Posted on 01/10/2005 7:32:00 AM PST by Thanatos
JANUARY 5, 2005
Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 778-9000
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I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................4
A. 60 Minutes Wednesday Background..............................................................................6
B. The Pursuit of a Story on President Bush’s TexANG Service ......................................7
C. Obtaining Documents ....................................................................................................8
D. The Production of the September 8 Segment ................................................................8
1. Efforts To Authenticate Documents ........................................................................9
2. Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents....................................................11
3. Barnes Interview ....................................................................................................12
4. White House Reaction ...........................................................................................13
E. The Vetting Process .....................................................................................................13
F. Authenticity of the Killian Documents ........................................................................18
G. The Aftermath..............................................................................................................19
1. The Initial Response ..............................................................................................20
2. The ABC News Report ..........................................................................................23
3. The Statements of Marian Carr Knox....................................................................24
4. The Change in Source............................................................................................25
5. The Apology ..........................................................................................................25
6. The Contact With the Kerry Campaign .................................................................26
H. Political Agenda...........................................................................................................28
I. Recommendations........................................................................................................28
III. PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION.................................................................................31
IV. BACKGROUND..............................................................................................................34
A. 60 Minutes – The Sunday Show ..................................................................................34
B. 60 Minutes Wednesday ................................................................................................34
V. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY..................36
A. Introduction..................................................................................................................36
B. Description of the Organization...................................................................................36
1. Correspondents, Producers and Associate Producers ............................................36
2. Executive Producer and The Senior Broadcast Producer ......................................38
3. Additional Layers of Review .................................................................................38
4. CBS’ Communications Group ...............................................................................39
C. The Unique Characteristics of the Production Process for the September 8
Segment........................................................................................................................39
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NATIONAL GUARD AND DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION..............................41
A. CBS News Standards ...................................................................................................41
B. Texas Air National Guard Background .......................................................................41
C. Background on Document Authentication...................................................................42
VII. THE PRODUCTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 REPORT ........................................44
A. The Initial Pursuit of the Story in 1999 .......................................................................45
B. The Continuing Investigation in 2000 .........................................................................49
C. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s National Media Appearances in February 2004...........51
1. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Allegations .............................................................52
2. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Retractions..............................................................53
3. Additional Questions Raised Regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s
Allegations .............................................................................................................53
4. Doubts at CBS News .............................................................................................55
5. Mapes’ Awareness of the Lieutenant Colonel Burkett News Coverage................56
D. The Continued Pursuit of a TexANG Story in the Summer of 2004...........................56
1. Following the Leads...............................................................................................57
2. Mounting Pressure To Get a Story.........................................................................58
E. The Potential for Documents Between Monday, August 23, 2004 – Thursday,
September 1, 2004 .......................................................................................................59
1. Courting Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.....................................................................59
2. Background Research on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett...........................................62
3. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
Regarding the Shifting Focus of the Story and Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s Requests .................................................................................................63
4. Mapes’ Initial Contact with the Kerry Campaign..................................................64
5. The Involvement of Dan Rather ............................................................................66
6. Ben Barnes’ Speech at a Kerry Campaign Rally ...................................................66
7. Other News Media Coverage of TexANG Issues Between August 23,
2004 and September 1, 2004..................................................................................67
F. Thursday, September 2, 2004 – Monday September 6, 2004......................................68
1. Thursday, September 2: The First Two Documents Were Obtained.....................68
a. Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett .............................................................68
b. Preliminary Review of the Documents ..................................................................70
c. Contact with Rather ...............................................................................................71
2. Friday, September 3, 2004: Additional Reporting and The Search for
Document Examiners.............................................................................................72
a. Additional Reporting .............................................................................................72
b. Retention of the Document Examiners ..................................................................73
(i) Qualifications of the Handwriting and Document Examiners.........................76
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(ii) The Panel’s Findings Regarding the Examiner Selection Process ..................77
c. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Lawyer ...............................77
d. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
Regarding Additional Burkett Demands................................................................79
3. Saturday, September 4, 2004: The Authentication Process Continued and
Other Issues............................................................................................................80
a. Contacts with the Document Examiners................................................................80
b. Other Background Reporting.................................................................................80
c. Rather’s Involvement.............................................................................................81
d. Mapes’ Communications with Murphy .................................................................82
4. Sunday, September 5, 2004: Document Authentication Issues,
Interviewing and Contact with Lockhart ...............................................................82
a. Additional Documents from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett......................................82
b. Further Attempts To Confirm the Killian Documents’ Content............................83
c. Concerns and Issues First Raised by the Document Examiners ............................84
(i) Emily Will........................................................................................................84
(ii) Linda James .....................................................................................................85
(iii)James Pierce.....................................................................................................85
(iv) Marcel Matley..................................................................................................86
d. Lieutenant Strong Interview ..................................................................................86
e. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett Regarding the Source and
Efforts To Find Chief Warrant Officer Conn ........................................................89
f. Mapes’ Contact with Joe Lockhart ........................................................................91
g. Return to New York and Discussion About the Documents .................................93
5. Press Coverage of TexANG Issues and the Timing of the September 8
Segment..................................................................................................................93
6. Monday, September 6, 2004: The Matley Interview and the Call with
Major General Hodges...........................................................................................95
a. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett ...............................................95
b. Colonel Hackworth Interview................................................................................96
c. Discussions Regarding When To Contact the White House .................................97
d. Matley Interview....................................................................................................98
(i) Meetings with Matley Prior to the Interview...................................................98
(ii) The Matley Interview.......................................................................................99
e. Telephone Call with Major General Hodges .......................................................101
f. Communications with Senior Management.........................................................104
G. Tuesday, September 7, 2004: Additional Interviews and the Vetting Process
Begins ........................................................................................................................104
1. Additional Attempts To Locate People Who Might Know About the
Documents ...........................................................................................................105
2. Contact with the Document Examiners and Their Concerns About the
Documents ...........................................................................................................106
a. Emily Will............................................................................................................106
b. Linda James .........................................................................................................108
c. Marcel Matley......................................................................................................108
d. James Pierce.........................................................................................................109
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e. Colonel Charles....................................................................................................109
f. Search for Other Document Examiners ...............................................................109
g. Miller’s Concerns................................................................................................110
h. Alerting Management ..........................................................................................110
3. Vetting Sessions...................................................................................................111
a. The Questions Mapes Was Asked .......................................................................112
b. Representations Made About the Source.............................................................112
c. Representations Made About the Document Examiners and the
Documents ...........................................................................................................113
d. Kartiganer’s Review of the Transcripts ...............................................................114
4. Ben Barnes Interview...........................................................................................115
5. The Promotion of the September 8 Segment .......................................................116
6. Notifying the White House ..................................................................................116
