Posted on 01/10/2005 7:32:00 AM PST by Thanatos
JANUARY 5, 2005
Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 778-9000
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I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................4
A. 60 Minutes Wednesday Background..............................................................................6
B. The Pursuit of a Story on President Bush’s TexANG Service ......................................7
C. Obtaining Documents ....................................................................................................8
D. The Production of the September 8 Segment ................................................................8
1. Efforts To Authenticate Documents ........................................................................9
2. Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents....................................................11
3. Barnes Interview ....................................................................................................12
4. White House Reaction ...........................................................................................13
E. The Vetting Process .....................................................................................................13
F. Authenticity of the Killian Documents ........................................................................18
G. The Aftermath..............................................................................................................19
1. The Initial Response ..............................................................................................20
2. The ABC News Report ..........................................................................................23
3. The Statements of Marian Carr Knox....................................................................24
4. The Change in Source............................................................................................25
5. The Apology ..........................................................................................................25
6. The Contact With the Kerry Campaign .................................................................26
H. Political Agenda...........................................................................................................28
I. Recommendations........................................................................................................28
III. PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION.................................................................................31
IV. BACKGROUND..............................................................................................................34
A. 60 Minutes – The Sunday Show ..................................................................................34
B. 60 Minutes Wednesday ................................................................................................34
V. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY..................36
A. Introduction..................................................................................................................36
B. Description of the Organization...................................................................................36
1. Correspondents, Producers and Associate Producers ............................................36
2. Executive Producer and The Senior Broadcast Producer ......................................38
3. Additional Layers of Review .................................................................................38
4. CBS’ Communications Group ...............................................................................39
C. The Unique Characteristics of the Production Process for the September 8
Segment........................................................................................................................39
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NATIONAL GUARD AND DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION..............................41
A. CBS News Standards ...................................................................................................41
B. Texas Air National Guard Background .......................................................................41
C. Background on Document Authentication...................................................................42
VII. THE PRODUCTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 REPORT ........................................44
A. The Initial Pursuit of the Story in 1999 .......................................................................45
B. The Continuing Investigation in 2000 .........................................................................49
C. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s National Media Appearances in February 2004...........51
1. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Allegations .............................................................52
2. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Retractions..............................................................53
3. Additional Questions Raised Regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s
Allegations .............................................................................................................53
4. Doubts at CBS News .............................................................................................55
5. Mapes’ Awareness of the Lieutenant Colonel Burkett News Coverage................56
D. The Continued Pursuit of a TexANG Story in the Summer of 2004...........................56
1. Following the Leads...............................................................................................57
2. Mounting Pressure To Get a Story.........................................................................58
E. The Potential for Documents Between Monday, August 23, 2004 – Thursday,
September 1, 2004 .......................................................................................................59
1. Courting Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.....................................................................59
2. Background Research on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett...........................................62
3. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
Regarding the Shifting Focus of the Story and Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s Requests .................................................................................................63
4. Mapes’ Initial Contact with the Kerry Campaign..................................................64
5. The Involvement of Dan Rather ............................................................................66
6. Ben Barnes’ Speech at a Kerry Campaign Rally ...................................................66
7. Other News Media Coverage of TexANG Issues Between August 23,
2004 and September 1, 2004..................................................................................67
F. Thursday, September 2, 2004 – Monday September 6, 2004......................................68
1. Thursday, September 2: The First Two Documents Were Obtained.....................68
a. Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett .............................................................68
b. Preliminary Review of the Documents ..................................................................70
c. Contact with Rather ...............................................................................................71
2. Friday, September 3, 2004: Additional Reporting and The Search for
Document Examiners.............................................................................................72
a. Additional Reporting .............................................................................................72
b. Retention of the Document Examiners ..................................................................73
(i) Qualifications of the Handwriting and Document Examiners.........................76
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(ii) The Panel’s Findings Regarding the Examiner Selection Process ..................77
c. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Lawyer ...............................77
d. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
Regarding Additional Burkett Demands................................................................79
3. Saturday, September 4, 2004: The Authentication Process Continued and
Other Issues............................................................................................................80
a. Contacts with the Document Examiners................................................................80
b. Other Background Reporting.................................................................................80
c. Rather’s Involvement.............................................................................................81
d. Mapes’ Communications with Murphy .................................................................82
4. Sunday, September 5, 2004: Document Authentication Issues,
Interviewing and Contact with Lockhart ...............................................................82
a. Additional Documents from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett......................................82
b. Further Attempts To Confirm the Killian Documents’ Content............................83
c. Concerns and Issues First Raised by the Document Examiners ............................84
(i) Emily Will........................................................................................................84
(ii) Linda James .....................................................................................................85
(iii)James Pierce.....................................................................................................85
(iv) Marcel Matley..................................................................................................86
d. Lieutenant Strong Interview ..................................................................................86
e. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett Regarding the Source and
Efforts To Find Chief Warrant Officer Conn ........................................................89
f. Mapes’ Contact with Joe Lockhart ........................................................................91
g. Return to New York and Discussion About the Documents .................................93
5. Press Coverage of TexANG Issues and the Timing of the September 8
Segment..................................................................................................................93
6. Monday, September 6, 2004: The Matley Interview and the Call with
Major General Hodges...........................................................................................95
a. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett ...............................................95
b. Colonel Hackworth Interview................................................................................96
c. Discussions Regarding When To Contact the White House .................................97
d. Matley Interview....................................................................................................98
(i) Meetings with Matley Prior to the Interview...................................................98
(ii) The Matley Interview.......................................................................................99
e. Telephone Call with Major General Hodges .......................................................101
f. Communications with Senior Management.........................................................104
G. Tuesday, September 7, 2004: Additional Interviews and the Vetting Process
Begins ........................................................................................................................104
1. Additional Attempts To Locate People Who Might Know About the
Documents ...........................................................................................................105
2. Contact with the Document Examiners and Their Concerns About the
Documents ...........................................................................................................106
a. Emily Will............................................................................................................106
b. Linda James .........................................................................................................108
c. Marcel Matley......................................................................................................108
d. James Pierce.........................................................................................................109
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e. Colonel Charles....................................................................................................109
f. Search for Other Document Examiners ...............................................................109
g. Miller’s Concerns................................................................................................110
h. Alerting Management ..........................................................................................110
3. Vetting Sessions...................................................................................................111
a. The Questions Mapes Was Asked .......................................................................112
b. Representations Made About the Source.............................................................112
c. Representations Made About the Document Examiners and the
Documents ...........................................................................................................113
d. Kartiganer’s Review of the Transcripts ...............................................................114
4. Ben Barnes Interview...........................................................................................115
5. The Promotion of the September 8 Segment .......................................................116
6. Notifying the White House ..................................................................................116
7. Two New Articles on Missing Records...............................................................117
H. Wednesday, September 8, 2004: Completing the Vetting Process and Airing
the Segment................................................................................................................118
1. Bartlett Interview .................................................................................................118
2. Vetting Meeting ...................................................................................................120
a. Discussion of the Documents...............................................................................120
b. The Source ...........................................................................................................121
c. Colonel Hackworth ..............................................................................................122
d. The Document Examiners....................................................................................122
e. Deficiencies in the Vetting Process .....................................................................123
3. Response at 60 Minutes Wednesday to the White House Interview....................124
4. Script Revisions ...................................................................................................124
5. First Screening .....................................................................................................125
6. Decision to Air the Show.....................................................................................126
7. CBS Evening News Promotional Piece: Late Afternoon......................................126
8. Final Screening ....................................................................................................126
I. The September 8 Segment Contained Inaccurate and Misleading Statements..........127
1. The Document Authentication Statement Lacked Support .................................127
2. The Lieutenant Strong Interview Excerpts Conveyed Inaccurate
Information ..........................................................................................................127
3. The Ben Barnes Interview Excerpts Were Misleading........................................130
VIII. WHETHER THE CONTENT AND FORMAT OF THE KILLIAN
DOCUMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OFFICIAL BUSH
RECORDS......................................................................................................................133
A. Comparing the Content of the Killian Documents and the Official Bush
Records ......................................................................................................................135
1. February 2, 1972 Memorandum ..........................................................................139
2. May 4, 1972 Memorandum .................................................................................140
3. May 19, 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Killian Memo to File.....................................141
4. August 1, 1972 Memorandum .............................................................................142
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5. June 24 and August 18, 1973 Memoranda...........................................................144
B. The Language and Format of the Killian Documents Do Not Match Those of
the Official Bush Records..........................................................................................145
1. Location of the Signature Block ..........................................................................146
2. Format of the Killian Signature Block.................................................................146
3. Abbreviation of “Texas Air National Guard”......................................................147
4. Abbreviation of “Fighter Interceptor Squadron” .................................................148
5. Abbreviation of “Group” .....................................................................................148
6. Abbreviation of “Officer Efficiency Report” ......................................................148
7. Abbreviation of “Lieutenant” ..............................................................................148
8. Proper Term for Evaluation Board ......................................................................149
9. Memorandum Addressed to “Sir”........................................................................149
10. The Superscript “th” ............................................................................................149
C. Concluding Observations on Meshing of Content and Language .............................150
IX. THE AFTERMATH......................................................................................................151
A. General Observations.................................................................................................151
B. September 8-9 – The Initial Attacks ..........................................................................153
C. CBS News Strategy, September 10-13, 2004 ............................................................159
1. Andrew Heyward’s September 10 Directive .......................................................159
2. CBS News’ Public Defense of the September 8 Segment...................................162
a. Development of the Strategy: The September 10 Conference Call....................162
b. The September 10 Press Statement......................................................................164
c. Failure to Have Experts to Defend the Documents and the September 10,
2004 CBS Evening News Broadcast.....................................................................166
d. 60 Minutes Wednesday Failed to Reassess Its Reporting ....................................173
(i) The Hunt for New Examiners........................................................................174
(ii) Conversations with Peter Tytell.....................................................................174
(iii)Major General Hodges...................................................................................175
(iv) Failure to Reassess CBS News’ Reporting....................................................178
e. September 11, 2004 .............................................................................................178
f. The Continued Defense: September 12-13 .........................................................182
D. The Beginning of Changes in CBS News Strategy: September 14-15......................187
1. The Initial Strategy on September 14 was Unchanged........................................187
2. Disclosure that Two 60 Minutes Wednesday Document Examiners Had
Concerns About the Killian Documents ..............................................................192
3. Knox’s Revelations..............................................................................................194
E. 60 Minutes Wednesday Develops a New Strategy Beginning September 15............199
1. September 15 and 16............................................................................................199
2. The First Indication of Contact with the Kerry Campaign and the On-
Camera Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett: September 17-18 .................201
3. Events Leading to the September 20 Apology ....................................................202
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4. The Lockhart Disclosures ....................................................................................208
A. Information that Might Suggest a Political Agenda ..................................................212
1. Rather and Mapes’ Long Pursuit of the TexANG Story......................................212
2. The Anti-Bush Sources........................................................................................212
3. Proposed Use of Colonel Hackworth...................................................................213
4. Kerry Campaign Connections..............................................................................214
B. Factors that Support a Conclusion that a Political Agenda Did Not Motivate
the September 8 Segment...........................................................................................214
1. The Previous Work of Rather and Mapes............................................................214
2. The Editing Process Added Balance....................................................................215
3. Assuming the Killian Documents Were Authentic, They Added New Data
to the Bush TexANG Record...............................................................................216
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................................217
XII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................221
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Exhibits 1A-1L Transcripts of 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News
Broadcasts Regarding the September 8 Segment
1A CBS Evening News, September 8
1B 60 Minutes Wednesday, September 8
1C CBS Evening News, September 9
1D CBS Evening News, September 10
1E CBS Weekend News, September 11
1F CBS Evening News, September 13
1G CBS Evening News, September 14
1H CBS Evening News, September 15
1I 60 Minutes Wednesday, September 15
1J CBS Evening News, September 20
1K CBS Evening News, September 21
1L CBS Evening News, September 22
Exhibits 2A-2F Documents Received from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2
and 5, 2004
2A February 2, 1972 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to
Major Harris
2B May 4, 1972 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to
Lieutenant Bush
2C May 19, 1972 Memo to File by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
2D August 1, 1972 Memorandum for Record by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
2E June 24, 1973 Memorandum to “Sir” by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
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2F August 18, 1973 Memo to File by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
Exhibits 3A-3L CBS News Media Statements Regarding the September 8 Segment
3A September 7 CBS News Promotion of Ben Barnes Interview
3B September 8 CBS News Promotion of Ben Barnes Interview
3C September 9 CBS News Statement
3D September 10 CBS News Statement
3E September 10 CBS News Media Alert
3F September 10 CBS News Promotion of a CBS Evening News Report on
the September 8 Segment
3G September 13 CBS News Promotion of a CBS Evening News Report on
the September 8 Segment
3H September 15 CBS News Promotion of September 15 60 Minutes
Wednesday Segment
3I September 20 CBS News Statement
3J September 20 Dan Rather Statement
3K September 21 CBS News Statement
3L September 22 CBS News Statement
Exhibit 4 Emily Will e-mail, September 5
Exhibit 5 Marcel Matley Handwritten Notes, September 6 Exhibit 6 Marcel Matley Typed-Up Handwritten Notes, September 10 Exhibit 7 Marcel Matley and James Pierce Draft and Final Letters, September 14 Exhibit 8 Dan Rather WCBS Interview, September 20 ix Exhibit 9A-9K Transcripts of Interviews related to the September 8 Segment and related CBS Evening News Reports (attached only to Web versions of this Report)
9A Ben Barnes Interview Transcript, September 7, 2004
9B Dan Bartlett Interview Transcript, September 8, 2004
9C Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett Interview Transcript, September 18, 2004
9D Bill Glennon Interview Transcript, September 13, 2004
9E Colonel David Hackworth Interview Transcript, September 6, 2004
9F Richard Katz Interview Transcript, September 13, 2004
9G Marian Carr Knox Interview Transcript, September 15, 2004
9H Marcel Matley Interview Transcript, September 6, 2004
9I Marcel Matley Interview Transcript, September 10, 2004
9J Jim Moore Interview Transcript, September 10, 2004
9K James Pierce Interview Transcript, September 14, 2004
9L Robert Strong Interview Transcript, September 5, 2004
Appendix 1 CBS News Standards Relevant to the Panel’s Report
Appendix 2 Background Data on Document Authentication
Appendix 3 Official Bush Records Relevant to Chapter VIII
Appendix 4 Panel’s Observations about Peter Tytell’s views on the Authenticity of the
Killian Documents
1
On September 8, 2004, CBS News’ 60 Minutes Wednesday aired a segment entitled “For
the Record” (the “September 8 Segment” or the “Segment”) concerning President Bush’s Texas
Air National Guard (“TexANG”) service.1 The first part of the Segment was an interview with
Ben Barnes, the former Lieutenant Governor of Texas and Speaker of the Texas House of
Representatives, who said that he had recommended that President Bush be given preferential
treatment to obtain a position in the TexANG in 1968. Whether President Bush had received
such preferential treatment had previously been the subject of many news stories dating back to
1994 when he first ran for public office.
The second part of the September 8 Segment highlighted four documents2 obtained by
60 Minutes Wednesday just a few days earlier. These documents were allegedly “taken from”
the personal files of the late Lieutenant Colonel Jerry B. Killian, the Commander of the 111th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron in which then-Lieutenant Bush served from May 1968 to October
1973. These documents, which were said to provide new information on Lieutenant Bush’s
TexANG service, were:
1. A memorandum dated May 4, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian ordered Lieutenant Bush to take his annual flying physical;
2. A file memorandum dated May 19, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian discussed a conversation with Lieutenant Bush about a transfer from Texas to Alabama to work on a political campaign, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s displeasure with the requested transfer;
3. A memorandum dated August 1, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that
he ordered Lieutenant Bush suspended from flight status due to his failure to meet
TexANG standards and his failure to take his required flying physical; and
1 Transcripts of the September 8 Segment and the other 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News reports
pertaining to the Segment that aired from September 8 through September 22 are attached as Exhibits 1A-1L to this
Report.
2 These four documents, along with two others obtained by 60 Minutes Wednesday, are referred to collectively as
the “Killian documents.” Copies of the six Killian documents are attached as Exhibits 2A-2F to this Report.
4. A file memorandum dated August 18, 1973 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that a retired TexANG General was putting pressure on various officers to “sugar coat” Lieutenant Bush’s officer evaluation.
In referring to the Killian documents, the September 8 Segment reported that 60 Minutes
Wednesday “consulted with a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the
material is authentic.” In further support of the documents, former TexANG Lieutenant Robert
Strong, identified as a “friend and colleague of Colonel Jerry Killian,” was asked whether there
was “any doubt in your mind that these are genuine?” Lieutenant Strong responded, “Well, they
are compatible with the way that business was done at that time. They are compatible with the
man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t see anything in the documents that are
discordant with what were the times, what were the situations, and what were the people that
were involved.”
Within hours after the Segment aired, questions about the authenticity of the Killian
documents were raised, initially in an outpouring from the so-called blogosphere3 on the Internet.
These early questions focused mainly on the typography of the documents. Specifically, it was
claimed that since the documents contained a superscript “th,” were proportionally spaced and
had Times New Roman font style, they must be forgeries because typewriters in existence at the
time the documents were purportedly written did not have the capabilities to produce these
features. This was quickly followed by a raging media firestorm in print, on the air and on the
Internet about the documents’ authenticity. In response to this crisis, CBS News issued a
number of statements and broadcast additional reports between September 9 and 15 defending
the Segment and the authenticity of the documents (the “Aftermath”).4 Finally, on
September 20, 2004, Andrew Heyward, President of CBS News, issued a statement that said,
among other things, “Based on what we now know, CBS News cannot prove that the documents
are authentic, which is the only acceptable journalistic standard to justify using them in the
report. We should not have used them. That was a mistake we deeply regret.”
On September 22, 2004, CBS News announced the appointment of an Independent
Review Panel consisting of Dick Thornburgh, former Attorney General of the United States, and
3 A blog is a website that contains an online personal journal, often with reflections, comments, and hyperlinks
provided by the writer.
4 Copies of the CBS News press statements issued in connection with the Segment between September 8 and
September 22 are attached as Exhibits 3A-3L to this Report.
Louis D. Boccardi, former Chief Executive Officer and President of The Associated Press, (the
“Panel”) to examine the process by which the September 8 Segment was prepared and broadcast.
The Panel was also asked to examine the circumstances surrounding the public statements and
news reports by CBS News after September 8 defending the Segment, as well as to make any
recommendations it deemed appropriate. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP was
retained as counsel to the Panel.
4
The stated goal of CBS News is to have a reputation for journalism of the highest quality
and unimpeachable integrity. To meet this objective, CBS News expects its personnel to adhere
to published internal Standards based on two core principles: accuracy and fairness. The Panel
finds that both the September 8 Segment itself and the statements and news reports by CBS
News that followed the Segment failed to meet either of these core principles.
The Panel has not been able to conclude with absolute certainty whether the Killian
documents are authentic or forgeries. However, the Panel has identified a number of issues that
raise serious questions about the authenticity of the documents and their content. With better
reporting, these questions should have been raised before the September 8 Segment aired.
While the focus of the Panel’s investigation at the outset was on the Killian documents,
the investigation quickly identified considerable and fundamental deficiencies relating to the
reporting and production of the September 8 Segment and the statements and news reports
during the Aftermath. These problems were caused primarily by a myopic zeal to be the first
news organization to broadcast what was believed to be a new story about President Bush’s
TexANG service, and the rigid and blind defense of the Segment after it aired despite numerous
indications of its shortcomings.
The most serious defects in the reporting and production of the September 8 Segment were:
1. The failure to obtain clear authentication of any of the Killian documents from any document examiner;
2. The false statement in the September 8 Segment that an expert had authenticated the Killian documents when all he had done was authenticate one signature from one document used in the Segment;
3. The failure of 60 Minutes Wednesday management to scrutinize the publicly available, and at times controversial, background of the source of the documents, retired Texas Army National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett;
4. The failure to find and interview the individual who was understood at the outset to be Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s source of the Killian documents, and thus to establish the chain of custody;
5. The failure to establish a basis for the statement in the Segment that the documents “were taken from Colonel Killian’s personal files”;
6. The failure to develop adequate corroboration to support the statements in the Killian documents and to carefully compare the Killian documents to official TexANG records, which would have identified, at a minimum, notable inconsistencies in content and format;
7. The failure to interview a range of former National Guardsmen who served with Lieutenant Colonel Killian and who had different perspectives about the documents;
8. The misleading impression conveyed in the Segment that Lieutenant Strong had authenticated the content of the documents when he did not have the personal knowledge to do so;
9. The failure to have a vetting process capable of dealing effectively with the production speed, significance and sensitivity of the Segment; and 10. The telephone call prior to the Segment’s airing by the producer of the Segment to a senior campaign official of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry - a clear conflict of interest - that created the appearance of a political bias.
Once questions were raised about the September 8 Segment, the reporting thereafter was
mishandled and compounded the damage done. Among the more egregious shortcomings during
the Aftermath were:
1. The strident defense of the September 8 Segment by CBS News without adequately probing whether any of the questions raised had merit;
2. Allowing many of the same individuals who produced and vetted the by-then controversial September 8 Segment to also produce the follow-up news reports defending the Segment;
3. The inaccurate press statements issued by CBS News after the broadcast of the Segment that the source of the documents was “unimpeachable” and that experts had vouched for their authenticity;
4. The misleading stories defending the Segment that aired on the CBS Evening News after September 8 despite strong and multiple indications of serious flaws;
5. The efforts by 60 Minutes Wednesday to find additional document examiners who would vouch for the authenticity of the documents instead of identifying the best examiners available regardless of whether they would support this position; and 6. Preparing news stories that sought to support the Segment, instead of providing accurate and balanced coverage of a raging controversy.
The Panel expresses the earnest hope, however, that the failures identified in this Report
will not induce timidity at CBS News or chill its investigative reporting. Done accurately and
fairly, investigative reporting serves a critical role in a free society. Done inaccurately, it can
cause great harm. The recommendations made by the Panel at the end of this Report will, we
hope and expect, strengthen 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS News’ capacity to fulfill this role.
60 Minutes Wednesday first aired in 1999. While similar in format and concept to the
original 60 Minutes which began in 1968 and which continues to air on Sunday, there is little
overlap between the two shows. They have separate staffs and offices, and work on distinct
stories.
At 60 Minutes Wednesday, the Executive Producer and Senior Broadcast Producer are
ultimately responsible for the production of the stories that are broadcast. They work closely
with correspondents and producers to identify and develop stories. They also are responsible for
determining the appropriate amount of vetting that a segment needs before it is ready for broadcast.
Executive Producer Josh Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Mary Murphy were the
senior producers for the September 8 Segment. Senior Producer Esther Kartiganer, who is
responsible for ensuring that excerpts of any interview used in a story are a fair representation of
the entire interview, assisted them in the vetting of the Segment. All three assumed their
positions with 60 Minutes Wednesday during the summer of 2004. They each had significant
experience at CBS News and all had previously worked at 60 Minutes.
The September 8 Segment was the first original story aired for which Howard was the
Executive Producer and Murphy was the Senior Broadcast Producer. Moreover, neither had an
extensive working relationship with either Dan Rather or Mary Mapes, the correspondent and
producer, respectively, of the September 8 Segment. The Panel recognizes that an effective
working relationship between an Executive or Senior Broadcast Producer and the people who
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investigate and produce a show can take time to develop. This consideration, along with the
production speed, significance and sensitivity of the story, caused the President of CBS News,
Andrew Heyward, to task his direct report, Betsy West, Senior Vice President, Prime Time, CBS
News, with closer supervision of the production of the Segment than was typical.
Correspondents at 60 Minutes Wednesday work with producers they select to develop
ideas for stories and to prepare a story once the concept is approved by 60 Minutes Wednesday
management. The correspondents have varying degrees of involvement in investigating and
developing stories, and the producers typically take the lead in this process. Rather and Mapes
had worked together for more than five years, and Rather gave Mapes significant responsibility
to produce stories, in part due to the great confidence and respect that he had for her work, and in
part due to the demands of Rather’s other duties at CBS News. In late August and early
September 2004, as the September 8 Segment was being developed, Rather had even greater
demands on his time than usual as he was covering the Republican Convention in New York
City and then a hurricane in Florida. Thus, he was not able to spend extensive time on the development of the September 8 Segment.
Mapes has been with CBS News since 1989 and joined 60 Minutes Wednesday in 1999,
working exclusively as a producer assigned to Rather. Mapes was described by many people
interviewed by the Panel as one of the most highly regarded producers at 60 Minutes Wednesday.
Mapes’ reputation grew dramatically in 2003 and 2004 as she produced a number of noteworthy
stories with Rather, including segments on Senator Strom Thurmond’s biracial daughter and the
Abu Ghraib prison abuses.
The interests of Rather and Mapes in pursuing a story about President Bush’s TexANG
service date back to at least 1999. At that time, and again during the presidential election of
2000, they investigated allegations that then-Texas Governor Bush had received preferential
treatment in getting into the TexANG in 1968. Although Rather did two interviews about the
subject in 1999, no story was put together for airing. They did little further investigating on this
matter until 2004, when numerous stories appeared in the media about both presidential candidates’ military service during the Vietnam War era.
8
On August 23, 2004, Mapes learned from a source that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett might
have a previously unreleased document related to President Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes
believed that a number of news organizations were pursuing this same document from him. She
and Michael Smith, a freelance journalist from Texas who was working with Mapes on this
story, thereafter had a number of conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in an effort to
determine whether he had the document. Ultimately, Mapes and Smith met with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett and his wife on Thursday, September 2, when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
provided Mapes and Smith with two of the Killian documents: the August 1, 1972 memorandum
and another document dated June 24, 1973, which was not used on the September 8 Segment.
On September 5, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided Smith with four more documents, three of
which were to be used on the September 8 Segment.
Smith told the Panel that when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided the documents on
September 2, he said that he had received them anonymously in the mail. Mapes had a different
recollection of what Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said at the same meeting about the source of the
documents. Mapes said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett stated that he received the documents
after he was interviewed on a national television show in February 2004 concerning President
Bush’s TexANG service, but did not say how he received them or from whom. Mapes added
that she spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on several occasions over the next couple of days to
get more information about the source of the documents. Ultimately, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
told Mapes on either September 4 or 5 that he had received the documents from another former
Texas Army National Guardsman, Chief Warrant Officer George Conn, a statement that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett would later admit was not true. Mapes and her team of associate
producers did virtually nothing to attempt to contact Chief Warrant Officer Conn to confirm this
story and further trace the chain of custody of the documents.
Once the documents were obtained by Mapes and Smith, there was a frenetic effort to
“crash” the Segment, meaning to prepare the Segment for broadcast quickly. Among other
things, the documents needed to be authenticated, five interviews had to be taped, including with
former Lieutenant Governor Barnes, and with White House Communications Director Dan
9
Bartlett, and the script for the story needed to be written and vetted. Despite this enormous
amount of work and the great sensitivity of the subject matter, it was decided to move up the date
the story would air from September 29, the first scheduled show for the 60 Minutes Wednesday
fall season, to September 8, a mere six days after the first Killian documents were obtained and
only three days after the four other Killian documents were received. This decision on timing
was driven in significant part by competitive pressures, as other news organizations were working on stories related to President Bush’s TexANG service.
Since Mapes’ regular associate producer was out on maternity leave, another associate
producer with whom she had not previously worked, Yvonne Miller, was assigned late on
Thursday, September 2, to assist Mapes in putting the story together. The first assignment that
Mapes gave to Miller on Friday, September 3, was to have the documents authenticated. Neither
Mapes nor Miller had any prior experience in document or handwriting analysis or the mechanics of document authentication.
The field of forensic document examination is fraught with controversy and has differing
and sometimes antagonistic certifying organizations. However, it is generally agreed that
authentication of a document is best done with the original, so that a chemical analysis of the ink
and paper, as well as a close review of any signature and the typography, can be conducted. In
addition, document examiners typically reach their conclusions with varying degrees of
certainty. A common finding is that the document in question does not have any indication that
it is not authentic.
Given the tight deadline, Miller did not have sufficient time to learn the fundamentals of
document authentication. Had she known the basics, she would have realized that it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to authenticate the Killian documents because they were
copies, the alleged author was dead and no person could be located who was alleged to have
been present when the documents were prepared. She instead called various people who she
believed had experience in the document and handwriting field to identify potential examiners
with requisite expertise. After approximately six hours of work on Friday, September 3, Miller
had found four examiners who seemed to have expertise in document and handwriting authentication and who were willing to work over the Labor Day weekend.
The four examiners initially were provided with the two documents obtained from
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2: (i) the June 24, 1973 memorandum, which was not
used in the Segment but included a signature which purported to be that of Lieutenant Colonel
Killian; and (ii) the August 1, 1972 memorandum, which only contained initials. The four
examiners also were provided with 17 other pages of documents from Lieutenant Bush’s
TexANG records that had been obtained from the government via requests pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) (the “official Bush records”) so that Lieutenant Colonel
Killian’s purported signature on the June 24, 1973 memorandum could be compared with his
signatures on those documents.
Over the next few days, the examiners analyzed the two documents and had several
conversations with both Mapes and Miller. Two of the examiners told the Panel that they
informed Mapes and Miller that they had various concerns about the documents. Significantly,
all four of the examiners told the Panel that they informed Mapes and Miller that they could not
authenticate the documents, primarily because they were copies.
One of the examiners, Marcel Matley, informed Miller on September 5 that based on his
initial review, he believed that the signatures from the June 24, 1973 memorandum and those
from the official Bush records were from the same person since he noticed “consistent
inconsistencies.” Mapes decided to bring Matley to New York on September 6 to be interviewed
for the September 8 Segment. When Matley arrived in New York, he was shown the four other
documents provided by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on the previous day. Matley told the Panel
that he informed Mapes and Miller at the time that he could not authenticate the documents, and
Matley’s contemporaneous notes from September 6 support this recollection.5 Instead, Matley
advised Mapes and Miller that he could comment only on the signatures of Lieutenant Colonel
Killian that were included in some of the documents. Matley opined that while one of the
signatures of Lieutenant Colonel Killian that he had examined had “conspicuous differences”
from signatures on the official Bush records, the “preponderance of available handwriting
evidence” was that one person had written all of the signatures. Matley repeated this opinion in
an interview with Rather that evening. It was ultimately decided not to include any portion of
the Matley interview in the September 8 Segment, at least in part because it was felt that Matley
did not clearly explain his opinion.
5 Copies of Matley’s handwritten notes from September 6 are attached as Exhibit 5 to this Report.
2. Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents
Aside from the efforts to authenticate the documents, Mapes also attempted to locate
people who could verify the content of the documents. One such person contacted by Mapes
was Lieutenant Robert Strong, who had served as an administrative officer in the TexANG.
Lieutenant Strong had previously been interviewed by Rather for a possible story in 1999. At
that time, he was asked about preferential treatment in getting into the TexANG, and he said that
a number of people appeared to get preferential treatment. He noted at the time, however, that he
had no personal knowledge about whether Lieutenant Bush received preferential treatment in
getting into the TexANG.
On September 5, as the production of the September 8 Segment gathered force, Rather
left his coverage of a hurricane in Florida to interview Lieutenant Strong in Austin, Texas.
Mapes was also present at the interview. Lieutenant Strong was shown the Killian documents
for the first time 20 minutes before the interview began. During the interview, Lieutenant Strong
was asked whether he had any doubt that the documents were genuine. Lieutenant Strong
responded, “Well, they are compatible with the way business was done at that time. They are
compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t see anything in the
documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the situations and what were
the people that were involved.” This response was included in the September 8 Segment.
The Panel finds this use of Lieutenant Strong’s statement to be misleading. Lieutenant
Strong told the Panel that he resigned from the TexANG in March 1972, two months before the
date of the earliest Killian document used in the September 8 Segment, that he had no personal
knowledge of Lieutenant Bush’s service in the TexANG, and that he did not have any personal
knowledge of the content of the documents. Lieutenant Strong explained to the Panel that he
gave the response he did because Mapes had assured him that four experts were in the process of
authenticating the documents. Lieutenant Strong advised the Panel that his response should have
included the caveat that he did not have any personal knowledge of the content of the documents,
but if they were authentic, then they reflected the “principles” of Lieutenant Colonel Killian.
Rather and Mapes arrived back in New York after the Lieutenant Strong interview early
in the morning of September 6. The rush to prepare the Segment for possible broadcast on
September 8 continued in full force. Among other matters, Mapes called Major General Bobby
Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commanding officer during the relevant time period, on
Monday, September 6 to discuss the content of the Killian documents. Mapes told the Panel that
Major General Hodges would not agree to an on-camera interview, but agreed to have the
documents read to him over the telephone. Mapes told the Panel that he confirmed the content of
the four documents and that this was a key factor in bolstering the conclusion that the documents
were authentic.
Major General Hodges told the Panel a different version of his conversation with Mapes.
Major General Hodges said that he did not confirm the content of the documents but only said
that he and Lieutenant Colonel Killian had discussed the fact that Lieutenant Bush had missed a
flying physical and that Lieutenant Bush wanted to transfer to Alabama. Major General Hodges
also told the Panel that he did not believe that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had ever ordered
anyone to take a physical, including Lieutenant Bush. Major General Hodges further told the
Panel that General Walter (“Buck”) Staudt had never pressured him regarding Lieutenant Bush,
as alleged in the August 18, 1973 memorandum. Moreover, Major General Hodges said that
when he finally saw the documents after the September 8 Segment aired, he was convinced that
they were not authentic and told this to Rather and Mapes in a telephone call on September 10,
2004.
Major General Hodges gave the Panel a number of specific reasons why he did not
believe that the documents were authentic, including the use of a number of allegedly erroneous
terms and abbreviations. Some of the deviations from standard format and usage mentioned by
Major General Hodges included: (i) the location and format of the signature block; (ii) the
abbreviations for Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Texas Air National Guard, group and officer
efficiency training report; (iii) the use of the terms “billet” and “billets”; and (iv) the reference to
a flight review board. While some of these observations may seem trivial, each branch of the
military uses specified standard abbreviations and terms. Major General Hodges did not think
that Lieutenant Colonel Killian, with whom he served for 20 years, would have written documents with so many deviations from standard format.
On Tuesday, September 7, Rather interviewed Ben Barnes, and a number of excerpts
from this interview appeared in the September 8 Segment. The Panel has several concerns about
whether the airing of the Barnes interview excerpts constituted fair and accurate reporting by
60 Minutes Wednesday. For example, the excerpts pertaining to Barnes conveyed the
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unmistakable impression that President Bush gained entry into the TexANG through preferential
treatment. Barnes stated, however, that he did not know if his call to a TexANG official back in
1968 made any difference with respect to President Bush. Further, Mapes had been told
previously by several former TexANG officers that President Bush entered the TexANG without
any preferential treatment. Finally, Mapes confirmed to the Panel that there was conflicting
information about whether there even was a waiting list to get in the TexANG as of the spring of
1968. At a minimum, these issues should have been disclosed to the 60 Minutes Wednesday
management, but they were not.
The morning of Wednesday, September 8, the Killian documents were delivered to White
House Communications Director Dan Bartlett in anticipation of an interview to get a reaction
from the White House. CBS News correspondent John Roberts interviewed Bartlett at around
11 a.m. at the White House. Bartlett did not dispute the authenticity of the documents at that
time but denied in the interview that the documents showed that President Bush did anything
improper during his service in the TexANG. The Panel was informed by West, Howard, Mapes,
Kartiganer and two CBS lawyers involved in the vetting, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard
Altabef, that Bartlett’s failure to challenge the authenticity of the documents hours before the
Segment was to air provided further comfort that the documents were authentic.
