Iranian Alert -- February 18, 2004 -- IRAN LIVE THREAD --Americans for Regime Change in Iran

The US media almost entirely ignores news regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran. As Tony Snow of the Fox News Network has put it, “this is probably the most under-reported news story of the year.” But most American’s are unaware that the Islamic Republic of Iran is NOT supported by the masses of Iranians today. Modern Iranians are among the most pro-American in the Middle East.

There is a popular revolt against the Iranian regime brewing in Iran today. Starting June 10th of this year, Iranians have begun taking to the streets to express their desire for a regime change. Most want to replace the regime with a secular democracy. Many even want the US to over throw their government.

The regime is working hard to keep the news about the protest movement in Iran from being reported. Unfortunately, the regime has successfully prohibited western news reporters from covering the demonstrations. The voices of discontent within Iran are sometime murdered, more often imprisoned. Still the people continue to take to the streets to demonstrate against the regime.

In support of this revolt, Iranians in America have been broadcasting news stories by satellite into Iran. This 21st century news link has greatly encouraged these protests. The regime has been attempting to jam the signals, and locate the satellite dishes. Still the people violate the law and listen to these broadcasts. Iranians also use the Internet and the regime attempts to block their access to news against the regime. In spite of this, many Iranians inside of Iran read these posts daily to keep informed of the events in their own country.

This daily thread contains nearly all of the English news reports on Iran. It is thorough. If you follow this thread you will witness, I believe, the transformation of a nation. This daily thread provides a central place where those interested in the events in Iran can find the best news and commentary. The news stories and commentary will from time to time include material from the regime itself. But if you read the post you will discover for yourself, the real story of what is occurring in Iran and its effects on the war on terror.

I am not of Iranian heritage. I am an American committed to supporting the efforts of those in Iran seeking to replace their government with a secular democracy. I am in contact with leaders of the Iranian community here in the United States and in Iran itself.

If you read the daily posts you will gain a better understanding of the US war on terrorism, the Middle East and why we need to support a change of regime in Iran. Feel free to ask your questions and post news stories you discover in the weeks to come.

If all goes well Iran will be free soon and I am convinced become a major ally in the war on terrorism. The regime will fall. Iran will be free. It is just a matter of time.

US Offered Assurances By Japan Over Iran Deal

February 18, 2004
Dow Jones Newswires
Alex Keto

WASHINGTON -- A senior Bush administration official said Wednesday the U.S. has been offered assurances that Japan's decision to go ahead with large oilfield development deal with Iran won't water down Japan's concerns with Iran's nuclear programs.

"In its public statements and its bilateral discussions with us, Japan has made it clear to us they still have concerns over the Iranian nuclear program," the official said on condition of anonymity.

"Japan has made it clear that the future of its overall relationship with Iran depends on Iran fulfilling its IAEA and NPT obligations," the official added.

The official was referring to commitments the Iranians have made to the Interantional Atomic Energy Agency and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The U.S. has accused Iran of seeking to develop nuclear weapons in violation of its commitments under the NPT. The Iranians have said they aren't, but they do intend to enrich uranium.

Earlier in the day, the Japanese agreed to a billion deal with Iran that would develop the Azadegan oilfield and give Japan exclusive rights to the oil.

The talks were interrupted until Iran signed an additional protocol with IAEA regarding its nuclear program.

While the official declined to go further than his statement on the deal, other U.S. officials weren't so reticent and expressed frustration with the deal.

"Our policy has been, with respect to Iran, to oppose petroleum investment there. We remain deeply concerned about deals such as this, and disappointed that these things might go forward. So we've, I think, very consistently expressed these views. The government of Japan is quite aware of our views on this," said State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher.

Boucher said he wasn't aware of how much pressure the U.S. put on Japan to nix this particular deal, but he did say that over the years, the U.S. has made its position clear on such deals.

"They know that fundamental concerns about Iran's nuclear developments, about Iran's support for violent groups that oppose the peace process, Iran's harboring and support of terrorists - all these things remain and have not changed," Boucher said.

