Posted on 11/05/2003 6:21:32 PM PST by Brian S
By JAMES RISEN
WASHINGTON, Nov. 5 — As American soldiers massed on the Iraqi border in March and diplomats argued about war, an influential adviser to the Pentagon received a secret message from a Lebanese-American businessman: Saddam Hussein wanted to make a deal.
Iraqi officials, including the chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, had told the businessman that they wanted Washington to know that Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction, and they offered to allow American troops and experts to conduct an independent search. They also offered to hand over a man accused of being involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing who was being held in Baghdad. At one point, the intermediary said in an interview, the Iraqis pledged to hold elections.
The messages from Baghdad, first relayed by the intermediary in February to an analyst in the office of Douglas J. Feith, the under secretary of defense for policy and planning, were part of an attempt by Iraqi intelligence officers to open last-ditch negotiations with the Bush administration through a clandestine communications channel, according to people involved in the discussion.
The efforts were portrayed by Iraqi officials as having the approval of Saddam Hussein, according to interviews and documents.
The overtures, following a decade of evasions and deceptions and a number of other attempts to broker last-minute meetings with American officials, were ultimately rebuffed. But the messages from Baghdad raised enough interest that in early March, Richard N. Perle, an influential adviser to top Pentagon officials, met in London with the Lebanese-American businessman, Imad Hage. According to both men, Mr. Hage laid out the Iraqis' position to Mr. Perle, and he pressed the Iraqi request for a direct meeting with Mr. Perle or another representative of the United States.
"I was dubious that this would work," Mr. Perle said, "but I agreed to talk to people in Washington."
Mr. Perle said he sought authorization from officials of the Central Intelligence Agency to meet with the Iraqis.
Mr. Perle said the C.I.A. officials said they did not want to pursue this channel and indicated they had already engaged in separate contacts with Baghdad. Mr. Perle said the response was simple: "The message was, `Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad.' "
A senior United States intelligence official said this was one of several contacts with the Iraqis or with people who said they were trying to broker meetings on their behalf before the war. "These signals came via a broad range of foreign intelligence services, other governments, third parties, charlatans, and independent actors," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "Every lead that was at all plausible and some that weren't were followed up."
There were a variety of efforts, both public and discreet, to avert a war in Iraq, but this clandestine channel appears to have been a final attempt by the Iraqis to communicate directly with United States officials.
In interviews in Beirut, Mr. Hage said he believed that the Iraqis appeared intimidated by the American military threat. "The Iraqis were finally taking it seriously," he said, "and they wanted to talk, and they offered things they never would have offered if the build-up hadn't occurred."
Mr. Perle said he found it "puzzling" that the Iraqis would use such a complicated series of contacts to communicate "a quite astonishing proposal" to the Bush administration. But former American intelligence officials with extensive experience in the Middle East say that many Arab leaders like Mr. Hussein have traditionally placed a high value on back channels communications, failing to understand that such informal arrangements are considered suspect in Washington.
The activity in this back channel, which was detailed in interviews and in documents obtained by The New York Times, appears to show an increasingly frantic Iraqi regime trying to find room to maneuver as the enemy closes in. And it also provides a rare glimpse into a subterranean world of international networking.
The key link in this particular network was Imad Hage, who has spent much of his life straddling two worlds. Mr. Hage, a Maronite Christian who was born in Beirut in 1956, fled Lebanon in 1976 after the civil war began there. He ended up in the United States, where he went to college and became a citizen.
Living in suburban Washington, Mr. Hage started an insurance firm, American Underwriters Group, and became involved in Lebanese-American political circles. In the late 1990's, Mr. Hage moved his family and his company to Lebanon.
Serendipity brought him influential contacts in the Arab world and in America. An influential Lebanese Muslim he met while handling an insurance claim introduced him to Mohammed Nassif, a senior Syrian intelligence official and a close aide to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
On trips back to Washington last year, he befriended a fellow Lebanese-American, Michael Maloof, who at the time was working in the Pentagon as an analyst in an intelligence unit created by Mr. Feith, the defense under secretary, to look for ties between terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and countries like Iraq. Mr. Maloof had ties to many leading conservatives in Washington, having worked for Mr. Perle at the Pentagon during the Reagan administration.