All 60 Minutes Wednesday stories go through a vetting process. The degree of vetting
depends on a variety of factors, including whether the story is an investigative report and what
information is presented in the segment. At a minimum, the vetting of all stories entails a review
by Executive Producer Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Murphy, a review by Senior
Producer Kartiganer of the excerpts of interviews that are to be used in stories to ensure that they
reflect a fair edit from the full interviews and a final fairness and accuracy screening by West.
Sternberg and Altabef, who have been in-house counsel for CBS for over 20 years each, also
may become involved in the vetting process depending on the type of story and issues involved.The September 8 Segment should have received the highest degree of vetting because, among other reasons, the Segment:
1. Was a major investigative piece that was produced in a very short period of time;
2. Was pursued intermittently for over five years, which could cause the correspondent and producer to become too personally invested in the story;
3. Was to be released in the middle of a presidential campaign and was highly negative to one candidate (President Bush);
4. Involved a source who did not want his identity disclosed;
5. Involved a second source who had never been located by 60 Minutes Wednesday;
6. Relied on documents that could not be verified by their purported author because he was deceased;
8. Was the first original story aired under the direction of the new 60 Minutes Wednesday management team.
The Panel finds that the vetting process for the September 8 Segment was seriously
flawed. The Panel believes that this was caused in large part by the speed with which this
Segment was produced. The Panel also believes that the vetting process was not sufficient
because too much deference was given to Mapes because of her experience and much admired
history at CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday, as well as her association with Rather. Rather
does not appear to have participated in any of the vetting sessions or to have even seen the
Segment before it was aired.
Mapes began to write the script in earnest on Tuesday, September 7. There were several
meetings and screenings to vet the script with various combinations of West, Howard, Murphy,
Kartiganer, Sternberg and Altabef on September 7 and 8. West typically did not get involved in
the vetting process until the story was ready for a final screening. Heyward, however, asked
West by no later than September 7 to become more deeply involved, which evidenced his
recognition that this was an important and potentially controversial story. Thus, Heyward
cautioned West and Howard in an e-mail on September 7 not to be “stampede[d]” and that
“we’re going to have to defend every syllable of this one . . .”
Given the significance of the Killian documents, it was critical for the vetters to know the
background, identity, credibility, motivations, biases and other relevant information about the
sources of the documents. All agree that they knew virtually nothing about Chief Warrant
Officer Conn, who at that time was thought to be the ultimate source. Mapes and the vetters
have different accounts as to what she told them about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Most of the
vetters told the Panel that they did not think they heard the name Bill Burkett as the source of the
documents prior to the airing of the Segment but did know that the source was a former National
Guardsman. Even if the name Bill Burkett had been mentioned, all the vetters said it would not
have meant anything to them.
Significantly, no one said that Mapes gave any indication of the level of controversy in
her source’s background. They told the Panel that the source was described by Mapes in
different meetings and conversations on September 6 through 8 in various terms, including
“solid,” “without bias,” “credible,” “a Texas Republican of a different chromosome,” a “John
McCain supporter,” “reliable” and “a maverick.” The only significant negatives about her
immediate source that they described hearing from Mapes were that he had a quarrel with the
National Guard over disability payments, that an investigation that he and three other National
Guardsmen had been directed to conduct concerning the National Guard had been abruptly
stopped and that he was not a supporter of President Bush.
These descriptions are in stark contrast to how Mapes told the Panel she described her
source during the vetting process. First, Mapes said that she did not shield Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s name from West, Howard, Murphy or Kartiganer. Second, Mapes said that she
provided all of the details of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s background that she knew to these
same people, that he became a controversial figure in February 2004 when his story about the
“scrubbing” of President Bush’s TexANG records had been publicized and challenged, that he
was a “moralistic whistleblower,” and that he was one of the most vocal critics of President
Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes also claimed that she disclosed less significant details about
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, including the name of his wife, his financial condition and the fact
that he used a dog to assist him with an illness.
As noted above, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had told Mapes on either September 4 or 5
that he received the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Mapes told the Panel that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told her that Chief Warrant Officer Conn, if contacted by Mapes,
would not confirm that he had provided the documents to him. Mapes said that she attempted to
call Chief Warrant Officer Conn at an address in Texas, but was unable to contact him. Mapes
added that it was her understanding that he was living in Germany, but she did not try to locate
him in Germany. Mapes further told the Panel that since she believed she had independent
16
verification of the content of the documents from Major General Hodges late on Monday,
September 6, she did not believe it necessary to pursue Chief Warrant Officer Conn further.
The Panel finds this explanation difficult to accept. Mapes had known that Chief
Warrant Officer Conn was the alleged source of the Killian documents since sometime on
September 5 at the latest and could not have known in advance that Major General Hodges
allegedly would confirm the content of the documents late on September 6. Further, the
Segment would contain the statement that the Killian documents “were taken from Colonel
Killian’s personal files.” Mapes told the Panel that she was told this by Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett, but had not been able to corroborate it with Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Thus, it
appears to the Panel that a crash to air the story was under way without effective consideration of
the chain of custody.
In contrast, the vetters told the Panel that Mapes informed them that the source of the
documents received them from another person who could not be located. None of the vetters
recalls hearing Chief Warrant Officer Conn’s name or other details about this ultimate source of
the Killian documents. The failure to obtain more information about the chain of custody should
have raised the bar for proof of authenticity. Instead, it was not pursued and Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s later different version as to how he got the documents would prove to overwhelm
60 Minutes Wednesday’s dogged but doomed defense of the Segment.
The Panel finds that the vetters should have asked more questions about the ultimate
source of the Killian documents. Given the importance of the documents to the Segment, the
high sensitivity of the story, and the use in the Segment of the uncorroborated assertion that the
documents came “from Colonel Killian’s personal files,” it was critical to understand precisely
and in great detail how the source came to acquire the documents. Without a detailed
understanding of the ultimate source of the documents and the chain of custody, the other efforts
to authenticate the documents and their content became that much more critical.
The authentication of the Killian documents is another area where a serious conflict
exists between what the Panel was told by the vetters and what Mapes told the Panel. Mapes
said that she told everyone involved in the story that there were four examiners and that while
two of the examiners (Matley and James Pierce) could not authenticate the documents, they
found “no exclusionary points” that would preclude them from being authentic. Mapes told the
Panel that the statement from the September 8 Segment that “we consulted a handwriting analyst
17
and document expert who believes the material is authentic” was based on conclusions by
Matley. Mapes further told the Panel that she disclosed that a third examiner (Emily Will) had
raised questions, but had deferred to Matley when she was told that he had endorsed the documents, and that a fourth examiner (Linda James) said she could not authenticate the documents without reviewing the originals.
The recollections of the vetters concerning what they were told by Mapes about the
document examiners were not always clear or consistent. Most of the vetters told the Panel that
Mapes told them that there were four examiners, including the “Dean” of document examiners
(Matley), who had authenticated all or some of the documents, without any reservation or
qualification. In any event, none of the vetters believed that there were any outstanding concerns
related to the authentication of the documents prior to the airing of the Segment.
Regardless of what was told to the vetters about the examiners, the Panel is seriously
troubled by the vetting process pertaining to the authentication of the Killian documents. Like
Mapes and Miller, none of the individuals involved in the vetting process had any prior
experience in the authentication of documents or handwriting analysis. None of these people
sought to learn more about the document authentication process, including the limitations of
having copies instead of originals. Had any of the vetters spoken to any of the examiners, they
would have immediately realized the challenges posed in attempting to authenticate a copy of a
document.
Mapes also told the Panel that she informed the vetters that the substance of the
documents had been verified by another National Guardsman, Major General Hodges, whose
name was included in an early version of the script that was available to the vetters on
September 8, though his name was not actually used on the air in the final script.6 Mapes told
the vetters that Major General Hodges’ confirmation of the content of the documents gave her
significant additional comfort as to the authenticity of the documents.
This alleged confirmation by Major General Hodges started to march 60 Minutes
Wednesday into dangerous and ultimately unsustainable territory: the notion that since the
content of the documents was felt to be true, demonstrating the authenticity of the documents
became less important.
6 However, as noted above, Major General Hodges denied to the Panel that he gave such confirmation.
The Panel’s investigation included interviewing other people who might have had
knowledge of the content of the documents, but who were not interviewed by 60 Minutes
Wednesday about the documents prior to airing the September 8 Segment. These people
included officers who served at Ellington Air Force Base (“Ellington AFB”) with Lieutenant
Colonel Killian, including Lieutenant Colonel Doug Via, former Operations Officer for the 111th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron, and Colonel Rufus Martin, former Personnel Staff Officer for the
147th Fighter Interceptor Group. Neither Lieutenant Colonel Via nor Colonel Martin believed
that the documents were authentic or that their content was correct.
The Panel was not able to reach a definitive conclusion as to the authenticity of the
Killian documents. However, Mapes made oral and written presentations to the Panel during its
investigation in an effort to demonstrate that the content of the Killian documents was in fact
authentic. These presentations were done primarily by comparing the Killian documents with
official Bush records to show how well she believed that the Killian documents “meshed” with
the official Bush records.
The Panel finds that the meshing analysis submitted by Mapes does not withstand
scrutiny for two reasons. First, in many instances, the content of the Killian documents does not
mesh well substantively with the official Bush records. Second, the Killian documents vary in
significant ways from the standard format and jargon of documents issued by the 147th Fighter
Interceptor Group in the early 1970s. Thus, the Panel believes that there remain substantial
questions regarding the authenticity of the Killian documents. The Panel believes that careful
reporting prior to airing the Segment should have identified these questions and, at a minimum,
should have delayed the broadcast so that more reporting could be conducted. In terms of meshing with the official Bush documents and the deviations in format, the Panel observes the following by way of example:
May 4, 1972 Memorandum. The official Bush records make no mention of this alleged order for Lieutenant Bush to take a physical, and Guardsmen who served with Lieutenant Colonel Killian, including Major General Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Via and Colonel Martin, told the Panel that they never heard of any such order.
The format of this document varies from standard format:
The signature block is on the right, while standard format was for the block to be on the left.
Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s name is listed as “JERRY B. KILLIAN,” while it was standard for his name to be “JERRY B. KILLIAN, Lt Col, TexANG.”
Fighter Interceptor Squadron in the official Bush records is overwhelmingly abbreviated as “FIS”; in this Killian document, it is abbreviated as “F.I.S.”
May 19, 1972 Memo to File. The first paragraph pertaining to Lieutenant Bush’s obtaining equivalent training at a location in Alabama meshes reasonably well with the official Bush records.
August 1, 1972 Memorandum. This memorandum suggests that Lieutenant Colonel Killian verbally suspended Bush from flying status. However, the official Bush records document that it was then-Colonel Hodges who suspended Lieutenant Bush and that he did so solely because Lieutenant Bush had failed to take his flight physical and not for the additional reason that he had failed to meet TexANG standards.
The format of this document varies from standard format:
Same signature block location and format deviations as with the May 4, 1972 memorandum Lieutenant Colonel Killian is shown to have used only initials to sign this document. Lieutenant Colonel Killian always wrote out his full name in the official Bush records.
This document abbreviates Texas Air National Guard as “USAF/TexANG.” The official Bush records from the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group abbreviate it as “TexANG.”
The memorandum calls for the convening of a “flight review board.” The proper term is “Flying Evaluation Board.”
August 18, 1973 Memorandum. This memorandum states that retired General Staudt was putting pressure on then-Colonel Hodges to provide Lieutenant Bush with a good Officer Efficiency Report. No official Bush record supports this document and the Guardsmen interviewed by the Panel, including General Staudt and Major General Hodges, deny that General Staudt exerted any influence after he retired.
The language in this document varies from standard language:
The standard abbreviation for “Group” was “Gp”; this document abbreviates Group in two places as “Grp.”
This memorandum abbreviates Officer Efficiency Training Report as “OETR.” The official Bush records abbreviate it as “OER,” and Guardsmen confirmed for the Panel that OER is the correct abbreviation.
Almost immediately after the September 8 Segment aired, there was an escalating
controversy about the authenticity of the Killian documents. The criticisms focused initially on
the allegation that typewriters that existed during the relevant period did not have the ability to
create the superscript “th” that was included in the May 4, 1972 and August 18, 1973
memoranda, that they could not have produced the proportional spacing that all four documents
allegedly contained, and that they did not have the Times New Roman font allegedly utilized in
all four documents.
Over the next week or so, CBS News issued a number of press statements and CBS
Evening News reports that staunchly defended the September 8 Segment despite increasingly
strong indications that the reporting for the Segment was flawed. The Panel finds that these
statements and reports contained numerous misstatements and inaccuracies. Moreover, the Panel
finds that once serious questions were raised, the defense of the Segment became more rigid and
emphatic, and that virtually no attempt was made to determine whether the questions raised had
merit.
The initial response of 60 Minutes Wednesday was to stand by the September 8 Segment,
a concept familiar to many journalists. This defense is only effective, however, when a story can
be proved to be true, even in hindsight. The rush to air and the flawed vetting put 60 Minutes
Wednesday in the untenable position of publicly defending the Segment, but being unable to
prove it.
On Thursday, September 9, in response to growing criticism of the Killian documents on
the Internet and in mainstream media like ABC News and The Washington Post, CBS News
issued its first statement defending the Segment. That statement said that the documents had
been “thoroughly examined and their authenticity vouched for by independent experts.” The
Panel finds that this statement is not accurate as no expert had vouched for the authenticity of the
documents.
On Friday, September 10, press coverage about the authenticity of the documents
intensified. In an effort to respond to the mounting criticism, CBS News issued a statement that
the September 8 Segment “was not based solely on recovered documents, but rather on a
preponderance of evidence, including documents that were provided by unimpeachable
sources. . . . . In addition, the documents are backed up not only by independent handwriting and
forensic document experts, but sources familiar with their content.” The Panel finds that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett could not be reasonably described as an “unimpeachable source,”
given his own inconsistent public statements, as well as his criticisms of President Bush and the
National Guard. Further, the statement was inaccurate because the Killian documents were not
backed up by forensic document experts.
The CBS Evening News on September 10 included a report that stated that an official
Bush record from 1968 included the same superscript “th” as in the Killian documents and that
the owner of a company that distributes typeface said that Times New Roman typeface had been
available since 1931. Moreover, the report continued that “[d]ocument and handwriting
examiner Marcel Matley analyzed the documents for CBS News. He says he believes they are
real . . . .” The report then included an excerpt of the September 6 interview with Matley in
which he discussed only the signature on one of the documents and not the authenticity of the
documents themselves. Finally, the report stated that Lieutenant Strong was “standing by his
judgment that the documents are real” and replayed the excerpt of his interview from the September 8 Segment.
The Panel finds a number of deficiencies with the September 10 CBS Evening News
report. First, while an official Bush record did include a superscript “th,” it is far different in
appearance from the superscript “th” in the May 4, 1972 and August 18, 1973 memoranda.
Second, while Times New Roman typeface may have been available since 1931, the Panel
understands that it was only available in typeset machines and not in typewriters during the
period the Killian documents were allegedly written. Third, neither Matley nor Lieutenant
Strong ever authenticated the documents or said that they were “real.” Fourth, no one asked
Lieutenant Strong after the Segment aired and before the September 10 report whether he was
“standing by his judgment.”
Friday, September 10, should have been a watershed day in dealing with the growing
controversy about the Segment. First, CBS News President Heyward, concerned about
mainstream media’s increasingly critical reporting about the Segment, directed Betsy West early
that morning to investigate the details of the examiners’ opinions and confidential sources that
allegedly supported the Segment. No such investigation was done at that time. Had this
directive been followed promptly, the Panel does not believe that 60 Minutes Wednesday would
have publicly defended the Segment for another 10 days.
Second, during the day, three events took place that should have alerted CBS News
management that the reporting for the Segment may have been flawed. First, the CBS News
22
strategy to get 60 Minutes Wednesday’s document examiners to defend the Segment was not
followed, as only Matley made an appearance. As noted above, Matley did not attest to the
authenticity of the documents. Second, a respected typewriter expert, Peter Tytell, contacted
Miller and Howard and explained in detail why he believed the Killian documents were likely
fakes. His views were not pursued or analyzed in part because 60 Minutes Wednesday was
searching only for experts who would defend the September 8 Segment. Third, Major General
Hodges contacted Mapes and Rather and told them that Mapes had misquoted him about his
alleged confirmation of the Killian documents and now that he had had the opportunity to review
them, he believed that the documents were not authentic. Neither Mapes nor Rather asked Major
General Hodges to explain why he believed the documents were not authentic and the Panel
finds no discussion of this conversation with others at CBS News at the time.
Thus, within two days following the airing of the September 8 Segment, 60 Minutes
Wednesday ignored significant opportunities to take a fresh look at the reporting that allegedly
supported the Segment. This was especially unfortunate because the criticisms of 60 Minutes
Wednesday thereafter only continued to mount.
Another unsettling disclosure occurred on Saturday, September 11. The media reported
that General Staudt had retired from the TexANG on March 1, 1972, approximately 18 months
before Lieutenant Colonel Killian allegedly had written the memorandum about General Staudt’s
trying to “sugar coat” Lieutenant Bush’s officer efficiency report. This obviously triggered
questions among the media about how General Staudt could have had such influence well after
retiring, but it did not trigger any re-examination by 60 Minutes Wednesday of its reporting.
Instead, Mapes told 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel that General Staudt remained influential
after his retirement. That representation went unchallenged. The Panel’s investigation suggests
that it is doubtful that General Staudt exerted any such influence after he retired.
On Monday, September 13, the CBS Evening News aired yet another report on the
continuing controversy about the Killian documents, despite misgivings by the CBS Evening
News’ Executive Producer that CBS News had anything new to report. The report said that
“CBS used several techniques to make sure these papers should be taken seriously, talking to
handwriting and document analysts and other experts who strongly insist that the documents
could have been created in the 70s.” The report included excerpts from an interview of Bill
Glennon, described as a technical consultant, who said that typewriters in the 1970s could have
23
produced a superscript “th” and proportional spacing. The Panel finds this statement
unpersuasive as Glennon conceded to the Panel that he was not a typography expert and did not
say which typewriters would have had those capabilities. Moreover, he did not know what type
of machine allegedly produced the Killian documents. Nevertheless, Rather closed this CBS
Evening News report by stating that CBS News “believes the [Killian] documents are authentic.”
Another significant rebuke to 60 Minutes Wednesday’s defense of the Segment occurred
on September 14. ABC News’ World News Tonight on that date featured two of the original four
document examiners, Linda James and Emily Will, who had reviewed certain of the Killian
documents for 60 Minutes Wednesday prior to the airing of the September 8 Segment. James
and Will told ABC News that they did not authenticate the documents and that they had each
raised concerns about the documents prior to the September 8 broadcast with 60 Minutes
Wednesday personnel. James and Will said that these concerns were not addressed by anyone at
60 Minutes Wednesday.
60 Minutes Wednesday learned before the airing of the ABC News broadcast that Will
and James were going to express their concerns about the documents publicly. In response,
Matley and James Pierce, the other examiners who had been retained by 60 Minutes Wednesday
prior to the September 8 Segment, were asked by Miller to prepare letters confirming the
authenticity of the documents. Matley’s initial letter stated that he only addressed whether the
purported “Jerry B. Killian” signatures were done by the same person and concluded that “the
preponderance of the available handwriting evidence was that one writer made all the signatures
examined.” There is no mention in the original letter about the authenticity of the documents.
Pierce’s conclusion in his initial letter was that “[t]he findings of the aforementioned physical
evidence strongly suggest the probability that the documents in question are authentic.”
60 Minutes Wednesday received revised letters from Matley and Pierce. While it was not
clear who suggested changes to the letters, handwritten notes on the initial drafts indicate that
West and Sandy Genelius, a member of the CBS Communications Group, provided proposed
edits to a representative of 60 Minutes Wednesday, who then provided the proposed edits to
Matley and Pierce. In the revised letters, which were posted on the CBS News website, Matley
added a sentence that “I observed nothing about the documents that could disprove their
authenticity.” Pierce revised his conclusion to state “[I]n my professional opinion, with what I
know and have examined based on the photocopied questioned documents, the documents in
question are authentic.”
Pierce would not agree to be interviewed by the Panel. However, in a conversation with
counsel to the Panel, Pierce stated that a representative of 60 Minutes Wednesday asked him to
strengthen his conclusion and that he informed her that it did not represent his views. He said
that he told the representative that he would provide an unqualified opinion since he was asked to
do so by 60 Minutes Wednesday, but only if the letter was not made public. Pierce told counsel
to the Panel that he further told the representative that 60 Minutes Wednesday would “get in
trouble” if it made his letter public. Nevertheless, the revised letters from Matley and Pierce
were posted on the CBS News website.
A further rebuke to 60 Minutes Wednesday’s defense of the September 8 Segment
occurred on September 14. On that date, an interview with Marian Carr Knox, a clerk typist who
worked with Lieutenant Colonel Killian during the relevant time period, was quoted in a Dallas
newspaper. Knox stated in the interview that she did virtually all of Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s
typing and that she did not believe that the documents were authentic, although the content
reflected Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s feelings. She was contacted by 60 Minutes Wednesday
and agreed to do a televised interview. Knox was flown to New York and interviewed by Rather
on September 15.
The interview with Knox was shown on 60 Minutes Wednesday on September 15. In that
segment, Knox, who was described by Rather as a “credible voice,” said that she did not type the
documents. While she did state in the interview that she did not think the documents were
authentic, she added that she did believe that the facts included in at least some of the documents
reflected Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s beliefs at the time.
The Panel spoke with Knox on two occasions, and she stated that she did not have any
personal knowledge about the content of any of the Killian documents, aside from the fact that
she knew Lieutenant Bush had sought to transfer to Alabama so that he could run a political
campaign. She informed the Panel that she answered Rather’s questions on the assumption that
the content was accurate. She made clear in her Panel interviews that she did not have any
personal knowledge about the thrust or content of the documents.
4. The Change in Source
In light of the interviews of James, Will and Knox questioning the authentication of the
documents, Heyward directed West to accompany Mapes to Texas to interview Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett about the documents. Before that occurred, a conference call was held on
Thursday, September 16 among Heyward, Rather, West, Mapes and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.
The call lasted about three hours. Among other things, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
acknowledged that he did not get the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn, but had
identified him as the source only because of pressure by Mapes to name his source and because
he wanted to protect the actual source. He then disclosed that his actual source was a woman
who identified herself as Lucy Ramirez. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said he received a call from
Ramirez after he had been interviewed extensively by the media in February 2004 in connection
with his published claim that some of President Bush’s TexANG records had been purged.
Ramirez told Lieutenant Colonel Burkett that she had some documents related to President
Bush’s TexANG service that she wanted to give to him. They arranged for him to receive the
documents at a livestock show in Houston in early March 2004, where an unidentified man
delivered the documents. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett agreed to repeat this information in an oncamera
interview and it was agreed that Rather would travel to Texas and interview Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett on Saturday, September 18. Rather interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on
that date, and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett repeated his story about obtaining the documents from
an unidentified man at the livestock show in Houston.
On Monday, September 20, the CBS Evening News aired a report in which Rather stated
that CBS News could “no longer vouch for [the Killian documents’] authenticity.” As one of the
reasons for this position, the story prominently cited the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had
changed his story and said that he got the documents from a different source that could not be
verified. The Panel finds this statement confusing, since 60 Minutes Wednesday had never
verified the original source from whom Lieutenant Colonel Burkett initially said he received the
documents. Moreover, the source of the documents was not the sole factor in determining whether the documents were authentic.
On that same day, Rather was interviewed at length by Marcia Kramer at WCBS, the
CBS-owned television station in New York City. In the interview, Rather made clear that the
blame for the airing of the September 8 Segment lay with 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel. The
Panel finds these statements to have been far more appropriate than the CBS Evening News
broadcast on September 20.
Rather told the Panel that he delivered the apology and gave the WCBS interview in
support of CBS News’ decision that the time had come to stop defending the Segment and,
indeed, to disown it. He told the Panel, however, that he did not fully agree with this decision
and still believes that the content of the documents is accurate. The Panel is troubled by these
conflicting statements.
Another troubling aspect of the September 8 Segment emerged in the public disclosure
on September 21 that Mapes had been in contact with Joe Lockhart, a senior staff member of the
Kerry presidential campaign, in connection with the production of the Segment. Mapes told the
Panel that before Lieutenant Colonel Burkett turned over any of the documents, he had pressed
her to arrange for him to be put in touch with someone from the Kerry presidential campaign so
that he could provide the campaign with strategic advice on how to rebut the attacks by the
“Swift Boat Veterans for Truth” group. Mapes told the Panel that she did not know anyone from
the Kerry campaign, but got Lockhart’s telephone number from Chad Clanton, a Kerry campaign
official who had been quoted by Mapes’ husband, a newspaper reporter, in an article on an
unrelated matter.
Mapes also told the Panel that before calling Lockhart, she discussed this request with
Howard and that he approved the contact. Mapes said that Howard had reasoned that reporters
exchange information from various sources and this request was not problematic. Howard,
however, told the Panel a very different version of this conversation and said that he clearly
informed Mapes that it would be inappropriate to intervene with Lockhart or anyone else associated with the Kerry campaign on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s behalf.
Mapes further told the Panel that at some point prior to September 8 she spoke to
Lockhart. According to Mapes, Lockhart called her and the conversation lasted only
approximately two minutes. Mapes told the Panel that she merely informed Lockhart that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett wanted to speak with him. She did not think she described
27
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as a source or that the subject of the documents ever came up during
the call.
Lockhart told the Panel a contrasting version of this conversation. Lockhart said that
Clanton, who reported to Lockhart, had asked Lockhart to take a call from Mapes about a story
she was working on related to President Bush’s TexANG service. Lockhart told the Panel that
Clanton said that the story involved documents and that a call from Lockhart to a 60 Minutes
Wednesday source who wanted input into the Kerry campaign might assist 60 Minutes
Wednesday in obtaining the documents from the source. Lockhart was reluctant to speak with
Mapes given that he did not want to give the impression that the campaign was assisting on the
matter. Lockhart said that he agreed to speak with Mapes only after he was assured by Clanton
that Mapes already had obtained the documents in question and that the reporting stage of the
story was complete.
Lockhart informed the Panel that Mapes called him on the evening of Saturday,
September 4. Lockhart said that she told him that she had lined up an interview with Ben Barnes
and had obtained documents that had been authenticated by some number of experts. Lockhart
stated that Mapes said that there may be more documents and Mapes asked him to call
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, whom she described as a source for the story. Lockhart said that it
was his impression that a call to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett could be helpful in obtaining the
additional documents.
Lockhart told the Panel that he did not immediately call Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as he
recognized it could be perceived negatively. However, he ultimately changed his mind and
spoke to him on Monday, September 6, by which time Mapes had received the rest of the Killian
documents. Lockhart said the call lasted less than five minutes and that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett gave his opinion on how the campaign should address the Swift Boat issue. Lockhart
stated that he said very little during the call and the subject of documents never came up.
The Panel is unable to resolve definitively the conflict between the accounts of Howard
and Mapes concerning whether permission was given to speak with a representative of the Kerry
campaign in connection with the TexANG story. Whether or not permission was given to
Mapes, the Panel finds this contact to be highly inappropriate. The September 8 Segment had a
strong political focus and it was to air in the middle of a hotly contested presidential campaign.
While it is certainly proper to receive information from a variety of sources, this contact crossed
28
the line as, at a minimum, it gave the appearance of a political bias and could have been
perceived as a news organization’s assisting a campaign as opposed to reporting on a story.
The Panel is aware that some have ascribed political motivations to 60 Minutes
Wednesday’s decision to air the September 8 Segment just two months before the presidential
election, while others further found political bias in the program itself. The Panel reviewed this
issue and found certain actions that could support such charges. However, the Panel cannot
conclude that a political agenda at 60 Minutes Wednesday drove either the timing of the airing of
the Segment or its content.
Given that the Panel does not believe that political motivations drove the September 8
Segment, questions likely will be raised as to why these massive breakdowns occurred on this
story at an organization like CBS News with its heritage and stated commitment to the highest
standards of journalism. The Panel heard from many that the Rather/Mapes team was a
formidable force at 60 Minutes Wednesday. Great trust was placed in Mapes, a highly respected
producer who had just produced a widely acclaimed segment on the Abu Ghraib prison abuses,
and vast deference was given to Rather, the “face” of CBS News. These factors, along with the
“crash” of the production, contributed greatly to the failures of the September 8 Segment and the
Aftermath.
The Panel concludes that the September 8 Segment reflected a widespread breakdown of
fundamental processes at 60 Minutes Wednesday. CBS News has an historic and deep-seated
commitment to accurate and fair reporting, and the Panel was impressed by the fact that so many
of its personnel have been with CBS News for many years and appear fully committed to the
Standards of accuracy and fairness that CBS News has articulated. That makes it all the more
difficult for the Panel to understand how this breakdown could have occurred.
While the Panel was not asked to look at any other segments of 60 Minutes Wednesday, it
did not find any evidence that the flaws of the September 8 Segment carried over to any other
segment. More than a few of the staff members interviewed by the Panel likened this breakdown
in the production of the September 8 Segment to a “perfect storm,” in which a confluence of
factors came together and led to the failures. The Panel believes that there is some basis for this
29
analogy, as the combination of a new 60 Minutes Wednesday management team, great deference
given to a highly respected producer and the network’s news anchor, competitive pressures, and
a zealous belief in the truth of the Segment seem to have led many to disregard some
fundamental journalistic principles, including but not limited to: tracking down the chain of
custody for the Killian documents; thoroughly understanding everything relevant about the
confidential sources; thoroughly understanding the document authentication process and what
the 60 Minutes Wednesday experts actually did and said; and thoroughly understanding the
corroboration process for critical information, such as the lack of personal knowledge of
Lieutenant Strong and the failure to attempt to show Major General Hodges the critical Killian
documents before the Segment was aired.
However, the “perfect storm” analogy cannot be used as an excuse. The fact is that basic
journalistic steps were not carried out in a manner consistent with accurate and fair reporting,
leading to countless misstatements and omissions in the reporting by 60 Minutes Wednesday and
CBS News. Those misstatements and omissions lead the Panel to conclude that it is not
sufficient simply to exhort those responsible to do better in the future. The Panel believes that
certain process changes must be put in place to strengthen controls so that similar problems are
less likely to occur in the future.
In making these recommendations, the Panel is mindful that no system can totally prevent
a breakdown, particularly a system such as that at 60 Minutes Wednesday which depends so
heavily on the trust and integrity of the individual participants. The Panel urges CBS News to
consider implementing the recommendations set forth in Chapter XI, including but not limited
to, the following:
· Create a new senior Standards and Practices position (“Standards Executive”), outside of the production structure of 60 Minutes Wednesday and reporting directly to the President of CBS News, whose mission would be as follows. Before airing any 60 Minutes Wednesday segment that involves investigative reporting, confidential sources or the authentication and/or chain of custody of materials received from outside sources, the Standards Executive must be consulted and must review whether proper processes have been followed. The Panel observes that CBS News has had a person in charge of “Standards and Practices,” but this position has not been tasked to function as outlined here. The Standards Executive should have the authority to delay or veto the segment.
· The Standards Executive would also be identified throughout 60 Minutes Wednesday as someone with whom the staff can communicate on a confidential basis, without
30 fear of retaliation, if they have concerns that a planned story or segment may not meet CBS News’ Standards of accuracy and fairness, or for any other reason.
· If the validity of information presented in a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment comes under a significant challenge, such as occurred with the September 8 Segment, reporting on the challenge should not be left largely or entirely in the hands of those who created the segment at issue. Instead, an additional team, led by someone not involved in the original segment, should be assigned to take the lead in the coverage. The Panel notes that once the attacks began on the September 8 Segment, essentially the same people who developed the challenged segment had control of the news reports defending it. This resulted in opportunities for other news organizations to do the reporting that exposed serious problems in the Segment.
· The same standards for accuracy and fairness prescribed by CBS News’ Standards Manual for its news stories should be applied to its press releases and public statements. That did not consistently occur here, as our Report on the Aftermath illustrates. CBS News management and the CBS Communications Group should coordinate their efforts and develop a protocol that accomplishes this objective.
· Competitive pressures are a fact of life in journalism and may impact the timing of a news story. The leadership of CBS News should make clear to all personnel that competitive pressures cannot be allowed to prompt the airing of a story before it is ready. It would have been better to “lose” the story on the Killian documents to a competitor than to air it short of investigating and vetting to the highest standards of fairness and accuracy.
· In sensitive stories relying on sources who cannot be identified on the air, senior management must, as appropriate, know not just the name of the source, but all relevant background that would assist in news decisions. Limitations in this regard must be reviewed with the Standards Executive that the Panel has proposed.
31
The Panel and its counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP, conducted
the investigation in a completely independent manner.7 CBS News did not control or influence
the scope of the investigation or the methods employed by the Panel. CBS News did not have
any input or influence with respect to the findings of the Panel, other than to commit itself at the
outset to make this Report public.8 The Panel received full cooperation from CBS News and its
personnel, including those who might have reason to believe that this Report would contain
findings critical of their work. Significantly, the Panel was given access to personal notes and
the investigative materials of many of the people, including Mary Mapes, involved in the reporting of the September 8 Segment.
The Panel assembled a vast quantity of information to support its findings. All
information obtained by the Panel during the process was done by voluntary means. The Panel
reviewed thousands of pages of scripts, e-mails, news releases, investigative notes, military
records and other relevant documents. The Panel also interviewed 66 individuals who had
knowledge of relevant events. This included 32 people from 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS
News and 8 people who had been affiliated with the TexANG during all or part of the period that
President Bush served in it. Several of those interviewed from CBS News were not involved in
the September 8 Segment, but had information or background the Panel believed relevant to its
work.
The Panel spoke to every person at CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday who played
any substantive role in the production of the September 8 Segment, as well as those who were
involved in a significant way in the news reports and press statements following the airing of the
Segment. The Panel interviewed many people on more than one occasion to ensure that it
received all of the necessary information and to provide people with a complete opportunity to
provide the Panel with any relevant information. Mary Mapes and her counsel provided several
7 In addition to the attorneys listed on the signature page of this Report, the Panel expresses it great appreciation for
the outstanding work and commitment of Matthew B. Bowman and Jennifer Shuttleworth, project manager and
administrative assistant, respectively, at Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP.
8 The Panel provided, on December 29, 2004 a substantially completed draft of its Report to Leslie Moonves,
chairman of CBS, Linda Mason, a vice president of CBS News responsible for interpreting the Standards of CBS
News, and two CBS attorneys just before it was submitted in final form to CBS News. None of these individuals
were involved in the production or vetting of the September 8 Segment, nor in the Aftermath. The purpose of the
review was to verify for the Panel that the Report contained a proper description of the Standards and processes at
CBS News, as well as to identify any potential issues of libel.
32
written submissions to supplement her interviews with the Panel. These submissions proved
helpful to the Panel’s considerations.
No court reporter was present at the interviews, but the Panel and its counsel took
detailed notes. There were instances when the recollections of certain individuals interviewed
were not consistent with the recollections of others. The more significant differences are noted
in this Report. The Panel found that e-mails prepared contemporaneously with events proved to
be particularly valuable in refreshing recollections of those interviewed and in assisting the Panel
in determining which recollections seemed more credible.
