Surrender of the Yokosuka Naval Base August 30, 1945
The reason was simple: the US Navy wanted the port facilities at Yokosuka for use after the war. Today, at Naval Activities Yokosuka (the official name of the US Navy base), there are still a number of intact buildings on the base that predate World War II.
only 3 days to go. ;(
Surrender of the Yokosuka Naval Base August 30, 1945
Marines go ashore for initial occupation of Japanese facilities, probably near Yokosuka, circa 30 August 1945. Taken by a USS Iowa (BB-61) photographer. Credit: Naval Historical Center.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army (second from right) with other senior Army officers, upon his arrival at Atsugi airdrome, near Tokyo, Japan, 30 August 1945. Among those present are: Major General Joseph M. Swing, Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division, (left); Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland (3rd from right); General Robert L. Eichelberger (right). Aircraft in the background is a Douglas C-54. Credit: Naval Historical Center.
Brigadier General William T. Clement, USMC (left), Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN (center) and Admiral William F. Halsey, USN (right) Go over plans at the Yokosuka Naval Hospital, which had been taken over for treatment of released Allied prisoners of war, 30 August 1945. Credit: Naval Historical Center.
U.S. Marines destroying rifles, light field guns and other weapons at Futtsu-misaki, on Tokyo Bay across from Yokosuka Navy Base, in a first step toward disarming Japan, 30 August 1945. Initial landings had taken place on that day. Credit: Naval Historical Center.
Hump Express - August 30, 1945
http://cbi-theater-10.home.comcast.net/~cbi-theater-10/hump_express/hump083045.html
US Army General MacArthur Arrives at Atsugi Airfield, August 30, 1945, and speaks to American and Japanese reporters. Standing behind General MacArthur, at right, is General Robert L. Eichelberger. When President Truman announced Japan's capitulation, he placed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in charge of the surrender and occupation of Japan, under the title Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). Though the first two weeks of this mission were directed from Manila, on August 30 MacArthur flew to Japan. Without escort and only armed with sidearms, his small party wondered if they would be killed or captured upon landing, but MacArthur was confident the Japanese were genuine in their surrender and the mission would be welcomed. Arriving at Atsugi airfield, he established temporary headquarters some twenty miles away, at the Tokyo Bay city of Yokohama. Arrangements for the formal surrender ceremonies were made there. SCAP headquarters moved to Tokyo on September 8, beginning six years of occupation government from the Japanese capital city.
By August 30 1945, folks were already busy drawing up plans to nuke Soviet targets.
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/04/27/friday-image-targeting-the-ussr-in-august-1945/
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12368
Harry S. Truman
119 - Letter to Byron Price Requesting Him To Study Relations Between U.S. Forces of Occupation and the German People.
August 30, 1945
Dear Mr. Price:
In accordance with our previous discussions, I am asking you to go to Germany as my personal representative to survey the general subject of relations between the American forces of occupation and the German people. You are hereby authorized to visit any place you deem necessary for this purpose.
I hope you will place yourself at the disposal of General Eisenhower and General Clay for such advice and help as they may want in this field.
At the end of your assignment, the duration of which you yourself will determine, I request you to submit to me your report and recommendations.
Very sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN
[Honorable Byron Price, Washington, D.C. ]
Note: Mr. Price’s report, dated November 9, 1945, was released on November 28. See Item 201. Citation: Harry S. Truman: “Letter to Byron Price Requesting Him To Study Relations Between U.S. Forces of Occupation and the German People.,” August 30, 1945.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12380
Harry S. Truman
117 - Letter to George E. Allen Concerning the Liquidation of War Agencies.
August 30, 1945
Dear Mr. Allen:
As the various war agencies are dissolved from time to time, it will become necessary to liquidate such of their functions as are not transferred to the permanent Departments. This will involve unexpended funds, surplus personnel, and surplus equipment.
Many suggestions have been made as to the most efficient and economical method of carrying on this liquidation.
I have designated you as my Personal Representative to study the whole problem, and to make recommendations to me as to the best means of accomplishing liquidation.
Very sincerely yours,
HARRY S TRUMAN.
