Posted on 06/26/2005 5:54:23 AM PDT by hipaatwo
Check out Tommy Franks autobiography. Rumsfeld didn't write the war plan. Franks and his staff did. Rumsfeld (and Bush) agreed to it. The same thing appears to be happening now with the occupation/transition.
Rumsfeld is claiming he is not dictating tactics (unlike, say, McNamara). I believe him.
He is also saying he is leaving the decision as to what the troop level should be up -- which appears to be the big part of the controversy -- up to the generals in Iraq. Again, I believe him.
Where are the 300,000 more troops going to come from? What would be gained by waiting? So we could be more like Bill Clinton?
Good, well written book.
Last question from Bush to Franks, "Do you have everything you need?"
Yep, that's what happens when you lose your nerve . . . or sniff the political wind.
Yesterday it was Durbin and the Vets; today it's Hagel and The American Legion. Their mission: find the disgruntled and the weak and shape their thoughts just a bit more to the left until you've GOT 'EM.
His story is quite fascinating. He was hired out of retirement in the summer of 2002 to serve as "Saddam Hussein" in a massive "war exercise" that was set up to simulate a major U.S. military operation in the Middle East.
The original scenario began with Van Riper thwarting the main U.S. invasion and sinking a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, and ended with the U.S. military forces getting mired in a long, drawn-out guerrilla war in the region. The Pentagon leadership that was overseeing the exercise went back and "fixed" things so that it would end up with a swift U.S. victory and minimal casualties.
Van Riper resigned in disgust when he realized that the Pentagon wasn't trying to conduct an accurate assessment of the situation in the Gulf region -- they were looking for a pre-determined outcome.
This country will not have the will to fight, and die, much past the end of the year. Sorry to say, but its already in the air.
Mainstream media "Vietnam's" the US again.
I keep running into more pessimistic military personnel on FR than any other site. Hard to believe we ever won a war. Might as well give up and invite the islamoterrorists over and hand them the reigns. We're too stupid to live, we're too stupid for freedom.
Mandatory call to prayers will be broadcast on all Internet connections and Ipods.
If not the Islamoterrorists, China will do. It's just such a damn hard lanugage to learn to speak.
Another "I was in Vietnam you know!!" presidential wannabe.
Dictionary definition of "Hagel" is "a phony". This leftist and defeatist stance from a political midget that was elected to the senate from a state with less population than East St. Louis, Illinois is ludicrous.
Tagline adjustment.
It is fascinating, so far. I'm looking for more. Any suggestions?
From the Guardian:
Vice-Admiral Marty Mayer, one of the coordinators, denied claims of fixing. "I want to disabuse anybody of any notion that somehow the books were cooked," he said.
The games were designed to test experimental new tactics and doctrines advocated by the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and were referred to in Pentagon-speak as "military transformation".
The transformation is aimed at making US forces more mobile and daring, but Gen Van Riper said that the "concepts" the game were supposed to test, with names such as "effects-based operations" and "rapid, decisive operations", were little more than "slogans", which had not been properly put to the test by the exercise.
I don't believe that is correct. Do you remember where you came across the number?
From his book:
Throughout our planning of 1003, we discussed Phase IV--"the Day after." . . . We considered the pros and cons of senior U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers and British military commanders working with Iraqi tribal sheiks all across the country. And we studied the feasibility of an interim government in Iraq formed with international support, along the lines of Hamid Karzai's administration in Afghanistan.
[. . .]
. . . And our planning assumption was that we would guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military and a paramilitary security force drawn from the better units of the defeated regular army. These units would serve side-by-side with the Coalition forces to restore order and prevent clashes among the religious and ethnic factions . . .
[. . .]
There was no question: Phase IV would be a crucial period. Having won the war, we would have to secure the peace. And securing the peace would not be easy in a country that had been raped and massacred for more than three decades under Saddam Hussein. There were deep divisions among Sunnis and Shias, Kurds and Arabs, haves and have-nots; the regions traditional tribal rivalries would be hard to overcome. It would take time--perhaps years. And the costs would be high, certainly in money and conceivably in lives.
[. . .]
On one hand, larger Coalition military forces and martial law might be required to stay in country for years, in order to preserve security. On the other, the Iraqis might claim their country as their own: they might welcome the liberation and organize themselves swiftly to control Iraq without Coalition help.
[. . .]
But the challenge was daunting, and it was clear that certain practical steps would be required as soon as Saddam's regime was removed:
- Securing massive funding for the immediate needs of the Iraqi people
- Hiring tens of thousands of Iraqi ex-soldiers, all of whom needed money to care for their families
- Identifying political leadership that would be trusted by Iraqis, and capable of assisting and ultimately replacing an occupying military force
- Implementing a de-Baathification policy that wasn't so cumbersome that it essentially disenfranchised Iraq's educated middle class
- Adjusting American expectations that the process would be fast and painless
The military coalition would liberate Iraq, set conditions for civilian authority to stand-up a provisional government supported by Coalition stability forces, and provide security until Iraq could field her own security forces--a common-sense approach to a complex problem.
[. . . ]
The plan depended on two equal imperatives--security and civil action. Only if we achieved both could Iraq be transformed into an example of the power of representative government.
I was glad that we had finally reached the stage in the iterations where a plan--not just a Commander's Concept--was emerging. For one thing, we were finally able to move beyond the hypothetical environment we'd been working in for months, and start deploying ships, planes, and troops.
For another, I had already spent longer than I liked skirting the issue of a "war plan" in my dealings with the press.
And prophetically from his Epilogue:
In these difficult months, the resolve of the United States will be sorely tested. The news media, whose embedded correspondents did such splendid work during the major combat of Operation Iraqi Freedom, will focus almost exclusively on casualties. All of us, especially those who have worn our nation's uniform, will grieve each time we hear of a young man or woman killed in a suicide bombing or mortar attack, or by a roadside mine. And the relentless glare of the media spotlight on casualties will continue to obscure the Coalition's accomplishments since the Baathist regime was removed.
I'm not saying there was or is no dissent. I'm saying that Rumsfeld didn't set tactic then and isn't setting them now. I believe him when he says that if the generals want more troops they would get them, and that those in command aren't seeking more troops for reason Rumsfeld listed on Fox this morning.
The original scenario began with Van Riper thwarting the main U.S. invasion and sinking a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf . . .
And did that happen?
and ended with the U.S. military forces getting mired in a long, drawn-out guerrilla war in the region.
What I'm hearing is that we are generally supported by the average Iraqi -- and the election backs this up -- and the guerillas are coming from outside the country. Do you disagree?
Van Riper resigned in disgust when he realized that the Pentagon wasn't trying to conduct an accurate assessment of the situation in the Gulf region
It sounds like he lost an argument, got mad and quit.
Exactly! And from Franks own pen.
Check your mail.
Where are they going to get them?
And did that happen?
It didn't happen because they gave Van Riper an important weapon in his arsenal that Saddam Hussein didn't have -- Chinese-made Silkworm missiles.
What I'm hearing is that we are generally supported by the average Iraqi -- and the election backs this up -- and the guerillas are coming from outside the country. Do you disagree?
I agree that foreigners comprise a significant portion of the enemy forces in Iraq, but it's becoming more clear by the day that the Ba'athist leadership in Iraq has planned a lot of this for a very long time.
It sounds like he lost an argument, got mad and quit.
Sort of what happened to Patton and MacArthur, right?
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