous functions that hold at all time [Newton's laws]. A naturalistic teleology would mean that organizational and developmental principles of this kind are an irreducible part of the natural order, and not the result of intentional or purposive influence by anyone. I am not confident that this Aristotelian idea of teleology without intention makes sense, but I do not at the moment see why it doesn't."
Well, I find this all tremendously interesting, even though I believe Aristotle may be rolling in his grave right now....
You'll recall Aristotle's four causes: Formal, material, efficient, and final. Final is the teleological one, in that it fulfills whatever is intended by the formal, by means of the material and efficient causes. The final cause expresses the purpose or goal of an intelligent agent. Nagel wants to dispense with the agent.
Why? I'll let Nagel explain himself:
A creationist explanation of the existence of life is the biological analogue of dualism in the philosophy of mind. It pushes teleology outside the natural order, into the intentions of the creator — working with completely directionless materials whose properties nevertheless underlie both the mental and the physical....I find Nagel's hypothesis fascinating; but I do not agree with it, because (of course) I am a "theist," a fan of both dualism in the philosophy of mind and the classical Aristotelian causal categories. But other than that, I think Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos is ingenious and valuable.
My preference for an immanent, natural explanation is congruent with my atheism. But even a theist who believes God is ultimately responsible for the appearance of conscious life could maintain that this happens as part of the natural order that is created by God, but that it doesn't require further divine intervention. A theist not committed to dualism in the philosophy of mind could suppose that the natural possibility of conscious organisms resides already in the character of the elements out of which those organisms are composed, perhaps supplemented by laws of psychophysical emergence. To make the possibility of conscious life a consequence of the natural order created by God while ascribing its actuality to subsequent divine intervention would then seem an arbitrary complication. Some form of teleological naturalism should for these reasons seem no less credible than an interventionist explanation, even to those who believe that God is ultimately responsible for everything.
The only questions that he seems not to want to answer are: (1) Where do the laws of nature, of physics, of chemistry come from? (2) Why is there anything at all, why not nothing?
In closing, just let me mention that the great Sir Isaac Newton believed that, not only did God create the universe, but that God "intervened" in it from time to time. While he evidently rejected what we call "special creation" (as do I), he believed that, as a mechanical system, the universe would be subject to an accumulation of distorting "errors," and that God would have to step in from time to time to set things aright again.
Newton called God "the Lord of Life with His creatures."
That's how I think about Him, too.
God's Name is I AM.
* * * * * * *
Thank you so much for writing, HHTVL! Sorry to run on so long.... I refer you to the sources presented here, thinking you might find them enjoyable and useful.
Nagel: (1) A creationist explanation of the existence of life is the biological analogue of dualism in the philosophy of mind. It pushes teleology outside the natural order, into the intentions of the creator — working with completely directionless materials whose properties nevertheless underlie both the mental and the physical.... (2) My preference for an immanent, natural explanation is congruent with my atheism. (3)But even a theist who believes God is ultimately responsible for the appearance of conscious life could maintain that this happens as part of the natural order that is created by God, but that it doesn’t require further divine intervention.
Spirited: The meaning of the three positions briefly outlined by Nagel:
1. Jesus Christ, the “angel” who spoke with Moses at Sinai, is the Creator. Foremost of His miracles is creation out of nothing – six acts or days of creation rather than the billions of years of evolutionary alchemical process out of matter:
“The first moment of time is the moment of God’s creative act and of creation’s simultaneous coming to be.” (Philosopher and New Testament scholar William Lane Craig quoted in “If God created the universe, then who created God?’ by Jonathan Sarfati, Creation Ministries International)
With Irenaeus, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was well established. He also argued that the world (matter) was not coeternal with God:
“But the things established are distinct from Him who has established them, and what [things] have been made from Him who has made them. For He is Himself uncreated, both without beginning and end, and lacking nothing. He is Himself sufficient for this very thing, existence; but the things which have been made by Him have received a beginning... He indeed who made all things can alone, together with His Word, properly be termed God and Lord; but the things which have been made cannot have this term applied to them, neither should they justly assume that appellation which belongs to the Creator.” (”Is Creatio Ex Nihilo A Post-Biblical Invention? An Examination Of Gerhard May’s Proposal,” Paul Copan, Trinity Journal 17.1; Spring 1996)
The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 affirms creation ex nihilo:
“We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God ... the Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who from the very beginning of time by His omnipotent power created out of nothing [de nihilo condidit] both the spiritual beings and the corporeal.” (ibid, Copan)
On creation ex nihilo, the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646) asserts:
“It pleased God ... in the beginning, to create or make of nothing the world, and all things therein” (IV.I; ibid)
2. Nagel’s preference: immanent, natural explanation
Underlying Nagel’s immanent naturalistic stance is metaphysical nihilism-— not ancient Greek atomism but rather the quasi-Buddhist stance, the ‘everything and nothingness’ position adopted by Teilhard.