Rather than offering reassurances, Boucher said Japan didn't take U.S. concerns seriously.

"I think in many ways the government of Japan does share those concerns, but our position is that because of those fundamental concerns, we should really not be investing in the oil sector in Iran. We made our view known to many other governments, including Japan," Boucher said.

- By Alex Keto, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-9256; Alex.Keto@dowjones.com

http://news.nasdaq.com/news/newsStory.aspx?&cpath=20040218ACQDJON200402181902DOWJONESDJONLINE001184.htm

Tokyo Turns Back On US, Signs Iran Oil Deal

February 19, 2004
Dow Jones Newswires
Sally Jones

LONDON -- Eager to gain a foothold in Iran's energy sector, Japan opted to ignore U.S. pressure to stall talks with Iranian oil officials and signed a much-delayed deal in Tehran late Wednesday to develop the country's massive Azadegan oil field.

The deal, valued at a little under $3 billion, advances import-dependent Japan's efforts to secure Mideast oil supplies and shows Iran's willingness to loosen what have been restrictive investment terms to boost ties with an economic superpower and pull in much needed foreign capital.

It also drew a rebuke from the U.S. State Department, which said the agreement, which it has long opposed, was poorly timed given renewed questions about whether Iran has fully disclosed its nuclear capabilities.

"It's deeply disconcerting," said Greg Sullivan, spokesman for the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Bureau. "It's been something we've repeatedly raised with the Japanese."

Tapping into Azadegan's huge oil reserves of around 30 billion barrels has long been a top priority for Japan, which relies on imports to cover the bulk of its energy needs. Japan lost oil rights in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

Keen to bag a deal to develop the onshore oil field in southwestern Iran, Tokyo moved quickly to secure negotiatings rights to develop Azadegan back in 2000. It showed Iran just how serious it was by pledging $3 billion in credits.

"It is very essential for Japan to tap into Azadegan," Yoshihisa Ohno, an official with Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said. "Japan has virtually no oil of its own."

Improved Terms

Although the contract was signed under Iran's unpopular "buyback" scheme, industry sources pointed to positive changes in the terms.

Under the the deal signed with the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIO.YY), a Japanese consortium led by Inpex Corp. and including Tomen Corp. (8003.TO) and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.(1662.TO) will be allowed to develop the onshore field for about 16 years - about twice as long as previous deals allowed.

"Iran realizes that it has to be more flexible," a senior Iranian oil source said. "What we are seeing is more relaxed and prolonged terms."

Buybacks skirt the Iranian constitution, which prohibits foreign firms from taking an equity stake in Iran's energy sector. Instead, they participate in a project for a limited period and are repaid in oil or gas revenues.

The main gripe of potential investors has been that the time frame for participating in Iranian energy projects has been too limited.

Tokyo will hold a 75% stake in the project, and local company the NaftIran Intertrade Co. will hold the remainder. Capital expenditure on the project is valued at $2 billion. Other costs such as customs and taxes will push the total figure closer to $3 billion, people close to the deal said.

For Iran, the deal with Japan is a big step in securing better relations with an economic superpower. It also triggers much needed foreign investment. So far Iran has only locked in around $12 billion of the $24 billion in foreign investment projected during coming years.

Iranian Minister of Petroleum Bijan Namdar Zangeneh said Wednesday the deal will open the door to more investment by Japanese companies and others. The country is in talks with Japanese companies about a project at Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf to collect now-wasted natural gas that is found in oil fields, the minister said.

Talks are also under way with Chinese and Indian oil companies over the development of northern areas of the Azadegan field, and Iran will soon sign a contract to develop oil in the South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf, the minister said.

The minister also encouraged the Japanese companies to bring in a European oil major as a partner in Azadegan.

New Capacity

Iran, facing growing competition from its neighbors and soaring domestic demand for energy, is keen to hike oil output, and quickly.

