Posted on 05/30/2014 4:12:35 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
Oops, never mind about the Hess thing. It’s not him on further review. Having trouble with resolution on my tablet.
Hoffmann worked in his father's photographic shop and as a photographer in Munich from 1908.[1] He joined the NSDAP in 1920 and was chosen by its new leader Hitler as his official photographer. A photograph taken by Hoffman in Munich's Odeonsplatz on 2 August 1914 purports to show a young Hitler among the crowds cheering the outbreak of World War I and was used in Nazi propaganda; its authenticity has been questioned.[2] Hitler and Hoffman became close friends—so close, in fact, that when Hitler became the ruler of Germany, Hoffmann was the only man authorized to take official photographs of him. Hoffmann's photographs were published as postage stamps, postcards, posters and picture books. Following Hoffmann's suggestion, both he and Hitler received royalties from all uses of Hitler's image (even on postage stamps), which made the photographer wealthy. In 1933 he was elected to the Reichstag and in 1938 Hitler appointed him a 'Professor'.
That is quite the find there. Heinrich Hoffmann was a photographer, and dedicated Nazi who took some of the most candid pictures of Adolf Hitler ever taken. He also wrote books on the Fuhrer. A true believer lets say.
This is a year book in photos. Weltgeschehen, roughly translates to world occurrence (world events).
tagesbildberichte would be “daily pictorial report”. (One thing that is nice about German is when they want a new word, they just string together a bunch of old ones)
Can you get a clearer picture of one of the photo’s subscript? I’d like to see what it says and these old eyes cant make out the ones on this one picture.
This is extremely cool.
After the war, Adm. Nimitz said it was "God's mercy" that the fleet was in port at the time of the attack. He believed that had Kimmel known of the impending attack he would have sallied the fleet out to attack the Japanese fleet, but the slow U.S. battleships would not have gotten within range of the Japanese carriers before they would have been attacked. The result, he believed, would have been a lot of ships sunk in deep water, instead of the shallow waters of Pearl where most of the sunk ships were eventually re-floated. Maybe he was just being nice to an old salt who was vilified for causing the Pearl disaster, but it's an interesting viewpoint.
As I recall from the recent biography of Adm. Nimitz, he was scrupulously devoted to present and future operational effectiveness, and refused to be drawn into bickering or recriminations. “How does this help the war effort?” was his attitude.
Besides being one of the best commanders of the War, Admiral Nimitz was a class act.
Kimmel was unfairly lumped together with Short for the Show Trial. It was solely the responsibility of the United States Army for the defense of the islands, the naval base, and while it was there, the Fleet. Whose radar station spotted the incoming Japanese attack? Whose planes, which were to provide for air defense, were lined up on their aifields wingtip to wingtip? Which branch of the service ran the air defense operations center?
The only naval failure I am aware of was in the chain of command by not taking action on the attack on the midget sub in the harbor entrance. But even had it been reported, the Fleet was not in any position to make a meaningful defense. Had Chester Nimitz been in command on December 7, 1941, the result would likely have been the same. As it was the Japanese pilots were amazed at how quickly the fleet reacted with a vigorous anti aircraft defense that eventually bagged 25 to 27 of the 29 Japanese planes lost.
Short was a relic of the last war, incomptent and unfit. Kimmel, on the other hand, was by all accounts considered a good commander. I think it was Gordon Prange who wrote that the best thing that came out of Kimmel’s relief was that it allowed the United States Navy to replace a good commander with a great one.
I think we have to look at the broader picture that the Left has always excised from the Pearl Harbor story and consider that in Feb 1941 CinCPac James O. Richardson was sacked by FDR for warning against moving the fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor since Pearl would be an obvious first point of attack by Japan. Richardson's opinion appeared to have wide support in the navy.
FDR replaced Richardson with Kimmel as CinCPac in February 1941 and we know what happened after that.
The only naval failure I am aware of was in the chain of command by not taking action on the attack on the midget sub in the harbor entrance.
Another naval failure to consider is in light of the recent war alerts, why are so many long range naval patrol aircraft in varying states of disrepair seen in the below photograph taken on Ford Island?
I photocopied a sample from each album and scanned them for posting. They came out a little better.
Top - 10-17 Jan 39, bottom - 1-6 Feb 39
Top - 1-10 Sep 39, bottom - 17-24 Nov 39
Top - 25-31 Jan 40, bottom - 25-30 Apr 40
Top - 10-20 Aug 40, bottom - 17-24 Oct 40
Back in '42, he appeared less careful.
March 1Enemy radio was intercepted which showed that some of our aviators had been made prisoners at Wake, and that they had told a good many truths about Pearl Harbor.
March 3
Radio intelligence indicates some kind of an offensive against the Hawaiian area, possibly tomorrow, employing large seaplanes and submarines based in the Marshalls. An alert was sent to all forces.