With two notable exceptions, the Panel was able to speak with the individuals the Panel
believed were important to its investigation. The Panel requested on several occasions the
opportunity to speak with Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett and Chief Warrant Officer George
Conn. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett initially informed the Panel that he did not believe that he had
been treated in a professional or ethical manner by CBS News and did not want to speak with the
Panel. The Panel also invited Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to make a written submission or
respond to written questions submitted to him by the Panel. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett never
provided a definitive response to these requests but did later inform the Panel, through an
intermediary, that he would consider providing information to the Panel if it was agreed that the
Panel would not include such information in its Report. The Panel could not agree to such a
condition. Chief Warrant Officer Conn did not respond to two requests made by the Panel to be
interviewed. Despite this, the Panel believes that it has obtained a substantial record on which to
base its findings and recommendations.
Notwithstanding its findings of numerous deficiencies related to the reporting, production
and vetting of the September 8 Segment and its Aftermath, the Panel was impressed with the
professionalism, dedication, commitment and intelligence of the individuals it interviewed from
CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday. Many of these individuals have been associated with
CBS News for many years and expressed great pride and respect for the organization and its
mission. Many spoke, often with emotion, of their “love” for CBS News. Some expressed
disbelief that CBS News could find itself in the situation created by the September 8 Segment.
CBS News has had a proud and storied tradition, and the Panel believes that it would be a
substantial loss if the troubled episode under discussion here were somehow allowed to diminish
its journalistic commitment or investigative zeal.
The Panel expects that some may ask why it took from September 22, 2004, the date this
Panel was announced, until January 5, 2005 for the Panel to issue its Report. The primary reason
is that the investigation needed to be much broader than initially anticipated. The Panel believed
at the outset that its investigation would focus primarily on the Killian documents. While the
Killian documents were, indeed, important to the investigation, it also became clear relatively
early in the Panel’s work that the problems affecting the Segment and its Aftermath involved
much more than the Killian documents. The Panel and its counsel devoted essentially full time
to this endeavor since September 22 and completed the Report in as thorough and expeditious a
manner as possible.
34
CBS News divides its news programming into two categories: “hard” news and news
magazines. The hard news division includes the CBS Evening News, the CBS Morning News,
The Early Show, CBS News Sunday Morning, Face The Nation, Up To The Minute, and certain
other special events and political coverage. The news magazine division includes 60 Minutes,
60 Minutes Wednesday and 48 Hours.
60 Minutes debuted on September 24, 1968 as television’s first news magazine show.
60 Minutes became one of the most popular shows in television, finishing in Nielsen’s Top Ten
programs for 23 consecutive seasons, a record unmatched by any other program. Now in its 37th
season, the show has developed into a “blend of hard-hitting investigative reports, interviews,
feature segments and profiles of people in the news.” 60 Minutes is still a top-rated show and
airs on Sunday evenings.
In the middle of the 1998-1999 season, CBS News launched a weeknight edition of
60 Minutes with a separate staff of management, producers and correspondents. The new show
was billed as having “the signature style, journalistic quality and integrity of the original
60 Minutes.” Originally entitled 60 Minutes II, the broadcast has since been renamed 60 Minutes
Wednesday and includes regular reports from the show’s own correspondents, periodic pieces
from other CBS News journalists and updated reports on previous 60 Minutes Wednesday stories. 60 Minutes Wednesday airs Wednesday nights at 8 p.m. Eastern time.
Several differences between 60 Minutes and 60 Minutes Wednesday were described to the
Panel. For example, 60 Minutes Wednesday was created to appeal to a “younger and jazzier”
demographic group than the original 60 Minutes audience. Although both shows gravitated
toward a team model, people familiar with the operation of both broadcasts told the Panel that
60 Minutes Wednesday correspondents typically have less contact with their producers and
associate producers than their counterparts at 60 Minutes because several 60 Minutes Wednesday
correspondents have additional responsibilities. For example, Dan Rather is not only a
60 Minutes Wednesday correspondent, but he also is the Anchor and Managing Editor of the CBS
35
Evening News. Charlie Rose, a 60 Minutes Wednesday correspondent, also hosts a show on
Another difference is that all of the 60 Minutes producers, associate producers and senior
management have offices on the same floor and seem to interact a great deal, while the
60 Minutes Wednesday production staff is located on a different floor from the senior
management of the show. The Panel was told by some that this physical separation makes it
more difficult for the 60 Minutes Wednesday staff and management to interact effectively.
36
The following chart9 depicts the hierarchy of those involved in the reporting, production or vetting of the September 8 Segment:
In addition, two CBS lawyers, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard Altabef, also were involved in the
vetting. A more detailed description of the roles of the various individuals involved follows.
1. Correspondents, Producers and Associate Producers
The correspondents for 60 Minutes Wednesday are ultimately responsible for the
production of the stories that air and are expected to exercise oversight over their producer
teams. In practice, the degree of oversight exercised by correspondents varies, with some being
very involved in their producers’ work on a regular basis while others give great authority and
9 This chart is not intended to include every individual in the 60 Minutes Wednesday structure. There were a number
of other individuals involved in the production of the Segment.
Executive Producer
Josh Howard
Senior Broadcast Producer
Mary Murphy
Producer
Mary Mapes
Correspondent
Dan Rather
Associate Producers
Roger Charles
Yvonne Miller
Lucy Scott
Michael Smith
Senior Vice President, Prime Time
Betsy West
Senior Producer
Esther Kartiganer
37
freedom to their producers. The correspondents at 60 Minutes Wednesday who have other
responsibilities, including Rather, tend to delegate significant responsibilities to their producers.
During the relevant time period, Rather had substantial additional responsibilities on his already
full schedule as anchor and Managing Editor of the CBS Evening News, as he was also anchoring
CBS News’ coverage of the Republican Convention in New York from Monday, August 30
through Thursday, September 2, and he traveled to Florida to cover Hurricane Frances on Friday,
September 3, through late afternoon on Sunday, September 5.
Producers at 60 Minutes Wednesday are primarily responsible for researching and
developing stories and are assisted by associate producers. A producer and associate producer
gather facts and put a story together. It is also the producer and associate producer’s
responsibility to put interview transcripts into context, so that a story fairly and accurately
reflects the contents of the interviews conducted. Producers also typically have the greatest role
in drafting the script for a segment. Thus, there is a great amount of responsibility and trust
placed in the producers.
Mary Mapes has served as a producer for Rather on 60 Minutes Wednesday since the
show’s inception. During that time, she produced more than 30 stories for the show. Her stories
have covered a wide variety of topics, including death penalty cases, an interview of Strom
Thurmond’s biracial daughter, an interview of George Clooney, an interview of former First
Lady and current Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and, notably, the Abu Ghraib prison story.
Mapes was considered by everyone at CBS News with whom the Panel spoke as “a superstar”
reporter and producer, and some of her superiors said that they stood in awe of her work.
Mapes was given permission to engage three part-time freelance associate producers to
assist her on the TexANG story: Colonel Roger Charles, a former Marine officer, who also
assisted Mapes on the Abu Ghraib prison story; Mike Smith, an Austin-based freelance journalist
who had worked on stories pertaining to President Bush for many years;10 and Lucy Scott, a
Dallas-based former CBS News Sunday Morning producer. In addition, late on September 2,
2004, Yvonne Miller, an experienced associate producer who regularly works with another
producer assigned to Rather, was asked to assist on the production of the Segment. Miller knew
Mapes but had never worked with her before. The associate producer who had worked with
10 Smith spent portions of 1997-99 working with Bill Minutaglio in writing First Son, which was published in 1999
and is generally considered to have been an objective book about then-Governor Bush.
38
Mapes since 1998 did not work on the September 8 Segment because she had left for maternity
leave on August 11, 2004.
The time to produce a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment once the reporting is complete can
last for several days or several weeks. There is no typical process or timeline. In fact, it is not
unusual for a “crash” piece to be written in less than 24 hours. The term “crash” is used to
describe a segment that is produced within a very short period of time. Crashes are generally
day-of-air reports, such as coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and are less often investigative
journalism pieces.
The Executive Producer is involved in approving a story concept proposed by a
correspondent or producer and has varying involvement in the production of the segment. When
a correspondent/producer team nears completion of a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment, a detailed
review or vetting process begins. The Executive Producer is ultimately responsible for everything that goes on the air.
The Executive Producer’s top assistant, a Senior Broadcast Producer, works closely with
the Executive Producer to form the senior management team of 60 Minutes Wednesday. The
Senior Broadcast Producer is generally deeply involved in both the production and vetting
processes.
Besides the Executive and Senior Broadcast Producers, there are at least three other
layers of review. First, the Interview Reviewer has both a formal and informal role in the
vetting. The current Interview Reviewer at 60 Minutes Wednesday, Senior Producer Esther
Kartiganer, has more than 40 years of experience at CBS News and is viewed as a valued voice
in the vetting process. Kartiganer’s formal role is to review excerpts of interviews used in a
segment and to compare them to the full interview transcripts (and interview notes when
necessary) to determine whether the excerpts are a fair and accurate portrayal of the full
interview. Kartiganer’s informal role is to raise questions about any aspect of a proposed
segment that may catch her attention, regardless of whether they involve edits of an interview.
On any proposed segment that may have legal implications, CBS lawyers, likely Jonathan
Sternberg and Richard Altabef, become involved in the vetting process. Like the Interview
39
Reviewer, they have both formal and informal roles. The formal role is to protect CBS News
from potential legal liability.
The Panel was told that the lawyers do not always limit their involvement to a review of
the legal issues. Given that they each have been with CBS for more than 20 years, their views on
editorial content and other matters are valued. For example, with respect to the September 8
Segment, Sternberg and Altabef asked questions about the source of the documents and the
authentication process and whether the Killian documents contained newsworthy information.
Finally, the Senior Vice President, Prime Time, Betsy West, usually does not play an
active role early in the production or vetting processes. Instead, her standard practice is to carry
out a final fairness and accuracy review once all other reviewers, including the Executive
Producer, have signed off and the segment is ready to be broadcast. In this role, she reviews
every story on 60 Minutes, 60 Minutes Wednesday and 48 Hours, a total of over 200 stories a
year.11 West told the Panel that she functions as the vetting representative of CBS News
President Andrew Heyward in the review process. Heyward generally does not have a role in the
production or vetting of 60 Minutes Wednesday segments, and he usually does not see a segment
before it is aired. Heyward will, however, become involved in the production or vetting process
if a segment is particularly sensitive or if he is asked to do so.
CBS has a Communications Group that, among other things, promotes 60 Minutes
Wednesday shows before they are broadcast and handles media inquiries after shows are aired.
Gil Schwartz is the head of the Communications Group at CBS. Sandy Genelius, a Vice
President of the Communications Group at CBS, is in charge of press relations for the CBS
News Division. Kelli Edwards, who reports to Genelius, is responsible for 60 Minutes Wednesday’s press relations.
The production process for the September 8 Segment had a number of unique
characteristics. First, the Segment was the first original story to be aired under the new team of
Howard, Murphy and Kartiganer. In June 2004, the Executive Producer, Jeff Fager, the
11 Although it is atypical for West to be involved early in the production process, she might become involved if a
segment has a shorter deadline or is particularly sensitive.
40
Executive Editor, Patti Hassler, and the Interview Reviewer, Claudia Weinstein, left 60 Minutes
Wednesday to assume similar positions at 60 Minutes. Fager and Hassler had been with
60 Minutes Wednesday since its inception in 1998. They were succeeded by Howard, Murphy
and Kartiganer. These three had a combined 71 years of CBS News experience. Howard had
spent the previous 14 years with 60 Minutes, serving as part of the management team for seven
years and one year as the top assistant to then Executive Producer Don Hewitt. Murphy had
been with CBS News for 17 years and had served as Senior Broadcast Producer with CBS News
Sunday Morning for four years and as a producer for 60 Minutes for one year. By all
appearances, the new management team at 60 Minutes Wednesday was well qualified to lead the
show.
Second, while there is no “typical” timeframe for the evolution of a 60 Minutes
Wednesday story, the September 8 Segment’s production was significantly shorter than a normal
investigative story. As previously noted, the September 8 Segment aired only six days after the
first Killian documents were received and only three days after the second batch of documents
was received.
Finally, the September 8 Segment differed from other segments in that West played a
greater role in the production and vetting processes than was customary. The production of the
segment began in force at 60 Minutes Wednesday offices on Monday, September 6. At the
direction of CBS News President Andrew Heyward, West became heavily involved in the
production the next day. In a normal production, she would not have been involved until the
piece was finished and ready to be aired. The early involvement of West underscored the
recognition by CBS News management that this story required the highest degree of vetting
possible.
VI. BACKGROUND ON CBS NEWS STANDARDS, THE TEXAS AIR NATIONAL
CBS News established Standards for its News Division in 1976 and most recently revised those Standards in 1999. The Standards are set forth in an internally published CBS News Standards Manual covering four areas: personal standards; production standards –
newsgathering; production standards – editing and production; and legal issues. As set forth in
the Introduction to the Manual, most of the Standards “come down to two essential principles:
accuracy and fairness.”
The Panel makes reference to a number of the Standards that seem particularly relevant to
this Report, although the noted accuracy and fairness principles are the overriding guide. Those
particular Standards are reproduced in Appendix 1 to this Report.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the top tier of the Texas National Guard was the
Adjutant General’s Office, located in Austin, Texas. The Adjutant General was appointed by the
Texas Governor and oversaw both the TexANG and the Texas Army National Guard. The
TexANG was led by the Assistant Adjutant General - Air, who was Brigadier General James
Rose when President Bush sought admission to the TexANG in 1968. Reporting to TexANG
headquarters were three flying units and three non-flying units. The flying units were the 147th
Fighter Interceptor Group in Houston, the 136th Tactical Airlift Wing in Dallas and the 149th
Fighter Interceptor Group in San Antonio. The non-flying units were two electronic units in La
Porte and Port Arthur and one communications unit in Garland.
The Commander of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group in Houston was responsible for
seven squadrons: the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron; the Civil Engineering Flight Squadron;
the 147th Combat Support Squadron; the 111th Weather Flight Squadron; the 147th Supply Squadron; the 147th CAMRON (maintenance) Squadron; and the 147th USAF Dispensary Squadron.
In spring 1968, then-Colonel Walter Staudt was Commander of the 147th Fighter
Interceptor Group and then-Major Jerry B. Killian was the Commander of the 111th Fighter
Interceptor Squadron. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Bobby W. Hodges was Operations Officer for
42
the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group. In 1969, Colonel Staudt moved to Austin to assume a new
Chief of Staff position in the TexANG headquarters, and then-Colonel Hodges became
Commander of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group. Colonel Staudt eventually was promoted to
General of the TexANG, and he retired from the TexANG on March 1, 1972.
The following additional people were located in Houston during the period that
Lieutenant Bush served in the TexANG. Colonel Rufus Martin was the Group’s Personnel Staff
Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Via was the Flying Training Instructor in the 111th Fighter
Interceptor Squadron. Lieutenant Colonel William Harris was a fighter pilot who commanded
one of the four flight groups of the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and was Lieutenant
Bush’s rating officer. Marian Carr Knox was the clerk typist for the 111th Fighter Interceptor
Squadron.
The chief function of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group in the early 1970s was to be on
alert for possible air attacks from the south, most likely from Cuba. The 11lth Fighter Interceptor
Squadron had approximately 30 pilots, who mostly flew F-102 jet fighters. The 30 pilots were
organized into four flight groups, each of which had a flight commander. At all times, two pilots
and two planes needed to be on alert so that they could be airborne within five minutes if an
unidentified or threatening aircraft was detected. Lieutenant Bush flew these alert missions
regularly during his period on flying status. In addition to alert duty, people like Lieutenant
Bush who were not full-time TexANG employees would normally have one duty weekend per
month and then a two-week duty period during the summer.
President Bush joined the TexANG in May 1968. After completing pilot training in
Georgia, Lieutenant Bush was assigned to fly F-102s at Ellington AFB in Houston in early 1970.
He flew F-102s until May 1972, when he sought a transfer to a National Guard unit in Alabama.
A transfer was granted in September 1972. Lieutenant Bush returned to Ellington AFB in
approximately May 1973 and sought an early discharge in September 1973. He was honorably
discharged as of October 1, 1973.
The authenticity of the Killian documents was recognized as a significant issue before
the airing of the September 8 Segment and became the lightning rod for attacks thereafter. To
provide context, the Panel offers background information pertinent to the authentication of
documents in Appendix 2.
As discussed in Appendix 2, it is extremely difficult to establish the authenticity of a
document if the original document or its author is not available. These basic concepts, and the
other challenges posed in authenticating documents, needed to be understood by the
correspondent, producer, associate producer and those at 60 Minutes Wednesday who vetted the
Segment. As described in Chapter VII, this requisite knowledge does not appear to have been
developed, leading to some significant errors pertaining to the purported authentication of the
Killian documents.
Like many other reporters and news organizations, Mapes, Rather and others at
60 Minutes Wednesday investigated intermittently for more than five years possible stories on
President Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes began her research in early 1999, when then-
Governor Bush’s first presidential campaign was getting under way but did not produce a
segment at that time. After the 2000 presidential election, Mapes did not pursue this topic again
until during the next presidential campaign in mid-2004. In search of a story about President
Bush’s TexANG service record, Mapes and her team attempted to interview as many people as
they could at the time and to obtain many official records of his service.
By late August 2004, despite months of work, the only firm element in Mapes’ story was
a possible interview with Ben Barnes, the former Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives
and former Lieutenant Governor of Texas, who reportedly had used his influence to help
President Bush enter the TexANG in the spring of 1968. On August 23, and seemingly out of
the blue, Mapes learned that a never-before-seen document might be in the possession of
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and that it might shed new light on the President’s Guard service.
Mapes and her team speculated that the document was the “holy grail” for which they had been
searching in the course of previous efforts.
After more than a week of coaxing, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided Mapes and her
freelance associate producer Mike Smith with two documents on Thursday, September 2. Four
additional documents were provided by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to Smith on Sunday,
September 5. All six documents were purportedly copies of memoranda taken from the personal
files of Lieutenant Colonel Killian, Lieutenant Bush’s commanding officer in the TexANG.
Where and when they were found, and by whom they were taken, remains clouded in mystery.
Moreover, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was a former officer in the Texas Army National Guard,
as opposed to the TexANG. He was also a controversial figure for, among other reasons, making
many public statements about the alleged “scrubbing” of the President’s TexANG files.
Prior to giving the documents to Mapes and Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett demanded
that he not be revealed as the source, and Mapes agreed to protect his identity. In addition at
some time either before or after Lieutenant Colonel Burkett gave the documents to Mapes and
Smith, he requested various “arrangements,” including the following: a consulting contract,
45
which would allow him to be compensated by 60 Minutes Wednesday; security protection or
relocation assistance if the story put him or his family in danger; and for Mapes to place him in
touch with someone from Senator John Kerry’s presidential campaign so that he could provide
strategic advice to that campaign as to how to rebut the attacks on Senator Kerry’s Vietnam
service by the “Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.” We return later to the outcome of those requests.
Between Thursday, September 2 and the broadcast on Wednesday, September 8, Mapes
and her team attempted to confirm that the documents were authentic, i.e., that they were indeed
what they purported to be. Attempts at this confirmation included: an on-camera interview of
one person who had served in the TexANG in an administrative position but had no personal
knowledge of the documents or Lieutenant Bush’s service; seeking the opinions of four
handwriting and document examiners; discussing the documents with Lieutenant Colonel
Killian’s former commanding officer over the telephone; speaking with Lieutenant Colonel
Killian’s widow; and providing the documents to the White House for comment.
The work to air the Segment by 8 p.m. EST on September 8 included much more than
just seeking to authenticate the Killian documents, a daunting task by itself. Mapes, Rather and
their team needed to arrange for and conduct five interviews between Sunday night,
September 5, and Wednesday, September 8. In addition, the script for the Segment had to be
written. Further, various graphics and background footage needed to be assembled. Finally, the
entire Segment needed to be thoroughly and carefully vetted, particularly since this involved a
highly sensitive investigative story about the incumbent President in the middle of a presidential
campaign.
The Panel finds that there were serious deficiencies in both the investigative reporting for
the September 8 Segment, as well as in the production and vetting process leading up to the
broadcast. A detailed chronology of the facts that lead to these conclusions follows.
Mapes started researching President Bush’s TexANG service in 1999, when then-
Governor Bush’s first presidential campaign was heating up. He was the Republican frontrunner
in polls as far back as November 1998, when he was re-elected Governor of Texas.12
12 Wayne Slater, Governor Plans ‘Private Time’ To Weigh Presidential Bid, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 4,
1998, at 28A.
46
By late April 1999, Mapes’ reporting was well under way. She was researching how
then-Governor Bush, along with professional athletes and the sons of other politicians, had
obtained what looked to be coveted assignments in the TexANG, thereby likely avoiding active
duty in Vietnam. At the time, Mapes was operating under the assumption that political
favoritism had contributed to various aspects of then-Governor Bush’s TexANG service,
including his admission into the TexANG, his rapid promotions (from Airman to Second
Lieutenant and then to First Lieutenant), his 1972 transfer to an Alabama National Guard unit so
that he could work on the U.S. Senate campaign of a Bush family friend and his early exit from
the TexANG in October 1973. Mapes observed in an e-mail to her then-Senior and Executive
Producers on April 27, 1999, on which she copied Rather, that “in his military career, Bush was
truly born on third base.” She suggested that “the way we ultimately do the story [could be] by
establishing a pattern in this unit that just happened to have been a safe haven for children of
privilege at the height of the Vietnam War.”
Mapes’ research at the time consisted of gathering public documents through multiple
requests under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and interviewing people who had
served in the TexANG at the same time as President Bush. Significantly, Mapes indicated in the
April 1999 e-mail that she had been informed that there was no waiting list for President Bush’s
TexANG unit at the time he entered. She posited the “darkest spin” that then-Colonel Walter
Staudt, then in charge of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, deliberately kept these spots open
“to take in the children of privilege . . . while maintaining deniability.” Mapes told the Panel that
she never found any proof for this theory.
Mapes told the Panel, as her interview notes reflect, that the interviews she conducted at
that time revealed a sharp division about President Bush’s service record among people who
served in the TexANG. She noted that most of the people interviewed could not or would not
confirm publicly that President Bush’s admission to the TexANG reflected preferential
treatment. Among the people she interviewed off -camera was Colonel Rufus Martin, the
Personnel Staff Officer of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, who told Mapes that President
Bush “did not get preferential treatment to get into the Guard.”13
13 Colonel Martin, however, told the Panel that he did not recall speaking to Mapes or anyone else from 60 Minutes
Wednesday.
47
Mapes also spoke to Major General Bobby Hodges, who was the Group’s commander
during most of the time that President Bush served in the TexANG. Major General Hodges told
Mapes that they “were hurting for pilots at that time” due to “big turnover.” He said that there
were “no strings pulled” to get President Bush into the TexANG.
In addition, Mapes interviewed General Staudt, who was Major General Hodges’
commanding officer at the time and who interviewed President Bush in May 1968 before he was
accepted into the TexANG. General Staudt told Mapes that no influence had been used to get
President Bush into the TexANG. Specifically, General Staudt told Mapes, according to her
contemporaneous notes of their conversation, “No influence used to get [President Bush] into the
Guard. Nobody called me.”
Mapes did speak, however, to others who claimed that President Bush had indeed
received preferential treatment. Former Texas State Representative Jake Johnson, who served as
the Chairman of the House Veterans and Military Affairs Committee in the late 1960s, told
Mapes that he heard General James M. Rose, then the Assistant Adjutant General - Air for the
State of Texas, say that he had put Bush in the TexANG.14 Another individual who knew
General Rose was quoted in notes kept by Mapes in 1999 in an off the record interview as
saying, “if Barnes says he talked to [General Rose], I can’t dispute that,” but added, “I believe
Bush didn’t personally ask for help.” This individual also commented that “[t]here’s no politics
like Guard politics.”
During this time in 1999, Mapes turned her attention to getting an interview with former
Texas Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives Ben Barnes. In
anticipation of that interview, she drafted a summary of what she had learned regarding then-
Governor Bush’s service in the TexANG. The summary stated:
Our big deal in this story is a promised interview with Ben Barnes after he
gives his deposition [in connection with the GTECH litigation] on August
24. For 30 years, he has told no one what he did for Bush . . . Barnes says
he is only telling now because he’s being asked under oath. And he’s only
doing the interview because he thinks the world of Dan [Rather].15
14 Johnson also told the same thing to The Washington Post in September 1999. See George Lardner Jr., Texas
Speaker Reportedly Helped Bush Get into Guard, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at A4.
15 Barnes was a consultant to GTECH Corp., the principal outside consulting firm for the Texas Lottery. GTECH
Corp. was sued by the former Director of the Texas Lottery who claimed that Barnes influenced his termination and
that Barnes had ties to then-Governor Bush because he allegedly helped President Bush enter the TexANG. Legal
Showdown Possible Over Barnes’ Deposition, AP, Sept. 22, 1999.
48
Lieutenant Governor Barnes’ deposition was not held until on or about September 27, 1999.
Soon after the deposition, the Houston Chronicle reported that Barnes had issued a statement
through his lawyers in which he admitted that he had made a call to General Rose at the behest
of a friend of the Bush family, prominent Houston businessman Sidney A. Adger, and
recommended President Bush for a pilot’s position in the TexANG.16
Mapes also sent an e-mail around this time to her Senior and Executive Producers
regarding President Bush’s TexANG service records, indicating that she had consulted an officer
who worked at the Air Reserve Personnel Center in Denver, Colorado (“ARPC”), which is the
national personnel headquarters for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. According to
the e-mail, the officer Mapes consulted noticed significant gaps in President Bush’s service
record – particularly that he did not take his flying physical in 1972 and that there was a gap or
abrupt stop to his service around that time – and commented that, “This guy just stopped performing.”
Like most of the other people whom Mapes contacted, this individual at the ARPC would
not speak on-camera. In fact, the only two people who were interviewed on-camera in the 1999/
2000 time period in connection with the possible 60 Minutes Wednesday TexANG story were
writer Bill Minutaglio17 and former Guardsman Lieutenant Robert Strong,18 neither of whom had
any personal knowledge of President Bush’s TexANG service. Rather interviewed both of them
in October 1999, but the interviews never aired.
Ultimately, Lieutenant Governor Barnes did not agree to be interviewed on-camera in
1999 by 60 Minutes Wednesday. Without Barnes, Mapes did not think she had a story. Mapes
told the Panel that she was then tied up on other work and abandoned the story until mid-2000.
16 Clay Robison, Barnes Says He Sought Spot in Guard for Bush, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 28, 1999, at A1.
17 Minutaglio is the author of First Son, a biography of the Bush family published in October 1999. Minutaglio said
in the interview that he believed that Bush’s status as the son of Congressman George H.W. Bush had helped him to
secure one of three to five sought-after pilot slots in the TexANG out of a waiting list of 150, but Minutaglio did not
indicate that Bush won the slot as the result of a specific request by the Bush family or any other direct political
influence.
18 Robert Strong was a First Lieutenant in the TexANG and, during the relevant period, worked in an administrative
capacity in TexANG’s headquarters in Austin, Texas. As previously noted, Lieutenant Bush served at Ellington Air
Force Base in Houston. In the interview with Rather, Lieutenant Strong said that there were long waiting lists to get
into the TexANG, but that he did not have any first hand knowledge whether that was why any individual, including
President Bush, was selected.
49
Throughout the first half of 2000, as the presidential primaries were under way, there
were continuing allegations in the press, as well as in new books, that then-Governor Bush had
avoided active duty during the Vietnam War and had pulled strings to obtain a spot in the
TexANG. Mapes began work again on a TexANG story in mid-2000, and she enlisted the
assistance of Mike Smith, a freelance reporter based in Austin, Texas. Mapes had worked with
Smith in March 2000 on unrelated stories. Smith had been a researcher for Minutaglio on First
Son and knew Mapes’ husband, a reporter for a Dallas newspaper. Smith told the Panel that,
because First Son was well-regarded, he received requests for assistance from many news organizations on research related to then-Governor Bush.
In September 2000, Smith also learned from a source about a retired Lieutenant Colonel
in the Texas Army National Guard named Bill Burkett, who reportedly had knowledge of
“scrubbing” of the TexANG files relating to then-Governor Bush. The source said that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had sent a letter regarding the alleged “scrubbing” to a Texas-based
group, “Veterans for Truth.” Smith was told by his source that, in the letter, Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett had alleged that Dan Bartlett, then an aide to Governor Bush and currently the White
House Communications Director, had cleaned out then-Governor Bush’s TexANG files.
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett also claimed that he overheard a speakerphone conference call on
which people said that they needed to “scrub” embarrassing TexANG files related to then-
Governor Bush. Smith told the Panel that he called Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in October 2000,
found him to be “nice” and “cut and dried,” and reported this to Mapes. Mapes, however,
appeared to be focused on another story at the time and did not pursue the TexANG investigation
further at this point.
On November 4, 2000, three days before the 2000 presidential election, Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett’s allegations of President Bush’s “scrubbed” TexANG files were reported on the
Internet by anti-Bush activists Linda Starr and Bev Conover of the Online Journal and Bob
Fertik of Democrats.com.19 The Online Journal article contained the following account of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations:
19 Linda Starr & Bev Conover, Former National Guard Officer Says Bush Aide Scrubbed Military Records, Nov. 4,
2000, at www.onlinejournal.com/bush/110400Starr-Conover/110400starr-conover.html; Bob Fertik, Bush Aides
Possibly Altered National Guard Records To Conceal Grounding and Missed Duty, Nov. 4, 2000, at
www.democrats.com/display.cfm?id=171.
50
A former officer in the Texas National Guard says an aide to George W. Bush scrubbed Bush’s military records to get rid of the disparities between those files and an account of Bush’s military service in his official biography.
Bill Burkett . . . said, “As the State Plans Officer for the Texas National Guard, I was on full-time duty at Camp Mabry when [Bush aide] Dan Bartlett was cleansing the George W. Bush file prior to G.W.’s presidential announcement . . . . This [cleansing] effort [also] involved . . . General Daniel James and Chief of Staff William W. Goodwin at Camp Mabry. . . . I knew one person who [was involved in] the records scrub who commented to me . . . that the Bush files really showed some problems with his blue-blood service record.”
Fertik’s article contained a similar description of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations,
although he noted that “Burkett stops short of directly accusing Bartlett of doctoring Bush’s
records.”
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations were not picked up by the mainstream media
except for The Times (London), which briefly reported Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s “scrubbing”
allegations in two articles on November 5, 2000. The first article stated:
The Bush camp was equally dismissive of a claim by Bill Burkett, a former lieutenant-colonel in the Texas National Guard, that the governor’s aides had doctored his military record.
Burkett said that Bush aides had visited the National Guard headquarters
at Camp Mabry “on numerous occasions” to make sure that records
available to the public about [then-Governor Bush’s] military service
would tally with his autobiography . . . .20
Another article that day in The Times (London) stated, “Bill Burkett . . . said that Bush aides had
been ‘scrubbing the files’ to bury disparities between his record while serving as a reserve pilot
during the Vietnam war and an account of the period in his official biography.”21
A “clarification” attributed to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was immediately issued, which
was and still is posted on various Internet blogs.22 His clarification did not revisit the facts of the
“scrubbing” allegations but addressed the extent of his allegations and the motivations and
circumstances surrounding his statements to the media. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett posed
20 Matthew Campbell, Gore Puts on Knuckle-dusters and Aims a Blow Below the Belt, TIMES (London), Nov. 5,
2000.
21 Tom Rhodes & Matthew Campbell, Bush Holds Narrow Lead Despite Last Minute Row, TIMES (London), Nov. 5,
2000.
22 See Bill L. Burkett, Air National Guard Commanding Officer Alleges Bush Military Records Cleansing, at
www.americanassembler.com/almanac/truth_about_bush_military.html.
51
several questions to himself, including, “Did you allege that the governor’s staff doctored the
records?” In response, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett wrote, “No, instead I stated that the way this
had been handled by the Bush staff including knowledgeable military officials at the Texas
National Guard, that it left the implication that the Bush staff had first incompetently provided an
incomplete military file for the Governor which was consistent with his autobiography.”
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett also said that, when speaking to the media regarding his allegations,
he was “extremely careful not to point an accusing finger.” He also said in his clarification that
his point in revealing his “scrubbing” allegations was to ask why then-Governor Bush had not
“simply release[d] his military pay files and retirement points accounting records” in order to
show that he had completed his service commitment satisfactorily and honorably. Years later, in
February 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett reportedly described this “clarification” as a
“mistake.”23
After President Bush was elected in November 2000, little more was reported in
mainstream media on his TexANG service until the 2004 presidential campaign began in earnest.
President Bush’s military service record became a campaign issue when his presumptive
opponent, Senator John Kerry, began to highlight his own military service in the Vietnam War.
The press then started reporting extensively on the military backgrounds of both candidates in
early 2004.
In February 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett issued statements in advance of the release
of James Moore’s book, Bush’s War for Reelection,24 in which Lieutenant Colonel Burkett is
cited as a source regarding the alleged “scrubbing” in the late 1990s of then-Governor Bush’s
TexANG records. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations, as well as interviews of Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett, were reported in February by many major news outlets, including CBS News,
The Boston Globe, The New York Times, USA TODAY, the Los Angeles Times, the Houston
Chronicle, The Dallas Morning News, The Kansas City Star, the Detroit Free Press, The
Washington Post, The Associated Press, MSNBC and CNN. The various interviews and
statements revealed inconsistencies in Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations, which led to
questions regarding his credibility and whether his claims could be proven. Mapes told the Panel
23 Kevin Drum, An Interview with Bill Burkett, Feb. 12, 2004, at www.calpundit.com/archives/003249.html.
52 that she was aware of the news reports at the time, but she was not involved in any of the contemporaneous reporting related to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett given that she was then investigating the Abu Ghraib Iraq prison scandal.
The Panel views this news coverage as significant because, although such information
could have been accessed nearly instantly through Internet or Lexis-Nexis searches, the Panel
found that no one involved in the vetting of the September 8 Segment seemed to be aware of it.
The Panel finds it unlikely that the Segment would have aired as it did if the vetters had been
provided details of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s controversial history.
1. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Allegations
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett claimed in Moore’s book and repeated in numerous media
interviews25 that he had overheard a speakerphone conversation through an open door in the
spring of 1997 between Joseph Allbaugh, Chief of Staff to then-Governor Bush, and Adjutant
General Daniel James III, then head of the Texas National Guard. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
said he overheard Allbaugh tell General James that Bartlett and Karen Hughes, then-Governor
Bush’s Communications Director, were going to review then-Governor Bush’s TexANG files in
connection with a book Hughes was writing regarding the Governor. Allbaugh allegedly asked
General James to gather up the files and ensure that “there’s not anything [in the files] that will
embarrass the governor.”
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett also said that, not long after he overheard this conversation
between Allbaugh and General James, he heard General James tell General John Scribner, who
was then head of the Texas Military Forces Museum at Camp Mabry, to gather the records
because Hughes would be coming out to look at them. According to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett,
another senior officer added that General Scribner should “clean it up” so that there would not be
“anything in there that will embarrass the governor.” Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said that he
and a fellow officer and friend, Chief Warrant Officer George Conn, were walking through the
Camp Mabry museum approximately 10 days after he overheard the phone call and saw General
Scribner reviewing then-Governor Bush’s TexANG records. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said
that he saw a trash can next to where General Scribner was working, and that in it were some of
then-Governor Bush’s records.
25 See MOORE, supra note 24, at 214-17. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Move to Screen Bush File in 90’s Is Reported,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at A33.