7. Two New Articles on Missing Records...............................................................117
H. Wednesday, September 8, 2004: Completing the Vetting Process and Airing
the Segment................................................................................................................118
1. Bartlett Interview .................................................................................................118
2. Vetting Meeting ...................................................................................................120
a. Discussion of the Documents...............................................................................120
b. The Source ...........................................................................................................121
c. Colonel Hackworth ..............................................................................................122
d. The Document Examiners....................................................................................122
e. Deficiencies in the Vetting Process .....................................................................123
3. Response at 60 Minutes Wednesday to the White House Interview....................124
4. Script Revisions ...................................................................................................124
5. First Screening .....................................................................................................125
6. Decision to Air the Show.....................................................................................126
7. CBS Evening News Promotional Piece: Late Afternoon......................................126
8. Final Screening ....................................................................................................126
I. The September 8 Segment Contained Inaccurate and Misleading Statements..........127
1. The Document Authentication Statement Lacked Support .................................127
2. The Lieutenant Strong Interview Excerpts Conveyed Inaccurate
Information ..........................................................................................................127
3. The Ben Barnes Interview Excerpts Were Misleading........................................130
VIII. WHETHER THE CONTENT AND FORMAT OF THE KILLIAN
DOCUMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OFFICIAL BUSH
RECORDS......................................................................................................................133
A. Comparing the Content of the Killian Documents and the Official Bush
Records ......................................................................................................................135
1. February 2, 1972 Memorandum ..........................................................................139
2. May 4, 1972 Memorandum .................................................................................140
3. May 19, 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Killian Memo to File.....................................141
4. August 1, 1972 Memorandum .............................................................................142
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5. June 24 and August 18, 1973 Memoranda...........................................................144
B. The Language and Format of the Killian Documents Do Not Match Those of
the Official Bush Records..........................................................................................145
1. Location of the Signature Block ..........................................................................146
2. Format of the Killian Signature Block.................................................................146
3. Abbreviation of “Texas Air National Guard”......................................................147
4. Abbreviation of “Fighter Interceptor Squadron” .................................................148
5. Abbreviation of “Group” .....................................................................................148
6. Abbreviation of “Officer Efficiency Report” ......................................................148
7. Abbreviation of “Lieutenant” ..............................................................................148
8. Proper Term for Evaluation Board ......................................................................149
9. Memorandum Addressed to “Sir”........................................................................149
10. The Superscript “th” ............................................................................................149
C. Concluding Observations on Meshing of Content and Language .............................150
IX. THE AFTERMATH......................................................................................................151
A. General Observations.................................................................................................151
B. September 8-9 – The Initial Attacks ..........................................................................153
C. CBS News Strategy, September 10-13, 2004 ............................................................159
1. Andrew Heyward’s September 10 Directive .......................................................159
2. CBS News’ Public Defense of the September 8 Segment...................................162
a. Development of the Strategy: The September 10 Conference Call....................162
b. The September 10 Press Statement......................................................................164
c. Failure to Have Experts to Defend the Documents and the September 10,
2004 CBS Evening News Broadcast.....................................................................166
d. 60 Minutes Wednesday Failed to Reassess Its Reporting ....................................173
(i) The Hunt for New Examiners........................................................................174
(ii) Conversations with Peter Tytell.....................................................................174
(iii)Major General Hodges...................................................................................175
(iv) Failure to Reassess CBS News’ Reporting....................................................178
e. September 11, 2004 .............................................................................................178
f. The Continued Defense: September 12-13 .........................................................182
D. The Beginning of Changes in CBS News Strategy: September 14-15......................187
1. The Initial Strategy on September 14 was Unchanged........................................187
2. Disclosure that Two 60 Minutes Wednesday Document Examiners Had
Concerns About the Killian Documents ..............................................................192
3. Knox’s Revelations..............................................................................................194
E. 60 Minutes Wednesday Develops a New Strategy Beginning September 15............199
1. September 15 and 16............................................................................................199
2. The First Indication of Contact with the Kerry Campaign and the On-
Camera Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett: September 17-18 .................201
3. Events Leading to the September 20 Apology ....................................................202
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4. The Lockhart Disclosures ....................................................................................208
A. Information that Might Suggest a Political Agenda ..................................................212
1. Rather and Mapes’ Long Pursuit of the TexANG Story......................................212
2. The Anti-Bush Sources........................................................................................212
3. Proposed Use of Colonel Hackworth...................................................................213
4. Kerry Campaign Connections..............................................................................214
B. Factors that Support a Conclusion that a Political Agenda Did Not Motivate
the September 8 Segment...........................................................................................214
1. The Previous Work of Rather and Mapes............................................................214
2. The Editing Process Added Balance....................................................................215
3. Assuming the Killian Documents Were Authentic, They Added New Data
to the Bush TexANG Record...............................................................................216
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................................217
XII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................221
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Exhibits 1A-1L Transcripts of 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News
Broadcasts Regarding the September 8 Segment
1A CBS Evening News, September 8
1B 60 Minutes Wednesday, September 8
1C CBS Evening News, September 9
1D CBS Evening News, September 10
1E CBS Weekend News, September 11
1F CBS Evening News, September 13
1G CBS Evening News, September 14
1H CBS Evening News, September 15
1I 60 Minutes Wednesday, September 15
1J CBS Evening News, September 20
1K CBS Evening News, September 21
1L CBS Evening News, September 22
Exhibits 2A-2F Documents Received from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2
and 5, 2004
2A February 2, 1972 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to
Major Harris
2B May 4, 1972 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to
Lieutenant Bush
2C May 19, 1972 Memo to File by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
2D August 1, 1972 Memorandum for Record by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
2E June 24, 1973 Memorandum to “Sir” by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
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2F August 18, 1973 Memo to File by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
Exhibits 3A-3L CBS News Media Statements Regarding the September 8 Segment
3A September 7 CBS News Promotion of Ben Barnes Interview
3B September 8 CBS News Promotion of Ben Barnes Interview
3C September 9 CBS News Statement
3D September 10 CBS News Statement
3E September 10 CBS News Media Alert
3F September 10 CBS News Promotion of a CBS Evening News Report on
the September 8 Segment
3G September 13 CBS News Promotion of a CBS Evening News Report on
the September 8 Segment
3H September 15 CBS News Promotion of September 15 60 Minutes
Wednesday Segment
3I September 20 CBS News Statement
3J September 20 Dan Rather Statement
3K September 21 CBS News Statement
3L September 22 CBS News Statement
Exhibit 4 Emily Will e-mail, September 5
Exhibit 5 Marcel Matley Handwritten Notes, September 6 Exhibit 6 Marcel Matley Typed-Up Handwritten Notes, September 10 Exhibit 7 Marcel Matley and James Pierce Draft and Final Letters, September 14 Exhibit 8 Dan Rather WCBS Interview, September 20 ix Exhibit 9A-9K Transcripts of Interviews related to the September 8 Segment and related CBS Evening News Reports (attached only to Web versions of this Report)
9A Ben Barnes Interview Transcript, September 7, 2004
9B Dan Bartlett Interview Transcript, September 8, 2004
9C Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett Interview Transcript, September 18, 2004
9D Bill Glennon Interview Transcript, September 13, 2004
9E Colonel David Hackworth Interview Transcript, September 6, 2004
9F Richard Katz Interview Transcript, September 13, 2004
9G Marian Carr Knox Interview Transcript, September 15, 2004
9H Marcel Matley Interview Transcript, September 6, 2004
9I Marcel Matley Interview Transcript, September 10, 2004
9J Jim Moore Interview Transcript, September 10, 2004
9K James Pierce Interview Transcript, September 14, 2004
9L Robert Strong Interview Transcript, September 5, 2004
Appendix 1 CBS News Standards Relevant to the Panel’s Report
Appendix 2 Background Data on Document Authentication
Appendix 3 Official Bush Records Relevant to Chapter VIII
Appendix 4 Panel’s Observations about Peter Tytell’s views on the Authenticity of the
Killian Documents
1
On September 8, 2004, CBS News’ 60 Minutes Wednesday aired a segment entitled “For
the Record” (the “September 8 Segment” or the “Segment”) concerning President Bush’s Texas
Air National Guard (“TexANG”) service.1 The first part of the Segment was an interview with
Ben Barnes, the former Lieutenant Governor of Texas and Speaker of the Texas House of
Representatives, who said that he had recommended that President Bush be given preferential
treatment to obtain a position in the TexANG in 1968. Whether President Bush had received
such preferential treatment had previously been the subject of many news stories dating back to
1994 when he first ran for public office.
The second part of the September 8 Segment highlighted four documents2 obtained by
60 Minutes Wednesday just a few days earlier. These documents were allegedly “taken from”
the personal files of the late Lieutenant Colonel Jerry B. Killian, the Commander of the 111th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron in which then-Lieutenant Bush served from May 1968 to October
1973. These documents, which were said to provide new information on Lieutenant Bush’s
TexANG service, were:
1. A memorandum dated May 4, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian ordered Lieutenant Bush to take his annual flying physical;
2. A file memorandum dated May 19, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian discussed a conversation with Lieutenant Bush about a transfer from Texas to Alabama to work on a political campaign, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s displeasure with the requested transfer;
3. A memorandum dated August 1, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that
he ordered Lieutenant Bush suspended from flight status due to his failure to meet
TexANG standards and his failure to take his required flying physical; and
1 Transcripts of the September 8 Segment and the other 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News reports
pertaining to the Segment that aired from September 8 through September 22 are attached as Exhibits 1A-1L to this
Report.