The Azadegan field is expected to produce 150,000 barrels a day in the first phase, which will be complete in 52 months, and 260,000 barrels a day in the second phase, which will be wrapped up in eight years, the minister said. An Iranian oil source said Wednesday that he expects the first barrels to be pumped in the next 22 months.

The extra oil will go a long way to securing Iran's position as the No. 2 producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Today, Tehran's crude oil production capacity stands at just over 4 million barrels a day, about 40% of the capacity of top OPEC producer Saudi Arabia.

Under pressure from Washington, which is nervous about Iran's nuclear power program, Japan backed off from signing a deal for Azadegan last June. Sources close to the negotiations said discussions between the two sides also were mired in differences over contract terms.

The talks resumed in earnest after Iran signed an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty late last year allowing snap inspections of its nuclear sites.

New concerns about Iran's intentions have arisen in the U.S., however, with revelations the country possessed drawings for a more sophisticated nuclear centrifuge design than it had acknowledged in disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"Given the recent revelations about the sensitive centrifuge designs, it raises all kinds of concerns about Iran pursuing development of nuclear weapons," Sullivan said.

Industry sources said they weren't surprised that Japan finally went ahead and inked the deal. They say Tokyo was concerned it might jeopardize a project that would offer it a steady flow of oil.

"Japan needs to invest to ensure its oil supplies for the future," said Ali Granmayeh, political expert and lecturer at the University of London.

-By Sally Jones, Dow Jones Newswires; 44-207-842-9347; sally.jones@dowjones.com

(John M. Biers in Houston and Hashem Kalantari in Tehran contributed to this article).

http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004021823220000&Take=1

AP Interview: Reformer Criticizes Islamic Control, but Says Demonstrations Too Risky
(Mohammad Reza Khatami )

By Brian Murphy/
Associated Press Writer

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - The leader of Iran's ruling clerics must be made more accountable to reform demands and should shed some powers to break a "vicious circle" of control, the most prominent dissident lawmaker and brother of the country's president said Wednesday.
But Mohammad Reza Khatami - who was deputy parliament speaker and among more than 2,400 candidates blackballed from Friday's elections - warned against public demonstrations to demand change, saying Iranians have no appetite for another revolution.

In an interview with The Associated Press, he offered glimpses of a high-stakes gambit: trying to pressure Iran's supreme leader and the Islamic power base that controls everything from foreign policy to the media.

"They have no accountability to any part of the government and to the people ... We have a vicious circle here," Khatami said during the interview in the headquarters of his party, the Islamic Participation Front.

The strategy of directly challenging supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could win applause from many Iranians frustrated by stalled efforts for more political and social openness.

But it carries clear risks. The Islamic leadership has come down hard in the past on those perceived as threats to the system.

On Tuesday, Khatami and other pro-reform lawmakers made public a letter sent to Khamenei accusing him of allowing freedoms to be "trampled in the name of Islam."

The letter served as a parting salvo by banned reform candidates calling the elections a "parliamentary coup" and urging for a voter boycott. It also was a taboo-breaking missive against the country's top religious and political authority - whose supporters say holds divine right to rule.

Khatami said Khamenei should dismantle some of his power structure to allow elected officials room to make key decisions.

"They know what the people want and, because of this, I think they should respond to this will of the people ... even if they don't like it," said Khatami, whose brother, President Mohammad Khatami, has greatly lost his appeal after backing down in attempts to postpone the elections.

He added that reformers want to reach a point "for people to believe they could change the leader."

It would be a huge challenge.

Khamenei and his inner circle have vast and powerful resources, including militia forces and the judiciary. In recent years, conservatives have detained or intimidated hundreds of reformers and muzzled dozens of publications.

Late Wednesday, two reformist newspapers, Yas-e-No and Sharq, were ordered to suspend publication, and top editors and staff were detained by judiciary agents for publishing portions of the reformers' letter to Khamenei, said Issa Sahakhiz, member of the Iranian branch of the Committee to Protect Journalists.

The rulers' almost unlimited power has become a crucial issue in the battle over the elections.

