Posted on 08/22/2012 4:27:52 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
Richard Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary
http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1942/aug42/f22aug42.htm
Brazil declares war on Germany, Italy
Saturday, August 22, 1942 www.onwar.com
From Brazil... The government of Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy after the recent sinking of several Brazilian ships by Axis forces.
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/andrew.etherington/frame.htm
August 22nd, 1942
UNITED KINGDOM: Corvette HMS Mandrake launched. (Dave Shirlaw)
GERMANY: U-419 launched.
U-227 and U-449 commissioned. (Dave Shirlaw)
POLAND: Lwow: 75,000 Jews have been deported to Belzec since 10 August.
U.S.S.R.: Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla: Shipping loss: MS “TSch-405 “Vzrivatel”” - by field artillery, close to Eupatoria (later raised) (Sergey Anisimov)(69)
Stalingrad: German paratroopers landing behind Soviet lines are massacred.
The advance of the German 17.Armee (Ruoff) toward the Black Sea port of Suchum west of the Caucasus bogs down. A platoon of 1.Gebirgs-Division hoists the German war flag on the top of Mt. Elbrus, the highest peak in the Caucasus.
U-456 found the motor boat Chaika anchored off the Matyuschev Isle west of the Matochkin Strait and at 2300 took her in tow unnoticed by the Soviets. After searching the boat she was sunk by scuttling charges. Nothing valuable was found except of four infantry guns. (Dave Shirlaw)
NEW GUINEA: The 18th Australian Brigade lands at Milne Bay. Allied troops in the Milne Bay area now numbered more than 8,800 and the fighting at Milne Bay resulted in the first defeat of a Japanese amphibious landing in WWII. (Jack McKillop)
Major-General Clowes takes command of Milne Force which stands at 1,365 men. (Michael Mitchell)
In the air, USAAF B-17s of the Allied Air Forces B-17s bomb the airfield at Lae. (Jack McKillop)
SOLOMON ISLANDS: The first USAAF aircraft, 5 P-400 Airacobras of the 67th Fighter Squadron, 58th Fighter Group, based on New Caledonia Island, New Hebrides, arrive at Henderson Field, Guadalcanal Island, joining USMC aircraft which arrived earlier; these P-400s, which operate under control of Marine Aircraft Wing One (MAW-1), prove no match for Japanese Zekes or bombers at high altitudes. (Jack McKillop)
The USN destroyers USS Blue (DD-387) and USS Henley (DD-391), trying to intercept Japanese reinforcements heading for Guadalcanal, run into the Japanese destroyer HIJMS Kawakaze, whose night-fighting experience outperforms the Americans’ radar. The Blue is torpedoed at 0359 hours local and throughout the 22nd and 23rd, unsuccessful attempts are made to tow her to Tulagi. She was scuttled at 2221 on 23 August 1942. Kawakaze escapes unscathed. (Jack McKillop)
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO: USAAF B-17s of the Allied Air Forces B-17s bomb the airfields at Rabaul on New Britain Island. (Jack McKillop)
TERRITORY OF ALASKA: Aleutians: A photo reconnaissance mission over Kiska Island by the US 11th Air Force is aborted due to overcast.
U.S.A.: “Cow-Cow Boogie” by Freddie Slack and his Orchestra featuring Ella Mae Morse on vocal, was released on today. It was on the charts for 2 weeks and reached Number 9. (Jack McKillop)
Light fleet carrier USS Independence launched.
Corvette USS Intensity is launched.
Frigate USS Asheville (ex-HMS Adur) launched.
Destroyer escort USS Brennan launched.
Corvette USS Haste launched.
Destroyer USS Ingraham sank after a violent collision with the Navy oil tanker USS Chemung in pea-soup fog off the coast of Nova Scotia. The Ingraham was part of Task Force 37 escorting Convoy AT-20 to the United Kingdom. An internal explosion caused the ship to blaze from stem to stern. It was all over in a flash, the burning wreck vanishing beneath the waves taking the lives of 218 of her crew. There were only 11 survivors, one officer and 10 ratings all rescued by the Chemung’s boat crews. (Dave Shirlaw)
CARIBBEAN SEA: The German submarine U-654 is sunk north of Colon, in position 12.00N, 79.56W, by depth charges from a US 6th Air Force B-18 Bolo based at France Field, Canal Zone. All hands on the U-boat, 44-men, are lost.