2 These four documents, along with two others obtained by 60 Minutes Wednesday, are referred to collectively as
the “Killian documents.” Copies of the six Killian documents are attached as Exhibits 2A-2F to this Report.
4. A file memorandum dated August 18, 1973 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that a retired TexANG General was putting pressure on various officers to “sugar coat” Lieutenant Bush’s officer evaluation.
In referring to the Killian documents, the September 8 Segment reported that 60 Minutes
Wednesday “consulted with a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the
material is authentic.” In further support of the documents, former TexANG Lieutenant Robert
Strong, identified as a “friend and colleague of Colonel Jerry Killian,” was asked whether there
was “any doubt in your mind that these are genuine?” Lieutenant Strong responded, “Well, they
are compatible with the way that business was done at that time. They are compatible with the
man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t see anything in the documents that are
discordant with what were the times, what were the situations, and what were the people that
were involved.”
Within hours after the Segment aired, questions about the authenticity of the Killian
documents were raised, initially in an outpouring from the so-called blogosphere3 on the Internet.
These early questions focused mainly on the typography of the documents. Specifically, it was
claimed that since the documents contained a superscript “th,” were proportionally spaced and
had Times New Roman font style, they must be forgeries because typewriters in existence at the
time the documents were purportedly written did not have the capabilities to produce these
features. This was quickly followed by a raging media firestorm in print, on the air and on the
Internet about the documents’ authenticity. In response to this crisis, CBS News issued a
number of statements and broadcast additional reports between September 9 and 15 defending
the Segment and the authenticity of the documents (the “Aftermath”).4 Finally, on
September 20, 2004, Andrew Heyward, President of CBS News, issued a statement that said,
among other things, “Based on what we now know, CBS News cannot prove that the documents
are authentic, which is the only acceptable journalistic standard to justify using them in the
report. We should not have used them. That was a mistake we deeply regret.”
On September 22, 2004, CBS News announced the appointment of an Independent
Review Panel consisting of Dick Thornburgh, former Attorney General of the United States, and
3 A blog is a website that contains an online personal journal, often with reflections, comments, and hyperlinks
provided by the writer.
4 Copies of the CBS News press statements issued in connection with the Segment between September 8 and
September 22 are attached as Exhibits 3A-3L to this Report.
Louis D. Boccardi, former Chief Executive Officer and President of The Associated Press, (the
“Panel”) to examine the process by which the September 8 Segment was prepared and broadcast.
The Panel was also asked to examine the circumstances surrounding the public statements and
news reports by CBS News after September 8 defending the Segment, as well as to make any
recommendations it deemed appropriate. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP was
retained as counsel to the Panel.
4
The stated goal of CBS News is to have a reputation for journalism of the highest quality
and unimpeachable integrity. To meet this objective, CBS News expects its personnel to adhere
to published internal Standards based on two core principles: accuracy and fairness. The Panel
finds that both the September 8 Segment itself and the statements and news reports by CBS
News that followed the Segment failed to meet either of these core principles.
The Panel has not been able to conclude with absolute certainty whether the Killian
documents are authentic or forgeries. However, the Panel has identified a number of issues that
raise serious questions about the authenticity of the documents and their content. With better
reporting, these questions should have been raised before the September 8 Segment aired.
While the focus of the Panel’s investigation at the outset was on the Killian documents,
the investigation quickly identified considerable and fundamental deficiencies relating to the
reporting and production of the September 8 Segment and the statements and news reports
during the Aftermath. These problems were caused primarily by a myopic zeal to be the first
news organization to broadcast what was believed to be a new story about President Bush’s
TexANG service, and the rigid and blind defense of the Segment after it aired despite numerous
indications of its shortcomings.
The most serious defects in the reporting and production of the September 8 Segment were:
1. The failure to obtain clear authentication of any of the Killian documents from any document examiner;
2. The false statement in the September 8 Segment that an expert had authenticated the Killian documents when all he had done was authenticate one signature from one document used in the Segment;
3. The failure of 60 Minutes Wednesday management to scrutinize the publicly available, and at times controversial, background of the source of the documents, retired Texas Army National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett;
4. The failure to find and interview the individual who was understood at the outset to be Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s source of the Killian documents, and thus to establish the chain of custody;
5. The failure to establish a basis for the statement in the Segment that the documents “were taken from Colonel Killian’s personal files”;
6. The failure to develop adequate corroboration to support the statements in the Killian documents and to carefully compare the Killian documents to official TexANG records, which would have identified, at a minimum, notable inconsistencies in content and format;
7. The failure to interview a range of former National Guardsmen who served with Lieutenant Colonel Killian and who had different perspectives about the documents;
8. The misleading impression conveyed in the Segment that Lieutenant Strong had authenticated the content of the documents when he did not have the personal knowledge to do so;
9. The failure to have a vetting process capable of dealing effectively with the production speed, significance and sensitivity of the Segment; and 10. The telephone call prior to the Segment’s airing by the producer of the Segment to a senior campaign official of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry - a clear conflict of interest - that created the appearance of a political bias.
Once questions were raised about the September 8 Segment, the reporting thereafter was
mishandled and compounded the damage done. Among the more egregious shortcomings during
the Aftermath were:
1. The strident defense of the September 8 Segment by CBS News without adequately probing whether any of the questions raised had merit;
2. Allowing many of the same individuals who produced and vetted the by-then controversial September 8 Segment to also produce the follow-up news reports defending the Segment;
3. The inaccurate press statements issued by CBS News after the broadcast of the Segment that the source of the documents was “unimpeachable” and that experts had vouched for their authenticity;
4. The misleading stories defending the Segment that aired on the CBS Evening News after September 8 despite strong and multiple indications of serious flaws;
5. The efforts by 60 Minutes Wednesday to find additional document examiners who would vouch for the authenticity of the documents instead of identifying the best examiners available regardless of whether they would support this position; and 6. Preparing news stories that sought to support the Segment, instead of providing accurate and balanced coverage of a raging controversy.
The Panel expresses the earnest hope, however, that the failures identified in this Report
will not induce timidity at CBS News or chill its investigative reporting. Done accurately and
fairly, investigative reporting serves a critical role in a free society. Done inaccurately, it can
cause great harm. The recommendations made by the Panel at the end of this Report will, we
hope and expect, strengthen 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS News’ capacity to fulfill this role.
60 Minutes Wednesday first aired in 1999. While similar in format and concept to the
original 60 Minutes which began in 1968 and which continues to air on Sunday, there is little
overlap between the two shows. They have separate staffs and offices, and work on distinct
stories.
At 60 Minutes Wednesday, the Executive Producer and Senior Broadcast Producer are
ultimately responsible for the production of the stories that are broadcast. They work closely
with correspondents and producers to identify and develop stories. They also are responsible for
determining the appropriate amount of vetting that a segment needs before it is ready for broadcast.
Executive Producer Josh Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Mary Murphy were the
senior producers for the September 8 Segment. Senior Producer Esther Kartiganer, who is
responsible for ensuring that excerpts of any interview used in a story are a fair representation of
the entire interview, assisted them in the vetting of the Segment. All three assumed their
positions with 60 Minutes Wednesday during the summer of 2004. They each had significant
experience at CBS News and all had previously worked at 60 Minutes.
The September 8 Segment was the first original story aired for which Howard was the
Executive Producer and Murphy was the Senior Broadcast Producer. Moreover, neither had an
extensive working relationship with either Dan Rather or Mary Mapes, the correspondent and
producer, respectively, of the September 8 Segment. The Panel recognizes that an effective
working relationship between an Executive or Senior Broadcast Producer and the people who
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investigate and produce a show can take time to develop. This consideration, along with the
production speed, significance and sensitivity of the story, caused the President of CBS News,
Andrew Heyward, to task his direct report, Betsy West, Senior Vice President, Prime Time, CBS
News, with closer supervision of the production of the Segment than was typical.