In its contemporary forms metaphysical nihilism is called evolutionary materialism by physicalist Darwinists and spiritual science by Theosophists, occult New Agers, and other forms of Eastern mysticism. While the former embraces a variation of Darwinism the latter prefers immanent spiritual conceptions such as Teilhard’s idea which leapfrogs off of Darwin’s theory.
The apostate French Jesuit priest Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) taught that an impersonal God-force emerges from spontaneously generated matter. According to him, this evolution of God from the world or universe results in evolution becoming “conscious of itself” and ultimately, in the transformation of all matter into “Christ consciousness” or “pure spirit.” This is the meaning of immanent. Teilhard called this final stage the “Omega Point” or “the cosmic Christ.”
3. Nagel’s third position is evolutionary theism. Here matter is co-eternal with a God who is not only limited but responsible for death, since life had to incarnate and die within millions of different life forms over vast periods of time. This God is not a God of salvation but a Gnostic deity of death, suffering, and unspeakable cruelty.
Provisionally, yes. The only reason I say "provisionally" is that I often find myself analogizing to some other natural phenomenon when speaking with critics of the ToE. Some critic will bring up the improbability of some aspect of the evolutionary theory and claim that it means there must have been some direct intervention, and I'll point to the equal improbability of some other phenomenon that no one claims requires particular intervention. But I'll try to stick to the subject.
Given the extraordinary "fine tuning" of the universe which makes biological life possible, or extremely likely to occur, the idea of "bias" becomes useful, especially in light of the fact that there is no principle in pure chance that could lead to the fine tuning.
This is the main hypothesis seemingly endorsed by a majority of evolutionary biologists today, though a minority still cling to the "pure chance" argument.
I'm going to try to pick my way very carefully through your next paragraphs. (Don't worry, I'm not going to discuss every step.) I worry a bit about your choice of words. Having chosen the word "bias," you've introduced a sense of purpose, even though you refer to "non-intentional bias." I don't completely understand your statement that "there is no principle in pure chance that could lead to the fine tuning." Isn't there no principle in pure chance period, sort of by definition? It seems to me that if pure chance can lead to a particular outcome, it's not in itself evidence of bias if it does lead to that outcome, no matter how unlikely the outcome is.
And what hypothesis is it that you see the majority of evolutionary biologists endorsing? That the universe is biased towards producing the particular set of organisms we see? Towards producing life?
At this point in the book, Nagel cites Roger White, a colleague and professor of philosophy at M.I.T...
If I'm understanding White's argument, then I think I disagree with it. He's claiming that outcome S can confirm intentional bias but can't confirm non-intentional bias. It seems to me that all it can do is confirm bias--whether the bias is intentional or non-intentional is a separate question.
There's another problem I have with his argument, well illustrated by the sentence in your next quote,
But there is no conceivable reason that blind forces of nature or physical attributes should be biased toward the marvelous.The world of living creatures is not necessarily marvelous in itself. It's marvelous to us because we're in it and of it. It's like saying "why should the sky be such a beautiful blue color if there's no bias towards beauty?" But is life or a blue sky, inherently and indisputably, more marvelous by some extrinsic standard than the lifeless hunk of rock we call Pluto? I think he'd have a really hard time making that case.
And I think my last two points illustrate a fundamental issue with these lines of thought. Note I didn't say "problem:" speculating about these questions is a fine use of our God-given brains, and that's what philosophers are for. But I'm not sure science can find an answer, because science is operating from within the effect of chance/intentional bias/non-intentional bias/whatever. It's like (analogy alert!) one fish arguing that the fishbowl is so well suited to living that an external agency must have designed it that way, and another fish saying no, that's just the way goldfish bowls are. From outside the bowl, of course, we know which is true; but I don't think there's anything the fish could do from inside the bowl to determine it one way or the other. (Which won't stop them from arguing about it forever, of course.)