53
These allegations were not only more specific than those Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had
made in November 2000, but they also suggested – contrary to his earlier retraction – that
relevant files were actually discarded by then-Governor Bush’s aides or Texas National Guard
personnel during the “scrubbing” incident. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s suggestion
in 2000 that retirement documents and pay records were missing from then-Governor Bush’s
files is consistent with his later allegations that he saw such documents in the trash can at the
Camp Mabry museum.26
2. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Retractions
As in 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett made claims during this time period that he soon
after retracted. In Moore’s book, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was quoted as saying
that he was sent to Fort Clayton in Panama as punishment because he had “refused to falsify
personnel records of Governor Bush.”27 He had made the same allegation in a March 19, 2003
article he authored that was posted in the Online Journal.28 The February 14, 2004 edition of the
Houston Chronicle, however, reported that, when interviewed, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
“backed off the claim that he was ordered to falsify Bush’s records” and said that “ ‘[t]hat
statement was not accurate, that is overstated.’ ”29 One month later, the Abilene(Tex.) Reporter-
News Lieutenant Colonel Burkett reportedly delivered a speech at the Taylor County, Texas
Democratic Club in which he stated that his prior allegation that he had been ordered to falsify
records was “poorly stated.”30
3. Additional Questions Raised Regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s
Soon after Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations surfaced in February 2004, most of
those people implicated in his account denied all allegations of wrongdoing, including General
26 See, e.g., Wayne Slater & Michelle Mittelstadt, Aides Say Records Show Bush Served, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 11, 2004, at 1A; Hardball (MSNBC television broadcast, Feb. 12, 2004) (featuring interview of Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett).
27 MOORE, supra note 24, at 130.
28 See Bill Burkett, What Do You Say?, Mar. 19, 2003, at www.onlinejournal.com/bush/031903Burkett/
031903burkett.html.
29 Michael Hedges, Story of Purged Bush Files Has Been Around the Block; HOUSTON CHRON, Feb. 14, 2004, at
30 Jerry Daniel Reed, Area Man Repeats Claims About Bush’s Guard Service, ABILENE (Tex) REPORTER-NEWS,
Mar. 12, 2004, at A11.
54
James, Allbaugh, General Scribner and Bartlett.31 There also were conflicting reports from other
purported associates of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. USA TODAY reported that it had contacted
a dozen of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s “former comrades” and that both Chief Warrant Officer
Conn and another colleague, Dennis Adams, then a Lieutenant Colonel in the Texas Army
National Guard, had confirmed that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told them in 2002 of the
overheard Allbaugh/General James conversation.32 The Houston Chronicle reported that
Colonel Adams confirmed that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told him in 1997 about the records
destruction in 1997, and stated that “I have no doubt [Lieutenant Colonel Burkett] is telling the
truth . . . Bill is one of my heroes. He was trying to take on certain rotten SOBs inside the
Guard.”33 The New York Times reported that Chief Warrant Officer Conn declined to comment
on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations, but stated that “I know LTC Burkett and served
with him several years ago in the Texas Army National Guard. I believe him to be honest and
forthright. He ‘calls things like he sees them.’ ”34
The Boston Globe, however, reported that Chief Warrant Officer Conn’s only
recollection of the speakerphone call was that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had told him that he,
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, was concerned that Lieutenant Bush’s files would be sanitized and
not that anyone had been ordered to do so.35 With respect to the Camp Mabry Museum incident,
Chief Warrant Officer Conn told The Boston Globe that he recalled introducing Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett to General Scribner but did not recall that General Scribner was reviewing then-
Governor Bush’s files. The Houston Chronicle also reported that Chief Warrant Officer Conn
“emphatically” denied that he escorted Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to the Camp Mabry museum
where Lieutenant Colonel Burkett claimed to have seen several pages from then-Governor
Bush’s military file in a trash can.36
Some reporters also suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations might be
motivated by his personal struggles with the National Guard. The Boston Globe reported that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett “has, in the past, raised his allegations about the Bush records as part
31 Ralph Blumenthal, Move to Screen Bush File in 90’s Is Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at A33; Hedges,
supra note 29.
32 Dave Moniz & Jim Drinkard, Ex-officer: Bush File’s Details Caused Concern, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2004, at
33 Hedges, supra note 29.
34 Blumenthal, supra note 31.
35 Michael Rezendes, Doubts Raised on Bush Accuser, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2004, at A3.
36 Hedges, supra note 29.
55
of his personal struggle with the Guard over medical benefits.”37 A local newspaper in the area
where Lieutenant Colonel Burkett lives also reported: “Burkett’s motives have been questioned
by critics who noted that he and others, including [his comrades in the Army Guard, former
Chief Warrant Officer Harvey] Gough and [Chief Warrant Officer] Conn, had been at odds with
the Texas Guard leadership over issues regarding the Guard’s military preparedness and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s claim that he was denied military-paid medical care for five months in 1998.”38 Virtually all of the above is from public records or news files of the period. As noted previously, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett declined to meet with the Panel under acceptable conditions.
4. Doubts at CBS News
On February 12, 2004, the CBS Evening News broadcast a report produced by the
network’s Washington Bureau regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s “scrubbing” allegations.
The report included a sound bite from an interview of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett by John
Roberts, CBS News’ White House Correspondent, and a statement by Allbaugh denying the
charges against him. In his statement, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said, “I was troubled
sufficiently within my own conscience that there was possibly an effort here to . . . cast . . . an
image that was better maybe than the individual’s record.” In the report, Roberts indicated that
the White House dismissed the claims and that Allbaugh had called them “hogwash.”
Roberts explained to the Panel that he had asked his producer to seek a statement from
Allbaugh because he thought Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was “unreliable.” He told the Panel
that when he initially contacted Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to question him regarding his
allegations, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett launched into an unprovoked “tirade” against him and
insisted that he call author Jim Moore to get Moore’s permission before Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett would speak further with Roberts. This struck Roberts as highly unusual as Lieutenant
37 Rezendes, supra note 35.
38 Jerry Daniel Reed, Area Man Repeats Claims About Bush’s Guard Service, ABILENE (Tex.) REPORTER-NEWS,
Mar. 12, 2004, at A11. Months later, the Abilene Reporter-News interviewed Dr. James Hays, a 20-year veteran of
the Guard, who served on a committee that reviewed illness claims for active duty personnel, including Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett’s. See Local Opinions of Burkett’s Actions Vary, ABILENE (Tex.) REPORTER-NEWS, Sept. 26, 2004.
Dr. Hays told the Abilene Reporter-News that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett “was trying to get a permanent disability
discharge . . . We didn’t grant it.” Dr. Hays then stated his view that “[t]hat’s why he’s so mad at Bush ,” and “I
think . . . his intentions were to go after George Bush.”
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Colonel Burkett had already given many interviews to other media outlets. Moore approved the
interview and Roberts interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on February 12. Roberts
described the interview as “meandering.” Roberts was not aware at that time of Mary Mapes’
previous work regarding President Bush’s TexANG service and thus did not consult with her
regarding the report.
5. Mapes’ Awareness of the Lieutenant Colonel Burkett News Coverage
While Mapes was not involved in the production of the February 2004 CBS Evening
News report, it is the Panel’s understanding that she was considered a resource at CBS News at
that time for information about President Bush’s TexANG records. In fact, Mary Murphy, who
was then the head of the Campaign Desk for CBS News at the time these allegations surfaced,
told the Panel that Dotty Lynch of CBS News’ Washington Bureau had recommended that she
call Mapes for more information on the news reports because Mapes “knew everything” about
President Bush’s TexANG service and had repeatedly “mined” the subject. Murphy said she
attempted to reach Mapes at that time, but does not believe that Mapes returned her call.
Mapes told the Panel that she was generally aware of the February 2004 reports regarding
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s allegations. Indeed, Mapes’ investigative notes reveal that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had informed Mapes before the airing of the September 8 Segment
that he had spoken with over 200 media entities in February 2004. Mapes said that she did not
“pay much attention” to the interviews of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett at the time because she
was “up to [her] eyeballs” in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse story, which Mapes began working
on in January 2004 and which was first aired on April 28, 2004.
Mapes and her team of associate producers again took up the review of various aspects of
President Bush’s TexANG service during the summer of 2004. Based on the information
available to the Panel, it appears that Mapes and her team were not focused on any particular
event or topic between June and late August, but instead, amid competition from many other
news organizations, were trying to identify a viable story line regarding the President’s military
service. The leads on the TexANG story that Mapes and her team pursued at the time were
ultimately not included in the September 8 Segment.
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1. Following the Leads
Sometime in the summer of 2004, Mapes discussed stories in progress and the plans for
the new season starting in September 2004 with her new Executive Producer, Josh Howard, and
new Senior Broadcast Producer, Mary Murphy. Mapes recalled discussing the TexANG story
and receiving authority to hire an additional freelance associate producer, Lucy Scott, who
previously had been a producer for CBS News, to work on a possible story on President Bush’s
TexANG service. Mapes already had a military affairs consultant, Colonel Roger Charles,
working on the story. Significantly, it does not appear that either Howard or Murphy met in
person with Mapes from at least the beginning of August until September 7, the day before the
broadcast of the September 8 Segment.
Scott and Colonel Charles spent time during the summer of 2004 pursuing various leads.
Colonel Charles researched President Bush’s pilot training at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia
in 1968 and 1969. He told the Panel that he found two sharply different perceptions of
Lieutenant Bush, i.e., either that he was a “middle of the pack guy” or that he was given special
attention. Colonel Charles said that he was concerned at the time because he did not see how
60 Minutes Wednesday could reconcile these perceptions. Mapes and her team continued to
focus on President Bush’s training at Moody AFB to determine whether he had received preferential treatment there.
With Colonel Charles’ help in obtaining lists of other pilots and members of the TexANG
from military records, Scott spent most of her time attempting to locate and interview people
who had first-hand knowledge of President Bush’s TexANG service. Some of the people Scott
contacted around this time had information about issues or people that would ultimately become
relevant when Mapes obtained the Killian documents. However, when Scott spoke to these
people during this time period there was no indication that 60 Minutes Wednesday was ever
going to obtain documents. Scott and Colonel Charles also filed FOIA requests for documents
related to President Bush’s TexANG service. They continued this research through mid-August.
Smith also was retained by Mapes to work on the TexANG story as a freelance
researcher, but not until later in the summer. Nonetheless, they corresponded regarding the topic
and other leads regarding President Bush in June and July. In mid-June, Smith e-mailed Mapes
and indicated that he was working on a documentary for a German television network regarding
the Bush family and that he had a “tasty brisket” of information. It is not clear what Smith
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meant. At the end of June, Smith asked Mapes whether she was “serious” about pursuing the
TexANG story. Mapes responded:
I am DEADLY serious about it. I have two other people working with me, looking at various aspects of the story, trying to find an opening. Barnes is on board, as on board as he can be anyway. I expect him to do it. The piece (if I get it) will run in early September. I need all the help I can get. Just tell me what you’ve got.
Mapes was targeting the beginning of the new 60 Minutes Wednesday season in September for
broadcast of a story. 60 Minutes Wednesday generally does not air new shows between June and
September but instead airs reruns.
2. Mounting Pressure To Get a Story
On July 23, while Mapes was away on vacation, Smith e-mailed Mapes and said:
I am close to something that the bushies are worried about; it’s a new angle and I have access to a variety of palace alert pilots [i.e., Guardsmen who volunteered for 90-day tours of active duty in Vietnam and elsewhere] that are on the edge of giving us something, but I think that access is closing.
Smith hinted that, if she were interested in the story and working with him, he needed to
formalize his contractual arrangement with 60 Minutes Wednesday. Mapes responded on July
26, “I desperately want to talk to you. . . . Do NOT underestimate how much I want this story.”
At the end of July, President Bush’s service in the TexANG received additional attention
from the media after Senator Kerry made his service in the Vietnam War an issue at the
Democratic Convention. As set forth below, Mapes’ e-mails during this time conveyed both a
sense of urgency in the face of heavy competition and her eagerness to break the story.
On July 30, Mapes e-mailed Howard and said, among other things:
. . . there is some very interesting Bush stuff shaking out there right now. I am getting about 4 calls a day from Austin. Re . . . his qualification and refusal of service in Vietnam, etc. Lots of goodies. We are in pursuit . . . as are Vanity Fair, NY Times, New Republic, various others. I’ll let you know what (if anything) comes of it.
A few days later, on August 3, Mapes again e-mailed Howard and Murphy:
There is a bit of a storm brewing in Austin re the Bush stuff. Many many reporters from various print outlets (Harpers, Vanity Fair, NY Times mag, etc) all chasing the Bush National Guard stuff again. It is much more intense than it was four years ago and there is a strong general feeling that this time, there is blood in the water.
59
At the time, Mapes’ team was exploring many angles but it does not appear that any
single story line had developed. Nonetheless, Mapes continued to believe that she would have
something ready by the start of the new season in September. In fact, CBS News President
Andrew Heyward recalled being told by either Mapes or Rather as early as July or possibly the
beginning of August about the existence of a potentially “big” story, but he recalled no details.
September 1, 2004
In late August 2004, Mapes got a break on the TexANG story. As discussed in detail
below, on Monday, August 23, Mapes was told that documents allegedly missing from President
Bush’s TexANG service record had surfaced. Mapes and her team spent the next 10 days
courting the person who was believed to be in possession of the documents: the same Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett who had burst into the mainstream news media with his “scrubbing” allegations
six months before. While attempting to obtain the documents, Mapes was in frequent contact
with Howard regarding developments. In addition, Howard was alerted to the fact that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had requested various types of assistance from Mapes, including that
she put him in touch with the staff of Senator John Kerry’s presidential campaign. Howard’s
response concerning this request to contact the Kerry campaign remains in dispute, as discussed
below. Mapes also continued throughout this week and a half to attempt to convince Ben Barnes
that he should tell his story to Rather on 60 Minutes Wednesday.
1. Courting Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
On Monday, August 23, Mapes learned that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was rumored to
have important documents regarding the President’s TexANG service. Paul Lukasiak, who
operates a website on which he posts disparaging analyses of President Bush’s TexANG service,
told Mapes that another blogger, Linda Starr, had seen new TexANG documents regarding
President Bush. Starr hosts a website that recently contained the slogan, “Bush lied, Americans
died,” and is the editor of Online Journal, an online newsletter often critical of President Bush.
Mapes contacted Starr, who responded that she believed that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
had a two-page, classified document regarding President Bush’s TexANG service, and Starr
speculated that it might be a disciplinary report. This disciplinary report was thought to relate to
an assessment of whether Lieutenant Bush was fit to fly jets armed with nuclear weapons. Starr
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told Mapes that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was trying to determine the best way to disseminate
the information to journalists “without leaving any fingerprints.”
Mapes told the Panel that she recognized Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name and knew
that he was the person who had been in the news back in February 2004 alleging that President
Bush’s TexANG records had been “scrubbed.” Mapes asked Smith to follow up with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett, which he did that evening. Smith said that it seemed clear that Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett already was talking to other news outlets, including The New York Times. Smith
spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett again later that evening and asked him about the two-page
disciplinary report that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was rumored to have in his possession.
Smith told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett neither admitted nor denied that he had it,
but Smith interpreted his response to be a confirmation that he had something. A few days later,
on August 25, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett posted a commentary for the Online Journal, in which
he addressed his involvement in reporting the “scrubbing” he said he witnessed in 1997, and
hinted about the documents. His posting stated, among other things, “George W. Bush, you may
be the president. But I know you lied” based on the “files that we have now reassembled.”39
Between August 24 and August 31, Mapes and Smith spoke to Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett many times. They also spoke to Starr because they believed that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett respected and trusted her, and they thought that an alliance with Starr might help them to
convince Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to give them the document(s). While waiting for
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to agree to share the document(s), Smith speculated in an e-mail to
Mapes about how Lieutenant Colonel Burkett obtained the “holy grail.” Smith’s principal theory
was that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was protecting the true source. Smith thought the true
source might be one of the three Guardsmen (Chief Warrant Officer Conn, Chief Warrant
Officer Gough or Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Adams) who, according to Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett, had investigated the Texas National Guard in 1997 with him to determine whether there
was a “ghost soldiers” problem, i.e., keeping troops on the books who were no longer in the
Guard in order to maintain federal funding levels.
Smith told the Panel that on August 28, 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett began to hint
that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had something to do with the Bush TexANG documents. Mapes
39 Bill Burkett, Bush Lies About His Service, Smears Kerry’s and Seeks Exoneration for the Abu Ghraib Brass,
Aug. 25, 2004, at www.onlinejournal .com/Commentary/082504Burkett/08-25-04_Burkett.pdf.
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and her team then set out to find a relative of Lieutenant Colonel Killian, as he was deceased.
Mapes eventually tracked down Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s son who, according to her notes,
told her that then-Lieutenant Bush had volunteered for active duty in Vietnam but did not have
enough flight hours to qualify. He also told her that Lieutenant Bush may have had “disciplinary
issues,” and said the fact that he was the only TexANG pilot in the training class at Moody AFB
created morale issues for the unit.
Late on Monday, August 30, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett agreed to meet with Mapes and
Smith on Thursday, September 2 and to show them some documents. In apparent anticipation
that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett might be reluctant to show them the documents, Smith e-mailed
a detailed proposal to Mapes on Tuesday, August 31, regarding putting Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett in touch with an agent for a book deal, and Smith indicated that he would try to work
something out with his publishing friends:
Today I am going to send the following hypothetical scenario to a reliable, trustable editor friend of mine . . .
What if there was a person who might have some information that could possibly change the momentum of an election but we needed to get an ASAP book deal to help get us the information? What kinds of turnaround payment schedules are possible, keeping in mind the book probably could not make it out until after the election . . . . What I am asking is in this best case hypothetical scenario, can we get a decent sized advance payment, and get it turned around quickly.
Then they will respond with some possible scenarios of what they could do. When we get to Burkett’s house I will have at least some scenarios to show Burkett about what could happen if he played ball with the documents. If he shows us what we want, then I can call my friend and tell him the real details and start the process.
Smith told the Panel that the book deal was his idea, and that it was “not a 60 Minutes deal.”
Mapes responded in an e-mail to Smith’s proposal, stating “that looks good, hypothetically
speaking of course.” Notably, she did not tell Smith in her reply e-mail that he could not
promote the book deal in order to entice Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, although she told the Panel
that neither this, nor the options presented in Smith’s reply e-mail described below, were real
options in fact. Smith wrote in reply:
Just in case Burkett asks – let me make sure I have this right. This is our plan: If he shows us some leg, we are going to talk to him about his options in the following areas: 1) Security, 2) Publishing, 2A) (related topics of “taking care of him” with money) and 3) forcing Kerry campaign 62 to acknowledge his wisdom and strategic abilities . . . If his leg is sexy and useful then we are going to then do whatever it takes to help him in those areas.
(emphasis added). Smith told the Panel that his e-mail was “dripping with sarcasm” and
reflected “the initial push to get [them] in” with Burkett. The Panel has discovered no written
response by Mapes to this e-mail. Smith, however, told the Panel that after he had sent the email,
Mapes told him that he was not allowed to negotiate on CBS News’ behalf with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett.
On September 1, Smith e-mailed Mapes and expressed frustration about not having been able to get the documents yet. He wrote:
When I talk to [LTC Burkett] later today, I will make sure that we can get a copy of at least one of the credible documents immediately. I don’t want to get caught in a situation where he is holding us hostage with increasing demands as we are getting close to air date.
Smith explained to the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was “high maintenance,” but Smith
never recalled his making monetary demands.
The Panel has found no evidence that any of the proposals contemplated in these e-mails
was ever consummated, except for putting Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in touch with the Kerry
campaign. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was ever even offered
a publishing deal. To the extent that any of the other proposals outlined by Smith were offered
to or discussed with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as a possible enticement to convince him to give
the documents to 60 Minutes Wednesday, such an offer would have constituted a clear violation
of CBS News’ Standard II-1 as an “unethical newsgathering practice.” See Appendix 1.
2. Background Research on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
Mapes told the Panel that she “did her homework” on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett during
this time by doing background research on him and speaking to other people who knew him.
Mapes said that she read some of the articles in which Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was quoted in
early 2004. Mapes said that she also recalled an article in which Chief Warrant Officer Conn
had denied Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s claims relating to the “scrubbing” incident. It was
Mapes’ understanding, however, based apparently on something she was later told by Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett, that Chief Warrant Officer Conn was still in the military and that his wife
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threatened to leave him if he spoke out against President Bush. Accordingly, she told the Panel,
she did not consider Chief Warrant Officer Conn’s denial to be reliable.
Mapes also said that she contacted Chief Warrant Officer Gough, whom she described as
a former Guardsman of a “different political ilk.” Mapes also spoke to author Jim Moore and
David Van Os, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s personal attorney. According to Mapes, they all
said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was an honest person. In addition, Mapes told the Panel
that she spoke to a mainstream media reporter, who had known Lieutenant Colonel Burkett since
2001, and she stated that he viewed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as reliable.
Mapes said that she did not think of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in political terms. She
said that he was “embittered” about his Texas Army National Guard experience. She believed
that he had close “friendships with Republicans” but that his “allegiance was more military.”
Mapes later formed the impression that he was a “folksy son of a minister” who viewed things
“in black and white” and “had strong feelings about right and wrong.” She described him to the
Panel as the “classic” whistleblower in that he is “cantankerous and demanding” and “has a
martyred view of his role in life.”
3. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
As the courtship of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett continued between August 23 and
September 2, Mapes was pursuing the parallel path of an interview with Barnes. Mapes was also
in frequent contact with Howard about the possible story. Thus, on the afternoon of August 23,
Mapes e-mailed Howard to suggest that they consider airing the Ben Barnes interview that week,
although Barnes had not yet agreed even to do the interview. Howard responded in an e-mail
that he had concerns about airing a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment at that time due to competing
programming (the Olympics) and other issues.
Later that evening, Mapes e-mailed Howard regarding her activities and the new
developments in the story. She told him that Barnes was about to make a decision regarding his
interview, but she also mentioned a “new and compelling document,” a classified disciplinary
report dated April 1972 on then-Lieutenant Bush. Mapes told Howard that she believed that the
person who had the document was in the National Guard “for years and could have gotten access
to it in 1997 . . . when this thing supposedly was copied and made off with.” She did not name
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the source but indicated that “this is fraught with problems . . . [and] may all fall apart by
tomorrow.” Howard responded: “how interesting. thank you for sharing! as for this week, i’m
told dan [Rather] is pretty fully booked . . . [but] that can be cancelled if we decide to go ahead
with barnes.”
The next day, August 24, Mapes e-mailed Howard again. She said that she was “still
working the new document story” and may have to go to “the wilds of East Texas to get a copy
of it.” Mapes also told Howard that she “should . . . hear from Barnes this morning after he talks
to the Kerry camp.” Howard responded: “keep me posted on barnes – i’m really starting to lean
toward holding this till september. particularly since (this is between us) we may be airing a
regular show on the 8th after all, and it could air then.”
On August 30 and 31, Mapes’ phone records show that she spoke with Howard at least
two times for 12 and 11 minutes, respectively. Further, on August 31, Mapes e-mailed Howard
that “our bitter little buddy” (a reference to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett) agreed to meet with her
and Smith on Thursday, September 2, “and show [them] some documents.” Mapes told Howard
in the e-mail that she thought they could do a “preliminary . . . verification” of the documents on
the spot, given her and Smith’s knowledge of President Bush’s TexANG records. She also noted
that Barnes wanted to do the interview in New York the following week and suggested that
Howard consider the story for the 60 Minutes Wednesday show on September 29.
4. Mapes’ Initial Contact with the Kerry Campaign
Per Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s demands, Mapes called Howard and asked him whether
she could pass along the number of her confidential source to the Kerry campaign. Neither
Mapes nor Howard recalls the precise date of the call, but the Panel believes that it occurred
during the last week of August. Both Mapes and Howard recall the conversation, but they agree
on little else about it.
Howard emphatically denies having given permission to Mapes to make the call.
Specifically, he told the Panel that the call with Mapes was short. He said that he and Mapes
discussed the sharing of information during the reporting process, and he told Mapes clearly that
she could not make such a contact with the Kerry campaign. Mapes’ recollection, however, is
that Howard gave her permission to call the campaign. Mapes told the Panel that Howard was
“very open” and said words to the effect that “producers and reporters talk to all kinds of people
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all the time.” Mapes also recalled that Howard told her it was not “a big deal” and that they did
not “go into right and wrong.”
The Panel cannot resolve this conflict, as both Mapes and Howard have consistently
maintained their respective positions during the investigation, and the Panel has not located any
other information that sheds further light.
Mapes told the Panel that, on or about August 26 or August 27, she called Chad Clanton,
who was a Kerry campaign communications official. Mapes’ phone records reflect a 13-minute
call with Clanton on August 27. Mapes told the Panel that she did not know anyone from the
Kerry presidential campaign and obtained Clanton’s name and number from her husband, a
newspaper reporter in Dallas who had quoted Clanton in a recent article. Mapes described this
call to Clanton as a “one time contact.” Mapes’ recollection is that she wanted to call Clanton
both to confirm Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s claim that he had spoken to former Governor
Howard Dean and former Senator Max Cleland when they came through Texas, as well as to
pass along Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s phone number and his request to be called. According
to Mapes, she told Clanton that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said he had strategic advice for the
Kerry presidential campaign as to how to respond to the attacks on Senator Kerry’s Vietnam
service by the “Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.” Mapes told the Panel that she did not think that
Clanton would call Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and that they discussed the fact that other news
organizations were also covering the TexANG story.
Clanton told the Panel a different version of his contact with Mapes. He told the Panel
that he spoke to Mapes several times during this period, not just once. He further told the Panel
that Mapes initially called him not long before the broadcast of the September 8 Segment to see
what he was hearing from other reporters regarding stories on President Bush’s TexANG service.
He said he and Mapes discussed in another conversation the story that she was working on for
60 Minutes Wednesday. Clanton added that Mapes asked for a phone number for Joe Lockhart, a
senior advisor to Senator Kerry’s presidential campaign and President Clinton’s former press
secretary, and that he gave it to her. Clanton did not recall Mapes’ mentioning Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett’s name or requesting information regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s
contacts with Senator Cleland and Governor Dean. Mapes and Lockhart did not speak until at
least a week later, and their conversation is discussed in Section F.4.f of this Chapter.
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5. The Involvement of Dan Rather
Beginning on or around Saturday, August 28, Rather was working extremely long hours
preparing for, and then covering, the Republican Convention in New York, which ran from
Monday, August 30, through Thursday, September 2. Beginning Wednesday, September 1,
Rather also was paying attention to looming Hurricane Frances, as he wanted to get to Florida in
time to cover it. Rather recalled receiving a message from Mapes sometime during the
Convention and returning her call on Wednesday, September 1. He said that Mapes asked him to
call Barnes to assure him that he would be treated “fairly and accurately, if he did an on-camera
interview.” He said that Mapes told him she had “other things working” that she would tell him
about after the Convention. Rather said that he called Barnes, whom he had known for many
years, and that Barnes said that he was close to making a decision on an interview and would be
in touch.
6. Ben Barnes’ Speech at a Kerry Campaign Rally
On or about August 27, video footage of a Barnes speech at a Kerry campaign rally in
May 2004 claiming that he had helped President Bush get into the TexANG was being circulated
on the Internet. Jim Moore, author of Bush’s War for Reelection, sent a copy of this video to
various reporters, including Mapes, just before the Republican Convention. Soon thereafter, a
rumor began to circulate in media circles that Barnes had been, or would soon be, interviewed by
Rather for 60 Minutes Wednesday.
On September 1, Salon.com reported that 60 Minutes planned to air an interview of
Barnes the following week.40 The article also contained excerpts from Barnes’ speech at the
Kerry campaign rally. According to the article, Barnes said, “I got a young man named George
W. Bush into the Texas National Guard . . . I got a lot of other people in the National Guard
because I thought that was what people should do when you’re in office, and you help a lot of
rich people.” In the video, as reported in the Salon.com article, Barnes recalled a recent visit to
the Vietnam Memorial and said, “I looked at the names of the people that died in Vietnam, and I
became more ashamed of myself than I have ever been, because it was the worst thing I ever did,
was help a lot of wealthy supporters and a lot of people who had family names of importance get
into the National Guard. And I’m very sorry about that, and I’m very ashamed.”
40 Eric Boehlert, Ben Barnes to Break Silence on “60 Minutes,” Salon.com, Sept. 1, 2004, at
http.//archive/salon.com/news/feature/2004/09/01/barnes60minutes/
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7. Other News Media Coverage of TexANG Issues Between August 23,
2004 and September 1, 2004
As Mapes and her team were pursuing the documents from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
and an interview with Barnes, several major newspapers were reporting on TexANG issues.
Specifically, USA TODAY, The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, The Associated Press,
The Dallas Morning News and The Boston Globe published stories regarding President Bush’s
TexANG service between August 23 and September 1. The articles included the following:
· On August 23, USA TODAY reported on the failure of the documents released by the White House to answer fundamental questions about President Bush’s TexANG service, such as why he stopped flying, his failure to take an annual physical, and the apparent gap in his service records in 1972-73 despite requests made to the
Pentagon’s FOIA office.41
· On August 25, 27, and September 1, articles in The Associated Press reported that there were questions about President Bush’s service in the TexANG and that an anti-Bush group had run television ads stating that he had shirked his duty.42
· On August 28, The Associated Press reported that President Bush told NBC News that Senator Kerry’s “going to Vietnam was more heroic than my flying fighter jets.
He was in harm’s way and I wasn’t. On the other hand, I served my country. Had
my unit been called up, I would have gone.”43 That same day, The Associated Press
also reported that Ben Barnes had said he was “ashamed” of helping President Bush
and others gain entry to the TexANG.44 The article noted that President Bush had
denied that family influence helped him get into the Guard. The Boston Globe, the
Los Angeles Times, USA TODAY and The Washington Post also covered one or both
of these stories.45
· On August 29, the Los Angeles Times reported that President Bush was periodically absent from his duties while in the TexANG and that he lost his flying status because he had not taken a required physical that included random drug testing.46 That same day, The New York Times published an article that summarized what was known
41 David Moniz & Jim Drinkard, Questions About Bush’s Guard Service Unanswered, USA TODAY, Aug. 23,
2004, at 6A.
42 Robert Tanner, Vietnam revisited: Newspaper Editorials Weigh in on Accusations, Defenses for Kerry’s Wartime
Record, AP, Aug. 25, 2004; Matt Kelley, Navy’s Report from 1969 Supports Kerry’s Version of Disputed Incident,
AP, Aug. 25, 2004; Ron Fournier, Republicans Urge Bush to Turn Attention from Iraq, Vietnam with Second-Term
Agenda at Convention, AP, Aug. 27, 2004; Ron Fournier, Democrats Press Kerry to Step Up Attacks on Bush, AP,
Sept. 1, 2004.
43 Ron Fournier, Bush Readies Second-Term Proposals, AP, Aug. 28, 2004; Pete Yost, On Bus Tour in Ohio, Bush
Says Economic Policies Will Bring Jobs to Farms and Factories, AP, Aug. 28, 2004.
44 Former Speaker of Texas House Says He’s Ashamed for Getting Bush into Texas Guard, AP, Aug. 28, 2004.
45 Glen Johnson, Clark Defends Kerry’s Record, Slams Bush, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2004, at A24; Bush Bows to
Rival’s ‘Heroic’ Military Service, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A23; Democrat ‘Ashamed’ He Helped Bush,
WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at A05; Bill Nichols & Martha T. Moore, Praise and Protests Greet GOP, USA
TODAY, Aug. 30, 2004, at 1A.
46 Kevin Phillips, History Haunts Bush and Kerry; L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at M1.
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about President Bush’s TexANG service from his entering training in June 1968 to
his honorable early discharge in October 1973 to attend Harvard Business School.47
F. Thursday, September 2, 2004 – Monday September 6, 2004
1. Thursday, September 2: The First Two Documents Were Obtained
a. Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
On September 2, Mapes and Smith met with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and his wife at a
restaurant near their home for approximately three hours. The Burketts arrived with stacks of
documents, including two binders full of depositions and other documents that were apparently
from his litigation with the National Guard over health benefits. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
spent a long time telling Mapes and Smith about his service in the Texas Army National Guard,
his fight with the Guard to get medical treatment and various threats he and his wife had
received over the years relating to allegations that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had made against
the Guard. The Burketts expressed great concern for their family’s personal safety if Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett was revealed as their source in light of the Burketts’ prior experiences. Mapes
told the Panel that she promised Lieutenant Colonel Burkett that she would protect his identity,
although she said she informed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett that she would have to disclose his
name to her superiors at 60 Minutes Wednesday.
At Mapes’ prodding, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett finally handed over one document, a
“Memorandum for Record” purportedly written by Lieutenant Colonel Killian and dated August
1, 1972. Later in the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided another document, a letter
addressed simply to “Sir,” dated June 24, 1973, that also was purportedly written by Lieutenant
Colonel Killian. Copies of these documents are contained in Exhibits 2D and 2E to this Report.
Mapes and Smith told the Panel that they immediately recognized the significance of these
documents.
The August 1, 1972 memorandum, which was ultimately used in the September 8
Segment, refers to a verbal order by Lieutenant Colonel Killian that Lieutenant Bush be
suspended from flight status due to his failure to take his physical and his failure to meet
TexANG standards. It also references Lieutenant Bush’s request to transfer “out of state.” The
June 24, 1973 document references a request to rate Lieutenant Bush and states that, “Neither Lt.
47 David M. Halbfinger, Three Decades Later, Vietnam Remains a Hot Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at 1.
69
Colonel Harris or I feel we can rate 1st Lt. Bush since he was not training with 111 F.I.S. since
April, 1972.” No mention was made of this document in the September 8 Segment.
Mapes told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett informed her that the documents
came from Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s personal file and that he had received them in March
2004 after he had appeared on the MSNBC cable television program Hardball in February 2004.
Mapes recalled that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said that he had received them from someone
who said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett would “know what to do with [the documents] better
than” he or she would. Mapes said that she did not press Lieutenant Colonel Burkett about the
chain of custody during the September 2 meeting because her primary objective was to be
allowed to take the documents with her, and she thought that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett might
be offended if she pressed too hard at that time on source issues.
Smith told the Panel a different story about what Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said about
the source of the documents. Smith said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett claimed that he had
received the documents anonymously in the mail. Colonel Charles also recalled hearing from
Smith or Mapes that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett “had received the two documents in the mail
from an anonymous source after he appeared on television in February 2004” and his
recollection is consistent with his contemporaneous notes. Thus, Colonel Charles’ handwritten
notes, apparently reflecting a phone call with Mapes or Smith on September 2, state “Bill B got
them in the mail after going on TV” and “source anonymous.” Mapes told the Panel that she did
not recall Lieutenant Colonel Burkett ever saying that he received them anonymously in the
mail.
Mapes told the Panel that she informed the Burketts that she was worried the documents
might be a “political dirty trick.” Mapes said that the Burketts appeared “genuinely shocked” at
the suggestion and this reaction gave her comfort. She said that she also told Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett that she would “verify” the documents and noted that this seemed to be important to him
as well.
Smith told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett tantalized them during their meeting
on September 2 about the existence of additional documents and suggested that they needed to
go through his personal lawyer, David Van Os, to get them. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was not
willing to discuss any additional documents at that time. Mapes did not recall learning about any
70
additional documents at that first meeting, but believed that she learned about them when she
spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett later that night.