The Guardian Council, a 12-member panel appointed by Khamenei, issued the mass disqualifications through its powers to vet political candidates. The blacklist means that the 290-seat parliament will likely return to the control of hard-liners.

But a sharp drop in voter turnout - particularly in the cities - would be interpreted as convincing public backing for liberals.

Khatami hoped for less than 25 percent turnout in the capital, Tehran, and anticipated 40 percent to 50 percent nationwide. In 2000, parliament elections drew more than 67 percent of voters around Iran and nearly 47 percent in Tehran.

"I think we will suffer from some pressures overall - more and more than before - but it's an opportunity for us to ... come back to the community and come back to the people," he said.

But he said it was "too risky for the time being" to try to organize mass demonstrations.

"People are not ready for another revolution because they are not happy with the result of the (1979 Islamic) revolution and they don't know what would happen after (another) revolution," he said.

Seeking changes within the system still appears the goal of reformers despite the current ballot boycott.

Khatami said his party already has some candidates in mind for next year's presidential elections - when his brother finishes his second and last term. But he declined to offer any names.

"Some things should be hidden in Iran because the conservatives would focus on that," he said.

Khatami, however, discounted any chance of him trying to succeed his older kin because of having to clear the Guardian Council review.

"I don't think of myself at all," he said.

He urged reformers not to follow in the model of his brother, who was elected in 1997 but failed to make any real headway to weaken the Islamic establishment.

"President Khatami clearly was leader of the reforms," his brother said. "But he didn't work very strongly and he ignored his leadership in the reforms."

Khatami believes his brother will leave office and seek an international role promoting cultural and social issues.

http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGA0GRZ5UQD.html

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 18 February 2004

Ahmad Chalabi and His Iranian Connection

Summary

The United States is struggling over the question of how U.S. intelligence was so deeply mistaken about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. One of the points that is consistently brought up is that much of the intelligence flowed through the Iraqi National Council, an opposition group led by Ahmad Chalabi. It is now well known that Chalabi's sources were not ideal. What is less well known is the close, long-term relationship that Chalabi, a favorite of Washington's, had with Iran. Chalabi, an Iraqi Shiite, was and remains in constant contact with Tehran. We have assumed he was a channel between Washington and Tehran. Given the erroneous intelligence he gave the United States, his relationship with Iran requires careful examination.

Analysis The United States is in the process of reviewing the intelligence that led it to conclude that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and which formed the public justification for war. A great deal of the discussion has concerned the sources of this intelligence. Some have pointed out that the main channel for intelligence on the subject involved sources developed through the Iraqi National Congress, a group opposed to Saddam Hussein, whose leader was Ahmad Chalabi -- also a key official in the U.S.-organized Iraqi Governing Council.

Chalabi, like any anti-Hussein leader, clearly would have had a vested interest in providing the United States with information that would lead it to invade Iraq and open the door for a new regime -- particularly a regime in which Shia would play a leading role. It ought not to have been a surprise that intelligence coming from the INC and Chalabi would tend to entice the United States to war. U.S. intelligence might have been more cautious with the INC, but if that is all there is to this story, then it is fairly straightforward.

However, there would appear to us to be something more here. In particular, there is a complexity that is usually omitted: namely, the relationship between Chalabi and leading figures in Iran. Prior to the war, Chalabi, an Iraqi Shiite who lived in the West for decades, made several trips to Tehran to confer with Iranian officials on a number of issues. He has continued to travel to Iran since the end of the war. Not to put too fine a point on it, Chalabi has had and continues to have excellent relations with Iran, as well as with leading Shia in Iraq.

As our readers will recall, we have argued since early fall that the guerrilla war in Iraq could be managed only if the Iraqi Shia were prepared to collaborate with the United States. We made two additional points: first, that the strings of the Iraqi Shia trail back to Iran, and any deal with the Shia would have to include a deal with Iran; and second, that any deal ultimately would hinge on a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq and the inclusion of Iraq in an Iranian sphere of influence. It has always been our view that the unanticipated rise of the guerrilla movement in Iraq forced this alliance upon the United States.