[Mr. George E. Allen, 1522 K Street NW., Washington 5, D.C.]
Citation: Harry S. Truman: “Letter to George E. Allen Concerning the Liquidation of War Agencies.,” August 30, 1945.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=60670
Harry S. Truman
Executive Order 9607 - Revoking Executive Order 9301 of February 9, 1943, Establishing a Minimum Wartime Workweek of Forty-Eight Hours
August 30, 1945
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statues as President of the United States it is ordered that Executive Order 9301 of February 9, 1943, establishing a minimum wartime workweek of forty-eight hours, be, and it is hereby, revoked.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 30, 1945
Citation: Harry S. Truman: “Executive Order 9607 - Revoking Executive Order 9301 of February 9, 1943, Establishing a Minimum Wartime Workweek of Forty-Eight Hours,” August 30, 1945.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12381
Harry S. Truman
118 - The President’s News Conference
August 30, 1945
THE PRESIDENT. [1.] Byron Price has agreed to go to Germany in an advisory capacity on public relations. He is going with the approval of General Eisenhower and General Clay, and I am very happy that he is going, because I think he can be a great deal of help to that situation over there.
[2.] In yesterday’s report which I handed to you I did not know at the time, because I hadn’t had time to read it completely myself, that there had been some aspersions cast on Cordell Hull. I want to agree fully and completely with Secretary Stimson on what he said about Cordell Hull.
[3.] Ambassador Pauley this afternoon will hold a press conference at 3 p.m. on the reparations situation. I think it will be right interesting and instructive to those of you who are interested in reparations.
Now if there are any questions—
[4.] Q. Mr. President, do you plan to confer with General de Gaulle again before he returns to France?
THE PRESIDENT. I don’t know; if General de Gaulle returns to Washington I may see him.
[5.] Q. In a magazine article you wrote, or that appeared under your name, when you were a Senator—
THE PRESIDENT. Things come back to haunt you! [Laughter]
Q.—you said Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not on speaking terms. Admiral Kimmel subsequently said that was a false statement.
THE PRESIDENT. Apparently, according to this report, it was not a statement of fact. I was speaking with the best information I had at the time.
Q. Mr. President, was there any reason for putting out the report on the day that we entered Tokyo?
THE PRESIDENT. No, no reason except that there was so much conversation about it; there was no ulterior motive to it.
Q. Mr. President, despite what you said yesterday, there are some very strong reports on the Hill and elsewhere that you are going to order the Army and Navy to institute a court-martial proceeding against certain people.
THE PRESIDENT. I am not. The matter has not been brought up to me. I don’t think I have authority to order a court-martial. I think it has to go through a form of procedure set up by Congress.
Q. There is a lot of talk that indicates some of them think the gentlemen, mentioning General Short and Admiral Kimmel, should have a court-martial if for no other reason than to make their side public.
THE PRESIDENT. If they want it, I have no objection to it. I want everybody to be fairly treated.
Q. You would like to see those fellows make their statement ?
THE PRESIDENT. Perfectly satisfactory to me.
Q. Is there any reason why they can’t make it without a court-martial?
THE PRESIDENT. I will not put a muzzle on them.
Q. Representative May represented the reports as a “whitewash.” Do you agree with that?
THE PRESIDENT. I don’t. I don’t think Representative May read the report. [Laughter] If you read them very carefully, they are not a “whitewash.”
Q. In that same article you discussed your feeling for need of unity of command. In the light of these new reports is there anything more you would like to say about that?
THE PRESIDENT. I am still in favor of unity of command, and always have been.
[6.] Q. Mr. President, can you tell us about Mme. Chiang’s visit yesterday?
THE PRESIDENT. She was in to pay her respects before returning to China. We had a very pleasant visit on the situation in the Far East. She was very happy over the Russian-Chinese treaty, just as all of us are.
[7.] Q. Mr. President, did you happen to receive a petition from some people in Indiana, near Indianapolis, about a boy named Colby who has been sentenced to hang in Germany?
THE PRESIDENT. I don’t remember receiving any such petition.