BRAZIL declares war on Germany and Italy. (Jack McKillop) This follows a week of anti-Nazi rioting following the recent sinking of six Brazilian ships by Axis submarines. The declaration was made after a meeting between President Getulio Vargas and his cabinet this afternoon, and the country’s armed forces were ordered to prepare for “sacrifices until death.” Though no explanation was given as to why Japan was not included in the declaration, it is unofficially pointed out that Japan has not committed any acts of aggression towards Brazil.
ATLANTIC OCEAN: U-507 sank neutral Swedish SS Hammaren in Convoy OS-36. (Dave Shirlaw)
Dieppe, “Tributes to Bravery,” CBC
http://ia701200.us.archive.org/0/items/1942RadioNews/1942-08-22-CBC-Tributes-To-Bravery.mp3
CBC Broadcast ping.
ON 24th August, at 0440 hours, the Combat Group Krumpen launched its attack against Spartakovka, Stalingrad's most northerly industrial suburb, with tanks, grenadiers, artillery, engineers, and mortars, preceded by Stukas.
But the enemy they encountered was neither confused nor irresolute.
On the contrary: the tanks and grenadiers were met by a tremendous fireworks. The suburb was heavily fortified, and every building barricaded. A dominating hill, known to the troops as "the big mushroom," was studded with pillboxes, machine-gun nests, and mortar emplacements. Rifle battalions and workers' militia from the Stalingrad factories, as well as units of the Soviet Sixty-second Army, were manning the defenses. The Soviet defenders fought stubbornly for every inch of ground. The order which pinned them to their positions had said clearly: "Not a step back!"
The two men who saw that this order was ruthlessly implemented were Colonel-General Andrey Ivanovich Yeremenko, Commander-in-Chief Stalingrad and South-east Front, and his Political Commissar and Member of the Military Council, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev.
It was then, at Stalingrad, that the officers of the 16th Panzer Division heard this name for the first time from Soviet prisoners.
With the forces available, Spartakovka could clearly not be taken.
The Soviet positions were impregnable.
The determination displayed by the Soviets in holding their positions was further illustrated by the fact that they launched an attack against the northern flank of Hübe's "hedgehog" in order to relieve the pressure on Spartakovka. The Combat Groups Dörnemann and von Arenstorff were hard pressed to resist the increasingly vigorous Soviet attacks.
Brand-new T-34s, some of them still without paint and without gun-sights, attacked time and again.
They were driven off the assembly line at the Dzerzhinskiy Tractor Works straight on to the battlefield, frequently crewed by factory workers. Some of these T-34s penetrated as far as the battle headquarters of 64th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and had to be knocked out at close quarters.
The only successful surprise coup was that by the engineers, artillery men, and Panzer Jägers of the Combat Group Strehlke in taking the landing-stage of the big railway ferry on the Volga and thereby cutting the connection from Kazakhstan via the Volga to Stalingrad and Moscow.
Strehlke's men dug in among the vineyards on the Volga bank.
Large walnut-trees and Spanish chestnuts concealed their guns which they had brought into position against river traffic and against attempted landings from the far bank.
But in spite of all their successes the position of 16th Panzer Division was highly precarious.
The Soviets were holding the approaches to the northern part of the city, and simultaneously, with fresh forces brought up from the Voronezh area, put pressure on the "hedgehog" formed by the division. Everything depended on securing the German corridor across the neck of land, and the 16th were therefore anxiously awaiting the arrival of 3rd Motorized Infantry Division.
The advanced units of that division had left the Don bridgeheads side by side with 16th Panzer Division on 23rd August and moved off towards the east. At noon, however, their ways had parted.
Whereas the 16th had continued towards the northern part of Stalingrad, Major-General Schlömer's regiments had fanned out towards the north in order to take up covering positions along the Tartar Ditch in the Kuzmichi area.