If we step back now, a different potential explanation emerges. First, Chalabi was extremely close to the Iranians prior to the war. Second, he provided much of Washington's prewar intelligence on Iraq. Third, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq. Fourth, the Iranians, along with the Iraqi Shia, are the main beneficiaries of the U.S. invasion. In that case, who Chalabi was and whose interests he actually was serving become the central questions.

Chalabi had a long, public and logical relationship with the Iranians. The Iranians were enemies of Saddam Hussein; so was Chalabi. It made perfect sense that they would collaborate. Let's begin with the failure of Petra Bank, which Chalabi opened in Amman, Jordan, in 1978 and which collapsed in 1989, when the Jordanian government seized it for bank fraud. That story is well known. Somewhat less known is an alternative explanation for the Petra Bank collapse. Sources in Jordan and Israel long have argued that the bank collapsed because Chalabi was collaborating with the Iranians in financing the Iranian war effort and trying to undermine Iraq's war financing. When the Iran-Iraq war ended in defeat for Tehran, Iraq placed enormous pressure on Jordan to shut down the bank, which was managing the flow of money through Chalabi-controlled banks in Lebanon. It is interesting to note that Chalabi escaped from Jordan in a car driven by Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan -- hardly the kind of treatment your average wanted criminal would receive -- and that King Hussein met with Chalabi several times for years after the bank collapsed and the Iraqi Shiite leader was convicted on fraud charges and sentenced to prison, although he served no time.

The claim that Chalabi was working for the Iranians in the Petra Bank scandal is plausible, but hardly provable. What is certain is that Chalabi spent a great deal of time in Iran before and after Sept. 11, and before and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. For example, in March 2001, Chalabi traveled to Tehran to meet with senior leaders. He set up an office for the INC in the capital that was to be paid for with U.S. aid -- and that required a special waiver from Washington because of U.S. sanctions. At a press briefing on March 19, 2001, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was specifically asked whether Chalabi's trip to Iran bothered the United States. Boucher did not answer the question, but it is clear that Washington knew about Chalabi's contacts with Iran and was not bothered by them.

Chalabi's relationship with Iran proved useful to the United States in the run-up to the war. For example, Chalabi arranged for a U.S.-financed transmitter to be installed on Iranian territory, broadcasting into Iraq. In August 2002, Chalabi met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran, then flew to Washington for separate consultations. According to the INC, Chalabi spoke to U.S. officials in Washington from Tehran while he was meeting not only with Iranian officials, but also with Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the country's main Shiite opposition group. Again in December 2002, as the war heated up, Chalabi flew to Tehran and, according to IRNA (quoting Radio Free Iraq, which was based in Prague and run by the United States) said, "The secretary of Iraq's National Congress, Ahmad Chalabi, is mediating between Iran and America." During that meeting, Chalabi was quoted as saying, "Our alliance with Iran is not temporary." Again in January 2003, before a planned meeting of Iraqi opposition leaders in London, Chalabi visited Tehran to meet with al-Hakim.

As the invasion of Iraq moved to its conclusion, U.S. aircraft flew Chalabi from northern Iraq to the city of An Nasiriyah on April 6. It was a symbolic gesture, intended to demonstrate that the INC was part of the fighting coalition. The problem was that Chalabi had trouble rounding up enough troops. The troops he used were drawn from the Badr Brigade, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia. Most recently, after attacks in Al Fallujah on Feb. 14, claims circulated that the attack was carried out by speakers of Farsi, and that they were members of the still-functional Badr Brigade. This might not be true, but the fact is that the Badr Brigade continues to operate, constituting an important and shadowy Shiite militia, and Chalabi was close enough to them in April 2003 that they fleshed out his fighting force.