April 18
The raid on TOKYO and vicinity has caused the Japs to search with their air, surface, and submarine units, This search maY possibly delay the SW Pac offensive as the RYUKAKU probably is at sea searching as are air units from the KAGA. It should be noted that (l) this raid ties up important forces for a long time ( 2) The military damage is small (3) the risk of loosing a CV is great (4) Bombing of shore objectives in this manner does not altogether agree with Cominch strategy (his 171750 referred to yesterday). The raid does have, however, great public approval. As one result of this raid we see the good work being done by our radio intelligence.
May 16.
Unless the enemy is using radio deception on a grand scale, we have a fairly good idea of his intentions. Of most interest is his preparation for an offensive in the Central or North Pacific. It seems quite possible that Orange will attack Midway and raid Oahu the first part of June. Present air weakness in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier makes it mandatory to employ a strong striking force in the area The striking force can be assisted by a BB covering force. BBs will be moved out from the coast if the problem of protecting light forces can be solved. The views of Cominch and Cincpac are shown ln the Aidacs attached.
July 24, 1942.
Japanese Naval Operations; Estimate of.
1. GENERAL
(a) There has been no mention of Midway in the radio traffic since the middle of June. Kiska and vicinity have been repeatedly mentioned as has Dutch Harbor, the latter place in connection with Radio Intelligence reports. No other American areas have been mentioned. Various areas in the Solomons have been very prominent including Guadalcanal and a place name designation believed to be Buna or possibly Gona.
17 August (Cont'd)
It is not at all certain that the Jap CV's are still in home waters. They may be using a bit of Radio deception. It is certain however that the Jap will soon make a determined effort to recapture GUADALCANAL. There are no indications of enemy moves toward the North or Central Pacific Areas.
I agree Kimmel should not have received the degree of scorn that he did. As you said, according to military protocol at that time, the protection of ships while they were in port fell upon the Army. General Short was ultimately responsible for all the facilities in the Hawaiian Department, including those ships at dock.
That said, there were things that Short was trying to accomplish before the attack that would have made the islands more defensible that just couldn’t get done.
For example, he had gotten approval and some of the appropriations to build hardened hangars at Hickam. What he didn’t have was the personnel to do the work or the materials to start construction. When he asked for materials he was told by the war department that he needed to get those from local vendors. The local vendors though could not get shipments of raw materials from the main land because priority for those materials were elsewhere. (ie. Philippines, stateside facilities, Lend-Lease)
So while I agree that Short was inadequate for the defense of the islands (he really didn’t want to be there), he also was not given the support he needed to even put up a feeble attempt.
These are really awesome. Some of the captions are surprisingly vague. Who the heck is that baby Hitler is playing with? “The fuhrer with a private attendant with General Field Marshal Goring”. I’m pretty certain that baby is not Goring.
Ugh, that writing is hard to read. The captured memo is discussed as an order to the 148th British Infantry Brigade. The caption mentions that the England had prepared for a move in Norway for months, and that the Nazi’s stopped their brutal game before it could start.
I wish I had more time to look at this.
Interesting little article on where the government “stimulus” program of buying up eggs got to be so much that they ended up turning the eggs into dog food.
I wonder if this is the origin of the term “This _____ is going to the dogs.”
Nimitz’ entries are ambiguous. These entires could be interpreted at traffic analysis, which could reveal the information without necessarily breaking the underlying code. On the other hand, it does appear that in order to remove any of the ambiguity, he is avoiding any reference to intelligence.
Nice pick up on the earlier diary entires. They are a great resource and part of my daily reading.
At the time I read them, the color purple flashed across my mind primarily due to the March 3 entry which clearly referenced Operation K and the May 16 entry predicting an early June attack on Midway and/or Oahu.
I don't see how Operation K could have been deduced so accurately via traffic analysis alone.
The Japanese employed massive radio deception for the Pearl Harbor raid and I don't know why they wouldn't have done similar for Midway. The May 16 entry might be referencing sloppy radio discipline but the Japanese knew that despite transmissions being encoded, they could still be detected and located. We know about reports of the fresh water situation on Midway but a quick flash widely distant might have been made by a submarine, long range patrol aircraft, or not even detected due to unfavorable radio conditions.
The gut wrenching entry is March 1
Enemy radio was intercepted which showed that some of our aviators had been made prisoners at Wake, and that they had told a good many truths about Pearl Harbor.One hates to imagine how the Kempeitai learned of those truths. One does wonder how Nimitz learned of it, clear channel communication, or decryption? I'm unsure what other options there might be?
Given the controversy surrounding his recent promotion to CinCPac and given his response to repeat war alerts by keeping long range naval patrol aircraft under his command on the ground, what should have been done?
And Mr. Hoffman employed a young assistant named Eva Braun.
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