In January 2003, Mr. Hage's two worlds intersected. On a trip to Damascus, he said, Mr. Nassif told him about Syria's frustrations in communicating with American officials. On a trip to the United States later that month, Mr. Hage said, Mr. Maloof arranged for him to deliver that message personally to Mr. Perle and to Jaymie Durnan, then a top aide to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Pentagon officials confirmed that the meetings occurred.
Mr. Perle, a member of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, is known in foreign capitals as an influential adviser to top administration officials. After Mr. Hage told his contacts in Beirut and Damascus about meeting Mr. Perle, Mr. Hage's influential Lebanese Muslim friend asked Mr. Hage to meet a senior Iraqi official eager to talk to the Americans. Mr. Hage cautiously agreed, and in early February Hassan al-Obeidi, chief of foreign operations of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, arrived in Mr. Hage's Beirut office, Mr. Hage said.
But within minutes, Mr. Obeidi collapsed, and a doctor was called to treat him, Mr. Hage said. "He came to my office, sat down, and in five minutes fell ill," recalled Mr. Hage. "He looked like a man under enormous stress."
After being treated, Mr. Obeidi explained that the Iraqis wanted to cooperate with the Americans and could not understand why the Americans were focused on Iraq, rather than countries, like Iran, that have long supported terrorists, Mr. Hage said. He seemed desperate, Mr. Hage recalled in an interview in Beirut.
"He seemed like someone who feared for his own safety, although he tried to hide it," Mr. Hage said.
Mr. Obeidi told Mr. Hage that Iraq would make deals to avoid war, including helping in the Mideast peace efforts. "He said if this is about oil, we will talk about U.S. oil concessions," Mr. Hage recalled. "If it is about the peace process, then we can talk. If this is about weapons of mass destruction, let the Americans send over their people. There are no weapons of mass destruction."
Mr. Obeidi said that the "Americans could send 2,000 F.B.I. agents to look wherever they wanted," Mr. Hage said.
Mr. Hage said that when he told Mr. Obeidi that the United States seemed adamant about forcing Saddam Hussein to give up power, Mr. Obeidi bristled, saying that would be capitulation. But later, Mr. Hage recounted, Mr. Obeidi said that Iraq could agree to hold elections within the next two years.
Mr. Hage said Mr. Obeidi made clear that he wanted to get his message to the Bush administration, so Mr. Hage contacted Mike Maloof in Washington. "Everything I was hearing I was telling Mike," Mr. Hage said. And Mr. Maloof was passing it on.
A few days later, Mr. Hage said, he met Mr. Obeidi at a hotel in downtown Beirut, and Mr. Obeidi repeated the concessions, which he said came from the highest levels of the Iraqi government. Mr. Obeidi seemed even more depressed. "The U.S. buildup was clearly getting to them," Mr. Hage said.
A week later, Mr. Hage said he agreed to hold further meetings in Baghdad. When he arrived, he was driven to a large, well-guarded compound, where he was met by a gray-haired man in an Iraqi military uniform. It was Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, who is now No. 16 on the United States list of most wanted Iraqi leaders. Mr. Hage said Mr. Habbush asked him if it was true that he knew Richard Perle. "Have you met him?"
Mr. Hage said Mr. Habbush began to vent his frustration over what the Americans really wanted. He said that to demonstrate the Iraqis' willingness to cooperate in America's effort against terrorism, Mr. Habbush offered to hand over Yasser Abdul Yassin, who has been indicted in United States in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Mr. Yassin fled to Iraq after the bombing, and the United States has put up a $25 million reward for his capture.
Mr. Hage said Mr. Habbush told him, "I will turn him over to you." Mr. Hage said he was not interested, but would pass the message that Mr. Yassin was available.
Mr. Hage said Mr. Habbush also insisted that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and told Mr. Hage, "Let your friends send in people and we will open everything to them."
Mr. Hage said he asked Mr. Habbush, "Why don't you tell this to the Bush administration?" He said Mr. Habbush replied cryptically, "We have talks with people."
Mr. Hage said he later learned that one of the contacts was a meeting in Rome between the C.I.A. and representatives of the Iraqi intelligence service. American officials confirm that the meeting took place. But they said that the Iraqi representative was not a current intelligence official and that the meeting was not productive. In addition, there was an attempt to set up a meeting in Morocco between Mr. Habbush and United States officials, but it never took place, according to American officials.
On Feb. 19, Mr. Hage faxed a three-page report on his trip to Baghdad to Mr. Maloof in Washington.
The Iraqis, Mr. Hage wrote, "understand the days of manipulating the United States are over." He said the top Iraqi officials, including Mr. Habbush and Tariq Aziz, the former deputy prime minister, wanted to meet with United States representatives.