Correspondents at 60 Minutes Wednesday work with producers they select to develop
ideas for stories and to prepare a story once the concept is approved by 60 Minutes Wednesday
management. The correspondents have varying degrees of involvement in investigating and
developing stories, and the producers typically take the lead in this process. Rather and Mapes
had worked together for more than five years, and Rather gave Mapes significant responsibility
to produce stories, in part due to the great confidence and respect that he had for her work, and in
part due to the demands of Rather’s other duties at CBS News. In late August and early
September 2004, as the September 8 Segment was being developed, Rather had even greater
demands on his time than usual as he was covering the Republican Convention in New York
City and then a hurricane in Florida. Thus, he was not able to spend extensive time on the development of the September 8 Segment.
Mapes has been with CBS News since 1989 and joined 60 Minutes Wednesday in 1999,
working exclusively as a producer assigned to Rather. Mapes was described by many people
interviewed by the Panel as one of the most highly regarded producers at 60 Minutes Wednesday.
Mapes’ reputation grew dramatically in 2003 and 2004 as she produced a number of noteworthy
stories with Rather, including segments on Senator Strom Thurmond’s biracial daughter and the
Abu Ghraib prison abuses.
The interests of Rather and Mapes in pursuing a story about President Bush’s TexANG
service date back to at least 1999. At that time, and again during the presidential election of
2000, they investigated allegations that then-Texas Governor Bush had received preferential
treatment in getting into the TexANG in 1968. Although Rather did two interviews about the
subject in 1999, no story was put together for airing. They did little further investigating on this
matter until 2004, when numerous stories appeared in the media about both presidential candidates’ military service during the Vietnam War era.
8
On August 23, 2004, Mapes learned from a source that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett might
have a previously unreleased document related to President Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes
believed that a number of news organizations were pursuing this same document from him. She
and Michael Smith, a freelance journalist from Texas who was working with Mapes on this
story, thereafter had a number of conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in an effort to
determine whether he had the document. Ultimately, Mapes and Smith met with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett and his wife on Thursday, September 2, when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
provided Mapes and Smith with two of the Killian documents: the August 1, 1972 memorandum
and another document dated June 24, 1973, which was not used on the September 8 Segment.
On September 5, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided Smith with four more documents, three of
which were to be used on the September 8 Segment.
Smith told the Panel that when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided the documents on
September 2, he said that he had received them anonymously in the mail. Mapes had a different
recollection of what Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said at the same meeting about the source of the
documents. Mapes said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett stated that he received the documents
after he was interviewed on a national television show in February 2004 concerning President
Bush’s TexANG service, but did not say how he received them or from whom. Mapes added
that she spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on several occasions over the next couple of days to
get more information about the source of the documents. Ultimately, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
told Mapes on either September 4 or 5 that he had received the documents from another former
Texas Army National Guardsman, Chief Warrant Officer George Conn, a statement that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett would later admit was not true. Mapes and her team of associate
producers did virtually nothing to attempt to contact Chief Warrant Officer Conn to confirm this
story and further trace the chain of custody of the documents.
Once the documents were obtained by Mapes and Smith, there was a frenetic effort to
“crash” the Segment, meaning to prepare the Segment for broadcast quickly. Among other
things, the documents needed to be authenticated, five interviews had to be taped, including with
former Lieutenant Governor Barnes, and with White House Communications Director Dan
9
Bartlett, and the script for the story needed to be written and vetted. Despite this enormous
amount of work and the great sensitivity of the subject matter, it was decided to move up the date
the story would air from September 29, the first scheduled show for the 60 Minutes Wednesday
fall season, to September 8, a mere six days after the first Killian documents were obtained and
only three days after the four other Killian documents were received. This decision on timing
was driven in significant part by competitive pressures, as other news organizations were working on stories related to President Bush’s TexANG service.
Since Mapes’ regular associate producer was out on maternity leave, another associate
producer with whom she had not previously worked, Yvonne Miller, was assigned late on
Thursday, September 2, to assist Mapes in putting the story together. The first assignment that
Mapes gave to Miller on Friday, September 3, was to have the documents authenticated. Neither
Mapes nor Miller had any prior experience in document or handwriting analysis or the mechanics of document authentication.
The field of forensic document examination is fraught with controversy and has differing
and sometimes antagonistic certifying organizations. However, it is generally agreed that
authentication of a document is best done with the original, so that a chemical analysis of the ink
and paper, as well as a close review of any signature and the typography, can be conducted. In
addition, document examiners typically reach their conclusions with varying degrees of
certainty. A common finding is that the document in question does not have any indication that
it is not authentic.
Given the tight deadline, Miller did not have sufficient time to learn the fundamentals of
document authentication. Had she known the basics, she would have realized that it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to authenticate the Killian documents because they were
copies, the alleged author was dead and no person could be located who was alleged to have
been present when the documents were prepared. She instead called various people who she
believed had experience in the document and handwriting field to identify potential examiners
with requisite expertise. After approximately six hours of work on Friday, September 3, Miller
had found four examiners who seemed to have expertise in document and handwriting authentication and who were willing to work over the Labor Day weekend.
The four examiners initially were provided with the two documents obtained from
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2: (i) the June 24, 1973 memorandum, which was not
used in the Segment but included a signature which purported to be that of Lieutenant Colonel
Killian; and (ii) the August 1, 1972 memorandum, which only contained initials. The four
examiners also were provided with 17 other pages of documents from Lieutenant Bush’s
TexANG records that had been obtained from the government via requests pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) (the “official Bush records”) so that Lieutenant Colonel
Killian’s purported signature on the June 24, 1973 memorandum could be compared with his
signatures on those documents.
Over the next few days, the examiners analyzed the two documents and had several
conversations with both Mapes and Miller. Two of the examiners told the Panel that they
informed Mapes and Miller that they had various concerns about the documents. Significantly,
all four of the examiners told the Panel that they informed Mapes and Miller that they could not
authenticate the documents, primarily because they were copies.
One of the examiners, Marcel Matley, informed Miller on September 5 that based on his
initial review, he believed that the signatures from the June 24, 1973 memorandum and those
from the official Bush records were from the same person since he noticed “consistent
inconsistencies.” Mapes decided to bring Matley to New York on September 6 to be interviewed
for the September 8 Segment. When Matley arrived in New York, he was shown the four other
documents provided by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on the previous day. Matley told the Panel
that he informed Mapes and Miller at the time that he could not authenticate the documents, and
Matley’s contemporaneous notes from September 6 support this recollection.5 Instead, Matley
advised Mapes and Miller that he could comment only on the signatures of Lieutenant Colonel
Killian that were included in some of the documents. Matley opined that while one of the
signatures of Lieutenant Colonel Killian that he had examined had “conspicuous differences”
from signatures on the official Bush records, the “preponderance of available handwriting
evidence” was that one person had written all of the signatures. Matley repeated this opinion in
an interview with Rather that evening. It was ultimately decided not to include any portion of
the Matley interview in the September 8 Segment, at least in part because it was felt that Matley
did not clearly explain his opinion.
5 Copies of Matley’s handwritten notes from September 6 are attached as Exhibit 5 to this Report.
2. Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents
Aside from the efforts to authenticate the documents, Mapes also attempted to locate
people who could verify the content of the documents. One such person contacted by Mapes
was Lieutenant Robert Strong, who had served as an administrative officer in the TexANG.
Lieutenant Strong had previously been interviewed by Rather for a possible story in 1999. At
that time, he was asked about preferential treatment in getting into the TexANG, and he said that
a number of people appeared to get preferential treatment. He noted at the time, however, that he
had no personal knowledge about whether Lieutenant Bush received preferential treatment in
getting into the TexANG.