After the meeting on Thursday, September 2, Mapes called Howard and told him about
the documents. Howard recalled that she described the source to him in a series of calls over the
next few days. According to Howard, Mapes said that in the mid- to late 1990s, four middleranked
National Guard officers were commissioned to do an investigation of a Texas National
Guard office relating to allegations about “ghost soldiers.” Mapes explained to Howard that
“ghost soldiers” were people whose names were listed on Texas National Guard payroll records
but did not report for duty. Howard recalled that Mapes said to him that at some point these four
Guardsmen were told to stop the investigation. Howard told the Panel that Mapes said that her
source was one of the four officers. According to Howard, Mapes said that one of the three other
officers removed certain documents from the Texas National Guard office at that time and gave
them to Mapes’ source in March 2004.
Howard did not recall whether Mapes mentioned the source’s name to him during these
conversations. He said that it would not have meant anything to him if she did tell him that the
source was a man named Bill Burkett. Murphy recalled that Howard also relayed the
background information about the source to her but did not recall whether she knew at that time
that the source was Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.
b. Preliminary Review of the Documents
Mapes and Smith drove to a Kinko’s store in Abilene after the meeting with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett and faxed the documents to Colonel Charles and Howard. Howard said that
when he initially looked at the two documents, he wondered why Mapes was excited about them
as he did not think that they contained significant new information.
Colonel Charles told the Panel that he had some initial questions regarding a few details
after he reviewed the documents, including the format of Lieutenant Bush’s service number. He
told the Panel that, after studying certain of the official Bush records, he was no longer
concerned. In addition, Colonel Charles felt that the date and content of the documents were in
line with the released records. Specifically, as he told Mapes and her team in an e-mail dated
September 2, Colonel Charles noted that the date of the earlier document, August 1, 1972, was
the exact date cited in the official Bush record of September 29, 1972, which confirmed the
verbal order suspending Lieutenant Bush from flying status. Colonel Charles also noted that the
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August 1, 1972 memorandum cited the same reference from the Air Force Manual, AFM 35-13,
that was cited in the September 29, 1972 Order.
c. Contact with Rather
On Thursday, September 2, Rather was still in New York covering the last day of the
Republican Convention. Mapes told the Panel that on her way back to Dallas after meeting with
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, she called Rather and Jim Murphy, the Executive Producer of the
CBS Evening News. Murphy told the Panel that he remembered Mapes calling that night while
Rather was busy with the CBS Evening News and that Rather returned her call after the
broadcast. Murphy recalled that Mapes told him that “something big had come up” and that she
had obtained documents that were the “missing links” in President Bush’s TexANG service
record.
Mapes told the Panel that she also spoke to Rather that night and told him that she had
obtained two documents from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. She said that Rather was familiar
with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and knew that he was the person who had earlier alleged that
President Bush’s files had been “scrubbed.” Mapes said that she also told Rather about
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s litigation over his Texas Army National Guard medical benefits
and that Rather understood that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was not the original source of the
documents.
Rather had only a vague recollection of speaking to Mapes either late on Thursday,
September 2, or early on Friday September 3, but said he could not recall the specifics of the
conversation as he was focused on getting to Florida to cover Hurricane Frances. Rather told the
Panel, however, that he was not aware before the September 8 broadcast of Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s notoriety, that Lieutenant Burkett had been interviewed by John Roberts on the CBS
Evening News in February 2004 or that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was a source for Jim Moore’s
book. Rather did recall at some point learning Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name and knowing
that he was a “key source” but not necessarily the source of the documents. He also said that he
did not know before the broadcast that there was another source. He told the Panel that he
recalled hearing something about the “scrubbing” allegations, and he recalled Mapes telling him
that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had been in the Texas National Guard for a long time and would
have had access to the documents. He also recalled that Mapes described Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett sometime before September 8 as a “straight-talking West Texan” with a “good
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reputation in the county where he lives even among people who do not like him, and they say he
is a truth teller.” Rather said that Mapes told him that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was a
supporter of Senator John McCain and, while he did not recall being told that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett was anti-President Bush, he did not have the view that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was a
supporter of President Bush.
2. Friday, September 3, 2004: Additional Reporting and The Search for
a. Additional Reporting
Early in the morning of Friday, September 3, Mapes sent an e-mail to Smith, Scott and
Colonel Charles indicating that there was much work to do on the story and she was very
energized – “[t]oo excited, busy, stressed, etc. to sleep, I guess.” She said, “I should be hearing
from [Colonel Burkett’s] lawyer [Van Os] this morning. He has more docs and more info. I
want it.” Mapes asked Scott to get in touch with one of her contacts who asked for anonymity48
and who had served in the TexANG with then-Lieutenant Bush, and Mapes commented, “We
HAVE to have an interview with him for this piece as it stands right now.” She also suggested
that Scott show the documents to General Staudt, with whom Scott had developed a cordial
relationship over the preceding few months.
Scott attempted to confirm the content of the two Killian memoranda with General Staudt
and her other contact. Neither would speak to Scott on the record. General Staudt refused to
discuss the documents with her and her subsequent attempts to reach him through Tuesday,
September 7 were unsuccessful. Scott then met with her other contact and showed him the two
documents that Mapes had received from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Scott told the Panel that
this contact provided confirmation of the content of the two documents to her and that she passed
along this information to Mapes. This contact had no personal knowledge about the documents
or their substance, however, and the contact even suggested the names of two other people Scott
should contact who might have such knowledge.49
Colonel Charles focused on finding people who worked in the 111th Fighter Interceptor
Squadron to confirm how Lieutenant Colonel Killian maintained his files, but he was
48 The Panel was provided the name of this contact but does not believe it appropriate to disclose it in this Report
given the request for anonymity.
49 One such person was deceased. It does not appear that Scott sought to contact or determine the status of the other
person.
73
unsuccessful. He told the Panel that he did not know that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had a
secretary or clerk typist at that time. One would surface after the Segment aired.
On either Friday, September 3, or Saturday, September 4, Mapes also reached out to
Lieutenant Robert Strong, whom Rather had interviewed in 1999. Lieutenant Strong had worked
at the TexANG headquarters in Austin in 1971 and part of 1972 in an administrative capacity
and knew Lieutenant Colonel Killian. Mapes told the Panel that she felt Lieutenant Strong was a
good person to interview about the documents because “paperwork was his specialty.” Mapes
said that Lieutenant Strong claimed that he knew Lieutenant Colonel Killian well.
b. Retention of the Document Examiners
On Friday morning, September 3, Yvonne Miller, who had been assigned to work on the
story the night before, talked with Mapes, who was still in Dallas, to discuss her initial
assignment. The Panel believes this call occurred around 11:15 a.m. EST and lasted about 10
minutes based on the available telephone records. At the time of this call, Miller had not seen
the two Killian documents faxed to Howard the day before. Miller told the Panel that Mapes
said that there had been an effort to cleanse TexANG files regarding Lieutenant Bush’s service
record but that someone in the Texas National Guard had seen the files in a trash can and took
them. She also said that the person who took Lieutenant Bush’s records gave them to Mapes’
source in March 2004. Based on Miller’s notes of the conversation, it appears that Mapes
provided Miller with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name during their conversation. Mapes told
Miller that the gist of the documents was that Lieutenant Bush had failed to fulfill his TexANG
duties.
During this conversation, Mapes asked Miller to find handwriting and document
examiners to analyze the documents that Mapes had faxed the previous day to Howard. As
noted, Miller had not yet seen the documents at the time of the call with Mapes and, in fact, does
not recall receiving the documents until after she had completed her task of finding the
examiners later that day. In addition, neither Mapes nor Miller had ever attempted to
authenticate documents before, and they were unfamiliar with the authentication process and
with the field of document authentication in general.
Mapes told Miller that Colonel Charles had the name of a document examiner who had
been recommended by someone in the FBI and that Colonel Charles would call Miller with the
74
examiner’s contact information. Miller did not know Colonel Charles, but Mapes told her that
he had been involved in the Abu Ghraib story and that she trusted him.
Mapes told Miller at some point, either during this conversation or in a subsequent one,
that the documents were copies. Miller said that Mapes told her to focus on authenticating the
signatures. Miller recalled that Mapes said she wanted three examiners, although Mapes
believes that she did not give Miller a specific number and merely told her to locate “a handful”
of the “best document authentication experts.”
Mapes informed Miller that she needed a response from the document examiners by the
end of the Labor Day weekend and that “complete confidentiality was required.” Mapes told the
Panel that she discussed briefly with Miller how to research such examiners, including finding
examiners frequently used as witnesses in litigation, a discussion that Miller did not recall.
Miller told the Panel that she did recall that someone, either Mapes or Colonel Charles, told her
that day she should try to find examiners who were familiar with government documents and/or
had worked for the government, but that she could not use anyone who was actively working in
the government. Miller was unable to do extensive research on the topic of document authentication due to the time constraints imposed by the schedule.
Colonel Charles then called Miller and gave her the name of Linda James, a handwriting
and document examiner in Plano, Texas. Colonel Charles said that James was a professional
document examiner who lived and worked in a town close to where Mapes lived.
Miller called James, and was told that James was willing to work over the Labor Day
weekend and that it would take approximately five hours to do a general assessment. Miller then
asked James for referrals to other examiners. James gave her names of other people she had
either worked with or against in litigation, including two of the examiners who eventually would
be retained by 60 Minutes Wednesday (Marcel Matley and Emily Will). Miller told James that
the documents would be delivered to her by hand on Saturday.
Miller spent approximately six hours on Friday, September 3 attempting to find
handwriting and document examiners by calling people and getting referrals. She had difficulty
reaching many of the examiners who were referred to her. Others were reachable but not willing
to work over Labor Day weekend or refused to work with copies. Ultimately, Miller found four
handwriting and document examiners who were willing to work for 60 Minutes Wednesday in
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the time frame dictated: James,50 Matley, 51 Will52 and James Pierce.53 At approximately 5 p.m.
on Friday, September 3, Miller called Mapes and sent her an e-mail with contact information for
the four examiners.
Miller learned at or around this time that Colonel Charles would be overnighting a
package of documents to her for Saturday delivery and that Miller should then send some of
those documents to the examiners on Saturday by courier. Miller said that she felt frustrated at
the time and “very uncomfortable” because she was rushed in this process and did not have a
handle on the documents that were to be authenticated. As noted, Miller did not see either of the
two documents that Mapes had received from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett until after she had
located the examiners. When she initially contacted the examiners on Friday, she knew only that
the documents were memoranda involving President Bush.
Miller and Mapes spoke several other times on Friday, September 3, regarding the
selection of the examiners. During one of these conversations, Miller told Mapes that Matley
had been recommended by a number of people. Mapes called Matley on September 3 and
provided him with the following information: (1) that the documents were copies; (2) that the
writer was now dead; (3) that they had official documents that Matley could use as a comparison
for the signatures; and (4) that the work was highly confidential because it involved President
50 James, based in Plano, Texas, told the Panel that she has been a document examiner for 13 years and that she has
completed 800 hours of training sponsored by the National Questioned Document Association and the American
Institute of Applied Science. James’ primary focus is on analyzing handwriting, and although she is trained on a
basic level on typography issues, she does not claim to be a typography expert. She is a member of the National
Association of Document Examiners (“NADE”) but is not certified by the American Board of Forensic Document
Examiners (“ABFDE”).
51 Matley, based in San Francisco, has a Master’s Degree in Library Science from Immaculate Heart College in 1963
and received private instruction in graphology in 1979 and 1980. Matley has no government training. Matley told
the Panel that he decided to become a document examiner in the early 1980s and learned the field through “selfstudy.”
Matley has been an honorary member of NADE since 1992 and received board certification from NADE in
October 2000. He is not certified by the ABFDE. Matley is not a typography specialist, although he told the Panel
that courts have recognized him as an expert in typeface analysis.
52 Will, based in Raleigh, North Carolina, told the Panel that she has been a forensic document examiner for
approximately 18 years. She stated that many of her cases involve handwriting and signature analysis, but she also
has worked on cases involving document alterations, obliterations, chronological dating, typography and other
document features. She considers herself competent to handle typewriter typography issues only up to a certain
point and generally refers typewriter issues beyond her expertise to Peter Tytell, whom she views as a “recognized
authority” and “top expert” on typewriter issues. Will also is a member of NADE, but is not certified by the ABFDE.
53 Pierce, based in Newport Beach, California, has substantial government training in document examination. Pierce
was initially a member of the ABFDE, but the Panel was informed that Pierce has not kept up his certification.
Pierce’s resume indicates that he has been employed since 1970 in the field of forensic document examination,
including the comparison of handwriting, typewriting and paper/ink analysis. He is currently in private practice, but
he previously managed the Questioned Documents Section of the Los Angeles Police Department Crime Lab.
Pierce declined to be interviewed by the Panel, but he did speak with counsel to the Panel.
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Bush. Mapes said that she asked Matley to “compare and authenticate” the documents. Matley
told the Panel that he told Mapes that it was not possible for him to authenticate the documents
completely because they were not originals and, therefore, he would not be able to carbon date
the ink or paper. Mapes told the Panel that she did not view this as a problem.
Mapes also spoke to Will on Friday evening, September 3, and Mapes’ telephone records
reflect that the call lasted approximately half an hour. Will recalled that Mapes told her that the
documents related to President Bush’s TexANG service and that Mapes had been working on the
story for five years. Will told the Panel that Mapes told her she was concerned that political
operatives, perhaps one of President Bush’s senior campaign strategists, had planted the
documents. Mapes also said that someone she had been interviewing over a long period of time
had brought her the documents voluntarily, which gave her comfort, and that the source had been
present when President Bush’s records were “cleaned out.” Will also recalled being told at some
point, either during this conversation or in a subsequent one, that Mapes’ source had received the
documents anonymously in the mail. Will said that she told Mapes that it was likely that her
opinion would be qualified based on the fact that there were no originals. Will told the Panel
that Mapes told her to do the best she could do. Mapes had a different recollection and told the
Panel that she never told Will about the source of the documents.
(i) Qualifications of the Handwriting and Document
The Panel has reviewed the backgrounds of the examiners selected by Miller and Mapes.
Miller conducted brief interviews of each, as did Mapes, but given the time constraints under
which they were working, neither Miller nor Mapes had the opportunity to conduct a detailed
examination of their experience and the scope of their expertise prior to retaining them. Miller
said that if the story had not been produced in a rush over Labor Day weekend, it is likely that
she would have spent a week or more learning about the document authentication process and
the field of expertise prior to choosing the examiners. The types of information that Miller
should have learned about are set forth in the Authentication Background, which is included in
Appendix 2 to this Report. Some of the more relevant considerations can be summarized as
follows:
At its base, document examination is divided by a fundamental difference over the
significance of training in “graphology.” Graphologists claim to be able to determine personality
77
characteristics through the analysis of handwriting. Graphology training is the focal point of
controversy in the field. Some document experts believe graphology is akin to astrology, and do
not believe that those trained as graphologists can perform as competently as document experts.
See Appendix 2.
This dispute has given rise to competing professional organizations, which in turn offer
competing certifications. The two organizations relevant with respect to the four experts selected
by 60 Minutes Wednesday are the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners
(“ABFDE”) and the National Association of Document Examiners (“NADE”). ABFDE is the
credentialing body used by the Questioned Document Section of the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences, and this group is considered by some to be the “most aggressive” in
maintaining its membership superiority. The ABFDE rejects graphology training. The NADE
accepts those with graphology training.
(ii) The Panel’s Findings Regarding the Examiner Selection
The Panel believes that the process of examiner selection by 60 Minutes Wednesday
should have been given more careful attention and time. If Mapes and 60 Minutes Wednesday
had been better informed regarding the examiners’ credentials and the authentication process, it
is likely that the Segment either would not have aired or would have contained appropriate
disclaimers as to the limits of such analysis. For example, none of the four examiners retained
appears to have extensive typography expertise, and many of the criticisms of the Killian
documents in the Aftermath were focused on typography. The Panel recognizes, however, that
there are situations where news is time-sensitive and a crash is necessary. Therefore, as
discussed in Chapter XI of the Report on the Panel’s recommendations, the Panel believes that
60 Minutes Wednesday should maintain a list of document examiners who are qualified to
provide opinions as needed regarding a document’s authenticity.
c. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Lawyer
Smith met with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s lawyer, David Van Os, on Friday,
September 3. Van Os was running for justice of the Texas Supreme Court54 and was in Austin
campaigning. Smith and Van Os met at a campaign event and then went to a restaurant where
54 Van Os was defeated in November 2004.
78 they talked for several hours, although much of the discussions involved Texas politics as opposed to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s situation.
Van Os explained to counsel for the Panel that he had been asked by Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett in late August, before any documents were given to Mapes and Smith, to help him
negotiate a deal with 60 Minutes Wednesday. At that point, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s
concerns were that 60 Minutes Wednesday (1) authenticate the documents, (2) ensure his
confidentiality and anonymity, and (3) guarantee a consulting contract. Van Os was surprised
when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told him in a telephone conversation on Thursday night,
September 2, that he had given documents to 60 Minutes Wednesday that day, since it took away
most of his leverage in seeking a deal. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told Van Os that he still
wanted him to meet with 60 Minutes Wednesday on Friday to discuss what could be done for
him.
At the restaurant, Smith and Van Os discussed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s concerns
about his personal safety and his relationship with 60 Minutes Wednesday. Van Os also told
Smith that he thought CBS News should work out a consulting arrangement with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett, and, according to Van Os, Smith told him that he thought CBS News would be
willing to discuss that with him.55 Van Os reiterated that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s identity
must be kept strictly confidential by 60 Minutes Wednesday. Van Os told counsel for the Panel
that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett also needed relocation assistance because “when you go against
the Bush machine, you tend to become a target for threats and harassment and problems.”
Van Os did not discuss specific terms of an arrangement with Smith but understood that
Smith would pass along the requests to Mapes. There appears to have been no discussion
regarding a possible publishing deal. In addition, Van Os told counsel for the Panel that Smith
showed Van Os one of the two documents he had obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett,
which Van Os had not previously seen. They did not discuss whether Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett had additional documents, but they did talk about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s concern
that the documents be authenticated.
At some point over the Labor Day weekend, Mapes also spoke to Van Os. Van Os
recalled that they spoke about his concern, which was shared by Mapes, that a senior campaign
55 Smith agreed that this issue came up during the meeting, but he said that he merely told Van Os that he would
forward the request to Mapes.
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strategist for President Bush was “capable of doing this as a setup,” i.e., of planting fake
documents. He recalled that Mapes reassured him that 60 Minutes Wednesday “had really good
experts . . . and that CBS was not going to do anything with the documents until they were
absolutely sure they were authentic.”
Van Os told counsel to the Panel that, while “the cows were out of the barn,” since
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had given the documents to Smith and Mapes, Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett still wanted Van Os to “negotiate something to protect his interests.” Van Os recalled
that he told Mapes that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett thought 60 Minutes Wednesday might retain
him as a consultant and Mapes indicated that someone from 60 Minutes Wednesday would get in
touch with him, although no one ever did. Van Os said that he also requested that 60 Minutes
Wednesday cover Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s expenses if relocation was necessary and Mapes
said that it was something they could consider, but they did not discuss the request again until
after the broadcast. Finally, Van Os told counsel for the Panel that he also discussed the
possibility of Mapes’ passing along Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name and number to the Kerry
presidential campaign. According to Van Os, Mapes said that she had previously discussed this
with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Van Os told the Panel that Mapes responded that she thought it
would be okay to pass along his name and number but that she could not “help anyone politically” because she had “journalistic independence.”
d. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday
Howard told the Panel that on either Thursday, September 2, or Friday, September 3,
Mapes asked for two other concessions for her source beyond the Kerry campaign contact:
(1) that CBS News pay for the source to “get out of town” because he was concerned for his
safety; and (2) that CBS News obtain a pre-paid cell phone for him. Howard said that he refused
the first request, but told Mapes that if she was really concerned for her source’s personal safety
she should alert Betsy West, Howard’s boss. Regarding the second request, Howard said that he
approved it because Mapes claimed that she needed to give the source the phone in order to keep
in touch with him.
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3. Saturday, September 4, 2004: The Authentication Process Continued
and Other Issues
a. Contacts with the Document Examiners
Miller’s primary task on Saturday, September 4, was to get the documents to the
document examiners. Miller went into the office that morning to pick up the package that
Colonel Charles had overnighted to her. It contained approximately 100 pages of documents
from the official Bush records. During a subsequent telephone call, Miller was told by Mapes
and Colonel Charles to send to the document examiners the two Killian documents that Mapes
had received from her source, as well as 17 other pages of documents from the official Bush
records. After the call with Mapes and Colonel Charles, Miller arranged for the 19 pages to be
couriered to three of the experts. Mapes planned to deliver one set personally to James later that
day.
In mid-afternoon on Saturday, September 4, Mapes and her husband drove to James’
house to deliver the documents and then met with James in her home office for 30-40 minutes.
Mapes handed James the same 19 pages of documents that had been sent to the other examiners.
Mapes explained to James that she should compare the signatures and other aspects of the two
documents (the August 1, 1972 memorandum and the June 24, 1973 memorandum) to the remainder of the documents in the package.
Mapes recalled that James showed her a book written by Matley during this meeting and
that James referred to Matley as the “Dean of Document Analysts.” James, however, told the
Panel that she did not recall discussing Matley or any of the other examiners retained by
60 Minutes Wednesday with Mapes.56 Mapes also told the Panel that James told her she had
never heard of Emily Will, although this appears unlikely since James had referred Will to Miller
the previous day. James told Mapes that she was concerned that the documents were copies
instead of originals, but that she thought she had enough material to compare the signatures.
b. Other Background Reporting
On Saturday, September 4, Scott spoke to an off-the-record contact who had known
Brigadier General James M. Rose, the Assistant Adjutant General – Air at the time that President
Bush was admitted to the TexANG. Mapes had spoken to this contact in 1999 (see Chapter
56 Mapes recalls that she did, and Yvonne Miller and Betsy West both recalled that Mapes told them that James
showed her Matley’s book.
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VII.A. above). Scott told the Panel that her contact said that Brigadier General Rose had once
admitted that he helped President Bush get a spot in the TexANG and had confirmed this fact
with Brigadier General Rose’s assistant at the time, although the assistant later “changed his
tune.” The contact would not agree to be interviewed on camera.
c. Rather’s Involvement
On Saturday, September 4, Rather was still in Florida covering Hurricane Frances. At
some point that day, Mapes and Rather spoke on the telephone. Mapes told the Panel that she
asked Rather to call Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to thank him for cooperating and asked him to
call Van Os as well. She also said that she spoke to Rather after he made the calls, and he
commented that they went fine. Rather, however, recalled only that Mapes told him she had the
documents and did not recall speaking to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett or Van Os prior to the
broadcast of the September 8 Segment. Smith told the Panel that he thought that Rather spoke to
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett before he gave them the documents on Thursday, September 2.
Rather was also in touch with Heyward on Saturday, September 4, or Sunday,
September 5. Their recollections of the substance and timing of their contact differ somewhat,
although they both recalled speaking about the National Guard story. Rather believed that he
had one call with Heyward about coverage of Hurricane Frances and that Mapes and the Killian
documents came up briefly during that call. Rather said that both he and Heyward agreed that it
was a potentially important and controversial story. According to Rather, he told Heyward that
the story could be “radioactive” and that Heyward should have it “checked out thoroughly.”
Rather said that he and Heyward agreed that Betsy West should be brought in to look at it
closely. Rather told the Panel that Heyward said to him, “Keep your focus on the hurricane.
We’re looking a full day broadcast.”
Heyward, on the other hand, told the Panel that sometime during that weekend,57 Rather
told him that the “big story” to which Rather had previously referred was going forward and
involved President Bush’s TexANG service and that they had documents. Heyward also recalled
that, when Rather mentioned documents, he told Rather that they had to make sure the documents were real. He said that Rather responded, “Of course.”
57 Heyward told the Panel that this conversation occurred two weeks before the broadcast, but said that he believes
Mapes had the documents at the time they spoke. Based on the content of the conversation, it appears that he is
recalling the same conversation as Rather, which appears to have taken place on Saturday, September 4.
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Heyward recalled a second conversation with Rather over the weekend as well. He told
the Panel that Rather said that Mapes had asked Rather to go to Texas to do an interview for the
TexANG story late on Sunday, September 5, and that Rather felt competitive pressure to do the
interview and get the story done even though he was tired. Heyward recalled that Rather did not
want to “lose the exclusive.” Heyward said that Rather told him that Mapes thought the story
had to get out soon and that they were aiming to air it on Wednesday, September 8. Heyward’s
impression was that another news outlet was also working on the same story and that Rather and
Mapes wanted to beat the competition.
d. Mapes’ Communications with Murphy
Senior Broadcast Producer Mary Murphy told the Panel that Mapes called her on
Saturday, September 4 and expressed concern about losing the story to competitors. According
to Murphy, Mapes said that “everyone was descending” and reporters from the Los Angeles
Times, The Boston Globe, and USA TODAY were “on to the story and the documents.” Murphy
told the Panel that Mapes also said that the source’s attorney had asked Mapes to pay the source
a consultancy fee. Mapes asked Murphy whether it would be possible to do so. Murphy said she
told Mapes that 60 Minutes Wednesday could not retain the source as a consultant.
4. Sunday, September 5, 2004: Document Authentication Issues,
a. Additional Documents from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
Smith met with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett again on Sunday afternoon, September 5, for
about two hours at the same restaurant where they had met the previous Thursday. Smith
obtained four additional documents, which he faxed to Colonel Charles and to Miller at around
6 p.m. EST from the same Kinko’s shop in Abilene, Texas. Mapes, who was home in Dallas,
also received a copy of the documents at or around that time. The documents were memoranda
purportedly written by Lieutenant Colonel Killian. They were as follows: (1) an unsigned note
from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to then-Major Harris regarding flight certifications dated
February 2, 1972; (2) a signed memorandum dated May 4, 1972 ordering Lieutenant Bush to
take his flying physical; (3) an unsigned memorandum to the file dated May 19, 1972 regarding
Lieutenant Bush’s physical and his request to transfer to Alabama, which noted that Lieutenant
Colonel Killian thought Lieutenant Bush was “also talking to someone upstairs”; and (4) an
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unsigned memorandum dated August 18, 1973 stating that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had been
pressured by General Staudt to “backdate” and “sugar coat” the performance rating of Lieutenant
Bush. These documents are attached as part of Exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C and 2F to this Report. All
but the February 2, 1972 document were used in the September 8 Segment.
Notably, these documents were shown only to Matley and not to the other document
examiners prior to the broadcast, despite the fact that several of the other examiners asked for
additional documents prior to September 8. Mapes conceded to the Panel that she should have
sent these documents to all the examiners but in the frenzy of the “crash,” she was too busy. In
the Panel’s view, this is another indication of the pressure the “crash” was putting on sound
reporting.
Smith told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett lectured him during the Sunday
meeting about providing protection for him and expressed worry that CBS News might “hang
him out to dry.” Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told Smith that he wanted a private guard. Smith
told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett again raised the issue of his being retained as a
consultant by CBS News regarding the TexANG documents, a request which Smith passed along
to Mapes. Smith also informed the Panel that he told Lieutenant Colonel Burkett that they did
not know whether they could use documents that were provided anonymously. Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett then said that “one of those military guys” had given him the package, but
offered no name. Smith further recalled that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett reiterated that he
wanted to ensure that 60 Minutes Wednesday properly vetted and authenticated the documents.
b. Further Attempts To Confirm the Killian Documents’ Content
On Sunday, September 5, Colonel Charles was still involved in attempting to confirm
facts related to the Killian documents. Colonel Charles spoke to Lukasiak and asked him for
additional samples of Killian’s signatures from public documents. Colonel Charles told the
Panel that he also was in contact with Lieutenant Strong to arrange the interview Rather was to
conduct that night. According to Colonel Charles, Lieutenant Strong said that Lieutenant
Colonel Killian was a “straight arrow” and that General Staudt exerted influence over Lieutenant
Colonel Killian’s unit while he was in charge of the squadron. Colonel Charles also interpreted
Lieutenant Strong’s comment to mean that General Staudt still had influence after he retired,
even though General Staudt had not been in the TexANG for nearly a year and a half by the time
the August 18, 1973 memorandum allegedly was written.
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c. Concerns and Issues First Raised by the Document Examiners
As set forth below, on Sunday, September 5, Miller had conversations with Pierce,
Matley, James and Will regarding their assessment of the Killian documents, though Mapes
spoke only to Will and James. All of the examiners raised certain concerns about the documents
themselves and/or their ability to authenticate the documents. Significantly, none of these concerns made their way into the September 8 Segment.
(i) Emily Will
Will sent an e-mail to Miller on Sunday afternoon at around 3:30 p.m. in which she
discussed some of her concerns regarding the signature on the June 24, 1973 memorandum
addressed to “Sir.” The e-mail attached a pdf file that illustrated the problems that Will had
detected regarding the signature when compared to four other signatures contained in the official
Bush records. That e-mail and pdf file is Exhibit 4 to this Report.
Miller told the Panel that she called Mapes as soon as she received Will’s e-mail and
urged Mapes to talk to Will. Miller forwarded the e-mail to Mapes at 4:24 p.m. Will told the
Panel that she spoke to Mapes that afternoon and that Mapes told her that she had the e-mail but
for some reason could not open the attachment. Will said that Mapes did not speak to her for
very long because Mapes had to get to the airport to meet Rather who was flying in from Florida
to do the Lieutenant Strong interview.
Nonetheless, Will told the Panel that she had enough time with Mapes on the telephone to
review the signature discrepancies reflected in her e-mail in addition to the potential problems
she had noticed in the typography of the two documents. Will referred to the two documents in
her contemporaneous notes as Q1 (the August 1, 1972 memorandum) and Q2 (the June 24, 1973
memorandum):
1. Is there suppose [sic] to be a letterhead?
Note differences in th in 111th in top line of “letterhead” and note lack of third line in Q2 “letterhead.”
2. Q2 has superscript th
3. Has the general appearance of a proportional spaced and proportional width font
4. Q2 has a comma in the date, which is not found in Q1 or any of the knowns Q2 does NOT look like a military document . . .
Will told the Panel that she informed Mapes that she wanted more documents for
comparison and analysis, and Mapes told her that she would send them. Will was never sent any
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more documents. Will also recalled that, when she started to discuss concerns regarding the
content of the documents, Mapes cut her off. Will’s notes regarding her conversation with
Mapes indicate that Mapes told her that this was not something Will “should be worrying about
[because] she [had] taken care of that part of it.” Miller also recalled that Mapes had commented
that Will was focused on the substance of the memoranda, but that it did not matter for purposes
of her analysis what the facts were. Mapes told Miller that she just wanted Will to look at the
signature. Will told the Panel she regarded examining content to be part of her job in assessing a
document’s authenticity.
Based on Will’s recollection and her notes, it appears that Will raised the issue of
proportional spacing with Mapes on Sunday. This topic would receive substantial attention in
the Aftermath of the broadcast of the Segment. The Panel finds it significant that Mapes did not
focus on this criticism and later would alert 60 Minutes Wednesday management only to the
issue of the superscript “th.”
Mapes recalled talking to Will on Sunday, although she did not recall the specifics of the
conversation. She told the Panel that she did not recall discussing Will’s e-mail containing the
pdf file with anyone and did not, in fact, review the e-mail until the following day.
(ii) Linda James
James told the Panel that she called Mapes on Sunday, September 5, and told her about
the “potential problems” she had noticed with the documents. She had conducted some research
regarding the typography and had concluded preliminarily that the superscript “th” was not in
common use at the time the documents were purportedly prepared. James was not certain
whether she told Mapes about this particular problem, however, and Mapes did not recall this
conversation. James also said that she was unable to reach a conclusion about the authenticity of
the signature on the June 24, 1973 document without more samples of Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s signature.
(iii) James Pierce
Miller told the Panel that she called Pierce on Sunday, September 5, to confirm that he
had received the documents. She recalled that Pierce told her that he believed the two Killian
documents were from the same person and that the signatures on the June 24, 1973 Killian
document and in the official Bush records were consistent. The Panel does not know the basis
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for this conclusion, as only one of the documents included Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s
signature. Miller’s notes from this call show that Pierce noticed a possible alteration in one of
the official documents. Miller said that Pierce also told her that there was nothing in the Killian
documents that indicated they had been tampered with but that he could not reach a definite
conclusion because he did not have the originals. Mapes recalled that Miller told her the
following day, Monday, September 6, that Pierce had said that he had not seen anything in the
documents that would exclude them from being authentic.
(iv) Marcel Matley
Miller also spoke to Matley on Sunday, September 5. In the 19 pages that he received
from Miller, Matley located five samples of Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s signatures, only one of
which was on a document that Mapes had obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett (the June
24, 1973 memorandum). The other document obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett (the
August 1, 1972 memorandum) contained only initials, which Matley said “does not help”
because there were no other exemplars with initials in the official Bush records for comparison.
Matley said that there were similarities and “consistent inconsistencies” among the signatures,
and that they all appeared to be written by the same individual. Miller recalled that Matley had
said that there were some problems but not enough to raise any suspicions. Miller said that
Matley seemed fairly confident that the signature on the June 24, 1973 memorandum was Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s.
Matley informed the Panel that he told Miller that he could compare only the Killian
signatures on the June 24, 1973 memorandum with the signatures on the other documents. His
recollection is that Miller consulted with Mapes and then confirmed to Matley that he should
look only at the signatures. Miller and Matley spoke again later that day to arrange for Matley to
come to New York to be interviewed by Rather on Monday, September 6.
d. Lieutenant Strong Interview
Mapes called Rather on Sunday afternoon, September 5, while he was covering
Hurricane Frances, and told him that he needed to leave Florida for Austin immediately. Mapes
met Rather at the Dallas airport, where he was connecting from a flight from Miami, and they
flew together to Austin for the interview with Lieutenant Strong.
87
While they were sitting in the public waiting area at the gate for their connection to
Austin, Mapes showed Rather the six Killian documents for the first time. According to Rather,
he told Mapes that she needed to vet the documents completely. He knew at that time that the
documents had been given to Mapes by a confidential source, but he told the Panel that he did
not know where the documents had been or how long the source had possessed the documents.
He also said that he did not recall whether Mapes had mentioned Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s
name to him at that time. Rather said that he did not spend much time going over the documents
with Mapes as he was trying to get focused on preparing for the Lieutenant Strong interview he
was to do in a few hours.
Mapes’ recollection regarding their preparations for the Lieutenant Strong interview is
somewhat different. She told the Panel that she and Rather spent most of the time before and
during the flight going over the Killian documents. She said that she also reminded Rather of his
1999 interview of Lieutenant Strong, although she did not bring the transcript of that interview
with her. Rather told the Panel he did recall the 1999 interview of Lieutenant Strong, but did not
recall the substance of it.
Rather and Mapes arrived in Austin to interview Lieutenant Strong at around 10:30 p.m.
CST on Sunday, September 5. In addition to Mapes and Rather, Scott, Smith and various crew
members were also present. Lieutenant Strong informed the Panel that Mapes met with him
prior to the interview for approximately 20 minutes and showed him the Killian documents,
which he had not seen previously. Lieutenant Strong informed the Panel that when he tried to
express his opinion regarding the format of the Killian documents, he was told by Mapes that
there were five experts who were authenticating the documents and that was not his concern.
Lieutenant Strong also said that he made clear to Mapes that he had no personal knowledge
regarding the Killian documents or the events described in the documents since he was no longer
working full-time at the TexANG when they purportedly were written.
