Skip to comments.Journal of the Federal Convention June 2nd 1787
Posted on 06/02/2011 2:54:16 AM PDT by Jacquerie
National Legislature Appointment of Executive. Franklin Speech. Election by Electors from New Districts. Seven Year Executive Term. Expenses yes, Salary no. Removable by Majority of State Legislatures. Ineligible for Reelection. Removable for Malpractice or Neglect. One v. Multiple Executives.
William Saml. Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer, from Maryd. & John Lansing Jr. from N. York, took their seats.
It was movd. & 2ded. to postpone ye Resol: of Mr. Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the 2d. branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: [FN3] agst. N. Y. Pena. Maryd. [FN3]
The mode of appointg ye Executive was resumed.
Mr. WILSON made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into -------- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect -------- members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at -------- and they or any -------- of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body -------- person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested."
Mr. WILSON repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.
Mr. GERRY, opposed the election by the national legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to [FN4] their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partisans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.
Mr. WILLIAMSON could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's substitute, it was negatived: Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. [FN5] Pa. ay. Del. no. Mard. ay. Virga. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geoa. no. [FN6]
On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, it was agreed to Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. Pena. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN7] Docr. FRANKLIN moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute-"whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services"-He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them.
Mr. WILSON made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted- The following is a literal copy of the paper.
Sir, It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. -I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace. And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre- eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate; the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers. -And these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them. -Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing & governed: the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the peoples money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France, the office of Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as legal interest is there at five per Ct. they in fact pay two per Ct. for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the experiment, and practised it with success more than an [FN8] hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it was [FN9] never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of public service the less the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and most important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends & Companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.
Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. HAMILTON with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.
Mr. DICKINSON moved "that the Executive be made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.
Mr. BEDFORD seconded the motion.
Mr. SHERMAN contended that the National Legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure.
Mr. MASON. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.
Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILSON observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues agst. him in States where his administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad p olicy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied. Mr. DICKINSON considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independent. as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt. itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives.
In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy however was out of the question.
The spirit of the times-the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential to such a Govt. could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair. If ancient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases.
One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether. As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.
A motion being made to strike out "on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States" and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question was taken-
On Mr. DICKINSON'S motion for making [FN10] Executive removeable by [FN10] Natl.; Legislature at [FN10] request of [FN11] majority of State Legislatures [FN12] was also rejected-all the States being in the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.
The Question for making ye. Executive ineligible after seven years, [FN13] was next taken, and agreed to:
Massts.; ay. Cont.; no. N. Y. ay. Pa. divd. Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no: [FN14] [FN15]
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. by Mr. DAVIE moved to add to the last Clause, the words- "and to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty"-which was agreed to.
Mr. RUTLIDGE & Mr. C. PINKNEY moved that the blank for the no. of persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that no member would oppose the motion.
Mr. RANDOLPH opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishmt. of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. [FN17] that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3. [FN17] that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. [FN17] that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country.
Mr. BUTLER contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads [FN18] distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.
The motion was then postpd. the Committee rose & the House Adjd.
FN1 The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN2 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
FN3 In the transcript the figures "7" and "3" are inserted after the States Georgia and Maryland, respectively.
FN4 The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.
FN5 N.Y. in the printed Journal-' divided.'
FN6 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye-2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, [FN5] Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-8."
FN7 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no-2."
FN8 The word "one" is substituted in the transcript for "an."
FN9 The word "is" is substituted in the transcript for "was."
FN10 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN11 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN12 The word "which" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN13 The phrase "ineligible after seven years" is italicized in the transcript.
FN14 In [FN16] printed Journal Geo. ay.
FN15 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, elaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-7; Connecticut, Georgia, [FN14] no-2; Pennsylvania, divided."
FN16 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN17 The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed to "first," "secondly," "thirdly" and "fourthly."
FN18 The transcript italicizes the phrase "plurality of military heads."
Elbridge Gerry (MA) feared corruption if the National Legislature appointed the executive. He leaned toward election by the state legislatures either directly or by selecting nominees for electors to elect.