The report also listed five areas of concessions the Iraqis said they would make to avoid a war, including cooperation in fighting terrorism and "full support for any U.S. plan" in the Arab-Israeli peace efforts. In addition, Mr. Hage's report said that "the U.S. will be given first priority as it relates to Iraq oil, mining rights," and that Iraq would cooperate with United States strategic interests in the region. Finally, under the heading "DISARMAMENT," the report said "Direct U.S. involvement on the ground in disarming Iraq."
Mr. Hage's messages touched off a brief flurry of communications within the Pentagon, according to interviews and copies of e-mail messages obtained by The Times.
In a Feb. 21 e-mail to Jaymie Durnan, chief of staff to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Mr. Maloof wrote that Mr. Perle "is willing to meet with Hage and the Iraqis if it has clearance from the building," referring to the Pentagon.
In an e-mail response, Mr. Durnan said: "Mike, working this. Keep this close hold." In a separate e-mail to two Pentagon officials, Mr. Durnan asked for background information about Mr. Hage. "There is some interesting stuff happening overseas and I need to know who and what he is," he wrote in one e-mail.
Mr. Hage had impressive contacts, but there was one blemish on his record: In January he was briefly detained by the F.B.I. at Dulles International Airport in Washington when a handgun was found in his checked luggage. Mr. Hage said he did not believe it was a security violation since it was not in his carry-on luggage, and the authorities allowed him to leave after a few hours.
Senior Pentagon officials said Mr. Durnan passed on to other Pentagon officials the messages about the Iraqis. It is unclear if Mr. Durnan's boss, Mr. Wolfowitz, was informed of the messages that were being relayed by Mr. Maloof. (In May, Mr. Maloof, who has lost his security clearances, was placed on paid administrative leave by the Pentagon.)
Mr. Hage continued to hear from the Iraqis and passed on their urgency in meeting Mr. Perle or another representative of the United States. In one memo sent to other Pentagon officials in early March, Mr. Maloof wrote: "Hage quoted Dr. Obeidi as saying this is the last window or channel through which this message has gone to the United States. Hage characterized the tone of Dr. Obeidi as begging."
Working through Mr. Maloof, Mr. Hage finally arranged to meet with Mr. Perle in London in early March. The two met in an office in Knightsbridge for about two hours discussing the Iraqi proposals, the men said. Mr. Hage told Mr. Perle that the Iraqis wanted to meet with him, or someone from the Bush administration.
Mr. Perle said that he subsequently contacted a C.I.A. official to ask if he should meet with the Iraqis. "The answer came back that they weren't interested in pursuing it, Mr. Perle said in an interview, "and I was given the impression that there had already been contacts."
Mr. Perle now plays down the importance of his contact with Mr. Hage. He said he finds it difficult to believe that Saddam Hussein would make serious proposal through that kind of channel. "There were so many other ways to communicate," he said. "There were any number of governments involved in the end game, the Russians, French, Saudis."
Nonetheless, Mr. Hage continued to deliver messages from the Iraqis to Mr. Maloof.
In one message in mid-March to Mr. Perle, Mr. Maloof relayed a message from Mr. Hage that Mr. Obeidi and Mr. Habbush "were prepared to meet with you in Beirut, and as soon as possible, concerning `unconditional terms.' " The message from Mr. Hage said "such a meeting has Saddam Hussein's clearance."
No meetings took place, and the invasion began on March 20. Mr. Hage, speaking in Beirut, wonders what might have happened if the Americans had pursued the back channel to Baghdad. "At least they could have talked to them," he said.
Here we have a story about Saddam willing to allow 2000 american inspectors free reign in Iraq, A promise of free elections and Blah blah blah. Like this was a credible effort to avoid war. I really have to question the mentality of whatever fool at CBS decided this was newsworthy, not to mention a lead story.
I'm sure the leftist morons at DU have gone orgasmic over this story, but that's to be expected. If Saddam said he was running for President of the USA as a democrat, they would back him
This smells like a RAT planted story.
Ding! Ding! Ding! wE HAVE A WINNER! You have rightly recognized this as a Red Herring attempt at damage control from THE MEMO. They are following THE MEMO to obscure THE MEMO - and that is the smell of desperation.
What the media doesn't understand is we have their playbook....:-)
As long as your at it, do one on "Richard Perle" also.... ;)
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