The general was moving ahead with the point battalion. Through his binoculars he could see the alluring sight of Soviet goods trains being feverishly unloaded at Kilometre 564, west of Kuzmichi.
He gave the order; "Attack!"
The motor-cyclists and armored fighting vehicles of Panzer Battalion 103 raced off. Gunners of Army Flak Battalion 312 sent over a few well-placed shells.
The Russian columns dispersed.
The goods wagons contained a lot of valuable equipment from America.
These had been shipped across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, through the Persian Gulf, across the Caspian Sea, and up the Volga as far as Stalingrad, and thence by railway to the front, to the halt at Kilometre 564.
Now these supplies were being gratefully passed around by Schlömer's 3rd Motorized Infantry Division—magnificent brand-new Ford lorries, crawler tractors, jeeps, workshop equipment, mines, supplies for engineering troops, flame throwers, bakeries, blankets, camouflage, clothing, American rifles and pistols, several staff cars, cable-laying equipment, switchboards, radio sets, explosives, grenades and, most valuable of all, enough cases of American Lucky Strike cigarettes for a month.
The tanks of the advanced battalion had continued on their way when suddenly five T-34s appeared, evidently in order to recapture the precious gifts from the USA.
Their 7.62-cm. shells quite literally dropped into the pea soup which was just being dished up for the division's operations section.
The general and the chief of operations dropped their mess-tins and took cover. Fortunately two tanks of the point battalion had got stuck near the goods train with damaged tracks. They knocked out two of the T-34s and saved the situation. The remainder turned tail.
While Schlömer's formations were still following behind 16th Panzer Division more disaster loomed up;
a Soviet Rifle Division, the 35th, reinforced with tanks, was driving down the neck of land from the north in forced marches. Its aim— as revealed by the papers found on a captured courier—was to seal off the German bridgeheads over the Don and keep open the neck of land for the substantial forces which were to follow.
The Soviet 35th Division moved southward into the rear of the German 3rd Motorized Infantry Division; it over-ran the rearward sections of the two foremost divisions of von Wietersheim's Panzer Corps, forced its way between the bridgehead formed by the German VIII Infantry Corps and the German forces along the Tartar Ditch, and thereby prevented the German infantry, which was just then moving across the Don into the corridor, from closing up on the forces ahead of them.
As a result, the rearward communications of the two German lead divisions were cut off, and those divisions had to depend upon themselves.
True, the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division and the 16th Panzer Division succeeded in linking up, but these two divisions now had to form a "hedgehog" 18 miles wide, extending from the Volga to the Tartar Ditch, in order to stand up to the Soviet attacks from all sides. Supplies had to be brought up by the Luftwaffe, or else escorted through the Soviet lines by strong Panzer convoys.
This unsatisfactory and critical situation persisted until 30th August.
Then, at long last, the infantry formations of LI Corps under General of Artillery von Seydlitz moved up with two divisions on the right flank. The 60th Motorized Infantry Division likewise succeeded in insinuating itself into the corridor front after heavy fighting.
As a result, by the end of August, the neck of land between Don and Volga was sealed off to the north. The prerequisites had been created for a frontal attack on Stalingrad, and the outflanking drive by Hoth's Panzer Army from the south was now covered against any surprises from the northern flank.
General von Seydlitz-Kurzbach had been wearing the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross since the spring of 1942. It was then that this outstanding commander of the Mecklenburg 12th Infantry Division had punched and gnawed his way through to the Demyansk pocket with his Corps group and freed Count Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt's six divisions from a deadly Soviet stranglehold.
That was why Hitler was again placing great hopes for the battle of Stalingrad on the personal bravery and tactical skill of this general, born in Hamburg-Eppendorf and bearing the name of an illustrious Prussian military family.
At the end of August Seydlitz launched his frontal attack against the centre of Stalingrad with two divisions striking across the neck of land from the middle of Sixth Army. His first objective was Gumrak, the airport of Stalingrad.
The infantry had a difficult time.