Mapes said that she asked Lieutenant Strong about the typewriters used at the TexANG
and that Lieutenant Strong recalled personally using an IBM Selectric, which contained a typing
ball that was ordered separately, and seeing IBM Selectrics at the 111th Squadron. Mapes said
that Lieutenant Strong did not comment on the superscript “th.” Lieutenant Strong told the Panel
that he did not recall discussing with Mapes the typewriters used at the TexANG until after the
September 8 Segment aired.
88
The actual interview of Lieutenant Strong lasted about an hour.58 It covered three areas:
Barnes and whether political favoritism was used to get people into the TexANG; the documents
allegedly authored by Lieutenant Colonel Killian; and General Staudt’s influence in the
TexANG. The transcript of the interview makes clear that Lieutenant Strong had no personal
knowledge regarding Barnes’ role with respect to President Bush, the documents or Lieutenant
Colonel Killian’s views regarding President Bush. Mapes told the Panel that, while she knew
that Lieutenant Strong did not have personal knowledge, she felt that he was a valuable witness
because (1) he knew all of the people involved, (2) he knew how the TexANG operated, and (3)
paperwork was his specialty.
As in his prior interview with Rather in 1999, Lieutenant Strong said that the TexANG
was highly politicized and that he suspected that “politically-connected people . . . had help
getting in.” He admitted, however, that he could not “prove it.” He was asked whether he
believed that Ben Barnes had helped President Bush get into the TexANG, and he said that it
“was the worst kept secret of the time.” He explained to Rather later in the interview that the
“secret” to which he was referring was the fact that “everybody knew [Barnes] was getting
people in.” Lieutenant Strong did not state that Barnes had specifically assisted President Bush
and has told the Panel that he does not know this as fact, although he would not be surprised if it
were true.
Lieutenant Strong also said that he knew Lieutenant Colonel Killian “quite well.”
Lieutenant Strong worked in Austin and Lieutenant Colonel Killian worked at Ellington Air
Force Base in Houston. Rather asked Lieutenant Strong whether there is “any doubt in [his]
mind that these [documents] are genuine.” Despite the fact that he had not seen the documents
until 20 minutes before the interview and that he said he had no personal knowledge of their
content, Lieutenant Strong responded, “Well, they are compatible with the way business was
done at the time. They are compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t
see anything in the documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the
situations, and what were the people that were involved.” This exchange was ultimately to be
included in the September 8 Segment.
Significantly, Lieutenant Strong was not asked whether he had discussed Lieutenant Bush
with Lieutenant Colonel Killian, whether he had seen the Killian documents before or whether
58 The Lieutenant Strong interview transcript is Exhibit 9L to this Report.
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he knew that private memoranda of this type generally were kept by Lieutenant Colonel Killian.
In fact, when Rather commented in the interview that President Bush “didn’t have the physical,”
Lieutenant Strong said, “Well, I don’t know that,” and Lieutenant Strong then proceeded to rely
on the information contained in the documents themselves to conclude that “he had not taken his
physical.” This exchange with Rather was not included in the September 8 Segment. In
addition, he was not asked in the interview about the types of typewriters used in the unit or who
might have typed the documents.
Finally, Mapes told the Panel that Lieutenant Strong described General Staudt as a
political creature who was “bullying” and that Lieutenant Strong said General Staudt had
retained a good deal of influence after he left the TexANG. The issue arose because Lieutenant
Colonel Killian’s August 18, 1973 memorandum states that General Staudt had exerted his
influence to “sugar coat” then-Lieutenant Bush’s record, although records reflect that General
Staudt had retired on March 1, 1972, at or around the time that Lieutenant Strong also left fulltime
TexANG service. Rather never asked Lieutenant Strong directly whether General Staudt
could have exerted influence a year and a half after he retired, and Lieutenant Strong’s comments
appear focused on General Staudt’s influence while he was still in the TexANG. While
Lieutenant Strong did comment on General Staudt’s power over his unit after he became the
Chief of Staff of the TexANG in 1969 and left Houston, Lieutenant Strong was not asked and did
not state that General Staudt had influence after he retired from the TexANG in 1972. However,
it is clear that Lieutenant Strong had no personal knowledge regarding whether General Staudt
continued to exert influence over TexANG officers after he retired, and, when asked by the
Panel, Lieutenant Strong said that he could only speculate as to General Staudt’s influence.
As discussed in greater detail below in Chapter VII.I.2., the Panel finds that, given
Lieutenant Strong’s lack of personal knowledge, it was inconsistent with standards of fair and
accurate reporting for 60 Minutes Wednesday to use Lieutenant Strong’s interview in the
September 8 Segment to confirm both the content of the documents and the alleged preferential
treatment accorded President Bush.
e. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett Regarding the
Mapes told the Panel that once she obtained the first two Killian documents, she pressed
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett for information about his source, particularly on Saturday,
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September 4, and Sunday, September 5. She said that she discussed with him the importance of
the chain of custody and that she needed to know “whose hands” were last on the documents.
According to Mapes, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett eventually told her that Chief Warrant
Officer George Conn, a former officer in the Texas Army National Guard and a long-time friend,
had given him the documents. He told Mapes, however, that she should not call Chief Warrant
Officer Conn because he would deny it. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett also said that Chief Warrant
Officer Conn was on active duty and could not be reached at his Dallas home.
Once Mapes obtained this information from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, she did not ask
for more details regarding how he got the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn because
she thought she had “pushed [Lieutenant Colonel Burkett] to the wall.” Mapes said that it
concerned her when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said that Chief Warrant Officer Conn would not
corroborate his story, and she was also aware that Chief Warrant Officer Conn had denied in
February 2004 having knowledge of the “scrubbing” incident. Her understanding, however, was
that Chief Warrant Officer Conn’s denial was a means to protect his job with the military and she
felt comforted that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and his wife spoke well of Chief Warrant Officer
Conn despite his prior statements undercutting charges Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had made.
Nevertheless, Mapes said she placed a call to Chief Warrant Officer Conn at a number
believed to be his residence in Dallas, but was not able to contact him. Mapes knew that Chief
Warrant Officer Conn worked in Germany, but she told the Panel that she tried his number in
Dallas because it was her understanding that he was sometimes in Dallas. Mapes said that she
also asked former Chief Warrant Officer Harvey Gough, another former Guardsman, for Chief
Warrant Officer Conn’s number in Germany, but he refused. She does not recall any subsequent
attempts to reach Chief Warrant Officer Conn or asking anyone else to find him.
Mapes told the Panel that she believed that the confirmation of the content of the Killian
documents was more important than finding the source to trace the chain of custody. She also
had reviewed the Killian documents and believed that they “meshed” well with known facts
about President Bush’s service record and documents previously released from his TexANG file.
The alleged “meshing” of the Killian documents with the official record is discussed in detail in
Chapter VIII.
The Panel finds the chain of custody an important aspect of authenticity and finds that
60 Minutes Wednesday should have made every effort to locate Chief Warrant Officer Conn
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prior to the broadcast. As discussed previously in this Report, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett by
now had given Mapes and Smith at least two different stories as to how he obtained the
documents –that they were sent to him anonymously in the mail and that they were given to him
by Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Particularly in light of her earlier concern that the Killian
documents could have been planted as a political dirty trick, more resources should have been
devoted to determining who had the documents and when, even at the risk of not being able to
air the Segment on September 8.
There is a further reason as well that the chain of custody issue should have been
important. The September 8 Segment reported: “60 Minutes has now obtained a number of
documents we are told were taken from Colonel Killian’s personal files.” Mapes informed the
Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided her with this information. However, since
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett did not himself purport to take the documents from those files, that
necessarily meant that Chief Warrant Officer Conn or someone else provided Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett with this information. The Panel believes it was incumbent on 60 Minutes Wednesday to
confirm this information or not use the information in the Segment. That did not occur, constituting another failure in the reporting and vetting process.
f. Mapes’ Contact with Joe Lockhart
Mapes spoke to Joe Lockhart at some point over the Labor Day weekend. The Panel is
unable to determine exactly when, as Mapes’ and Lockhart’s recollections differ widely with
respect to both the timing and the substance of their conversation.
Mapes’ recollection is that Lockhart called her at some point prior to September 8,
probably on or around Monday, September 6. She said that he left a message with his cell phone
number and that she returned his call shortly thereafter. She said that the conversation lasted
approximately two minutes. She believes that she told him that one of her sources, Lieutenant
Colonel Bill Burkett, wanted to speak to him about how the Kerry campaign should respond to
the attacks by the “Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.” She did not recall discussing the Killian
documents with him. She recalled ending the conversation by saying to him that she could “not
wait to do a tough story on your guy,” i.e., Senator Kerry.
Lockhart’s recollection of this conversation with Mapes is quite different. Lockhart told
the Panel that Clanton approached him about speaking to Mapes regarding a story she was doing
about President Bush’s TexANG service involving documents, but Lockhart was “wary” to do
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so. Lockhart said that he believed that it was not good for the campaign or CBS News for him to
be involved during the fact-gathering phase of a 60 Minutes Wednesday story. He explained that
if the story held up, his involvement would merely cast doubt on it, and if the story did not hold
up, he did not want to be associated with it. Lockhart also told the Panel that he did not want to
speak with Mapes until she had already obtained the documents in question and that the
reporting had been completed. Some time thereafter, Lockhart said that Clanton informed him
that the reporting on the story was finished.
Lockhart said that he recalled receiving a call from Mapes on Saturday night,
September 4, and that the call lasted approximately five minutes. Lockhart told the Panel that
Mapes told him that there was going to be an interview on 60 Minutes Wednesday with former
Lieutenant Governor Barnes. Lockhart said that this was not news to him, as he had heard about
it both through Clanton and campaign gossip.
Lockhart told the Panel that Mapes then said that there had been a significant break in the
story. She explained that she had obtained some documents regarding President Bush’s
TexANG service. According to Lockhart, Mapes indicated that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
wanted to talk to the Kerry campaign regarding strategy and that he had suggested to her that
more documents could be made available. Lockhart’s understanding was that there was some
connection between his talking to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and the latter’s willingness to
cooperate further with Mapes. Lockhart said that he told her that he was reluctant to get
involved, as he wanted to know how sure she was that it was not a setup. Lockhart said that
something did not “feel right.” Mapes told him that CBS News had retained experts to verify the
documents. Lockhart did not recall Mapes’ comment that she could not wait to do a “tough
story” on Senator Kerry.
Despite his wariness, Lockhart ultimately called Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on Monday,
September 6. He said that the call lasted only a few minutes. After introductions, Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett told him that he wanted to talk about the direction of the campaign and he talked
about how the campaign could push back on the Swift Boat attacks. Lockhart said that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett did not raise the issue of either President Bush’s TexANG service or
any documents. Lockhart told the Panel that he had a bad feeling “15 seconds into the
conversation” that he was being taped, so he merely listened and responded very briefly and
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generally to what Lieutenant Colonel Burkett was saying. He told the Panel that he wanted
simply to get off the phone.
g. Return to New York and Discussion About the Documents
After the interview of Lieutenant Strong, Rather, Mapes, Scott and Smith flew back to
New York on a chartered jet. Heyward had wanted Rather to be back in New York early on
Monday to cover any news developments emerging from former President Clinton’s quadruple
bypass heart surgery, which was scheduled for 8 a.m. Monday, September 6.
Rather told the Panel that, during the flight back to New York, he discussed the Killian
documents with Mapes. He said that he told Mapes that they needed to authenticate the
documents and make sure they were accurate. According to Rather, Mapes said that the “process
was under way and . . . would be accelerated upon their arrival in New York.” Rather did not
recall being told at the time that any experts had been retained. Rather said that he told Mapes to
retain “at least four independent experts” who did not know of the other experts retained so that
their views would not be influenced by the others. Rather also recalled discussing the Barnes
interview with Mapes.
5. Press Coverage of TexANG Issues and the Timing of the September 8
As discussed previously, Mapes mentioned in e-mails and in conversations with Howard
and Murphy the fact that other news organizations were aggressively trying to break TexANG
stories during this period. Indeed, there appears to have been a surge in media interest.
There were daily references to President Bush’s TexANG service in several major
newspapers without substantial discussion, such as The New York Times (September 2 and 4), the
Los Angeles Times (September 5) and The Boston Globe (September 3).59 On Sunday,
September 5, The Associated Press reported that documents that should have been prepared to
explain gaps in President Bush’s TexANG service were missing from released military records
detailing his service in 1972 and 1973.60 The article stated that regulations at the time required
59 See Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard W. Stevenson, A Leader Now Tested by Tragedy – George Walker Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at P1; Richard W. Stevenson, Job Figures Help President Promote Economic Record, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2004, at A1; Matea Gold & Nick Anderson, The Race to the White House, L.A.TIMES, Sept. 5. 2004,
at A23; Patrick Healy & Glen Johnson, Kerry Calls Rival ‘Unfit,’ Rips VP on Deferments, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3,
2004, at A1.
60 Bush’s Air National Guard File Missing Some Required Records, AP, Sept. 5, 2004.
94
superiors to write an investigative report for the Air Force when Lieutenant Bush missed an
annual medical exam in 1972 and required commanders to certify that Lieutenant Bush received
counseling after missing five consecutive months of drills. In addition, the article stated that a
May 1973 yearly evaluation from Lieutenant Bush’s unit did not include ratings for Lieutenant
Bush and stated that he had been absent from the Texas base since April 1972. Mapes forwarded
this article to Howard and Murphy with the note, “I have some of these missing documents on
my desk. Yikes!” Clearly, as Mapes saw it, everything was coming together.
The Washington Post reported on Saturday, September 4, three days before Barnes’
interview actually occurred, that Barnes’ friends said that he had already recorded an interview
for CBS News’ 60 Minutes that would address whether President Bush pulled strings to avoid
Vietnam.61 The article summarized the statements made by Barnes in 1999 during the GTECH
litigation.
Finally, information available to the Panel, including e-mails and interviews, indicates
that reporters from other news organizations were also trying to get information from Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett at the same time as 60 Minutes Wednesday. In fact, on Thursday, September 9,
USA TODAY would publish a story using some of the same documents that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett had given to Smith and Mapes, which its reporters had independently obtained directly
from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.62
The impact of this increase in interest by other news organizations in the TexANG story
on the timing of the September 8 Report is a matter of dispute. Mapes told the Panel that she had
insisted to her superiors that she wanted more time to prepare the Segment, but that Howard
decided to run it on September 8 despite her wishes. Howard’s recollection differs as explained
below. Mapes said that she told Howard she could be ready with the story by September 8, but
believed it would be beneficial to have some additional time. Mapes also told the Panel that
Howard had specifically refused to postpone the story to the 60 Minutes program on Sunday,
September 12. The Panel was informed by 60 Minutes management, however, that Howard did
approach them about broadcasting the story on September 12, but that it was they who declined.
61 Michael Dobbs, Democrat Says He Helped Bush into Guard To Score Points, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2004, at A02.
62 See Dave Moniz & Jim Drinkard, Guard Commander’s Memos Criticize Bush, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2004, at
4A. See also Dave Moniz, Jim Drinkard & Kevin Johnson, Texan Has Made Allegations for Years, USA TODAY,
Sept. 21, 2004, at 4A.
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West, Howard and Murphy have a different recollection of Mapes’ wishes regarding the
timing of the Segment. They all told the Panel that Mapes expressed concern to them that she
would lose the story if 60 Minutes Wednesday did not broadcast it on September 8. The
impression they had from Mapes was that other news organizations were ready to publish stories
on the Killian documents and that if the Segment was not broadcast on September 8, it would be
old news by the time of the next show. In addition, in an e-mail on the evening of Sunday,
September 5, from Murphy to Howard, Murphy stated that Mapes was “more convinced we will
need to go this week.”
Based on the information available to the Panel, it appears that competition from other
news outfits propelled the Segment forward and that Mapes was driving the Segment to air on
September 8. Nonetheless, West, Howard and Murphy were also complicit in allowing the
concern about timing that they perceived from Mapes to dictate the production process to rush
the Segment to air as described below.
6. Monday, September 6, 2004: The Matley Interview and the Call with
a. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, to whom Mapes and Smith referred as the “Overlord” or
“Bill” while in 60 Minutes Wednesday’s New York office so as to keep his identity confidential,
sent a flurry of e-mails to Mapes on the morning of Monday, September 6. He was apparently
frustrated regarding Senator Kerry’s response to the Swift Boat attacks. In the first e-mail, he
suggested that the attacks were in “response to the rumors about Ben Barnes and others.” In the
second e-mail, he stated, “I need you to pass a message a little earlier than we had expected . . . .
Have them call and give me a secure number.” His third e-mail conveyed a sense of urgency.
He stated, “I need to expedite the Friday event with a serious call contact today and as early as
possible . . . I hate to do this because it leaves a fingerprint, but if your inside contact won’t call
me, at least maybe they can give me an e-mail address . . . . don’t want you caught in the middle.
But I need the Point #1 agreement contact expedited.”
Mapes responded to his first e-mail. She stated, “You are right as always on this stuff. I
will make some phone calls.” Mapes told the Panel, however, that she did not make any
additional calls to the Kerry campaign on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s behalf at that point. She
believes that the “Point 1 agreement” referred to the fact that Mapes told him that she would pass
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along his telephone number to the Kerry campaign. While it appears that Mapes and Lockhart
had spoken by this time, the Panel does not believe that Lockhart had contacted Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett yet.
b. Colonel Hackworth Interview
Colonel David H. Hackworth was interviewed by Rather as an expert to evaluate the
documents that Mapes obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Colonel Hackworth is a
retired Army officer who has been a columnist, commentator and reporter for various news
organizations.63 Mapes said that she asked Colonel Hackworth to “look at the back and forth” in
the Killian documents because he had worked in the Pentagon and knew about Pentagon politics.
Even though Colonel Hackworth was never in the TexANG, did not know Lieutenant Colonel
Killian or any of the other relevant individuals, had no personal knowledge of President Bush’s
service in the TexANG and had no personal knowledge regarding the Killian documents, he
reached some highly critical conclusions in his interview regarding President Bush’s TexANG
service based solely on the purported authenticity of the Killian documents and his general
knowledge of the military.
First, Colonel Hackworth concluded that the documents were “genuine.” He reached this
conclusion by relating his own experience at the Pentagon during the Vietnam War when he was
running the “Army input system for . . . basic training.” Colonel Hackworth said that, while in
that post, he received and refused requests by members of Congress and generals to assign
certain men to particular units and wrote “cover my own butt” memoranda in many cases to
document his refusals. Colonel Hackworth then concluded that Lieutenant Colonel Killian was
“in the same kind of pickle that I found myself in” and proceeded to discuss what Lieutenant
Colonel Killian was thinking at the time he wrote the memoranda. Rather asked Colonel
Hackworth whether there was any doubt in his mind that the documents were real, and Colonel
Hackworth replied, “Having been down that road before I would say that these are genuine
documents.”
Second, Colonel Hackworth concluded that, by not taking his physical, then-Lieutenant
Bush was “insubordinate” and would have been treated more harshly had he been “an
unconnected Lieutenant.” Third, Colonel Hackworth stated repeatedly throughout his interview
63 See David H. Hackworth Biography, at http://www.hackworth.com/biography.html. The Hackworth interview
transcript is Exhibit 9E to this Report.
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that then-Lieutenant Bush was “AWOL” and that a person would have to reach that conclusion
when reviewing the documents “unless you’re the village idiot.” Colonel Hackworth appeared to
be referring to the fact that he had seen no evidence that President Bush was “present for duty”
once he left for Alabama in 1972, although he did not articulate clearly how he reached his
conclusion. Finally, Colonel Hackworth concluded that “the bottom line here is – is the abuse of
power.” He said that “[I]t’s how people up at the top can . . . lean on the little people.”
Rather thought Colonel Hackworth was a “strong and valuable expert witness.” Mapes
also believed that Colonel Hackworth was important for the Segment and included excerpts of
his interview in early drafts of the September 8 Segment script. These excerpts were ultimately
cut from the final script by Heyward and West.
c. Discussions Regarding When To Contact the White House
Kathy Sciere, Senior Editor of the Political Unit of CBS News, Dotty Lynch, CBS News’
Senior Political Editor, and Janet Leissner, CBS News Washington Bureau Chief, each told the
Panel that they recalled having discussions with Mapes over Labor Day weekend, about the
September 8 Segment. Specifically, Mapes contacted them to seek advice as to how to notify
and obtain an interview from the White House about the Killian documents. Mapes did not
recall these conversations specifically, although she recalled generally speaking to Sciere, Lynch
and Leissner at or around this time.
One or more of the three recalled specifically that Mapes made the following representations:
1) That she had obtained the Killian documents relating to President Bush’s TexANG service;
2) That she had interviewed someone who served in the TexANG at the same time as President Bush who said that the documents seemed accurate to him;
3) That she had asked four experts to review the documents and was satisfied that she had “covered her bases”;
4) That, in response to a question as to whether Democrats had been involved in handing over the documents, Mapes said, “Texas Republicans of a different chromosome” were her source; and
5) When asked why she was rushing the story, Mapes said that USA TODAY had also obtained the documents and planned to publish them on Wednesday.
None of these three editors recalled hearing Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name during
these conversations. All told the Panel that if they had heard his name, it would have caused
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concern because they believed him to be a controversial figure. Sciere recalled that CBS News’
Chief White House Correspondent, John Roberts, had interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in
February 2004 and did not find him to be credible. Leissner told the Panel that Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett’s name had been “around for a long time” as someone who was connected to
Bush TexANG issues but had been embroiled in controversy surrounding his earlier statements.
Mapes told the Panel that she spoke to Sciere about the documents she had obtained and
explained how the documents “meshed” with the known factual record. Mapes said that she told
Sciere that she had been working on the story for a long time but that she did not identify her
source to Sciere. Mapes did not recall using the term “Texas Republican of a different
chromosome” to describe her source and told the Panel she would not have done so because
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett did not fit that description. Mapes said that she used that term to
describe those Republicans in Texas who were not Bush supporters, but were supporters of
William Clements (a former Texas Governor). Mapes said that, for example, she had used the
term “Texas Republicans of a different chromosome” when speaking to Josh Howard about
another of the former Guardsmen who had been involved in the “ghost soldier” investigation.
d. Matley Interview
Matley flew from San Francisco to New York on Monday, September 6 to be
interviewed by Rather. While he was waiting for his flight, Matley created a one-page
handwritten list of eight points regarding the Killian documents, which he revised later in the day
as he received more Killian documents and information from Miller and Mapes. Matley arrived
at the 60 Minutes Wednesday offices around 5 p.m. but was not interviewed until Rather had
finished the CBS Evening News broadcast.
(i) Meetings with Matley Prior to the Interview
When Matley arrived, he was shown the four additional Killian documents that Smith had
received from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett the previous day. Significantly, Matley was the only
document examiner to be shown these additional documents prior to the airing of the September 8 Segment.
After reviewing the new documents, Matley met with Miller and Mapes in Miller’s office
and reviewed his notes with them. Matley told the Panel that he informed Mapes and Miller that
he could not authenticate the documents due to the fact that the documents were poor quality
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copies. Thus, he was obliged to assume that they were reliable copies of authentic documents.
Matley told Mapes and Miller that the preponderance of the available evidence suggested that all
of the signatures on the documents he was asked to analyze appeared to have been written by the
same person, which included two of the six documents that Mapes received from Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett, only one of which was used in the September 8 Segment. The Panel notes that
three of the six Killian documents did not contain any handwriting, and two of these were used in
the September 8 Segment. Moreover, Matley explicitly said that he could not opine on the
document that contained only initials, the August 1, 1972 memorandum, which was used in the
September 8 Segment.
Matley, whose specialty is handwriting analysis, was invoked as the authority for the
following statement in the September 8 Segment: “We consulted a handwriting analyst and
document expert who believes the material is authentic.” The Panel finds this statement
troubling given that of the four Killian documents relied on in the Segment:
· Two had no handwriting at all on them;
· One had only initials which Matley said he could not verify; and
· One had a signature which Matley said matched, with qualifications, signatures in the official documents.
These points are all reflected in Matley’s handwritten notes that he prepared that day,
which are attached as Exhibit 5. Matley said that Mapes and Miller did not make a copy of his
notes. He recalled that Mapes said to him that they were “not interested in all the parameters” of
his findings. As later reported in Chapter IX, Matley later had these notes typed up and faxed
them to 60 Minutes Wednesday on Friday, September 10. These typed up notes of Matley are
attached as Exhibit 6.
(ii) The Matley Interview
In preparation for Matley’s interview, Miller had the signature portion of several of the
documents enlarged and placed on easels so that Matley could explain his analysis during the
interview by pointing to them. In addition, she prepared questions for the interview and e-mailed
them to Mapes around 6:20 p.m. The questions are as follows:
· Whats [sic] your specialty?
· What do you look at to determine whether signatures are written by the same person?
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· What do you see with the group of signatures that we gave you? The quality of the copies is not good, but.....
· Do you believe these were all written by the same person?
· Why? Be specific (he can use the board)
· If you were testifying in court to give your opinion on whether or not these signatures
matched.... what would you say?
None of the questions addressed the typography of the documents or other indicia of authenticity
about which Will and James had raised concerns the previous day.
Rather came over to the 60 Minutes Wednesday offices after the CBS Evening News
broadcast on Monday, September 6, to interview Matley. Mapes introduced Matley to Rather
shortly before the interview as the “leading authority on documents.” According to Rather,
Mapes said that he was “the best,” and that he was an expert on both signature and document
authentication. He also recalled that Mapes had told him that Matley was “going to explain . . . why the documents are real.”
Rather interviewed Matley in front of the easels with the enlarged signatures. By all
accounts, the interview did not go well. Rather said that he did not have concerns regarding
Matley’s expertise and noted that he “came across strong and solid in person,” but did not
interview well on-camera. Rather said that he was concerned only that “if CBS News had to put
an expert out there, [Matley] would not be very persuasive.”
As a result of the problems with the interview, 60 Minutes Wednesday decided to do a
second interview immediately following the first one.64 This second interview appeared to have
gone better than the first. Rather felt that they “were able to get what they needed in the retake.”
At the end of the interview, Rather asked Matley whether he thought Rather would be “on safe
ground” if on television he told people that “this is a memorandum written by Lieutenant
Colonel Killian on these dates, in so far as it’s humanly possible, to determine so.” Matley
responded, “Yes, sir.”
However, prior to responding to this question, Matley had made clear in the interview that his authentication of the signatures – without even reaching to the question of the authentication of the documents – was equivocal and limited, as follows:
· Matley noted that “we have poor material” and he was relying on the “available handwriting evidence”;
64 The transcript of the second Matley interview is Exhibit 9H to this Report.
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· Matley said that he analyzed whether the signatures on the documents provided to him “were written by the same person” and concluded that the “significant features” on four were the same. None of these was used on the September 8 Segment;
· Matley noted that the signature on the June 24, 1973 document, one that was not used on the September 8 Segment, was “different from the other four” and hypothesized that stress might account for the difference as a comparison of the content of the six documents could indicate stress;
· Matley could not analyze the memorandum that had only initials (August 1, 1972) because there was no basis for comparison;
· Matley could not provide an opinion as to two of the documents that had no handwriting on them (May 19, 1972 and August 18, 1973);
· Matley was asked if CBS News was “safe in saying these documents . . . were written by the person whose signature it purports to be.” Matley responded that if he was advising a client who was preparing to go to court with the documents, he would answer “yes” to that question, but would encourage his client to force discovery from the other side, and “if they [didn’t] come forth with [discovery to the contrary,] that would confirm that yeah, we’re on the right track.”
With regard to the last question, Rather told the Panel that he interpreted Matley’s response as an
indication that Matley believed both the documents and the signatures were authentic, although
Rather acknowledged that Matley pointed out some problems with one of the signatures.
Rather’s impression upon the conclusion of the interview was that Matley had authenticated all
of the documents, even those without handwriting.
As discussed in more detail below, Matley’s interview was not used in the September 8
Segment. Instead, his purported conclusions were summarized in a voiceover in the September 8
Segment that did not accurately represent Matley’s carefully circumscribed observations regarding the documents.
e. Telephone Call with Major General Hodges
On Monday evening, after Matley’s interview, Mapes spoke by telephone to Major
General Hodges for the first time since she had received the six documents from Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett. Major General Hodges had been Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commander for
most of the time that Lieutenant Bush served in the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and
worked with Lieutenant Colonel Killian for 20 years.
Mapes and Major General Hodges have differing recollections as to what transpired
during their conversation. It is undisputed, however, that Mapes never provided Major General
Hodges with copies of the Killian documents but merely read at least some of the content to him
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over the telephone. In addition, both Mapes and Major General Hodges had contemporaneous
handwritten notes of this conversation, with Mapes’ notes filling up one page and Major General
Hodges’ notes being considerably longer.
Mapes recalled that she told Major General Hodges that she had obtained documents
relating to President Bush’s service in the TexANG. Mapes also recalled telling him that the
documents were from the personal files of Lieutenant Colonel Killian and that she read all six of
the documents to him verbatim. She further said that Major General Hodges remarked that
Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s words “sounded harsh” but said the documents sounded “very
familiar” because he “was angry when [President] Bush left [the unit].” Mapes recalled that
Major General Hodges said that Lieutenant Colonel Killian thought Lieutenant Bush should keep
flying and was upset that he was leaving the unit. Mapes said that he told her that he had thought
it was “no big deal that Lieutenant Bush missed a physical,” but that Lieutenant Colonel Killian
was angry about this. Mapes’ notes of the conversation contain the following additional notations regarding Lieutenant Bush’s transfer to Alabama:
Jerry mad @ Bush leaving
Can’t treat weekenders like full-timers
4-6 months Bush was gone
Killian miffed because some of his pilots were [bailing] out rather than go to F-101
Jerry was miffed
He was a hard nose. Overboard hard nose
Jerry thought he could have kept . . . flying
Black and white sounds harsh
Mapes recalled that, in Major General Hodges’ view, Lieutenant Bush was “an
outstanding officer for four years” and “could have continued to fly if he had not gone to
[Alabama to] work for [the] campaign [of a family friend].” According to Mapes, Major General
Hodges said that President Bush went to Alabama “with everybody’s blessing” except for
Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s. Mapes’ notes reflect only that “He went to Alabama w/
everybody’s blessing.” Mapes told the Panel that Major General Hodges chided her for just
“trying to make news” and that it would be wrong for CBS News to air Lieutenant Colonel
Killian’s personal thoughts. Mapes’ notes reflect that Major General Hodges said, “You’re
trying to make news. Trying to create a problem here when there isn’t one. Public info – OK /
For somebody’s personal notes, that’s going overboard.”
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For his part, Major General Hodges told the Panel that he was under the impression that
Mapes was reading from Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s personal handwritten notes and not from
typed memoranda. Major General Hodges also said that Mapes told him that CBS News knew
that Lieutenant Bush had left his unit at Ellington Air Force Base in April 1972 and asked him
whether he and Lieutenant Colonel Killian had discussed Lieutenant Bush’s leaving for Alabama
and missing his required physical for that year. Major General Hodges told the Panel that he told
Mapes that he and Lieutenant Colonel Killian had talked about these topics and that they had
given Lieutenant Bush permission to go to Alabama.65
According to Major General Hodges, however, he did not confirm to Mapes that the
Killian documents were consistent with how Lieutenant Colonel Killian felt about Lieutenant
Bush. Major General Hodges’ handwritten notes of this conversation do not reflect that he told
Mapes that Lieutenant Colonel Killian was angry with Lieutenant Bush for leaving. Major
General Hodges told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Killian never expressed that he was angry
regarding Lieutenant Bush’s leaving the unit or failing to take the physical.
In addition, while Mapes insists that she read all six documents to Major General
Hodges, his notes reflect references to only four of the documents – the four that were ultimately
used in the September 8 Segment (the May 4, 1972, May 19, 1972, August 1, 1972 and August
18, 1973 memoranda), and he advised the Panel that “very little of the documents” was read to
him. Major General Hodges also did not recall stating that the documents sounded familiar. In
fact, Major General Hodges told the Panel that, had the documents been read in their entirety, he
believes he would have remembered certain words and phrases, such as “billet” and the phrase
“administrative officer,” which were inconsistent with traditional TexANG jargon and certainly
would not have been familiar terms.66 Major General Hodges told the Panel that he and
Lieutenant Colonel Killian never disagreed about then-Lieutenant Bush and said that then-
Lieutenant Bush had his and Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s permission to go to Alabama and to
take his physical when he returned.
Mapes ultimately relied heavily on her conversation with Major General Hodges as
confirming the content of the Killian documents. For example, both Scott and Smith recalled
65 Mapes’ handwritten notes of their conversation state: “He went to Alabama with everybody’s blessing.”
66 In an e-mail dated September 9, 2004, Mapes told Walter Robinson of The Boston Globe that Major General
Hodges had “confirmed that some of the memos sounded familiar,” thus suggesting that Major General Hodges did
not confirm all of the documents, as she represented to people at 60 Minutes Wednesday. (emphasis added).
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that after Mapes got off the phone with him, she represented that he had “verified the contents of
the documents.” In addition, Mapes told Murphy the next morning in an e-mail, “Got
confirmation on the docs last night from a longtime Guard Bush backer. Gee, they’re not just
juicy. They’re TRUE.” Miller recalled that Mapes said that Major General Hodges would not be
able to authenticate the memoranda, but he could verify that the memoranda reflected what was
happening at that time. Miller commented that Mapes and Smith thought that Major General
Hodges was the “holy grail.”
f. Communications with Senior Management
Despite the sensitivity and significance of the subject matter of the September 8 Segment,
and despite the fact the story was being crashed, no members of 60 Minutes Wednesday senior
management were present in the office on Monday, September 6, which was Labor Day. Mapes
expressed frustration about this fact at the time.
Howard and Murphy checked in with Mapes periodically during the day. At one point,
Mapes e-mailed Murphy and said that she and Rather were interviewing “the country’s best
graphologist,” i.e., Marcel Matley, and that he “believes these things [i.e., documents] are real.”
Mapes did not mention in her e-mail to Murphy that Matley could not opine regarding all of the
documents or that all his opinions were limited by the fact that the documents were copies.
Heyward recalled speaking to Rather on Monday, September 6, and being told that the
story was thoroughly vetted. Heyward also told the Panel that Rather said he had not “been
involved in this much checking on a story since Watergate.” Heyward also said that Rather
commented, “This isn’t as big as Abu Ghraib, but it’s very big, and you should probably look at
it before it goes to air.”
G. Tuesday, September 7, 2004: Additional Interviews and the Vetting Process
As of Tuesday, September 7, there was still much work to be done to get the Segment
ready for broadcast, including two interviews: the Barnes interview part of the September 8
Segment and the Bartlett interview for comment from the White House. In addition, a draft of
the script was not prepared until late Tuesday night. Additional concerns were raised by some of
the document examiners about the documents on Tuesday night, but these concerns were set
aside as Wednesday’s deadline loomed.
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1. Additional Attempts To Locate People Who Might Know About the
Smith told the Panel that he called Brigadier General Belisario Flores, who succeeded
General Rose as Assistant Adjutant General – Air for the Texas National Guard in 1972, on
Tuesday or Wednesday and read him the August 1, 1972 memorandum, which was used in the
September 8 Segment. This document related, in part, to a verbal order to suspend then-
Lieutenant Bush “from flight status due to failure to perform to USAF/TexANG standards and
failure to meet annual physical . . . as ordered.”