On September 5, as the production of the September 8 Segment gathered force, Rather
left his coverage of a hurricane in Florida to interview Lieutenant Strong in Austin, Texas.
Mapes was also present at the interview. Lieutenant Strong was shown the Killian documents
for the first time 20 minutes before the interview began. During the interview, Lieutenant Strong
was asked whether he had any doubt that the documents were genuine. Lieutenant Strong
responded, “Well, they are compatible with the way business was done at that time. They are
compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t see anything in the
documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the situations and what were
the people that were involved.” This response was included in the September 8 Segment.
The Panel finds this use of Lieutenant Strong’s statement to be misleading. Lieutenant
Strong told the Panel that he resigned from the TexANG in March 1972, two months before the
date of the earliest Killian document used in the September 8 Segment, that he had no personal
knowledge of Lieutenant Bush’s service in the TexANG, and that he did not have any personal
knowledge of the content of the documents. Lieutenant Strong explained to the Panel that he
gave the response he did because Mapes had assured him that four experts were in the process of
authenticating the documents. Lieutenant Strong advised the Panel that his response should have
included the caveat that he did not have any personal knowledge of the content of the documents,
but if they were authentic, then they reflected the “principles” of Lieutenant Colonel Killian.
Rather and Mapes arrived back in New York after the Lieutenant Strong interview early
in the morning of September 6. The rush to prepare the Segment for possible broadcast on
September 8 continued in full force. Among other matters, Mapes called Major General Bobby
Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commanding officer during the relevant time period, on
Monday, September 6 to discuss the content of the Killian documents. Mapes told the Panel that
Major General Hodges would not agree to an on-camera interview, but agreed to have the
documents read to him over the telephone. Mapes told the Panel that he confirmed the content of
the four documents and that this was a key factor in bolstering the conclusion that the documents
were authentic.
Major General Hodges told the Panel a different version of his conversation with Mapes.
Major General Hodges said that he did not confirm the content of the documents but only said
that he and Lieutenant Colonel Killian had discussed the fact that Lieutenant Bush had missed a
flying physical and that Lieutenant Bush wanted to transfer to Alabama. Major General Hodges
also told the Panel that he did not believe that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had ever ordered
anyone to take a physical, including Lieutenant Bush. Major General Hodges further told the
Panel that General Walter (“Buck”) Staudt had never pressured him regarding Lieutenant Bush,
as alleged in the August 18, 1973 memorandum. Moreover, Major General Hodges said that
when he finally saw the documents after the September 8 Segment aired, he was convinced that
they were not authentic and told this to Rather and Mapes in a telephone call on September 10,
2004.
Major General Hodges gave the Panel a number of specific reasons why he did not
believe that the documents were authentic, including the use of a number of allegedly erroneous
terms and abbreviations. Some of the deviations from standard format and usage mentioned by
Major General Hodges included: (i) the location and format of the signature block; (ii) the
abbreviations for Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Texas Air National Guard, group and officer
efficiency training report; (iii) the use of the terms “billet” and “billets”; and (iv) the reference to
a flight review board. While some of these observations may seem trivial, each branch of the
military uses specified standard abbreviations and terms. Major General Hodges did not think
that Lieutenant Colonel Killian, with whom he served for 20 years, would have written documents with so many deviations from standard format.
On Tuesday, September 7, Rather interviewed Ben Barnes, and a number of excerpts
from this interview appeared in the September 8 Segment. The Panel has several concerns about
whether the airing of the Barnes interview excerpts constituted fair and accurate reporting by
60 Minutes Wednesday. For example, the excerpts pertaining to Barnes conveyed the
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unmistakable impression that President Bush gained entry into the TexANG through preferential
treatment. Barnes stated, however, that he did not know if his call to a TexANG official back in
1968 made any difference with respect to President Bush. Further, Mapes had been told
previously by several former TexANG officers that President Bush entered the TexANG without
any preferential treatment. Finally, Mapes confirmed to the Panel that there was conflicting
information about whether there even was a waiting list to get in the TexANG as of the spring of
1968. At a minimum, these issues should have been disclosed to the 60 Minutes Wednesday
management, but they were not.
The morning of Wednesday, September 8, the Killian documents were delivered to White
House Communications Director Dan Bartlett in anticipation of an interview to get a reaction
from the White House. CBS News correspondent John Roberts interviewed Bartlett at around
11 a.m. at the White House. Bartlett did not dispute the authenticity of the documents at that
time but denied in the interview that the documents showed that President Bush did anything
improper during his service in the TexANG. The Panel was informed by West, Howard, Mapes,
Kartiganer and two CBS lawyers involved in the vetting, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard
Altabef, that Bartlett’s failure to challenge the authenticity of the documents hours before the
Segment was to air provided further comfort that the documents were authentic.
All 60 Minutes Wednesday stories go through a vetting process. The degree of vetting
depends on a variety of factors, including whether the story is an investigative report and what
information is presented in the segment. At a minimum, the vetting of all stories entails a review
by Executive Producer Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Murphy, a review by Senior
Producer Kartiganer of the excerpts of interviews that are to be used in stories to ensure that they
reflect a fair edit from the full interviews and a final fairness and accuracy screening by West.
Sternberg and Altabef, who have been in-house counsel for CBS for over 20 years each, also
may become involved in the vetting process depending on the type of story and issues involved.The September 8 Segment should have received the highest degree of vetting because, among other reasons, the Segment:
1. Was a major investigative piece that was produced in a very short period of time;
2. Was pursued intermittently for over five years, which could cause the correspondent and producer to become too personally invested in the story;
3. Was to be released in the middle of a presidential campaign and was highly negative to one candidate (President Bush);
4. Involved a source who did not want his identity disclosed;
5. Involved a second source who had never been located by 60 Minutes Wednesday;
6. Relied on documents that could not be verified by their purported author because he was deceased;
8. Was the first original story aired under the direction of the new 60 Minutes Wednesday management team.
The Panel finds that the vetting process for the September 8 Segment was seriously
flawed. The Panel believes that this was caused in large part by the speed with which this
Segment was produced. The Panel also believes that the vetting process was not sufficient
because too much deference was given to Mapes because of her experience and much admired
history at CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday, as well as her association with Rather. Rather
does not appear to have participated in any of the vetting sessions or to have even seen the
Segment before it was aired.
Mapes began to write the script in earnest on Tuesday, September 7. There were several
meetings and screenings to vet the script with various combinations of West, Howard, Murphy,
Kartiganer, Sternberg and Altabef on September 7 and 8. West typically did not get involved in
the vetting process until the story was ready for a final screening. Heyward, however, asked
West by no later than September 7 to become more deeply involved, which evidenced his
recognition that this was an important and potentially controversial story. Thus, Heyward
cautioned West and Howard in an e-mail on September 7 not to be “stampede[d]” and that
“we’re going to have to defend every syllable of this one . . .”
Given the significance of the Killian documents, it was critical for the vetters to know the
background, identity, credibility, motivations, biases and other relevant information about the
sources of the documents. All agree that they knew virtually nothing about Chief Warrant
Officer Conn, who at that time was thought to be the ultimate source. Mapes and the vetters
have different accounts as to what she told them about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Most of the
vetters told the Panel that they did not think they heard the name Bill Burkett as the source of the
documents prior to the airing of the Segment but did know that the source was a former National
Guardsman. Even if the name Bill Burkett had been mentioned, all the vetters said it would not
have meant anything to them.
Significantly, no one said that Mapes gave any indication of the level of controversy in
her source’s background. They told the Panel that the source was described by Mapes in
different meetings and conversations on September 6 through 8 in various terms, including
“solid,” “without bias,” “credible,” “a Texas Republican of a different chromosome,” a “John
McCain supporter,” “reliable” and “a maverick.” The only significant negatives about her
immediate source that they described hearing from Mapes were that he had a quarrel with the
National Guard over disability payments, that an investigation that he and three other National
Guardsmen had been directed to conduct concerning the National Guard had been abruptly
stopped and that he was not a supporter of President Bush.