[8.] Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can tell us about the general plans on what we are going to do to feed Europe this winter, now that lend-lease is—
THE PRESIDENT. I can’t give you the details on that. The plans are being studied and worked on. As soon as the British representatives come here from Great Britain I think we will work out a plan that will be satisfactory to all concerned.
Q. You mean there will be an interim period between now and the time when the Bretton Woods monetary agreement begins?
THE PRESIDENT. That’s the present plan.
Q. How much will that involve.
THE PRESIDENT. I can’t tell you, because I haven’t the figures.
[9.] Q. Will Byron Price be your representative or the representative of one of the departments?
THE PRESIDENT. He is my representative.
[10.] Q. Have you any international assignment for Senator Maybank?
THE PRESIDENT. I hope Senator Maybank will stay in the Senate. He is a very excellent Senator.
Q. We have that inference.
Q. Did you know he wanted a diplomatic post?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I didn’t. He has never discussed the matter with me.
[11.] Q. Has Justice Roberts changed his mind about that international appointment you wanted to give him?
THE PRESIDENT. He hasn’t made up his mind, and I would rather not discuss it until he does.
[12.] Q. If we may return to the Pearl Harbor report for a moment, it seems to me that anyone who tries to make that clear to himself has a very tough time clarifying such things as why, when Stimson reported that they had told Hull that the Army and Navy wanted 3 months more time, they didn’t know about it, and why, when Hull had broken with these people, that information was not relayed to Hawaii.
THE PRESIDENT. I wasn’t here then.
Q. No, but I wondered if you were clear in your own mind.
THE PRESIDENT. I have read it very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that the whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself pursued. The country was not ready for preparedness. Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through Congress, it was stifled. Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness, he was vilified for doing it. I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.
Q. May we have that in quotations, sir, exactly what you said?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
[13.] Q. Can you tell us anything more about the nature of Mr. Price’s duties?
THE PRESIDENT. Oh, they just wanted an expert’s advice, and when Price’s job ceased over here, they asked that Price give us the benefit of his experience and advice.
Q. Is that for the benefit of both radio and press?
THE PRESIDENT. Everything that has to do with public relations.
Q. Does that apply to Great Britain?
THE PRESIDENT. And to the United States also.
[14.] Q. Mr. President, there is one thing in the Army and Navy Board reports about Marshall and Stark telling President Roosevelt they were not ready for war in November, and the Army report says that was transmitted November 27.
THE PRESIDENT. I only know what I see in the report.
Q. Mr. President, that’s what made me think a court-martial would help to lay the whole thing out.
THE PRESIDENT. It might—it might. I have no objection to a courtmartial, but I don’t intend to order one.
Q. Any reason now why the whole Roberts committee report1 should not be released?
THE PRESIDENT. Only that there is still some information that should not be divulged that has nothing to do with the Pearl Harbor situation. It is the system by which we get information. We need that source of information now as we needed it then.
1The report “Attack Upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces” of the Commission appointed by President Roosevelt and headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts is printed in Senate Document 159 (77 Gong., 2d sess.).
Q. Mr. President, in all the pages of the volumes there is not a word about the two privates who gave the warning.
THE PRESIDENT. They have been promoted; one is a lieutenant and the other a sergeant, I think.
Q. The lieutenant who said “Forget it” is a lieutenant colonel.
THE PRESIDENT. Is he? I didn’t know that.
[15.] Q. Mr. President, do you plan any early recommendation on the St. Lawrence Seaway?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I do. I will let you know about it when I get it ready.
[16.] Q. Mr. President, can you tell us further about the interim plan you have in mind between lend-lease and—which departments are working on it?
THE PRESIDENT. State, FEA, and War Department.
[17.] Q. Mr. President, do you have any idea when the 52 pages deleted from the Army report will be made public?2
THE PRESIDENT. I don’t think they ever will be.
2Chapter V of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board (released by the President to the press at his news conference of August 29) was omitted in accordance with the Secretary of War’s statement of that date, which the President also released. The missing 52 pages were made public by Secretary of War Patterson on October 5, 1945.
Q. Why?
THE PRESIDENT. For the reason I just told you; there are sources of information to be protected.
[18.] Q. Did Mme. Chiang talk with you about the relations of China with America and a meeting between you and the Generalissimo?