The Soviet Sixty-second Army had established a strong and deep defensive belt along the steep valley of the Rossoshka river. These defenses formed part of Stalingrad's inner belt of fortifications, which circled the city at a distance of 20 to 30 miles. Until 2nd September Seydlitz was halted in front of this barrier. Then, suddenly, on 3rd September the Soviets withdrew, Seydlitz followed up, pierced the last Russian positions before the city, and on 7th September was east of Gumrak, only five miles from the edge of Stalingrad. What had happened?
What had induced the Russians to give up their inner and last belt of defenses around Stalingrad and to surrender the approaches to the city?
Had their troops suddenly caved in? Was the command no longer in control? Those were exciting possibilities.
There can be no doubt that this particular development in the battle of Stalingrad was of vital importance for the further course of operations. The events in this sector have not yet received adequate attention in German publications about Stalingrad—but the battle for the Volga metropolis certainly hung in the balance during these forty-eight hours of 2nd and 3rd September.
The fate of the city appeared to be sealed.
Marshal Chuykov, then still a lieutenant-general and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Sixty-fourth Army, casts some light in his memoirs on the mystery of the sudden collapse of Russian opposition in the strong inner belt of fortifications along the Rossoshka stream.
The solution is to be found in the actions and decisions of the two outstanding contestants in this mobile battle of Stalingrad—Hoth and Yeremenko.
Yeremenko, the bold and dashing, yet also strategically gifted Commander-in-Chief of the "Stalingrad Front" has revealed some interesting details of this great battle in his writings.
Chuykov's memoirs fill in many gaps and cast additional light on various aspects.
Colonel-General Hoth, Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Panzer Army, then living in Goslar and still alive, where, before the war, he had served with the Goslar Rifle Regiment, just as Guderian and Rommel, has made available his personal notes about the planning and execution of the offensive which brought about the collapse of the Soviet front.
At the end of July, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had wheeled away from the general direction of attack against the Caucasus and had been re-directed from the south through the Kalmyk steppe against the Volga bend south of Stalingrad. Its thrust was intended to relieve Paulus's Sixth Army, which even then was being hard pressed in the Don bend.
But once again the German High Command had contented itself with a half-measure.
Hoth was approaching with only half his strength: one of his two Panzer Corps, the XL, had had to be left behind on the Caucasus front. His effective strength, in consequence, consisted only of Kempf s XLVIII Panzer Corps, with one Panzer and one motorized division, as well as von Schwedler's IV Corps, with three infantry divisions. Later, Hoth also received the 24th Panzer Division. The Rumanian VI Corps under Lieutenant-General Dragalina with four infantry divisions was subordinated to Hoth to protect his flank.
The Soviets instantly realized that Hoth's attack spelled the chief danger to Stalingrad. After all, his tanks were already across the Don, whereas Paulus's Sixth Army was still being pinned down west of the river by the Soviet defenders. If Hoth, coming from the Kalmyk steppe, were to succeed in gaining the Volga bend with the commanding high ground of Krasnoarmeysk and Beketovka, Stalingrad's doom would be sealed and the Volga would be severed as the main supply artery for American deliveries through the Persian Gulf.
On 19th August Hoth reached the southernmost line of defense of the Soviet Sixty-fourth Army, and at the first attempt achieved a penetration at Abganerovo.
Kempf's Panzer Corps pushed through with 24th and 14th Panzer Divisions as well as with 29th Motorized Infantry Division, followed on the left by Schwedler's infantrymen.
Twenty-four hours later Hoth's tanks and grenadiers were attacking the high ground of Tundutovo, the southern cornerstone of Stalingrad's inner ring of defenses. Colonel-General Yeremenko had concentrated all his available forces in this favorable and vital position. Armored units of the Soviet First Tank Army, regiments of the Soviet Sixty-fourth Army, militia, and workers' formations were holding the line of hills with their wire obstacles, blockhouses, and earthworks established in deep echelon. Krasnoarmeysk in the Volga bend was only 9 miles away.
The companies of 24th Panzer Division attacked again and again, swept forward by their experienced commanders and combat-group leaders. But success continued to be denied to them.
Colonel Riebel, commanding 24th Panzer Regiment, and for many years Guderian's ADC, was killed in action.