These descriptions are in stark contrast to how Mapes told the Panel she described her
source during the vetting process. First, Mapes said that she did not shield Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s name from West, Howard, Murphy or Kartiganer. Second, Mapes said that she
provided all of the details of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s background that she knew to these
same people, that he became a controversial figure in February 2004 when his story about the
“scrubbing” of President Bush’s TexANG records had been publicized and challenged, that he
was a “moralistic whistleblower,” and that he was one of the most vocal critics of President
Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes also claimed that she disclosed less significant details about
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, including the name of his wife, his financial condition and the fact
that he used a dog to assist him with an illness.
As noted above, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had told Mapes on either September 4 or 5
that he received the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Mapes told the Panel that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told her that Chief Warrant Officer Conn, if contacted by Mapes,
would not confirm that he had provided the documents to him. Mapes said that she attempted to
call Chief Warrant Officer Conn at an address in Texas, but was unable to contact him. Mapes
added that it was her understanding that he was living in Germany, but she did not try to locate
him in Germany. Mapes further told the Panel that since she believed she had independent
16
verification of the content of the documents from Major General Hodges late on Monday,
September 6, she did not believe it necessary to pursue Chief Warrant Officer Conn further.
The Panel finds this explanation difficult to accept. Mapes had known that Chief
Warrant Officer Conn was the alleged source of the Killian documents since sometime on
September 5 at the latest and could not have known in advance that Major General Hodges
allegedly would confirm the content of the documents late on September 6. Further, the
Segment would contain the statement that the Killian documents “were taken from Colonel
Killian’s personal files.” Mapes told the Panel that she was told this by Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett, but had not been able to corroborate it with Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Thus, it
appears to the Panel that a crash to air the story was under way without effective consideration of
the chain of custody.
In contrast, the vetters told the Panel that Mapes informed them that the source of the
documents received them from another person who could not be located. None of the vetters
recalls hearing Chief Warrant Officer Conn’s name or other details about this ultimate source of
the Killian documents. The failure to obtain more information about the chain of custody should
have raised the bar for proof of authenticity. Instead, it was not pursued and Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett’s later different version as to how he got the documents would prove to overwhelm
60 Minutes Wednesday’s dogged but doomed defense of the Segment.
The Panel finds that the vetters should have asked more questions about the ultimate
source of the Killian documents. Given the importance of the documents to the Segment, the
high sensitivity of the story, and the use in the Segment of the uncorroborated assertion that the
documents came “from Colonel Killian’s personal files,” it was critical to understand precisely
and in great detail how the source came to acquire the documents. Without a detailed
understanding of the ultimate source of the documents and the chain of custody, the other efforts
to authenticate the documents and their content became that much more critical.
The authentication of the Killian documents is another area where a serious conflict
exists between what the Panel was told by the vetters and what Mapes told the Panel. Mapes
said that she told everyone involved in the story that there were four examiners and that while
two of the examiners (Matley and James Pierce) could not authenticate the documents, they
found “no exclusionary points” that would preclude them from being authentic. Mapes told the
Panel that the statement from the September 8 Segment that “we consulted a handwriting analyst
17
and document expert who believes the material is authentic” was based on conclusions by
Matley. Mapes further told the Panel that she disclosed that a third examiner (Emily Will) had
raised questions, but had deferred to Matley when she was told that he had endorsed the documents, and that a fourth examiner (Linda James) said she could not authenticate the documents without reviewing the originals.
The recollections of the vetters concerning what they were told by Mapes about the
document examiners were not always clear or consistent. Most of the vetters told the Panel that
Mapes told them that there were four examiners, including the “Dean” of document examiners
(Matley), who had authenticated all or some of the documents, without any reservation or
qualification. In any event, none of the vetters believed that there were any outstanding concerns
related to the authentication of the documents prior to the airing of the Segment.
Regardless of what was told to the vetters about the examiners, the Panel is seriously
troubled by the vetting process pertaining to the authentication of the Killian documents. Like
Mapes and Miller, none of the individuals involved in the vetting process had any prior
experience in the authentication of documents or handwriting analysis. None of these people
sought to learn more about the document authentication process, including the limitations of
having copies instead of originals. Had any of the vetters spoken to any of the examiners, they
would have immediately realized the challenges posed in attempting to authenticate a copy of a
document.
Mapes also told the Panel that she informed the vetters that the substance of the
documents had been verified by another National Guardsman, Major General Hodges, whose
name was included in an early version of the script that was available to the vetters on
September 8, though his name was not actually used on the air in the final script.6 Mapes told
the vetters that Major General Hodges’ confirmation of the content of the documents gave her
significant additional comfort as to the authenticity of the documents.
This alleged confirmation by Major General Hodges started to march 60 Minutes
Wednesday into dangerous and ultimately unsustainable territory: the notion that since the
content of the documents was felt to be true, demonstrating the authenticity of the documents
became less important.
6 However, as noted above, Major General Hodges denied to the Panel that he gave such confirmation.
The Panel’s investigation included interviewing other people who might have had
knowledge of the content of the documents, but who were not interviewed by 60 Minutes
Wednesday about the documents prior to airing the September 8 Segment. These people
included officers who served at Ellington Air Force Base (“Ellington AFB”) with Lieutenant
Colonel Killian, including Lieutenant Colonel Doug Via, former Operations Officer for the 111th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron, and Colonel Rufus Martin, former Personnel Staff Officer for the
147th Fighter Interceptor Group. Neither Lieutenant Colonel Via nor Colonel Martin believed
that the documents were authentic or that their content was correct.
The Panel was not able to reach a definitive conclusion as to the authenticity of the
Killian documents. However, Mapes made oral and written presentations to the Panel during its
investigation in an effort to demonstrate that the content of the Killian documents was in fact
authentic. These presentations were done primarily by comparing the Killian documents with
official Bush records to show how well she believed that the Killian documents “meshed” with
the official Bush records.
The Panel finds that the meshing analysis submitted by Mapes does not withstand
scrutiny for two reasons. First, in many instances, the content of the Killian documents does not
mesh well substantively with the official Bush records. Second, the Killian documents vary in
significant ways from the standard format and jargon of documents issued by the 147th Fighter
Interceptor Group in the early 1970s. Thus, the Panel believes that there remain substantial
questions regarding the authenticity of the Killian documents. The Panel believes that careful
reporting prior to airing the Segment should have identified these questions and, at a minimum,
should have delayed the broadcast so that more reporting could be conducted. In terms of meshing with the official Bush documents and the deviations in format, the Panel observes the following by way of example:
May 4, 1972 Memorandum. The official Bush records make no mention of this alleged order for Lieutenant Bush to take a physical, and Guardsmen who served with Lieutenant Colonel Killian, including Major General Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Via and Colonel Martin, told the Panel that they never heard of any such order.
The format of this document varies from standard format:
The signature block is on the right, while standard format was for the block to be on the left.
Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s name is listed as “JERRY B. KILLIAN,” while it was standard for his name to be “JERRY B. KILLIAN, Lt Col, TexANG.”
Fighter Interceptor Squadron in the official Bush records is overwhelmingly abbreviated as “FIS”; in this Killian document, it is abbreviated as “F.I.S.”
May 19, 1972 Memo to File. The first paragraph pertaining to Lieutenant Bush’s obtaining equivalent training at a location in Alabama meshes reasonably well with the official Bush records.
August 1, 1972 Memorandum. This memorandum suggests that Lieutenant Colonel Killian verbally suspended Bush from flying status. However, the official Bush records document that it was then-Colonel Hodges who suspended Lieutenant Bush and that he did so solely because Lieutenant Bush had failed to take his flight physical and not for the additional reason that he had failed to meet TexANG standards.
The format of this document varies from standard format:
Same signature block location and format deviations as with the May 4, 1972 memorandum Lieutenant Colonel Killian is shown to have used only initials to sign this document. Lieutenant Colonel Killian always wrote out his full name in the official Bush records.
This document abbreviates Texas Air National Guard as “USAF/TexANG.” The official Bush records from the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group abbreviate it as “TexANG.”