THE PRESIDENT. The Generalissimo would like very much to see me, and I would like very much to see him, but no definite plans were made for a visit either way.
Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President.
Note: President Truman’s twenty-second news conference was held in his office at the White House at 10 a.m. on Thursday, August 30, 1945. The White House Official Reporter noted that the following special guests attended this conference: Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, and Mrs. Alfred (Frances) Burns, a reporter on the Boston Globe who was writing a special story on the President.
Citation: Harry S. Truman: “The President’s News Conference,” August 30, 1945.
USS Pavlic - APD 70
August 30, 1945
At 4:59 am we got underway for Tokyo Bay with orders to neutralize Fort #4 and Fort #2, both on islands in Tokyo Bay. As we were entering Tokyo Bay and approaching Fort #4, close to Yokosuka Naval Base, all hands were at general quarters because no one knew how the Japanese were going to react. At 9:34 am two boatloads of British marines were under way for Fort #4. At 9:55 am we proceeded to Fort #2 on an island near the center of the bay. By 10:00 am we had word that Fort #4 was secured. By 10:16 am the other two boats were away with British marines to neutralize Fort #2, and we then anchored off Fort #2. The ship’s camera went in the boats to Fort #2. Hence we have no pictures of Fort #4.
As the boats approached the island fort you could see the white surrender flag flying over it. There is also a small group of soldiers standing near the landing ramp with a surrender flag.
On landing at the boat ramp they found the four-man surrender committee waiting.
The British marines...were apparently a seasoned group of guys who’d been at war for a good six years. In spite of their WW I steel helmets, you had to take them seriously. They really seemed to love the food we had on our ship—which we were not inclined to rate too highly. Actually, I thought it was ok except for the powdered milk and the coffee. They came ashore ready for trouble, but fortunately, there wasn’t any.
In addition to the boat crews, Pavlic’s part of the landing party (right) was a group of volunteers, a mix of various ratings from gunner’s mate to signalman to mailman. When they had asked for volunteers, they got lots of responses, but not from me. With the war over, I thought it would be silly to risk a sniper’s bullet from some dedicated die-hard, unless there was a real need for me to get involved. Not pictured are our fellows in the boat crews, which also went ashore.
Pictured...is the formal surrender ceremony in which the big surrender flag is being lowered. This was supposed to be a surrender to the British landing party. However, the Japanese were willing to surrender to the Americans, not to the British. Consequently there was a hurried boat trip back to the ship to get an American flag. Everything then went smoothly and US colors were raised over Fort #2 shortly thereafter.
It wasn’t as dramatic as the raising of the flag over Iwo Jima, but it was probably one of the first formal surrender ceremonies in the Tokyo area. ...
Some interesting background on the contacts that led to cooperation between MacArthur and Hirohito.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/133011?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
http://www.mansell.com/pow_resources/camplists/sendai/hanawa/murph_5.html
KILL THE PRISONERS. Page 5
The Japanese government policy was to not allow the escape of a single POW and to eliminate them without a lingering trace.
At Hanawa, the final disposition of the POWs was clear. The Japanese, second-in-command, Sergeant Hoichi Takahashi who worked directly under the Japanese camp commander, Toshinori Asaka, was mean and cruel and often times dealt brutal treatment to the POWs. At other times, he attempted to be somewhat friendly. During several of his friendly moments he told me and many others that official Japanese Army orders directed that all POWs be summarily massacred at the moment that Allied Forces landed on the Japanese homeland. He said that all Japanese men, women, and children were armed and ready to defend and die for their homeland. He told us that they would be through with the POWs at that time and that we would just be in their way. He did not tell us the means in which they would massacre us but it was our belief that we would all be forced into the deepest lateral of the copper mine, the entrance sealed and that we would be buried alive there with no trace left for eternity. Sgt. Takahachi showed us, at one time, copies of the Japanese orders (in Japanese of course) that ordered our death when the Americans invade the homeland...
Read the whole account here:
http://www.mansell.com/pow_resources/camplists/sendai/hanawa/murph_5.html
HMS Prince Robert arriving at Kowloon, August 30, 1945.