Colonel von Lengerke, commanding 21st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was mortally wounded in an attack against the railway to Krasnoarmeysk.
Battalion commanders, company commanders, and the old and experienced NCOs were killed in the infernal defensive fire of the Soviets.
At that stage Hoth called a halt. He was a cool strategist, not a gambler. He realized that his attacking strength was inadequate.
At his battle headquarters at Plotovitoye, Hoth sat bent over his maps. His chief of staff, Colonel Fangohr, was entering the latest situation reports.
Only two hours before, Hoth had visited General Kempf at his Corps Headquarters and had driven with him to General Ritter von Hauenschild to hear about the situation at 24th Panzer Division. He had also called on Major-General Heim at the railway station of Tinguta. In a balka, one of those typical deep ravines of Southern Russia, Heim had explained the difficult situation in which 14th Panzer Division found itself. Here, too, further advance seemed impossible.
"We've got to tackle this thing differently, Fangohr," Hoth was thinking aloud.
"We are merely bleeding ourselves white in front of these damned hills: that's no ground for armor.
We must regroup and mount our attack somewhere else, somewhere a long way from here. Now, listen carefully. . . ."
The colonel-general was developing his idea.
Fangohr was busily drawing on his map, checking reconnaissance reports and measuring distances.
"That should be possible," he would mumble to himself now and again. But he was not entirely happy about Hoth's plan, mainly because time would again be lost with regrouping. Besides, a lot of fuel would be needed for all this driving around. And fuel was very short. And ultimately those "damned hills" in front of Krasnoarmeysk and Beketovka would have to be tackled one way or another, for they dominated the entire southern part of the city and its approaches. Exactly the same arguments against regrouping were advanced also by General Kempf. But in the end both Fangohr and Kempf let themselves be persuaded by their commander-in-chief.
Hoth rang up Army Group.
He had a half-hour conversation with Weichs. Weichs agreed and promised to come round in person to discuss the operational problems, and especially fuel supplies.
Everything sprang into action: orderlies raced off with orders; telephone wires buzzed ceaselessly. The entire headquarters personnel were moving in top gear. A regrouping operation was being carried out.
Unnoticed by the enemy, Hoth pulled out his Panzer and motorized formations from the front during the night and replaced them by infantry of the Saxon 94th Division.
In a bold move, rather like a castling in chess, he moved his mobile formations past the rear of IV Corps in the course of two nights and reassembled them 30 miles behind the front in the Abganerovo area to form them into a broad wedge of attack.
On 29th August this armada struck northward at the flank of the Soviet Sixty-fourth Army, to the complete surprise of the enemy.
Instead of fighting his way frontally towards the Volga bend, across the heavily fortified hills of Beketovka and Krasnoarmeysk, which were studded with tanks and artillery, Hoth intended to bypass these positions and enemy forces hard to the west of Stalingrad, in order then to wheel round and attack the entire high ground south of the town with an outflanking attack which would simultaneously trap the left wing of the Soviet Sixty-fourth Army.
The operation started astonishingly well.
Jointly with the assault infantry of IV Corps the fast formations on 30th August burst through Stalingrad's inner belt of fortifications at Gavrilovka and over-ran the rearward Soviet artillery positions.
By the evening of 31st August Hauenschild with his 24th Panzer Division had reached the Stalingrad-Karpovka railway-line—an unexpected penetration 20 miles deep.
The entire picture, as a result, was changed.
A great opportunity was offering itself. The prize was no longer merely the capture of the high ground of Beketovka and Krasnoarmeysk, but the encirclement of the two Soviet Armies west of Stalingrad, the Sixty-second and Sixty-fourth.
This prize was suddenly within arm's reach, provided only Sixth Army could now drive southward with its fast formations, towards Hoth's units, in order to close the trap.
Hoth's bold operation had created an opportunity for annihilating the two enemy Armies covering Stalingrad.