The memorandum calls for the convening of a “flight review board.” The proper term is “Flying Evaluation Board.”
August 18, 1973 Memorandum. This memorandum states that retired General Staudt was putting pressure on then-Colonel Hodges to provide Lieutenant Bush with a good Officer Efficiency Report. No official Bush record supports this document and the Guardsmen interviewed by the Panel, including General Staudt and Major General Hodges, deny that General Staudt exerted any influence after he retired.
The language in this document varies from standard language:
The standard abbreviation for “Group” was “Gp”; this document abbreviates Group in two places as “Grp.”
This memorandum abbreviates Officer Efficiency Training Report as “OETR.” The official Bush records abbreviate it as “OER,” and Guardsmen confirmed for the Panel that OER is the correct abbreviation.
Almost immediately after the September 8 Segment aired, there was an escalating
controversy about the authenticity of the Killian documents. The criticisms focused initially on
the allegation that typewriters that existed during the relevant period did not have the ability to
create the superscript “th” that was included in the May 4, 1972 and August 18, 1973
memoranda, that they could not have produced the proportional spacing that all four documents
allegedly contained, and that they did not have the Times New Roman font allegedly utilized in
all four documents.
Over the next week or so, CBS News issued a number of press statements and CBS
Evening News reports that staunchly defended the September 8 Segment despite increasingly
strong indications that the reporting for the Segment was flawed. The Panel finds that these
statements and reports contained numerous misstatements and inaccuracies. Moreover, the Panel
finds that once serious questions were raised, the defense of the Segment became more rigid and
emphatic, and that virtually no attempt was made to determine whether the questions raised had
merit.
The initial response of 60 Minutes Wednesday was to stand by the September 8 Segment,
a concept familiar to many journalists. This defense is only effective, however, when a story can
be proved to be true, even in hindsight. The rush to air and the flawed vetting put 60 Minutes
Wednesday in the untenable position of publicly defending the Segment, but being unable to
prove it.
On Thursday, September 9, in response to growing criticism of the Killian documents on
the Internet and in mainstream media like ABC News and The Washington Post, CBS News
issued its first statement defending the Segment. That statement said that the documents had
been “thoroughly examined and their authenticity vouched for by independent experts.” The
Panel finds that this statement is not accurate as no expert had vouched for the authenticity of the
documents.
On Friday, September 10, press coverage about the authenticity of the documents
intensified. In an effort to respond to the mounting criticism, CBS News issued a statement that
the September 8 Segment “was not based solely on recovered documents, but rather on a
preponderance of evidence, including documents that were provided by unimpeachable
sources. . . . . In addition, the documents are backed up not only by independent handwriting and
forensic document experts, but sources familiar with their content.” The Panel finds that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett could not be reasonably described as an “unimpeachable source,”
given his own inconsistent public statements, as well as his criticisms of President Bush and the
National Guard. Further, the statement was inaccurate because the Killian documents were not
backed up by forensic document experts.
The CBS Evening News on September 10 included a report that stated that an official
Bush record from 1968 included the same superscript “th” as in the Killian documents and that
the owner of a company that distributes typeface said that Times New Roman typeface had been
available since 1931. Moreover, the report continued that “[d]ocument and handwriting
examiner Marcel Matley analyzed the documents for CBS News. He says he believes they are
real . . . .” The report then included an excerpt of the September 6 interview with Matley in
which he discussed only the signature on one of the documents and not the authenticity of the
documents themselves. Finally, the report stated that Lieutenant Strong was “standing by his
judgment that the documents are real” and replayed the excerpt of his interview from the September 8 Segment.
The Panel finds a number of deficiencies with the September 10 CBS Evening News
report. First, while an official Bush record did include a superscript “th,” it is far different in
appearance from the superscript “th” in the May 4, 1972 and August 18, 1973 memoranda.
Second, while Times New Roman typeface may have been available since 1931, the Panel
understands that it was only available in typeset machines and not in typewriters during the
period the Killian documents were allegedly written. Third, neither Matley nor Lieutenant
Strong ever authenticated the documents or said that they were “real.” Fourth, no one asked
Lieutenant Strong after the Segment aired and before the September 10 report whether he was
“standing by his judgment.”
Friday, September 10, should have been a watershed day in dealing with the growing
controversy about the Segment. First, CBS News President Heyward, concerned about
mainstream media’s increasingly critical reporting about the Segment, directed Betsy West early
that morning to investigate the details of the examiners’ opinions and confidential sources that
allegedly supported the Segment. No such investigation was done at that time. Had this
directive been followed promptly, the Panel does not believe that 60 Minutes Wednesday would
have publicly defended the Segment for another 10 days.
Second, during the day, three events took place that should have alerted CBS News
management that the reporting for the Segment may have been flawed. First, the CBS News
22
strategy to get 60 Minutes Wednesday’s document examiners to defend the Segment was not
followed, as only Matley made an appearance. As noted above, Matley did not attest to the
authenticity of the documents. Second, a respected typewriter expert, Peter Tytell, contacted
Miller and Howard and explained in detail why he believed the Killian documents were likely
fakes. His views were not pursued or analyzed in part because 60 Minutes Wednesday was
searching only for experts who would defend the September 8 Segment. Third, Major General
Hodges contacted Mapes and Rather and told them that Mapes had misquoted him about his
alleged confirmation of the Killian documents and now that he had had the opportunity to review
them, he believed that the documents were not authentic. Neither Mapes nor Rather asked Major
General Hodges to explain why he believed the documents were not authentic and the Panel
finds no discussion of this conversation with others at CBS News at the time.
Thus, within two days following the airing of the September 8 Segment, 60 Minutes
Wednesday ignored significant opportunities to take a fresh look at the reporting that allegedly
supported the Segment. This was especially unfortunate because the criticisms of 60 Minutes
Wednesday thereafter only continued to mount.
Another unsettling disclosure occurred on Saturday, September 11. The media reported
that General Staudt had retired from the TexANG on March 1, 1972, approximately 18 months
before Lieutenant Colonel Killian allegedly had written the memorandum about General Staudt’s
trying to “sugar coat” Lieutenant Bush’s officer efficiency report. This obviously triggered
questions among the media about how General Staudt could have had such influence well after
retiring, but it did not trigger any re-examination by 60 Minutes Wednesday of its reporting.
Instead, Mapes told 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel that General Staudt remained influential
after his retirement. That representation went unchallenged. The Panel’s investigation suggests
that it is doubtful that General Staudt exerted any such influence after he retired.
On Monday, September 13, the CBS Evening News aired yet another report on the
continuing controversy about the Killian documents, despite misgivings by the CBS Evening
News’ Executive Producer that CBS News had anything new to report. The report said that
“CBS used several techniques to make sure these papers should be taken seriously, talking to
handwriting and document analysts and other experts who strongly insist that the documents
could have been created in the 70s.” The report included excerpts from an interview of Bill
Glennon, described as a technical consultant, who said that typewriters in the 1970s could have
23
produced a superscript “th” and proportional spacing. The Panel finds this statement
unpersuasive as Glennon conceded to the Panel that he was not a typography expert and did not
say which typewriters would have had those capabilities. Moreover, he did not know what type
of machine allegedly produced the Killian documents. Nevertheless, Rather closed this CBS
Evening News report by stating that CBS News “believes the [Killian] documents are authentic.”
Another significant rebuke to 60 Minutes Wednesday’s defense of the Segment occurred
on September 14. ABC News’ World News Tonight on that date featured two of the original four
document examiners, Linda James and Emily Will, who had reviewed certain of the Killian
documents for 60 Minutes Wednesday prior to the airing of the September 8 Segment. James
and Will told ABC News that they did not authenticate the documents and that they had each
raised concerns about the documents prior to the September 8 broadcast with 60 Minutes
Wednesday personnel. James and Will said that these concerns were not addressed by anyone at
60 Minutes Wednesday.
60 Minutes Wednesday learned before the airing of the ABC News broadcast that Will
and James were going to express their concerns about the documents publicly. In response,
Matley and James Pierce, the other examiners who had been retained by 60 Minutes Wednesday
prior to the September 8 Segment, were asked by Miller to prepare letters confirming the
authenticity of the documents. Matley’s initial letter stated that he only addressed whether the
purported “Jerry B. Killian” signatures were done by the same person and concluded that “the
preponderance of the available handwriting evidence was that one writer made all the signatures
examined.” There is no mention in the original letter about the authenticity of the documents.