Smith told the Panel that Brigadier General Flores’ “breathing got quicker” when Smith
read the memorandum. Smith recalled that Brigadier General Flores was reluctant to get
involved but said that the document sounded “right or authentic.” According to Smith, Brigadier
General Flores also said words to the effect that Lieutenant Bush “reneged on his commitment
and was removed from flying status.” Smith told the Panel that he informed Mapes of the
conversation after he spoke to Brigadier General Flores. He said that Mapes did not exhibit
interest in what Brigadier General Flores had to say about the documents at this juncture,
however, because she was focused on the fact that Major General Hodges had verified the
contents.67
In addition, on Tuesday evening, Scott telephoned Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s widow to
verify the content of some documents. Scott asked her whether her husband had felt conflicted
about Bush, and she responded that her husband had “loved the President” and would be
campaigning for him if he were alive. Scott said that she tried to engage Lieutenant Colonel
Killian’s widow in a discussion about the documents but was unsuccessful. It does not appear,
based on the information available to the Panel, that she was asked whether her husband had
personal files, used a typewriter or had a secretary.
Based on the information available to the Panel, it appears that no further attempts were
made to vet the content of the documents with others who might have had personal knowledge of
them or the people or issues referenced in them. Instead, it all seems to have rested heavily on
67 Mapes had interviewed Brigadier General Flores off-camera on a number of occasions previously and, according
to her notes, he had said with respect to Lieutenant Bush, “I have no respect for someone who did not fulfill his
obligation,” and added that it was “unthinkable” for a pilot to turn in his wings. Brigadier General Flores was
quoted by USA TODAY as saying a few days after the broadcast of the September 8 Segment, however, that
Lieutenant Colonel Killian had not mentioned any problems in dealing with Lieutenant Bush and noted that it would
be unusual for a personal file to be maintained for so many years. See Jim Drinkard & Dave Moniz, Memos Debate
Eclipses Content, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2004, at A11.
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Major General Hodges. The Panel believes that the attempts to investigate the people and the
issues presented in the documents were insufficient.
The Panel has interviewed a number of other former Guardsmen who worked closely
with Lieutenant Colonel Killian and/or were in a position to have personal knowledge of the
matters discussed in the documents. None of these former Guardsmen was contacted regarding
the Killian documents by Mapes or her team in 2004 prior to the airing of the September 8
Segment. Some of these men had been interviewed by Mapes in 1999, but had not agreed that
President Bush received preferential treatment. Collectively, they presented a credible critique
of the Killian documents, including the format, terminology, abbreviation usage and the
underlying substance. These issues are explored in more detail in Chapter VIII, in which the
Panel discusses Mapes’ theory that the Killian documents “meshed” with the official Bush
records. While the concerns raised by these former Guardsmen in the end may be simply
different views of events, they should have been uncovered and vetted prior to airing given the
highly sensitive nature of the Segment.
2. Contact with the Document Examiners and Their Concerns About the
a. Emily Will
On Tuesday evening, Miller received a call from Emily Will at about 8:25 p.m. Miller
told that Panel that Will said that she objected to the use of the documents in the story and
expressed the following concerns, which are reflected in Miller’s contemporaneous handwritten
notes:
· Will could not determine that the signatures matched based on the samples she had been provided;
· Will could not opine on the initials (August 1, 1972 memorandum, which was used in the September 8 Segment) because there was no basis for a comparison;
· The fact that the documents were multi-generational copies made it difficult to analyze them;
· The font was troublesome, including the superscript “th”;
· There was no city, state or zip code indicated in the return address of the June 24,
1973 memorandum; and
· Will did not think that these documents could have been prepared in 1972 and believed that they must have been prepared using a word processor.
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Miller told the Panel that she was troubled by Will’s concerns and transferred the call to Mapes.
Miller said that she was not present when Will spoke with Mapes.
Will told the Panel that she did not recall discussing the substance of her concerns with
Miller at any time, but she did recall speaking to Mapes directly that night and repeating the
same concerns she had discussed with her on Sunday, September 5. According to Will, Mapes
told her that James had raised the same question regarding the superscript, but that the story was
going to air because Matley supported the documents and had attributed the signature differences
to stress. Will also noted that Mapes said that Matley had seen all of the documents, whereas
Will had seen only some of the documents. Will further told the Panel that Mapes said that
Major General Hodges had said that the content of the documents “sounded right.”
Will said that she told Mapes that Matley’s theory about stress was speculative and that
Major General Hodges’ statement did not go to the authenticity of the documents. Will also told
the Panel that she warned Mapes that, if she used the documents, “every document expert in the
country will be after you with hundreds of questions.” Will told the Panel that she had typed the
two documents in Microsoft Word and noticed they were very similar to the documents she had
been provided, but she is not sure that she told this to Mapes. Will recalled that Mapes asked her
whether she was absolutely certain that the superscript “th” could not have been produced by a
typewriter in the 1970s because she did not want to lose the story over the “little ‘th.’ ” Will
told Mapes that she was reasonably certain but that 60 Minutes Wednesday should consult Peter
Tytell, a typewriter expert. Per Mapes’ request, Will located Tytell’s phone number, which she
then relayed to Miller.
Mapes told the Panel, as well as others at the time, that she told Will that Matley was not
concerned about the superscript “th” and that Will had deferred to Matley. Will strongly denied
to the Panel that she had deferred to Matley.
After Will spoke to Mapes, Mapes told Miller again, as she had on Sunday, that Will was
“more concerned about the facts about President Bush’s National Guard service than on her job
and that the facts were none of Will’s business.” Miller said that Mapes was not concerned
about Will’s comments because she believed that she had enough information to support the
story and the content of the documents. Scott also recalled that Mapes said that one of the
experts “canceled herself out” and showed a bias by researching President Bush’s TexANG
service on the Internet.
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b. Linda James
Miller told the Panel that she received a call from Linda James not long after getting off
the phone with Will. As reflected in Miller’s contemporaneous handwritten notes, James said
that there were “unexplainable differences in the signatures” and that she did not have enough
documents to reach a conclusion. James also noted the superscript “th” on the June 24, 1973
memo and said that she thought it might be too sophisticated for that time but that it could be
unique to the military.” Miller’s notes reflect that she transferred the call to Mapes.
Miller also told the Panel that she had the impression that Will and James had spoken to
each other, although neither indicated that they had. James also recalled that she had spoken
with Miller and that she suggested that Miller and Mapes call Peter Tytell regarding the superscript issue.
Miller said that when she told Mapes about James’ call, Mapes responded, “Enough
about the [expletive] ‘th’.” Miller recalled that Mapes then said that James had already told her
that there was not enough information or enough documents to do her work and that James had
also deferred to Matley. Miller advised the Panel that James had not said anything to her about a
deferral to Matley. In addition, James told the Panel that she did not tell Mapes that she would
“defer” to Matley and said that she did not even know what Matley’s opinions were prior to the
broadcast.
c. Marcel Matley
While it appears that Mapes and/or Miller did consult with Matley regarding the “th”
issue, the Panel is unable to determine whether this occurred when he was in New York on
Monday, September 6, or after his return to San Francisco on Tuesday, September 7. Whenever
the conversation occurred, Matley recalled telling them the following: (1) IBM had multiple
characters that could be specially ordered for its typewriters during the early 1970s; and (2) one
could modify any typewriter to include a special character like the “th” at that time. He also
believes he told them, in effect, that “it would not have been impossible” to have produced the
superscript “th” in the early 1970s. Matley also said that he told Mapes and Miller that
proportional spacing was “available” on IBM electric typewriters. Matley believes that this
conversation lasted no longer than five minutes, and that this was the full extent of their consultation with him about the issue.
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Mapes’ recollection was fairly consistent with Matley’s regarding this discussion,
although she also recalled that he told her that the inconsistency in the appearance of the “th” on
the documents (sometimes a superscript and sometimes a regular “th”) was an indicator that it
was typed by a person who was not used to working with a typewriter. She said that Matley told
her that there was a typing ball containing the “little ‘th” that could have been ordered at the
time.
d. James Pierce
Miller told the Panel that she also spoke to Pierce on Tuesday, as reflected in her
contemporaneous notes. Pierce mentioned at that time that there was a possible alteration in one
of the documents, although the document was from the official Bush records and was not one of
the two provided by Colonel Burkett. She said that Pierce did not raise any serious questions
regarding the authenticity of documents and that he indicated he believed that the samples of
Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s signature among the documents he had received “appeared
consistent.” She also recalled that he said the typeset in the Killian documents appeared
consistent with the typeset in the official documents. Miller had the impression that Pierce was
very thorough in his analysis. The Panel has not seen any evidence suggesting that Pierce raised
the “th” issue or otherwise discussed this issue with Miller during this conversation.
e. Colonel Charles
Colonel Charles informed the Panel that at some point on Tuesday night, he told Miller
and Mapes that he also had concerns regarding the documents, including form, the superscript
“th,” inconsistent references to the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and Bush’s service
number. Miller recalled this conversation and told the Panel that she was upset that Colonel
Charles had not raised his concerns earlier. Colonel Charles at some point also pointed out to
Mapes that the Killian documents did not conform to Air Force correspondence guidelines.
Colonel Charles could not recall any reaction by Mapes to his concerns and told the Panel that
there were “so many things going on” that he was not sure that “it even registered.” Mapes did
not recall any concerns raised by Colonel Charles about the documents.
f. Search for Other Document Examiners
Miller recalled that Mapes asked her on Tuesday evening to find another document
examiner to weigh in on the superscript “th” issue and Miller made calls to Peter Tytell and Bob
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Phillips. Tytell was referred to Miller and Mapes by both Will and James. According to Miller’s
notes, Bob Phillips was referred by Matley. Miller told the Panel that she was unable to reach
Tytell, and Phillips would not take the assignment. Mapes also did not recall any further attempt
to find additional examiners prior to the broadcast of the Segment.
Tytell confirmed to the Panel that Miller had left a voicemail message at his office at
about 9:20 p.m. on Tuesday, September 7, which he did not retrieve until the next day. When
Tytell returned Miller’s call at around 11 a.m. on Wednesday, Miller did no go into any detail
about the issue and told him that they did not need him anymore.
g. Miller’s Concerns
Miller told the Panel that, by Tuesday night, “everything but the ceiling tiles” was falling
down on Mapes. She said that Mapes was angry and worried because the examiners appeared to
be questioning the documents. Miller was seriously concerned about the issues raised by Will
and James. Miller told the Panel that she was reluctant to alert West, Murphy or Howard about
her own concerns regarding the documents, in part because Mapes had retorts for every
challenge to the documents and in part because it would have raised a “storm” internally. She
also said that she was preoccupied with all of the work that she had that night to get the Segment
ready for airing the following evening.
h. Alerting Management
Mapes called West on Tuesday evening and alerted her to the potential superscript “th”
issue. West recalled that Mapes said the examiners had “spooked” her. Mapes explained that
one of the examiners was not certain whether a typewriter at the time could have produced a
superscript “th.” West told the Panel that this call from Mapes was “highly unusual,” and that
she told Mapes that they did not have to go with the document story if they were not able to
resolve the issue. Mapes also told Howard about the issue at some point on Monday or Tuesday,
and Howard informed Murphy. Significantly, Mapes did not alert Howard, Murphy and West to
the other issues raised by Will, such as her concern about the signatures and proportional spacing
of the Killian documents.
Shortly after midnight, Mapes told Howard in an e-mail that she was “pretty much over
that whole little “th” problem I had. No one can agree on it because no one knows . . . and if
[Will] had not brought it up, I wouldn’t have obsessed about it. She is also the woman who
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started arguing with me about when Bush was in Alabama . . . I think all these people are nuts.”
Notably, Mapes did not state that Will had deferred to Matley. West recalled, however, that
when she inquired about the “th” issue early Wednesday morning, Mapes told her that she had
spoken to the examiner who had also raised the issue, and that she had deferred to Matley, who
thought that the documents were “fine.” As previously noted, Will told the Panel that she did not
defer, and would not have deferred, to Matley. Similarly, James told the Panel that she did not
tell Mapes that she deferred to Matley.
The Panel finds that the concerns raised by Will and James, which were communicated at
least in part by Mapes to 60 Minutes Wednesday management, should have been vetted in detail
before the Segment aired. Instead, as detailed below, Mapes advised management that the issues
were resolved and no further vetting on this issue occurred. The failure to vet further was
problematic given the prominence the documents were accorded on the Segment and the
significance of the subject matter. This is not the only time, as discussed later in this Report, that
information that challenged the thesis of the September 8 Segment was either ignored or not
given adequate consideration.
3. Vetting Sessions
Much of Tuesday was spent working on the production, such as arranging to get
background clips and stills (e.g., photographs of then-Lieutenant Bush and others in the TexANG
at that time, footage of Ellington AFB and footage of President Bush’s comments regarding his
TexANG service) and pulling pieces of interviews together to form the basis of a script. By
Tuesday afternoon, the vetting process was under way, although there was no script until late
that night.
The show’s senior management met with Mapes several times that day as well. Esther
Kartiganer, whose primary responsibility is to review full transcripts of interviews to ensure the
fairness and accuracy of what is aired, first became involved in the substance of the story on
Tuesday. Kartiganer said that she was informed about the story by Howard and Murphy, who
told her that Mapes was working on a report for the following day’s broadcast. Mapes, however,
recalled that she herself had brought the story to Kartiganer’s attention and told the Panel that
she met with Kartiganer in her office for about twenty minutes that morning.
Betsy West, who had heard about the story a week or so before the Segment aired, did
not become involved in the vetting of the piece until Tuesday, and she noted that Heyward asked
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her that afternoon to “watch over” the story given its “sensitivity.” Heyward also urged West
and Howard in an e-mail later that afternoon to “work closely with” Rather and Mapes but to not
let them “stampede us in any way.” Heyward expressed concern about being fair to President
Bush and noted that “we’re going to have to defend every syllable of this one, which is how it
should be.” West’s involvement in the piece this early in the process was unusual, as her role is
normally to screen reports as the final phase of the vetting process.
A challenge for the Panel in determining whether the vetting was adequate is that the
recollections of the people involved in these discussions vary dramatically. In general, Mapes
recalled disclosing all the potential shortcomings of the story, while the others not only did not
recall learning about these shortcomings prior to the broadcast, but, to the contrary, they recalled
being reassured that the story, the documents and the source were solid. These recollections are
set forth below.
a. The Questions Mapes Was Asked
One or more of the vetters, who included at various times West, Howard, Murphy and
Kartiganer, recalled that Mapes was asked the following questions on Tuesday, September 7:
1. Does the source have “an axe to grind”?
2. Is there anything “problematic” or “embarrassing” about the source?
3. How did the source obtain the documents?
4. What is the significance of the documents?
5. Are the documents real?
Significantly, none of the vetters recalled asking Mapes who the source was and did not
recall hearing Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name on Tuesday, although they all told the Panel
that the name would not have meant anything to them even if Mapes had mentioned it. Several
of the vetters explained that, at the time, they did not think that the source was the key to the
process. Similarly, they did not ask Mapes whether the document examiners had put any of their
opinions in writing to 60 Minutes Wednesday.
b. Representations Made About the Source
Specifically, one or more of the vetters recalled being told by Mapes the following
information about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett by the end of the day on Tuesday at the latest:
1. The source was an ex-Guardsman who was one of four officers investigating “shadow” or “ghost” soldiers; 113
2. The source had obtained the documents from someone who now lived in Germany and who had taken the documents when President Bush’s TexANG records were being “scrubbed”;
3. The source was present at the “scrubbing” of the records;
4. The source was not a supporter of President Bush;
5. The source had medical issues and had a service dog to assist him;
6. The source had a quarrel with the National Guard regarding disability payments;
7. Mapes had obtained the documents from a “reliable source who had access”;
8. Mapes knew the source and did not have any questions regarding his credibility;
9. The source “is a Democrat but a John McCain supporter”; and
10. The source had a grudge about preferred treatment in the National Guard, but was a “maverick.”
Mapes recalled, however, telling at least some of the vetters that her source allegedly
witnessed the “scrubbing” incident in 1997 and that he had become a controversial figure when
his story “had not proven out.” None of the vetters recalled being told this.
c. Representations Made About the Document Examiners and the Documents
The vetters recalled being told that there were four document examiners, one of whom
was the “dean of document analysis.” Howard and Murphy were under the impression that all
four experts had authenticated the documents. West recalled being told less categorically,
however, that the experts “had found nothing that ruled out the documents,” that the
authentication process was an inexact or “voodoo” science, that one or more experts had
authenticated the documents to the extent possible, considering they were copies and not
originals, and that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that they were real. Significantly,
however, none of the vetters recalled being informed that only one of the experts, Matley, had
seen all of the documents. In addition, they did not recall hearing that Matley said that he could
not authenticate any of the documents or opine on the documents that did not contain full signatures, including three documents that were used in the September 8 Segment.
In addition, Mapes told the vetters that she had also spoken to other people who said that
the content of the documents was accurate, including the leader of President Bush’s TexANG
unit, Major General Hodges, and that someone who knew Lieutenant Colonel Killian well,
Lieutenant Robert Strong, had said that the memoranda were consistent with what Lieutenant
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Colonel Killian thought at the time. It does not appear that the vetters were told that Lieutenant
Strong had no personal knowledge and had left his full-time position in the TexANG by the time
the documents purportedly were written. Further, it does not appear that the vetters were told
that General Staudt had left the TexANG 17 months before he allegedly sought to “sugar coat”
Lieutenant Bush’s rating.
Finally, one of the vetters recalled that Mapes had walked them through the documents to
explain how they fit into the official record regarding President Bush’s TexANG service and that
Mapes was very persuasive. Mapes also recalled explaining to the vetters how the documents
meshed.
The Tuesday discussions about authenticity between Mapes and 60 Minutes Wednesday
management raise significant issues. The fact that Mapes believed that Major General Hodges
confirmed the content of the Killian documents and the meshing discussion had little or nothing
to do with whether the documents were authentic, i.e., what they purport to be. See CBS
Standard II-15, discussed in Appendix 1 to this report and the Background on Authentication,
discussed in Appendix 2 to this Report. The Panel finds that on Tuesday, September 7, there had
been no clear communication to the vetting group about what the document experts had done and
the limits on their conclusions. The Panel also finds that on Tuesday, those in 60 Minutes
Wednesday management did not probe adequately to understand how document authentication
works and what the 60 Minutes Wednesday document examiners actually had been shown and
what they actually had found. Unfortunately, the situation would not improve on Wednesday, as
described hereafter.
d. Kartiganer’s Review of the Transcripts
Kartiganer initially reviewed the transcripts of the interviews of Matley, Colonel
Hackworth and Lieutenant Strong, the only interview transcripts available during the day on
Tuesday. Kartiganer thought that Matley spoke in a “narrow range” about the signatures on the
documents and used a lot of “expert garble.” She told the Panel that she had read that Matley
told Rather it was “safe to go on the documents.” Based on that statement, she did not think
other examiners were needed in the Segment. It appears that, with all of that “garble,” the fact
that Matley’s opinions were qualified and limited, as he stated in his interview, was not picked
up by Kartiganer. In addition, Kartiganer said that she was never told that Matley had said that
copies of documents could not be authenticated.
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Similarly, Kartiganer did not focus at the time on the fact that Lieutenant Strong opined
regarding Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s state of mind as if he had personal knowledge despite his
plain disclosures during his interview that he had no such knowledge. Moreover, she was not
provided with a copy of Lieutenant Strong’s 1999 interview transcript. Kartiganer also reviewed
the Colonel Hackworth transcript, but the portion of the Colonel Hackworth interview that was
included in a draft script was ultimately removed by others in the vetting process because it was
considered inflammatory and gratuitous.
Kartiganer told the Panel that she felt that the production was moving at such a fast pace
that she was unable to become substantially involved in reviewing the scripts. As a result, she
said, she eventually stopped providing comments on the Segment and “got out of the way” so
that it could proceed on schedule. This is another example where the “crash” overcame what is
supposed to be an important part of the vetting process.
4. Ben Barnes Interview
On Tuesday afternoon, Ben Barnes was finally interviewed, after years of coaxing by
Mapes to come forward. The Barnes interview transcript is Exhibit 9A to this Report. Barnes’
interview lasted approximately one hour. Most of the interview consisted of a discussion of what
he perceived to be his role in getting people into the Texas National Guard despite allegedly long
waiting lists, a role for which he apologized, as he now believed that he may have determined
life or death for some men. In many respects, Barnes’ interview was about Barnes and his own
sense of responsibility for actions he took at a time when he had political ambitions and political
power. Significantly, it does not appear that Barnes’ interview was especially newsworthy,
given the fact that he had issued through his lawyer a press release containing essentially the
same information in September 1999 following his deposition in the GTECH Corp. litigation and
a video of similar statements by Barnes was already on the Internet. Thus, the Barnes interview
could hardly be regarded as shedding significant new information or light regarding his role in
getting President Bush into the TexANG.
Specifically, Barnes told Rather in his interview that Sid Adger, whom he described as a
“friend of the Bush family,” came to see him and asked if he would recommend George W. Bush
for the TexANG. Barnes said that after Adger spoke to him, he talked to General Rose and
recommended President Bush. He said that General Rose was “a personal friend . . . as well as a
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political friend.” He noted that there was a long waiting list of people applying for the National
Guard, as it was a route “available to a very special few . . . to avoid going to Vietnam.”
Significantly, Barnes said that he did not know whether his recommendation “was the
absolute reason [President Bush] got into the Guard.” Although Barnes had a vague recollection
of President Bush thanking him for his help after he was elected Governor, he could not describe
the communication in detail. Further, when commenting on President Bush’s assertion that he
“just happened to get one of the spots” in the TexANG, Barnes said that he could not
“answer . . . with any real certainty” whether or not that was possible. He also had no knowledge
regarding President Bush’s service while in the TexANG. The Panel’s concerns regarding the portions of the Barnes interview used in the September 8 Segment are detailed below in Section I.3 of this Chapter.
5. The Promotion of the September 8 Segment
Kelli Edwards, who works in the Communications Group at CBS and is primarily
responsible for 60 Minutes Wednesday publicity, began to work on a press release to promote the
upcoming broadcast. Ultimately, only the Barnes interview was promoted because 60 Minutes
Wednesday management and Mapes were waiting to hear the reaction from the White House
regarding the documents. See Exhibits 3A and 3B. By this time, 60 Minutes Wednesday management still had not made a final decision to include the documents in the Segment.
6. Notifying the White House
By Tuesday, December 7, Dan Bartlett had heard that 60 Minutes Wednesday was
working on a story involving the TexANG, and Ben Barnes and wondered whether anyone from
the show would ask him to comment about it. Accordingly, Bartlett asked his assistant to reach
out to 60 Minutes Wednesday to determine the status of the story.
Bartlett told the Panel that his assistant called Howard around 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday and
said that the White House had heard about the story from sources outside of 60 Minutes
Wednesday. Howard said that he could not confirm that the Segment was going to air the next
night. Bartlett also said that his assistant told Howard that if the Segment was going to air, it was
unfair that 60 Minutes Wednesday planned to give the White House only a few hours to respond.
Bartlett said that Howard left a message for him at 6:50 p.m. to inform him that 60 Minutes
Wednesday did indeed plan to air a report involving Barnes, but Howard did not mention the
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TexANG documents. Howard told the Panel, however, that he recalled that the person from the
White House who initially called him about the story knew that 60 Minutes Wednesday had
documents.
Howard spoke to Bartlett later that evening. Howard told Bartlett about Ben Barnes’
“side” of the story. Howard also told Bartlett that 60 Minutes Wednesday had obtained new
documents from the personal files of President Bush’s commanding officer in the TexANG.
Bartlett said that he told Howard that this was “new news” to him and asked Howard what the
documents said. At that point, Mary Murphy read the documents to Bartlett over the telephone.
Murphy’s impression was that Bartlett took notes about the documents’ content as she spoke.
Bartlett also recalled that Howard told him that 60 Minutes Wednesday had someone on camera
verifying the documents.
Bartlett asked Murphy to fax the documents to him that evening. Murphy and Howard
did not want to give him the documents that night, however, but made arrangements to get the
documents to Washington Bureau Chief Leissner so that she could have them delivered to the
White House by seven the next morning. The four documents provided to Bartlett were the four
used in the September 8 Segment.
7. Two New Articles on Missing Records
At around 10 p.m. on Tuesday, September 7, Chad Clanton of the Kerry campaign
forwarded to Mapes a copy of an article regarding new records released by the Department of
Defense pursuant to The Associated Press’ FOIA requests.68 According to the article, the new
records stated that then-Lieutenant Bush had rated in the middle of his Guard flight class and that
he had flown 336 hours in a fighter jet before letting his flight status lapse. The records also
showed that his last flight was in April 1972 and that he missed a key 24-hour active alert
mission to safeguard against surprise attacks in the southern United States beginning on October
6, 1972. The article claimed that the newly released records did not include any documents from
the five required categories that Lieutenant Bush’s commanders should have kept, such as an
investigative report on why he skipped his flying physical. Mapes forwarded Clanton’s e-mail
to Howard and Murphy.
68 Matt Kelley, Lawsuit Prompts Release of New Records Showing Bush Grades as Guard Pilot, AP, Sept. 7, 2004.
(Note: this article also ran on September 8, 2004).
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At around the same time, Mapes sent a draft of the script to Howard with the following preamble:
JUST HEARD FROM A SOURCE WHO HAS SEEN A BOSTON GLOBE STORY FOR TOMORROW THAT SAYS THAT IN REEXAMING BUSH DOCS, THEY HAVE FOUND EVIDENCE THAT HE DIDN’T SERVE OUT HIS FULL TIME. I’M SURE THEY ARE SCRAMBLING TO LOOK ON TOP OF THINGS.
On September 8, The Boston Globe article was published on the front page of the newspaper.69
The article concluded that the records related to President Bush’s TexANG service showed that
then-Lieutenant Bush did not satisfy his training commitments or face any punishment for this.
The article also stated that President Bush’s attendance at required drills was “irregular” and that
he failed to sign up with a Boston-area reserve unit when he moved to Cambridge to attend
Harvard Business School. Finally, the article reported that “[s]ince the Globe first reported
Bush’s spotty attendance record in May 2000, no one has come forward with any credible
recollection of having witnessed Bush performing guard service in Alabama or after he returned
to Houston in 1973.”
H. Wednesday, September 8, 2004: Completing the Vetting Process and Airing the Segment
1. Bartlett Interview
The TexANG documents were delivered to Bartlett early on Wednesday morning.
Rather was unable to fly to Washington, D.C. for the Bartlett interview due to inclement weather
and Leissner was told that John Roberts should conduct the interview in Rather’s place. Leissner
met Roberts at the White House with the Killian documents. Roberts had about 45 minutes to
prepare for the interview, during which time he called Mapes to get a primer on the documents.
Leissner said that Mapes told them that she thought the White House would say that the
documents were not real. Roberts recalled that Mapes “sounded 100 percent confident” about
the story and the documents and told him the following:
(1) The documents were from the personal files of Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Killian, who died in 1984; and
(2) If the White House questioned the content of the Killian documents, Roberts should know that Mapes had talked to Major General Bobby Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commanding officer, who told Mapes that the documents described exactly how Lieutenant Colonel Killian felt at the time. In addition, Mapes spoke to Robert
69 Walter V. Robinson, Bush Fell Short on Duty at Guard, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2004, at Al.
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Strong, the administrative head of the TexANG, who said that the documents were consistent with the man he knew Lieutenant Colonel Killian to be and with documents he had seen every day at the TexANG.
Roberts told the Panel that Mapes did not say that the documents had been authenticated, how
she got the documents or Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name. Like Sciere, Lynch and Leissner,
Roberts told the Panel that if he had known on Wednesday morning that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett was the source of these documents, he would have had serious concerns about the
60 Minutes Wednesday Segment.
At approximately 11 a.m., Roberts interviewed Bartlett at the White House. The Bartlett
interview transcript is Exhibit 9B to this Report. Roberts asked several questions to ensure that
the White House was not challenging the authenticity of the documents. Bartlett told him that
CBS News was a reputable news organization and that he was not suggesting that the documents
were not real. Nonetheless, Bartlett made several comments during his interview that supported
President Bush’s military record and appeared to challenge the veracity of the September 8
Segment. For example, Bartlett stated: “President Bush, after his fourth year of service, asked
for permission to go in a non-flying capacity to Alabama. There was no reason for President
Bush to take a flight exam if he wasn’t going to be flying.” Bartlett explained further that
President Bush “did not take a flight exam . . . [b]ecause in Alabama they weren’t flying the
same plane that President Bush was trained in.”
Roberts told the Panel that he had the impression that Bartlett kept referring back to the
administration’s prior positions in his interview because he did not know what he was dealing
with as he had not had much time to review the documents. In addition, Roberts said that the
fact that he asked Bartlett whether he was challenging the authenticity of the documents was not
planned. It was prompted by one of Bartlett’s responses to his questions and not by Mapes.
Roberts said that neither Mapes nor anyone else told Roberts that he needed to get an opinion
from the White House regarding the documents or provided him with questions to ask Bartlett,
other than, “You’ve seen the documents. What do you think?”
Mapes told the Panel that Roberts called her after the interview and told her that the
White House had not challenged the authenticity of the documents. Roberts recalled that Mapes
responded with words to the effect that she had several experts lined up to vouch for the veracity
of the documents and did not need to include them because the White House is not challenging
the documents.
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2. Vetting Meeting
CBS lawyers, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard Altabef, were first informed about Mapes’
TexANG story on the morning of Wednesday, September 8, when they attended the screening
for another story which was scheduled to air that night if the TexANG story did not air. In
contrast to the September 8 Segment, the lawyers had been extensively involved in reviewing the
other piece.
Immediately after the screening of the other segment, at or around 11 a.m., the vetting
session with the lawyers regarding the Segment was held. A final decision had not yet been
made to air the story that night. Present at this meeting were at least Mapes, Sternberg, Altabef,
Howard, Kartiganer, Murphy and West, although West apparently was in and out of the meeting.
At this meeting, Sternberg and Altabef were shown the documents and a rough script for the first
time.
a. Discussion of the Documents
Mapes was asked to explain why the documents were newsworthy, as some participants
did not think that they advanced the story of President Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes told the
Panel that she recalled being asked this question and said that she gave an abbreviated version of
the way in which the Killian documents meshed with the known factual record and said that the
documents provided insight into “what went on in the unit and with Killian.”
With regard to the August 18, 1973 memorandum that states, in part, that General Staudt
purportedly had pressured then-Colonel Hodges to “sugar coat” Lieutenant Bush’s evaluation,
Mapes was asked whether General Staudt was alive. Mapes responded that she had contacted
him, but he refused to speak with her. Instead of pulling the document from the Segment, the
lawyers asked Mapes to contact General Staudt again to seek his comment, but no one followed
up with her later that day to determine whether she had contacted General Staudt as requested.
In fact, it does not appear that Mapes or anyone else attempted to reach General Staudt on
Wednesday after the meeting. If they had reached him and he had agreed to talk, and if he
repeated the same statements that he did when he was interviewed by the Panel, General Staudt
would have denied having any influence over TexANG matters after he retired in the first quarter
of 1972 and would have said that he was unaware of any problems with then-Lieutenant Bush
while he served in the TexANG.
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Mapes was also asked at the meeting whether the original documents were available. At
least two people present at the meeting recalled that Mapes indicated that it was not possible to
get the originals. Mapes said that, if originals existed, they were in the possession of her
source’s source, who was not willing to cooperate. Mapes also said that the documents were not
on letterhead because these types of personal memoranda typically would not be on letterhead.
b. The Source
One or more of the people present at the meeting recalled that Mapes was asked various
questions about the source, such as who he was, did she trust him, what was the source’s
relationship to the documents, where did the “scrubbing” take place and whether the source had
witnessed the “scrubbing.” Several people recalled that Mapes said that her source and her
source’s source had witnessed the purging of President Bush’s files in the 1990s, were offended
by this and had taken other files that they realized might have been purged, including those of
Lieutenant Colonel Killian. One person recalled that Mapes said her source was nearby when
her source’s source took the documents and that the documents remained with her source’s
source, who now lived in Germany and was “unavailable,” until he gave copies to her source.
No one present at the meeting asked Mapes why the source’s source was “unavailable” or
demanded that she find him before airing the Segment. The Panel finds this to be a significant
omission.
Those present at the meeting recalled that Mapes expressed “enormous confidence” in
her source’s reliability and said that he was solid with no bias or credibility issues. In terms of
trust, those present at the meeting also recalled that Mapes conveyed confidence in her source
and did not reveal the source’s name or anything negative about the source. Mapes, on the other
hand, told the Panel that she was “almost certain” that she identified Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
by name when speaking to the group. Mapes also recalled giving them a sketch of Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett, and, in particular, telling them that he was a “difficult,” “moralistic stickler”
who had medical problems, was a disgruntled former Guardsman, and was anti-Bush. Mapes
also told the Panel that she told the vetters that her source had become a controversial figure in
February 2004 when his story about the “scrubbing” was publicized and challenged. Mapes said
that she told the group that she did not think that the source had forged the documents.
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c. Colonel Hackworth
During the meeting, a CBS lawyer expressed relayed his concerns about using Colonel
Hackworth in the Segment and suggested that it might not be appropriate to rely on him. As
previously noted, Colonel Hackworth was not included in the September 8 Segment.
d. The Document Examiners
No one present at the meeting had prior experience with document authentication, but no
one asked Mapes to explain the techniques utilized by the examiners engaged by 60 Minutes
Wednesday. Some people present at the meeting recalled Mapes’ saying that four examiners
believed that both the signatures and the documents they reviewed were authentic. One of the
lawyers recalled being told that one examiner had authenticated all four documents and that
others had authenticated some of the documents or some parts of the documents. Similarly, the
other lawyer present recalled that Mapes said that one examiner had looked at all four documents
and the three others had looked at several. No one inquired why all four examiners had not seen
all of the documents.
When asked whether any examiner had found problems with the documents, Mapes said
that one of the examiners had raised an issue regarding the superscript “th,” but that, ultimately,
all of the examiners were satisfied that the concern was resolved. In addition, they discussed at
length whether the documents’ content was accurate, and Mapes told them that Major General
Hodges recalled that this was how Lieutenant Colonel Killian felt at the time and that Lieutenant
Strong thought that they reflected the way in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian expressed himself
and felt generally.
Mapes told the Panel that she recalled discussing the examiners at the meeting, although
her recollection differs in some respects. Mapes told the Panel that she said to the vetting group
that she had received a “strong endorsement” from both Matley and another examiner who was a
former Los Angeles police officer (Pierce) and that they found “no exclusionary points.” She
said that one document examiner had deferred to Matley’s opinion and another said that she
could not authenticate the documents without reviewing the originals. Mapes said that the group
discussed the little “th,” but they agreed that they did not have the expertise required to
determine whether the “th” could have been produced at the time the documents were written.
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e. Deficiencies in the Vetting Process
Based on the recollections of those present at the meeting and the vetting sessions the
previous day, it appears that Mapes did not disclose the following to 60 Minutes Wednesday
management prior to the airing of the Segment on September 8:
· That she had interviewed several people in 1999, including General Staudt and Major General Hodges, who told her that, contrary to Barnes’ statements, no influence was used to get President Bush into the TexANG, and that Barnes himself was not certain that his call to General Rose had gotten him in;
· That Barnes had given a speech similar to his interview in May at a Kerry campaign rally;
· That none of the experts could authenticate the documents because they were copies;
· That Matley’s analysis was limited to the Killian signatures, which appeared on only one of the four documents used in the Segment, and that the other three documents used had not been verified by any of the document examiners;
· That at least one expert had raised concerns not only about the superscript “th,” but also proportional spacing, font, terminology and the signatures;
· That Lieutenant Strong did not have personal knowledge of then-Lieutenant Bush’s service record in the TexANG or the Killian documents;
· That inadequate steps had been taken to confirm Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s statement, which would be included in the Segment, that the Killian documents were taken from Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s personal files.