The relationship with Iran continued after the end of the conventional war. On the evening of Dec. 1, 2003, Chalabi met with the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rohani. At that meeting, Rohani laid out the argument for Iraqi national elections that Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani had begun pressing the previous summer. Chalabi responded, "The role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in supporting and guiding the opposition in their struggles against Saddam's regime in the past, and its assistance toward the establishment of security and stability in Iraq at present, are regarded highly by the people of Iraq." In a later interview with the Iranian Student News Agency, Chalabi said, "Our cooperation with Iran is very good. One can argue that Iran has cooperated with us more than any other neighbor."

Many people in the Bush administration championed Chalabi -- people well beyond the neoconservatives in the Defense Department normally cited as his bedrock of support. One of his strongest backers had been Vice President Dick Cheney. U.S. intelligence became increasingly aware of the relationship between Chalabi and the Iranians -- and discovered that he had equally good relations with hard-liners and moderates. U.S. intelligence also was tracking his relationship to the Badr Brigade. According to Newsweek and other press reports, Cheney became extremely uneasy about Chalabi's relationships, particularly after the CIA briefed him on Chalabi's relations in Iran. There was a sense that those relationships might be more substantial than mere opportunism and mediation.

During the meetings in December with Rohani, Chalabi said Iraq was ready to import Iranian oil, pipelines, construction material, food and pharmaceuticals. Rumors in both countries indicate that this trade is already under way outside normal channels, which, of course, have not yet been established. Which companies will be used to manage these transactions is not clear to us.

That Chalabi had close relations with Iran is not in itself startling. He is a Shiite who was deeply opposed to Saddam Hussein; he took friends where he could get them. It is somewhat more surprising that his extensive dealings with Iran were not regarded as a hindrance to a U.S. relationship with him prior to the war. He was in rather deep with the Iranians. After the war ended and the guerrilla campaign began, Chalabi was clearly useful in negotiating Iraqi Shiite cooperation with Tehran. The postwar relationship was visible and reasonable.

Here is where the problem begins. Most reports say U.S. intelligence on Iraqi WMD came through the INC, which means that it came from Chalabi. Chalabi simply might have been trying to get the Americans to invade Iraq, feeding them whatever it took to get them there. The problem with that theory, from our point of view, is that the administration intended to invade Iraq, regardless. Choosing WMD was a persuasive, public justification - - and a good one, given the proof Washington had at hand. Or more precisely, it was a good justification based on the proof that Chalabi provided.

U.S. intelligence about Iraq was terrible. It was wrong about WMD; it underestimated the extent to which the Shia in the south had been organized by Iranian intelligence prior to the war; it was wrong about how the war would end -- predicting unrest, but not predicting a systematic guerrilla war. An enormous amount of this intelligence -- and certainly critical parts of it -- came to the United States by way of the INC or by channels the INC or its members were involved in cultivating. All of it was wrong.

It was not only wrong, it created an irresistible process. The WMD issue has delegitimized the war in the eyes of a substantial number of Americans. The failure to understand the dynamic of the Shiite community led to miscalculations about the nature of postwar Iraqi politics. The miscalculation about the guerrilla war created a U.S. dependence upon the Shia that is still unfolding. It is al-Sistani, in consultation with U.N. negotiators, who is setting the terms of the transfer of power. The U.S. position in Iraq is securely on Shiite terms, and that means it is on Iranian terms.

This is not an argument against the invasion from a strategic point of view, nor an argument that it was a failure. In the real world, things are rarely so clear-cut. But it does raise a vital question: Who exactly is Ahmad Chalabi? He has been caricatured as an American stooge and used as a tool by the Defense Department. As we consider the intelligence failures in Iraq, Chalabi's role in those failures and his relationship with senior Iranian officials of all factions, a question needs to be raised: Who was whose stooge?

The review of U.S. intelligence on Iraq will have to study many things. Many of those things will have nothing to do with Chalabi. But some of the most important things will pivot around intelligence directly or indirectly provided by Chalabi and his network of sources inside and outside Iraq. Given the events that have transpired, it is not unreasonable to expect the intelligence review to undertake an intense analysis of Chalabi's role, beginning with this question: What exactly was Chalabi's relationship with Iran from the 1980s onward?

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