Army Group headquarters instantly realized this opportunity. In an order to General Paulus, transmitted by radio at noon on 30th August, it was stated:
In view of the fact that Fourth Panzer Army gained a bridgehead at Gavrilovka at 1000 hours to-day, everything now depends on Sixth Army concentrating the strongest possible forces, in spite of its exceedingly tense defensive situation ... on its launching an attack in a general southerly direction ... in order to destroy the enemy forces west of Stalingrad in co-operation with Fourth Panzer Army. This decision requires the ruthless denuding of secondary fronts.
When Army Group, moreover, received information on 31st August of the deep penetration made by 24th Panzer Division west of Voroponovo, Weichs sent another order to Paulus on 1st September, couched in considerable detail and no doubt intended as a reminder.
Under Figure 1 it said: "The decisive success scored by Fourth Panzer Army on 31.8 offers an opportunity for inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy south and west of the Stalingrad-Voroponovo-Gumrak line. It is important that a link-up should be established quickly between the two Armies, to be followed by a penetration Into the city centre."
The Fourth Panzer Army reacted swiftly.
On the same day, 1st September, General Kempf led the 14th Panzer Division and the 29th Motorized Infantry Division in the direction of Pitomnik, having quite ruthlessly denuded the sectors hitherto held by 24th Panzer Division.
But the Sixth Army did not come.
General Paulus found himself unable just then to release his fast forces for a drive to the south, in view of the strong Soviet attacks being made against his northern front. He considered it impossible to hold the northern barrier successfully with his Panzer lagers and a few tanks and assault guns, even if supported by ground-attack aircraft of VIII Air Corps, while hiving off an armored group to be formed from the five Panzer battalions of XIV Panzer Corps for a drive to the south.
He was afraid that, if he did so, his northern front would collapse.
Perhaps he was right.
Perhaps any other decision would have been a gamble. In any event, a great opportunity was missed.
Twenty-four hours later, in the morning of 2nd September, operational reconnaissance by 24th Panzer Division established that there was no enemy left in front of the German lines.
The Russians had pulled out of the southern defensive position, just as on the same day they had abandoned a defensive position facing Seydlitz's Corps in the western sector. What had induced the Russians to take this surprising step?
General Chuykov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Sixty-fourth Army, had realized the dangerous situation which had arisen as a result of Hoth's advance. He gave the alarm to Colonel-General Yeremenko. Yeremenko not only saw the danger, but also acted in a flash, in complete contrast to the former ponderous way in which the Soviet Commands used to react to such situations.
Yeremenko took the difficult and dangerous decision—but the only correct one—of abandoning the well-prepared inner belt of defenses. He sacrificed strong-points, wire obstacles, anti-tank barriers, and infantry trenches in order to save his divisions from the threatening encirclement, and retreated with his two Armies to a new, improvised defensive line close by the edge of the city.
This operation showed once more how consistently the Soviets were implementing the new tactics adopted by the Soviet High Command early in the summer. In no circumstances again were major formations to allow themselves to be encircled.
For the sake of this new principle they were prepared to risk the loss of the city of Stalingrad.
In the afternoon of 2nd September General Paulus decided after all to dispatch fast units of his XIV Panzer Corps to the south, and on 3rd September the infantrymen of Seydlitz's Corps linked up with Hoth's armored spearheads. Thus the pocket envisaged by Army Group on 30th August was, in fact, formed and closed, but no enemy was trapped inside it.
The maneuver had been accomplished forty-eight hours too late.
This delay was to cost Stalingrad.
But as yet nobody suspected this.
Army Group thereupon issued orders to Paulus and Hoth to exploit the situation and to penetrate into the city as fast as possible.
A grenadier company moves towards the front in the Don bend. The company chief (Kompanie-Chef), usually an Oberleutnant or Hauptmann, was provided with a riding horse. A full strength-first line 1940 German Infantry company had 180 men on its ration strength. On 15 October 1942 Infanterie-Regimenter were redesignated Grenadier-Regimenter and individual Schutzen were redesignated Grenadiere. This was an effort to improve the morale of infantrymen as in the old Imperial Army grenadier units were considered elite. Only a small portion of a division's service and support units are seen in the background.