Hugh Williamson (NC) saw no advantage to electors other than the State Legislatures standing between the people and the Executive.
On Mr. Wilsons motion to set up districts in which the people elect electors, it failed 7-2.
The convention agreed to appointment of the Executive by the first branch of the Legislature for a term of seven years by an 8-2 vote.
Dr. Benjamin Franklin (PA) was too feeble to stand and speak at length. (His personal infirmities would be a plus for history; James Wilson (PA) read his prepared speech to the convention. Madison saved the speech. It is an incredible pity we do not have a transcript of the entire convention.)
I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great advantages. Franklin feared federal offices will become enticing for the salaries they offer. Our Framers were familiar with the British corruption of saleable offices and wished to prevent their repetition. (Are not the richest counties in the nation adjacent to Washington, DC?)
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money.
Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honor that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them.
The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure.
It will be said, that we don't propose to establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and most important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; (Meaning, George Washington did not accept a dime in salary for leading his Continental Army to victory. He would likewise accept no salary for two terms as President. He considered such service his duty, and one does not accept remuneration for doing ones duty.)
Franklin did not believe that salaries are necessary to attract patriots to government.
Unfortunately, James Madison (VA) disrespected Franklin.
John Dickinson (DE) proposed the Executive be removable by the National Legislature on request by a majority of the states.
(John Dickinson: Born 1732 in MD, moved to Dover DE in 1740. Tutored at home and studied law in Britain at the Inns of the Court in 1750s. Practiced law in Philadelphia. Entered PA Legislature. Attended Stamp Act Congress 1765, First Continental Congress 1774, Annapolis Convention 1786.)
(Famous since publication of Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania in 1767 against the Townshend duties. In this work he drew a fine line between proper taxation in support of regulating trade, and improper British power to tax in search of revenue. Supported reconciliation with Britain until the final break, in part because he thought a union of thirteen sovereign nations inherently unstable. He lead the committee that provided the first draft of the Articles of Confederation in June, 1776. Despite voting against the Declaration of Independence, he immediately marched off with the militia.)
(He was a DE delegate to Congress 1776-1777, 1779-1780, served as President of both DE 1781-1782, and PA 1782-1785. In 1785 he retired to Dover.)
(By 1787 he was among the strongest advocates for a National Government. In an act that perhaps more than any other promoted the prosperity of the US, he and Judge George Read shepherded a bill through the DE Assembly that tied their hands, prevented the delegates from considering anything other equal State representation. This would result in two State legislature appointed Senators per State, the elimination of which via the 17th Amendment is regretted daily at FreeRepublic.)
Gunning Bedford (DE) seconded Mr. Dickinson.
Roger Sherman (CN) would have the National Legislature alone responsible for Executive removal.
George Mason (VA) warned of Executive dependency if he was both elected by and impeachable by the National Legislature. However, he unequivocally supported some means of Executive disposal.
James Madison (VA) and James Wilson (PA) reflected their distrust of states when they contended a majority of states could easily mean a minority of people represented. They thought State participation in impeachment was bad policy.
(At times, Madison appears to take better notes than at others. I am thankful he kept careful notes of the speech by John Dickinson. Dickinson illustrates the wisdom the delegates brought to the convention. He discusses monarchies v. republics, separation of powers, the inherent stability of a legislature divided into two, and distinct state governments. Ancient republics fared poorly because they were badly constituted. The convention had the opportunity and duty to avoid similar mistakes. Finally, he proposed the solution to a problem that would occupy the convention for weeks, the representational basis of the House and Senate.)
The motion to strike, "on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States, was rejected.
All states except DE rejected Mr. Dickinsons motion that the Executive be removable by the National Legislature on request by a majority of the states.
A vote was taken next to limit the President to one term. It passed 7-2-1.
Hugh Williamson (NC) motioned and William Davy seconded to add, And to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty, which was agreed to.
John Rutlidge (SC) and Charles Pinckney (SC) motioned for one Executive magistrate.
Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia defended multiple executives. A single Executive smacked of monarchy, the people were against it, a unity was not necessary to the object, remote parts of the country would not be on an equal footing to supply a single Executive. What was certain was a nod toward minimizing sectionalism and mutual suspicion of the states. He proposed three executives selected from different portions of the US.
Mr. Butler argued for a single Executive. Multiple execs would complicate administration as they vied with each other.
The motion as to the number of supreme Executives was postponed
where’s the ping?
Franklin’s speech had some beauties in it!!
I found the Convention notes more informative and interesting than the Federalist or the Ratification Debates. Heck, what tells us more about the Constitution, what people had to say about it later on, or the people who actually wrote it? The Convention delegates did not play to an audience, unlike many of the State Ratification Debate delegates, nor in newspapers as with the Federalist. Convention delegates were spared the flowery oratory BS and just got down to business.
As for Franklin, well, we can't say we weren't warned. He was a money man through and through and knew man's weakness to it. He preferred an unpaid President, and later on, an unpaid Senate. Real men of talent don't enter senior level politics to make money; that is for the demagogues. Bill and Hillary were pipsqueak lawyers before cashing in during their terms in the White House. Hussein and his disgusting wife will be wealthy for the rest of their days for their four year residence. Think of Biden, Schumer . . . and Franklin was right.
Just as important, Franklin posited what such men would do in office. They would reward their supporters with taxpayer money who in turn would support them.
I think Franklin was also prescient when he borrowed from Aristotle when he said, The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. Last year, every school system employee in my county got an extra $2,000 from Obamas’s stimulus via Gov Charlie Crist. Didn't Obama and the democrat Congress greatly enlarge the federal workforce and give them pay raises?
Also, Franklin so much as predicted a king in our future. It took a long time, but Hussein and his recent rat predecessor view the other branches of government and States as bodies to be consulted only when they can be relied upon to rubber stamp their diktats.
As a sidebar, the word at the time was that if George Washington refused, or could not attend the Convention, Ben Franklin would have presided over the proceedings. He was that well respected.
This is too good, not to ping the list. Do it, would you?
I think our government can only work if it stays small - by gross number of employees, dollar amount, and reach.
Franklin is correct in that corruption seeks corruption. In a way, bad people drive out good.
Today, the 3rd being Sunday, the Convention did not meet.
Back to business tomorrow.
I was surprised at the efforts taken, the time spent by the convention to minimize corruption.
But, as you said, since corrupt people invite corruption, I suppose it was only a matter of time before the paper shackles were broken.
When I was a kid, I think the days of shopping bags full of money on Senator’s desks were just about over with. Today, instead of outright bribery, average lawyers suddenly become the best stock pickers in the world upon entering Congress.
I’m not surprised at all, though sadly I had to learn this outside of a formal school setting. The Founders knew history very well and ancient history is rife with terrible, violent and often deadly corruption.
Corruption is the enemy to freedom and individual liberty. As Franklin’s ‘quote’ indicates it is a vicious cycle that self-reinforces the behavior. Also, the French Revolution was current history for them. They could compare the corruption of the French Crown and the British Crown which was ‘less’ government. It is patently obvious that more government equals more corruption.
That you, I and others are having to relearn this shows the destructive power of government education (indoctrination).
Thanks, if I don’t get pinged to these great articles of yours, I would likely never see them.
I haven’t finished reading and absorbing what you have written.
Thanks for the ping!
Okay, daily pings it will be.
You are doing this daily?
OMG-what have I missed?
I’ve posted the first week of the Convention.
To search titles, they are all in the “Journal of the Federal Convention” format. They will all pop up.
See you tomorrow.
Have we determined how to elect senators yet?
As we will see, almost all of the Resolutions were interconnected to at least some degree. Slavery for instance, was wrapped up in questions over taxation, imposts and representation in the House of Reps.
One other important thing, the delegates will be meeting as a Committee of the Whole for some time. Much will change, as we know, from what they appeared to agree to in June, when they later meet in Convention with George Washington presiding.
Good stuff, thanks.
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