The Panel finds that Mapes’ failure to disclose to the vetters and the lawyers all of the
information that tended to undermine the Segment was a serious problem in the production of the
Segment. The Panel faults not only Mapes, however. The Panel also finds that those present at
the meeting, including 60 Minutes Wednesday management, West and the lawyers, should have
probed more deeply. Specifically, as a group, they should have asked more specific questions of
Mapes in order to: determine the chain of custody and what had been done to find Chief Warrant
Officer Conn; learn about the authentication process, the extent to which the documents had, in
fact, been authenticated and what exactly the examiners had said; and understand what the basis
was for the statements made by Lieutenant Strong that were included in the script.
The Panel does not feel that it is unfair hindsight to have expected the vetters to have
probed far more deeply at the meeting on September 8. This was an extraordinarily sensitive and
significant story that was being crashed, which should have caused great care and thoroughness
in the vetting process. This clearly was not achieved.
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The Panel was told by some of the vetters why they did not press further on the issues
identified above. The practice and tradition at 60 Minutes Wednesday is to put a large amount of
responsibility and trust in producers. In this instance, every member of the vetting group,
including West, Howard and Murphy, expressed the view that while tough questions were asked
of Mapes, she responded adequately, and they did not feel the need to probe more deeply.
Mapes told the Panel that she answered fully each question asked by the vetters. While the Panel
continues to believe that the vetting for the September 8 Segment was not adequate, West
Howard and Murphy did not feel compelled to have done more, given their experience in trusting
producers and the stellar reputation of Mapes in particular. Accordingly, nothing in this Report
should be construed to suggest that the vetting group believed that the Segment had any unresolved issues or was otherwise not ready to air by 8 p.m. EST on September 8.
3. Response at 60 Minutes Wednesday to the White House Interview
During the vetting session, Mapes received word from John Roberts that the Bartlett
interview had gone well and that he had not disputed the authenticity of the documents, as
discussed above. Many of the people that the Panel interviewed said that they had been
concerned about how the White House would react and believed that Bartlett’s reaction provided
additional confirmation that the documents were real or that it had given them comfort. In the
Panel’s view, this reaction seriously misplaced responsibility for making sure that the documents
were authentic.
4. Script Revisions
The Panel has identified, reviewed and compared a number of versions of the script of the
September 8 Segment that were prepared between Tuesday night and Wednesday evening and
circulated to some or all of those involved in the vetting. The script was finalized at about 5 p.m.
on Wednesday. Various versions of the script were reviewed by Howard, Murphy, Kartiganer,
Sternberg, Altabef, West and Heyward.
As might be expected with any show, there were many stylistic and other non-substantive
changes made between drafts. Without recounting all such changes from draft to draft, the Panel
observes the following significant omissions, additions, revisions and deletions:
· Due to fairness concerns raised by Heyward and West, the sound bites from Colonel Hackworth’s interview were taken out of the final script in mid-afternoon.
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· An early version of the script contained a reference to Major General Hodges and stated that he “confirmed to us that these memos were consistent with the way Killian felt about Bush’s move to Alabama and failure to take a physical.” This passage was removed from the script sometime later that day. Mapes told the Panel that she was upset that the passage was removed and suggested that Howard had removed it because it was too wordy. Howard told the Panel, however, that Mapes had requested to take out the reference to Major General Hodges because he had talked to her off the record.
· In a draft circulated at 4:43 p.m. by Murphy, an additional excerpt from the Bartlett interview was added regarding Kerry-supporter Barnes’ alleged motivation in speaking out during an election year.70
· The unsigned August 18, 1973 “Memo to File/ Subject: CYA” was featured prominently in the scripts and in the final version despite the fact that it was reviewed by only one expert, Marcel Matley, who informed Mapes and Miller that he could not authenticate it because it contained no signature.
· The draft scripts never included an excerpt from Matley’s interview but merely a place marker to insert a sound bite from his interview “if necessary.”
· Ultimately, the following language was added to a draft that was circulated at 4:53 p.m. on Wednesday: “[CBS] consulted a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the material is authentic.” The Panel believes that this representation does not accurately represent Matley’s conclusions, as reflected in his interview and in his conversations with Mapes and Miller, as discussed in greater detail below in Section I.2 of this Chapter.
· None of the scripts contained sound bites or narrative indicating the presence of contrary views or conflicting evidence, as discussed previously in “Deficiencies in the Vetting Process,” which were known to Mapes and/or her team at the time that the September 8 Segment aired.
5. First Screening
Around 2 or 3 p.m., the initial screening of the September 8 Segment was held in two
parts in the edit rooms. This was unusual because segments normally are viewed in their entirety
and in one screening room. Howard, Murphy, Kartiganer, West, Mapes, Sternberg and Altabef
attended the screening. Surprisingly, Rather did not attend any of the pre-air screenings. The
comments at the screening were focused on form rather than substance. No one who attended
the screening recalled any question of the authentication of the documents or raised any other
questions or concerns about the Segment at that time. It appears that by then, the vetters had
moved beyond these issues.
70 Murphy had been asked by West to review the transcript and sound bites from Bartlett’s interview to ensure that
Bartlett’s statements were fairly represented.
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6. Decision to Air the Show
In the late afternoon, at Betsy West’s direction, a backup show was put together just in
case the TexANG story was not ready to go by the deadline that evening. 60 Minutes
Wednesday management attempted to keep its options open until the latest possible moment in
the event that it could not get enough comfort with the TexANG story to let it go to air.
Sometime that afternoon, although it is not clear exactly when due to the differing recollections
of those involved, the decision was made by West, Howard and Murphy to go with the entire
Segment, including both the Killian documents and the Barnes interview
7. CBS Evening News Promotional Piece: Late Afternoon
A report also was recorded on Wednesday for the CBS Evening News to promote the
60 Minutes Wednesday show. Initially the script for the piece was only about the Barnes
interview, but it was later changed to include references to the documents. Murphy, Executive
Producer of the CBS Evening News, told the Panel that he was assured by Mapes, Rather and
Howard that the vetting and sources were solid.71
8. Final Screening
The final screening took place at 7 p.m. Heyward, West, Howard and Murphy were
present, but Rather and Mapes were not. Heyward’s presence at the screening and involvement
in reviewing the script were notable because it is extremely rare for him to attend a screening, let
alone be involved in the editing process for any story. Heyward told the Panel that he previewed
the Segment because it was a “politically sensitive piece.” No concerns were expressed at the 7
p.m. meeting and everyone agreed that the Segment was ready to go.
The Panel feels that Rather’s absence from the screening and vetting, and his regrettably
limited participation in the Segment’s production, deprived it of valuable perspective. This
detachment may have been due in large part to his considerable other work, the speed with which
this Segment was put together and his reliance on Mapes, for whom he expressed to the Panel the
highest professional regard.
71 The script of the CBS Evening News for Wednesday, September 8, is Exhibit 1A to this Report.
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I. The September 8 Segment Contained Inaccurate and Misleading Statements
A transcript of the Segment is attached as Exhibit 1B. As discussed previously, the Panel
has identified many deficiencies in the reporting, production and vetting of the September 8
Segment. The Panel also concludes, as set forth below, that portions of the Segment were
neither fair nor accurate given the facts that were known or should have been known to Mapes,
her team, and/or others at 60 Minutes Wednesday at the time the Segment was aired.
1. The Document Authentication Statement Lacked Support
Approximately one-third of the way through the September 8 Segment, Rather introduced
the audience to the first of the Killian documents, the May 19, 1972 file memorandum, and made
reference to other documents. Rather said, “60 Minutes has now obtained a number of
documents we are told were taken from Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s personal files . . . . We
consulted a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the material is authentic.”
(emphasis added). This statement was without factual support.
The Panel in its interviews was advised that the “handwriting analyst and document
expert” referred to in the Segment was Matley, the expert interviewed by Rather on Monday,
September 6. It is without question, however, that Matley did not authenticate any of the
documents. Indeed, he authenticated with qualifications only the signature on the May 4, 1972
memorandum.
It was suggested by some people who were interviewed by the Panel that the
authentication sentence was proper because Matley had informed Mapes and Miller that he had
not discerned any factors that would rule out the possibility that the Killian documents were what
they purported to be. In the Panel’s view the script goes well beyond what Matley said. For
60 Minutes Wednesday to say that Matley believed the “material” was authentic was to suggest
that Matley had authenticated all four of the documents used on the Segment. The Panel believes that this was not fair and accurate reporting.
2. The Lieutenant Strong Interview Excerpts Conveyed Inaccurate
The Panel is similarly concerned about the Lieutenant Strong excerpts used in the
September 8 Segment. As discussed previously, the Lieutenant Strong interview revealed the
following: Lieutenant Strong had left the TexANG in March 1972, which was before the date of
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the earliest Killian document used in the Segment (May 4, 1972); Lieutenant Strong knew
Lieutenant Colonel Killian but worked in the TexANG headquarters in Austin, approximately
180 miles away from Ellington AFB, where Lieutenant Colonel Killian was located; Lieutenant
Strong had no personal knowledge about any preferential treatment given to Lieutenant Bush;
Lieutenant Strong had no knowledge of the Killian documents; and, while Lieutenant Strong
believed that he had witnessed preferential treatment in terms of well-to-do and connected men
being admitted into the TexANG, he identified no preferential treatment of the type suggested in
the Killian documents, e.g., the ability to defy a direct order to take a physical examination or to
have his records “sugar coat[ed].”
Against the foregoing facts, the Panel has considered the use of the Lieutenant Strong
interview excerpts in the September 8 Segment. The first mention of Lieutenant Strong in the
Segment is the introduction: “Robert Strong was a friend and colleague of Colonel Jerry Killian.
Strong ran the Texas Air National Guard administrative office during the Vietnam era. He’s now
a college professor.” While Lieutenant Strong considered Lieutenant Colonel Killian to be a
friend, as he told both 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel and the Panel, there was no disclosure
here or anywhere else in the Segment that Lieutenant Strong did not work in the same location as
Lieutenant Colonel Killian or that Lieutenant Strong had left the TexANG more than two months
before the May 4, 1972 memorandum is alleged to have been prepared. To provide proper
context, and to allow the audience better to consider the weight to give to Lieutenant Strong’s
statements, there should have been such disclosures.
The second Lieutenant Strong excerpt that troubles the Panel immediately follows the first and is a sound bite taken directly from Lieutenant Strong’s interview with Rather on Sunday, September 5:
Rather: When you read through these documents is there any doubt in your mind that these are genuine?
Strong: Well, they are compatible with the way that business was done at that time, they are compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being, I don’t see anything in the documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the situations, and what were the people that were involved.
While this excerpt accurately reflects Lieutenant Strong’s response to the question, the Panel
finds it misleading to have included it in the Segment as there was no disclaimer that Lieutenant
Strong had no personal knowledge about the documents or their content. Lieutenant Strong told
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the Panel that he had not seen the documents until 20 minutes before the interview and had no
personal knowledge of the content of the documents, but was told to assume that the content was
accurate.
The third troubling excerpt consists of a narration by Rather and a sound bite from
Lieutenant Strong’s interview in which Lieutenant Strong is commenting generally regarding the
documents:
Narration by Rather: This memo is from August 18, 1973. Colonel Killian titled it “CYA.” In it, Colonel Killian says General Buck Staudt, the man in charge of the Texas Air National Guard, is putting on pressure to “sugar coat” an evaluation of Lieutenant Bush. Staudt, a longtime friend and supporter of the Bush family, would not do an interview for this broadcast. The memo goes on with Killian saying “I’m having trouble running interference and doing my job.”
Strong Sound Bite: He was trying to deal with a volatile political situation, dealing with the son of an ambassador and a former congressman. He was trying to deal with at least one superior officer, General Staudt, who is closely connected to the Houston political establishment. And I just saw him in an impossible situation. I felt very, very sorry because he was between a rock and a hard place. (emphasis added).
This Lieutenant Strong sound bite, particularly the quote, “I just saw him in an
impossible situation . . .,” suggests that Lieutenant Strong had personal knowledge about the
particulars of Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s alleged difficulties with Lieutenant Bush, which
clearly he did not. Moreover, the question assumes that General Staudt was actually in charge of
the Texas Air National Guard on August 18, 1973. That was not true, as General Staudt had left
the TexANG approximately eighteen months before.
A final Lieutenant Strong excerpt used in the Segment is also troubling:
Narration by Rather: Robert Strong says he saw many well-connected young men pull strings and avoid service in Vietnam. Rather: Why would these men do this? Didn’t conscience come into play somewhere here?
Strong: What you saw here is the way power works. Power begets power. Power goes to power to get more power. And if you have a little bit of power and someone offers you an opportunity to gain more power by doing power a favor, this is what power does. It trades on itself. It feeds on itself. This is the way the system worked. This is the way state government worked, this is the way the Guard worked.
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The clear inference from this excerpt is that President Bush was in the TexANG to avoid
service in Vietnam. Bush did state in his 1968 TexANG application that he did not volunteer to
go overseas. However, Mapes had information prior to the airing of the September 8 Segment
that President Bush, while in the TexANG, did volunteer for service in Vietnam but was turned
down in favor of more experienced pilots.72 For example, a flight instructor who served in the
TexANG with Lieutenant Bush advised Mapes in 1999 that Lieutenant Bush “did want to go to
Vietnam but others went first.” Similarly, several others advised Mapes in 1999, and again in
2004 before September 8, that Lieutenant Bush had volunteered to go to Vietnam but did not
have enough flight hours to qualify. The Panel is troubled that this excerpt was used when there
was information that contradicted, or at least weakened, the implication of the exchange between
Rather and Lieutenant Strong.
The Panel finds that virtually every excerpt used from the Lieutenant Strong interview
was either inaccurate or misleading. Indeed, the Panel questions whether any Lieutenant Strong
excerpts should have been used at all, given his total lack of personal knowledge.
3. The Ben Barnes Interview Excerpts Were Misleading
As discussed previously, at the time that President Bush was admitted into the TexANG
in 1968, Barnes was Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives and a powerful figure in
Texas. In the excerpts of Barnes’ interview that were included in the Segment, Barnes stated that
he had made a call to General Rose to recommend Bush for a position in the TexANG. Then, in
additional excerpts, Barnes stated that this was preferential treatment and that he was sorry about
having done it. The clear impression created by the Barnes excerpts was that there was no
question but that President Bush received Barnes’ help to get into the TexANG and that this
constituted preferential treatment. The Panel has several concerns.
First, while the Panel acknowledges that Barnes believes his call probably assisted
President Bush in getting into the TexANG, there was no proof that it did. In fact, Barnes
admitted in his interview with Rather that he did not know whether his call to General Rose had
any effect on President Bush’s admission to the TexANG and that sometimes a call to General
Rose did not work. This portion of his interview, however, was not included in the September 8
Segment. Moreover, as discussed previously, General Staudt, Major General Hodges and other
72 In the late 1960s, the U.S. government had the so-called Palace Alert program, by which Air National Guard
pilots could volunteer for 90-day tours of active duty in Vietnam and other locations.
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ex-Guardsmen told Mapes in 1999 that “no influence” was used and that no strings were pulled,
as reflected in Mapes’ contemporaneous notes.73
The Panel would have expected this contrary information that General Staudt and other
Guardsmen had told Mapes that President Bush did not receive preferential treatment to get into
the TexANG to have been disclosed to those doing the vetting and that there would have been
discussion about the possible need to disclose in the script that others disagreed with the views
expressed by Barnes about how President Bush got into the TexANG. There was no such disclosure and, accordingly, no such discussion.
Second, the Panel is also concerned about the airing of the Barnes statement that “[t]here
were hundreds of names on the list of people wanting to get into the Air National Guard and the
Army National Guard.” The fact is that there is sharply conflicting information about whether a
waiting list existed at all as of spring 1968 for entrance into the TexANG, particularly for fighter
pilots. As discussed previously in Section A of this Chapter, Mapes expressed in a 1999 e-mail
to her Senior Broadcast and Executive Producers that “this squad did not have a waiting list” in
1968 and that the “Colonel who ran it appeared to keep about 20 places open at all times.”74
In addition, a distinction must be made between vacancies in the Guard generally and
vacancies for pilot positions. When Rather interviewed author Bill Minutaglio in 1999,
Minutaglio advised Rather that, while the Group did, in fact, have a waiting list of about 150,
there were 3-5 open pilot slots at that time. Further, as discussed previously, Major General
Hodges had also advised Mapes in 1999 that the Group had no waiting list, particularly for
volunteers who wanted to be fighter pilots. In fact, Mapes’ 1999 notes reflect that he told her
that they “were hurting for pilots.”75
Mapes advised the Panel that she had sought in her reporting to attempt to determine for
certain whether there was in fact a waiting list for the TexANG in Spring 1968 but was never
successful. In these circumstances, where Mapes had been unable to confirm the existence of a
waiting list, the Panel must question the failure of the September 8 Segment to address this issue.
It does not appear that Mapes brought to management’s attention the fact that she had received
73 In a brief interview with counsel to the Panel, General Staudt stated that no one had called him to ask that
President Bush be admitted to the TexANG.
74 General Staudt also told counsel to the Panel that the Group had no waiting list and needed pilots as of spring
1968.
75 General Hodges confirmed for the Panel that in the early 1960s, the Group had had a waiting list but that it had
disappeared by 1968.
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conflicting information about the waiting list issue. This was contrary to the requirement that a
producer make sure that management is apprised of all potentially relevant information.
In sum, the Panel finds that the inaccuracies and misleading statements and sound bites
contained in the final Segment that aired on September 8 resulted from failures at every level.
They also reflect the deficiencies in both the reporting and the vetting process and the failure of
Mapes and others at 60 Minutes Wednesday to probe deeply enough into the factual accuracy of
the story.
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Prior to airing the Segment, Mapes told her 60 Minutes Wednesday colleagues that the
Killian documents fit well, or “meshed,” with the official Bush records, an important assertion in
evaluating the documents provided by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Thus, several people in the
vetting group recalled that Mapes persuasively argued that the Killian documents were consistent
with the publicly available records, although it does not appear that the vetters asked for or were
provided with a detailed analysis of this comparison.
In her presentations to the Panel, Mapes relied heavily on the meshing concept to support
her continuing belief in the authenticity of the Killian documents. Thus, at her initial interview
in October, Mapes submitted a chronology of the Killian documents intermixed with documents
from the official Bush records, and explained to the Panel why she believed they meshed.
Subsequently, on November 12, Mapes, through her counsel, submitted a 14-page letter to the
Panel on the subject.
Mapes was interviewed a second time in December. In this second interview, the Panel
indicated to Mapes and her counsel through its questions possible inconsistencies that might
cause the Panel to question the meshing analysis. Thereafter, on December 23, 2004, the Panel
received a further submission from counsel for Mapes, setting forth arguments why the questions
raised by the Panel did not refute the meshing analysis.
The Panel addresses the meshing claim these issues in this Chapter. The Panel observes
at the outset, however, that what was at first asserted by Mapes prior to the broadcast of the
Segment to be a good meshing without any apparent qualification has now been transformed into
an argument that there is nothing in the official Bush records that would rule out the authenticity
of the Killian documents. This is similar to statements made by Matley, one of the document
examiners, before the airing of the Segment that he could not see anything in the Killian
documents that would rule out the possibility that they were authentic. While such an argument
may have legitimacy in an advocacy proceeding, the Panel does not find it to be a sufficient
standard for journalism, which should not stand on a “nothing to rule it out” foundation.
With the foregoing in mind, the Panel has considered the meshing concept in two ways:
content and format.
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First, the Panel sought to determine if there is, in fact, a reasonable meshing of the data in
the official Bush records with the information and assertions in the Killian documents. To
inform itself on the subject, the Panel not only interviewed Mapes and reviewed the official Bush
records, but it also interviewed a number of former Guardsmen, who served at Ellington AFB
with Lieutenant Colonel Killian and Lieutenant Bush and who were or could have been
contacted by 60 Minutes Wednesday before the Segment was aired. These included Major
General Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commanding officer, Colonel Rufus Martin, the
Group’s Personnel Staff Officer, and Lieutenant Colonel Doug Via, Operations Officer for the
111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. In every instance, the Panel made sure that the Guardsmen
had available both the Killian documents and many of the official Bush Records to review.
The Panel concludes that while certain of the Killian documents mesh well with the
official Bush records in terms of content, there are several significant inconsistencies that
undercut the meshing notion. At a minimum, the inconsistencies should have prevented an
unqualified assertion as of September 8 that the Killian documents fit precisely into the pattern
of the official Bush records.
Second, the Panel has examined whether the Killian documents fit with the official Bush
records in terms of format, jargon and language. The Panel concludes that there are significant
differences in these areas between the Killian documents and the official Bush records. The
Panel recognizes that the Killian documents were supposed to have come from Lieutenant
Colonel Killian’s personal files, which might suggest he would not have felt compelled to utilize
customary military formalities. However, immediately after the Segment aired, Mapes
represented that the Killian documents “are absolutely in accordance with reasonable military
formats and memo formats used at the time.” In any event, the differences between the official
Bush records and the Killian documents are sufficiently great that this “personal files” explanation does not resolve all the discrepancies and the Panel is left without a basis to conclude that the format, jargon and language support the authenticity of the documents.
The Panel reaches no definitive conclusion as to whether the Killian documents are
authentic. Given that the Killian documents are copies and not originals, that the author is
deceased, that the Panel has not found any individual who knew about them when they were
created, and that there is no clear chain of custody, it may never be possible for anyone to
authenticate or discredit the documents. However, based on a comparison to the official Bush
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records and the other data referred to in this Chapter, the Panel finds many reasons to question
the documents’ authenticity. At a minimum, if the official Bush records had been compared
carefully to the Killian documents prior to airing the September 8 Segment, there would likely
have been, in the Panel’s view, enough issues raised to prevent a rush to air within days of
obtaining them.
A. Comparing the Content of the Killian Documents and the Official Bush
The Panel has compared the content of the purported six Killian documents with the
official Bush records to determine whether they are factually consistent. To provide a context
for this comparison, the Panel lists chronologically the relevant documents that have been
examined. The Killian documents are identified with an asterisk after the date and are quoted in
full below.76 Copies of the documents from the official Bush records listed below can be found
in Appendix 3 to this Report.
February 2, 1972* Lt Col Killian asks Maj Harris, Lt Bush’s flight supervisor and rating officer, for an update on the flight certifications of Lt Bush and Lt Bath.
Thus, Lt Col Killian wrote:
Update me as soon as possible on flight certifications. Specifically – Bath and Bush.
May 3, 1972 The 90-day window for Lt Bush to take a physical examination begins on this date. Lt Bush must take a physical before July 31, 1972 or he will lose his flight status.77 May 4, 1972* Lt Col Killian orders Lt Bush to report for a physical examination no later than May 14, 1972. He states:
1. You are ordered to report to commander, 111 F.I.S., Ellington AFB, not later than (NLT) 14 May, 1972 to conduct annual physical examination (flight) IAW AFM 35-13.
2. Report to 111th F.I.S. administrative officer for schedule of appointment and additional instructions. Examination will be conducted in duty status.
76 In this portion of this Chapter, the Panel attempts to use the rank of individuals as of the time the documents were
prepared unless the context dictates otherwise. The Panel also attempts to use appropriate military abbreviations.
77 The Panel notes that this entry in the chronology is not a document, but rather is based on data provided by former
Guardsmen.
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May 19, 1972* In a file memorandum, Lt Col Killian discusses a telephone call with Lt
Bush. He states:
1. Phone call from Bush. Discussed options of how Bush can get out of coming to drill from now through November. I told him he could do ET for three months or transfer. Says he wants to transfer to Alabama to any unit he can get in to. Says that he is working on another campaign for his dad.
2. Physical. We talked about him getting his flight physical situation fixed before his date. Says he will do that in Alabama if he stays in a flight status. He has this campaign to do and other things that will follow and may not have the time. I advised him of our investment in him and his commitment. He’s been working with staff to come up with options and identified a unit that may accept him. I told him I had to have written acceptance before he would be transferred, but think he’s also talking to someone upstairs.
May 24, 1972 Lt Bush completes an application for a reserve assignment with the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron in Montgomery, Alabama.
May 26, 1972 Lt Bush’s Officer Efficiency Report for May 1, 1971 – April 30, 1972 is completed by Maj Harris, Lt Col Killian and Col Hodges. The Report, authored by Maj Harris, contains a favorable review and then had one additional comment:
Lt Bush is very active in civic affairs and in the community and manifests a deep interest in the operation of our Government. He has recently accepted the position of campaign manager for a candidate for the United States Senate. He is a good representative of the military and Air National Guard in the business world. His abilities and anticipated future assignments make him a valuable asset.
Lt Col Killian concurs in Maj Harris’ observations, as does Col Hodges. May 26, 1972 Lt Bush’s application for assignment to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron in Montgomery, Alabama is approved by Commander Reese Bricken of the 9921st.
June 2 and 5, 1972 The Personnel Staff Officer of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, Maj
Martin, acting on behalf of its commander, Col Hodges, and Maj Charles Shoemake, acting on behalf of the Adjutant General of Texas, approve the assignment of Lt Bush to the 9921st.
July 31, 1972 Lt Bush is declared ineligible for assignment to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron by the Headquarters Air Reserve Personnel Center in Denver, 137 Colorado, because “an obligated Reservist can be assigned to a specific Ready Reserve position only.”
August 1, 1972* Lt Col Killian verbally orders Lt Bush suspended from flight status. He states:
1. On this date I ordered that 1st Lt. Bush be suspended from flight status due to failure to perform to USAF/TexANG standards and failure to meet annual physical examination (flight) as ordered.
2. I conveyed my verbal orders to commander, 147 th Ftr. Intrcp Gp with request for orders for suspension and convening of a flight review board IAW AFM 35-13.
3. I recommended transfer of this officer to the 9921 st Air Reserve Squadron in May and forwarded his AF Form 1288 to 147 th Ftr Intrcp Gp headquarters. The transfer was not allowed. Officer has made no attempt to meet his training certification or flight physical. Officer expresses desire to transfer out of state including assignment to non-flying billets.
4. On recommendation of Harris, I also suggested that we fill this critical billet with a more seasoned pilot from the list of qualified Vietnam pilots that have rotated. Recommendations were received but not confirmed.
August 3, 1972 Maj Shoemake, acting for the Adjutant General of Texas, requests the 147th
Fighter Interceptor Group to explain what it plans to do in light of the rejection of Lt Bush’s transfer request.
September 5, 1972 Col Hodges executes an Order suspending Lt Bush from flying status, effective August 1, 1972, for failure to accomplish his annual medical examination. Maj Martin, Personnel Staff Officer, then sends the Order to TexANG Headquarters.
September 5, 1972 Lt Bush requests permission from Lt Col Killian to transfer to the 187th
Tac Recon Group in Alabama.
September 6 and 8,
1972 Lt Col Killian and Col Hodges recommend approval for Lt Bush to perform equivalent duty with the 187th Tac Recon Group in Alabama.
September 15, 1972 The Alabama Air National Guard approves Lt Bush for three months of
Equivalent Training with the 187th Tac Recon Group in Alabama. The approval is forwarded to the Adjutant General of Texas on September 19, 1972.
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September 20, 1972 Lt Col Herber, Air Administrative Officer, acting on behalf of the TexANG Adjutant General, recommends approval of the September 5 suspension of Lt Bush from flying status.
September 29, 1972 Verbal orders on August 1, 1972 of the Commander of the 147th Ftr Gp
suspending Lt Bush from flying status are confirmed by the National Guard Bureau. “Reason for suspension: Failure to accomplish annual medical examination.”‘ May 2, 1973 Instead of completing an Officer Efficiency Report for Lt Bush for the period May 1, 1972 – April 30, 1973, Lt Col Harris, Lt Bush’s rating officer, writes: “Lt Bush has not been observed at this unit during the period of report. A civilian occupation made it necessary for him to move to Montgomery, Alabama. He cleared this base on 15 May 1972 and has been performing equivalent training in a non flying status with the 187 Tac Recon Gp, Dannelly ANG Base, Alabama.”
Lt Col Killian concurs with Lt Col Harris’ comments.
June 24, 1973* Lt Col Killian authors a Memorandum to “Sir,” stating as follows:
1. I got a call from your staff concerning the evaluation of 1st Lt.
Bush due this month. His rater is Lt. Colonel Harris.
2. Neither Lt. Colonel Harris or I feel we can rate 1st Lt. Bush since he was not training with 111 F.I.S. since April, 1972. His recent activity is outside the rating period.
3. Advise me how we are supposed to handle this.
June 29, 1973 A U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant issues a notice stating that an Officer Efficiency Report needs to be completed for Lt Bush and states that data “should be requested from the training unit so that this officer can be rated in the position he held.”
August 18, 1973* Lt Col Killian authors a CYA File Memorandum stating as follows:
1. Staudt has obviously pressured Hodges more about Bush. I’m having trouble running interference and doing my job. Harris gave me a message today from Grp regarding Bush’s OETR and Staudt is pushing to sugar coat it: Bush wasn’t here during rating period and I don’t have any feedback from 187th in Alabama. I will not rate. Austin is not happy today either.
2. Harris took the call from Grp today. I’ll backdate but won’t
rate. Harris agrees.”
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September 5, 1973 Lt Bush requests discharge from the TexANG and reassignment to ARPC
(NARS) effective October 1, 1973 to attend Harvard Business School. Lt Col Killian recommends approval on September 6, 1973. September 18, 1973 Col Hodges recommends approval of Lt Bush’s discharge request, effective October 1, 1973.
October 16, 1973 Lt Bush is honorably discharged, effective October 1, 1973.
November 12, 1973 Instead of an Officer Efficiency Report for Lt Bush for the missing period,
Maj Martin, Personnel Staff Officer, states: “Not rated for the period 1 May 1972 through 30 April 1973. Report for this period not available for administrative reasons.”
The Panel offers the following observations about the meshing claim.
1. February 2, 1972 Memorandum
In this memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Killian asks then-Major Harris for an update on
Lieutenant Bush’s flight status. The Panel cannot conclude that this memorandum meshes with
the official Bush records, which reflect no such requests for flight certification records pertaining
to Lieutenant Bush at or around this date.
Mapes suggested that the Panel rely on a September 10, 2004 analysis by The Associated
Press of Lieutenant Bush’s flight logs, which reported that Lieutenant Bush flew in T-33 trainers
nine times in February and March, 1972, rather than in F-102s.78 The article also stated that
Lieutenant Bush required more passes than usual to land his jet on March 12 and April 10, 1972.
Mapes suggested that this information indicated that Lieutenant Bush was having difficulty
flying, which, in turn, might explain why Lieutenant Colonel Killian would have sought flight
certification data from Major Harris.
The Panel cannot accept this explanation. First, these instances cited in The Associated
Press article all occurred after the date that the February 2, 1972 memorandum allegedly was
authored. Second, the Guardsmen with whom the Panel spoke on this issue, Colonel Martin and
Lieutenant Colonel Via, who were at Ellington AFB during the relevant period, stated that they
observed no problems with Lieutenant Bush’s flying ability. Finally, then-Lieutenant Bush
received a highly complimentary Officer Efficiency Report for the period May 1, 1971 through
April 30, 1972. Indeed, on a rating scale from 1 (serious problems) to 5 (exceptional),
78 Matt Kelley, Bush Piloted National Guard Trainers, AP, Sept. 10, 2004.
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Lieutenant Bush received three 4’s and six 5’s. See Appendix 3. Thus, the Panel is not aware of
any satisfactory explanation for why Lieutenant Colonel Killian would have sought flight certification data for Lieutenant Bush on February 2, 1972.
2. May 4, 1972 Memorandum
The Panel next addresses the May 4, 1972 memorandum by which Lieutenant Colonel
Killian allegedly ordered Lieutenant Bush to take a flying physical by May 14, 1972. The Panel
finds that this document also does not mesh well with the official Bush records.
The Panel has not found in the official Bush records any document that references such
an order. Further, the Panel has spoken to a number of former Guardsmen, including Major
General Hodges,79 Colonel Martin, and Lieutenant Colonel Via, all of whom served with
Lieutenant Colonel Killian at Ellington AFB, and none of them recall ever seeing or hearing of
an order commanding anyone to take a physical, much less Lieutenant Bush. In addition, the
Panel has learned that there was a 90-day window during which a pilot could take his flying
physical. That window ended on the last day of a pilot’s birth month, which would have been
July 31, 1972 for Lieutenant Bush. That means that the earliest that Lieutenant Bush could have
sought a timely physical would have been May 2, 1972.
These Guardsmen explained that taking a flying physical was automatic, like renewing a
driver’s license. The Panel was told that the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group routinely posted, on
a monthly basis, a form notice listing those pilots who were entering their 90-day window for
taking a physical.
The Panel asked these former Guardsmen whether they could imagine any pilot being
ordered to take a physical on such short notice, as was supposedly ordered by Lieutenant Colonel
Killian on May 4, 1972. The only circumstance cited was that a pilot might be ordered to do so
if he were having serious problems, which, with respect to Lieutenant Bush, were not apparent to
Major General Hodges, Colonel Martin or the other former Guardsmen spoken to by the Panel.
Further, the Lieutenant Bush Officer Efficiency Report, dated May 26, 1972 and covering the
period that ended April 30, 1972, provides no hint of any such difficulties. Instead, it is extremely complimentary. Major Harris, in rating Lieutenant Bush, stated:
79 In Mapes’ counsel’s December 23 letter, it is stated that Major General Hodges “recall[ed] a written order from
Lieutenant Colonel Killian to then-Lieutenant Bush directing that a physical be taken.” Major General Hodges
denied to the Panel ever telling that to Mapes and Mapes’ notes of her September 6 conversation with Major General
Hodges provide no corroboration of that assertion.
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Lt Bush is an exceptional fighter interceptor pilot and officer. He eagerly participates in scheduled unit activities. During the past year he participated in several target force deployments and an F-102 aircraft element deployment to Canada. His conduct and professional approach to this mission were certainly exemplary and apparent to observers. His skills as an interceptor pilot enabled him to complete all his ADC intercept missions during the Canadian deployment with ease. STRENGTHS: Lt Bush’s major strength is his ability to work with others. He makes a welcome addition to any group or team effort. SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENTS: Lt Bush should be retained in his present assignment. He has gained valuable experience in the operations area and would be a welcome addition to any fighter squadron. SELF IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: Lt Bush is presently enrolled in the Squadron Officer’s School by correspondence and progressing satisfactorily. He also participates in unit ground schools and briefings to stay abreast of the F-102 weapons employment and the ADC mission. OTHER COMMENTS:
Lt Bush is very active in civic affairs in the community and manifests a deep interest in the operation of our Government. He has recently accepted the position as campaign manager for a candidate for United States Senate. He is a good representative of the military and Air National Guard in the business world. His abilities and anticipated future assignments make him a valuable asset. He is a member of the National Guard Association of the United States and Texas.
Lieutenant Colonel Killian then stated on the same Officer Efficiency Report: “I concur with the comments and ratings of the reporting official.” Finally, Major General Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commander, stated:
I concur with the ratings of the reporting and indorsing officials. Lieutenant Bush is an exceptionally fine young pilot and officer and is a credit to this unit. I have personally observed his participation, and without exception, his performance has been noteworthy.
3. May 19, 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Killian Memo to File
With regard to the May 19, 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Killian Memo to File, the Panel
concludes this document about an alleged phone call with Lieutenant Bush meshes well with the
official Bush records in some respects. In the first