German Pioneers reconnoitering for a bridge crossing site come across a KV-1 which has sunk while crossing one of the Don's smaller streams.
Landser of 267. Infanterie-Regiment of 94. Infanterie-Division use a deserted Russian farmstead as a command post not far from the Volga. The Landser adopted the Russian name for log cabins, Isba. From here soldiers watched Luftwaffe bombing raids on Stalingrad and could see the black smoke from the factories rise thousands of meters into the warm southern Russian sky.
An officer, probably a Kompaniechef (company chief) and two NCOs stand on a road leading down to the Volga river on 24 August. All three are armed with the 9mm MP-40 submachine gun. The officer has a Stg.24 stick hand grenade pushed through his enlisted man's belt. Officer's Leibriemen (belt) Officer's had a rectangular open-faced buckle and the belt itself was reddish brown; enlisted men's were black. The NCO to the right is an Unteroffizier (corporal)while the one in the center wears his rank shoulder straps upside-down as a means of camouflage.
A Gefreiter (private first class) from 94. Infanterie-Division takes a much needed respite and pauses for some apple juice refreshment. The late August heat was oppressive, demonstrated by the open collar of his wool uniform, but soon the weather would change as the autumn rains took a grip along the banks of the Volga. Rear service troops were issued only one 30round Patronentasche 11 (cartridge pouch) rather than two as Frontsoldat. He wears a Gasplane (anti-gas sheet) in a dark bluish green rubberized fabric pouch on his gas mask carrier's strap.
Small German unit approaches the first empty isbas to the west of Rynok. During the night Soviet troops coming from the north would begin to infiltrate into built-up areas such as these (some wearing German uniforms)causing German supply units nightmares with their sniping and kidnap teams.
Panzergreandiere of Hube's 16. Panzer Division arrive on the banks of the Volga. A MaschinengewehrschOtze (machine gunner) carries his 7.92mm MG-34 over his shoulder and his ErsatzstOcketasche 34 (replacement parts pouch) on his right front belt. He is also armed with a Stg.24 stick hand grenade. Machine gunners were known simply as an Abzug (trigger), as in triggerman.
German MG-34 team set up near a Soviet tank in the north of Stalingrad during the first days of the German attack.
An 8.8cm Flak 18 antiaircraft gun of The 37th Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the 9th Anti-Aircraft Division announced its first evening on the banks of the Volga by shelling a railway ferry and a gunboat and sinking a steamer. Over the next few days they continued firing on boats while Soviet artillery counter-battery-fired on them. The Landser knew the 8.8cm as the "Acht-Acht"-Eight-eight. Note the field gray metal ammunition cases in the foreground. Unpainted wicker containers of the same size and shape were introduced later.
A Landser, the "proprietor," of the "Savoy Hotel" had posted a sign announcing that the "Wolga Bar" offers a teatime dance at 5. Such (fruppen- and halbgruppenunterstande (group and halfgroup living bunkers) were called Kleine Hauser (small houses) by the Landser. They were essential to survive the ceaseless artillery and later the below freezing weather.
An officer is speaking on the telephone next to his Sd.Kfz.251/6 Ausf. B Befehlswagen (command vehicle) of 16 Panzer Division in the Kuzmichi area of Stalingrad. By the 24 August the 16. PanzerDivision's position was perilous because the Soviets were holding the approaches to the northern part of the city and bringing reinforced by troops funneled in from Voronezh to the north.
These troops have taken a defended gully on the approaches to Stalingrad. A knocked out T-34 is seen on the lip and a limbered 10.5cm leFH.18 light field howitzer passes on its way forward. This was the standard divisional field piece and not the 8.8cm FlaK as is often portrayed in movies, novels, and memoirs.
Good post ... thanks.
A follow-up on the front page story about the young American, Donald Joseph CURTIN, from the Bronx who secretly went to Canada to join the RCAF in 1941 (lied to his mother about job at shoe company) and received the Distinguished Flying Cross in August 1942:
http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/35900/supplements/751/page.pdf
Air Ministry, izth February, 1943
ROYAL AIR FORCE.
The KING has been graciously-^pleased to approve
the following awards in recognition of gallantry displayed
in flying operations against the enemy —
Bar to Distinguished Flying Cross
Acting Flight Lieutenant Donald Joseph CURTIN,
DFC (Can/J 9340), Royal Canadian Air Force,
No 106 Squadron
Since the award of the Distinguished Flying
Cross this officer has participated in numerous
operational sorties against heavily defended targets
in the Ruhr and in North Italy During a
daylight raid on Milan in October, when attacked
by two enemy fighters Flight Lieutenant Curtm
skilfully evaded them and enabled his gunners
to destroy i and drive off the other. On two
consecutive nights in January, 1943, he took
part in attacks on Berlin, on the second occasion
spending 30 minutes over the target to ensure
accurate bombing This officer has always
displayed the greatest courage and devotion to
duty.
http://www.warbirdinformationexchange.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?p=457066
One of Joe’s neighborhood lifelong friends was fellow civilian pilot, Donald Joseph Curtin. It was Curtin who suggested that they should head North to Canada and join the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Because of the war, Don had been laid off from his job as a cruise director with the Holland America Steamship Company.
“Within two days”, McCarthy recalled, “Don and I boarded a bus and headed for Ottawa, Ontario. We crossed the St. Lawrence river by ferry and the Canada Customs people helped us get a connecting bus to Ottawa. We spent the night at the YMCA and the following morning, May 5, 1941, we proceeded to RCAF No. 12 Recruiting Centre. There we were told we would have to come back in six weeks. Don and I responded we didn’t have the money to return again so if the Air Force wanted us they had better decide that day!” The Warrant Officer in charge took a second look at the two American volunteers, changed his mind and had them sign enlistment papers. That was fine with both as all they wanted to do was fly.
Later that day, as Aircraftsmen Second Class (AC2) Airmen, they, along with thirteen other new recruits, were on a Westbound train headed to No. 1 Manning Depot (MD) in Toronto, Ontario.
After MD training, they attended No. 1 Initial Training School (ITS) also in Toronto from where they graduated on August 11.
Promoted from AC2 to Leading Aircraftsmen (LAC), McCarthy and Curtin reported to No. 12 Elementary Flying Training School (EFTS) located at Sky Harbour Airport in Goderich, Ontario. There they flew Fleet Finch Biplanes, easily passing out of the course on September 26.
Next the two friends were sent to No. 5 Service Flying Training School (SFTS) in Brantford, Ontario where they learned to fly the twin-engined Avro Anson.
Once, during his training at No. 5, “Big Joe”, low on fuel and hopelessly lost, landed in a farmer’s field to ask directions after his navigation map flew out the open window of the cockpit. That slight blemish on his training record did not preclude him from winning his Wings.
McCarthy and Curtin graduated near the top of their class on December 18, 1941 as Sergeant Pilots (SP’s) and, within hours, both were commissioned from the ranks as Pilot Officers (PO’s).
Their Officer Service Numbers were only six digits apart - Curtin’s was J.9340 and McCarthy’s was J.9346. Taking their two week pre-embarkation leave, they returned to the New York area where they spent time with their families over the Christmas/New Year holidays.
Don Curtin headed overseas before Joe and, after training at two Operational Training Units (OTU’s), went on to fly Avro Manchesters and Lancasters with RAF No. 106 Squadron from Syerston in Nottinghamshire. PO Curtin was awarded a British Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) on his first sortie in July, 1942 and a further award of a Bar to his DFC was approved in January, 1943. During the eight month period Curtin flew with No. 106, his Commanding Officer, was twenty-three year old WC Guy P. Gibson.
WWII Canadian War Dead, February 25, 1943:
http://www.canadaatwar.ca/memorial/world-war-ii/date/1/19430225/
Donald Joseph Curtin Royal Canadian Air Force Flight Lieutenant February 25, 1943
“The two men who saw that this order was ruthlessly implemented were Colonel-General Andrey Ivanovich Yeremenko, Commander-in-Chief Stalingrad and South-east Front, and his Political Commissar and Member of the Military Council, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev.”
So Nikita was a key player at Stalingrad. That could explain a lot!
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