Pierce’s conclusion in his initial letter was that “[t]he findings of the aforementioned physical
evidence strongly suggest the probability that the documents in question are authentic.”
60 Minutes Wednesday received revised letters from Matley and Pierce. While it was not
clear who suggested changes to the letters, handwritten notes on the initial drafts indicate that
West and Sandy Genelius, a member of the CBS Communications Group, provided proposed
edits to a representative of 60 Minutes Wednesday, who then provided the proposed edits to
Matley and Pierce. In the revised letters, which were posted on the CBS News website, Matley
added a sentence that “I observed nothing about the documents that could disprove their
authenticity.” Pierce revised his conclusion to state “[I]n my professional opinion, with what I
know and have examined based on the photocopied questioned documents, the documents in
question are authentic.”
Pierce would not agree to be interviewed by the Panel. However, in a conversation with
counsel to the Panel, Pierce stated that a representative of 60 Minutes Wednesday asked him to
strengthen his conclusion and that he informed her that it did not represent his views. He said
that he told the representative that he would provide an unqualified opinion since he was asked to
do so by 60 Minutes Wednesday, but only if the letter was not made public. Pierce told counsel
to the Panel that he further told the representative that 60 Minutes Wednesday would “get in
trouble” if it made his letter public. Nevertheless, the revised letters from Matley and Pierce
were posted on the CBS News website.
A further rebuke to 60 Minutes Wednesday’s defense of the September 8 Segment
occurred on September 14. On that date, an interview with Marian Carr Knox, a clerk typist who
worked with Lieutenant Colonel Killian during the relevant time period, was quoted in a Dallas
newspaper. Knox stated in the interview that she did virtually all of Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s
typing and that she did not believe that the documents were authentic, although the content
reflected Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s feelings. She was contacted by 60 Minutes Wednesday
and agreed to do a televised interview. Knox was flown to New York and interviewed by Rather
on September 15.
The interview with Knox was shown on 60 Minutes Wednesday on September 15. In that
segment, Knox, who was described by Rather as a “credible voice,” said that she did not type the
documents. While she did state in the interview that she did not think the documents were
authentic, she added that she did believe that the facts included in at least some of the documents
reflected Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s beliefs at the time.
The Panel spoke with Knox on two occasions, and she stated that she did not have any
personal knowledge about the content of any of the Killian documents, aside from the fact that
she knew Lieutenant Bush had sought to transfer to Alabama so that he could run a political
campaign. She informed the Panel that she answered Rather’s questions on the assumption that
the content was accurate. She made clear in her Panel interviews that she did not have any
personal knowledge about the thrust or content of the documents.
4. The Change in Source
In light of the interviews of James, Will and Knox questioning the authentication of the
documents, Heyward directed West to accompany Mapes to Texas to interview Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett about the documents. Before that occurred, a conference call was held on
Thursday, September 16 among Heyward, Rather, West, Mapes and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.
The call lasted about three hours. Among other things, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
acknowledged that he did not get the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn, but had
identified him as the source only because of pressure by Mapes to name his source and because
he wanted to protect the actual source. He then disclosed that his actual source was a woman
who identified herself as Lucy Ramirez. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said he received a call from
Ramirez after he had been interviewed extensively by the media in February 2004 in connection
with his published claim that some of President Bush’s TexANG records had been purged.
Ramirez told Lieutenant Colonel Burkett that she had some documents related to President
Bush’s TexANG service that she wanted to give to him. They arranged for him to receive the
documents at a livestock show in Houston in early March 2004, where an unidentified man
delivered the documents. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett agreed to repeat this information in an oncamera
interview and it was agreed that Rather would travel to Texas and interview Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett on Saturday, September 18. Rather interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on
that date, and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett repeated his story about obtaining the documents from
an unidentified man at the livestock show in Houston.
On Monday, September 20, the CBS Evening News aired a report in which Rather stated
that CBS News could “no longer vouch for [the Killian documents’] authenticity.” As one of the
reasons for this position, the story prominently cited the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had
changed his story and said that he got the documents from a different source that could not be
verified. The Panel finds this statement confusing, since 60 Minutes Wednesday had never
verified the original source from whom Lieutenant Colonel Burkett initially said he received the
documents. Moreover, the source of the documents was not the sole factor in determining whether the documents were authentic.
On that same day, Rather was interviewed at length by Marcia Kramer at WCBS, the
CBS-owned television station in New York City. In the interview, Rather made clear that the
blame for the airing of the September 8 Segment lay with 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel. The
Panel finds these statements to have been far more appropriate than the CBS Evening News
broadcast on September 20.
Rather told the Panel that he delivered the apology and gave the WCBS interview in
support of CBS News’ decision that the time had come to stop defending the Segment and,
indeed, to disown it. He told the Panel, however, that he did not fully agree with this decision
and still believes that the content of the documents is accurate. The Panel is troubled by these
conflicting statements.
Another troubling aspect of the September 8 Segment emerged in the public disclosure
on September 21 that Mapes had been in contact with Joe Lockhart, a senior staff member of the
Kerry presidential campaign, in connection with the production of the Segment. Mapes told the
Panel that before Lieutenant Colonel Burkett turned over any of the documents, he had pressed
her to arrange for him to be put in touch with someone from the Kerry presidential campaign so
that he could provide the campaign with strategic advice on how to rebut the attacks by the
“Swift Boat Veterans for Truth” group. Mapes told the Panel that she did not know anyone from
the Kerry campaign, but got Lockhart’s telephone number from Chad Clanton, a Kerry campaign
official who had been quoted by Mapes’ husband, a newspaper reporter, in an article on an
unrelated matter.
Mapes also told the Panel that before calling Lockhart, she discussed this request with
Howard and that he approved the contact. Mapes said that Howard had reasoned that reporters
exchange information from various sources and this request was not problematic. Howard,
however, told the Panel a very different version of this conversation and said that he clearly
informed Mapes that it would be inappropriate to intervene with Lockhart or anyone else associated with the Kerry campaign on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s behalf.
Mapes further told the Panel that at some point prior to September 8 she spoke to
Lockhart. According to Mapes, Lockhart called her and the conversation lasted only
approximately two minutes. Mapes told the Panel that she merely informed Lockhart that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett wanted to speak with him. She did not think she described
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Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as a source or that the subject of the documents ever came up during
the call.
Lockhart told the Panel a contrasting version of this conversation. Lockhart said that
Clanton, who reported to Lockhart, had asked Lockhart to take a call from Mapes about a story
she was working on related to President Bush’s TexANG service. Lockhart told the Panel that
Clanton said that the story involved documents and that a call from Lockhart to a 60 Minutes
Wednesday source who wanted input into the Kerry campaign might assist 60 Minutes
Wednesday in obtaining the documents from the source. Lockhart was reluctant to speak with
Mapes given that he did not want to give the impression that the campaign was assisting on the
matter. Lockhart said that he agreed to speak with Mapes only after he was assured by Clanton
that Mapes already had obtained the documents in question and that the reporting stage of the
story was complete.
Lockhart informed the Panel that Mapes called him on the evening of Saturday,
September 4. Lockhart said that she told him that she had lined up an interview with Ben Barnes
and had obtained documents that had been authenticated by some number of experts. Lockhart
stated that Mapes said that there may be more documents and Mapes asked him to call
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, whom she described as a source for the story. Lockhart said that it
was his impression that a call to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett could be helpful in obtaining the
additional documents.
Lockhart told the Panel that he did not immediately call Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as he
recognized it could be perceived negatively. However, he ultimately changed his mind and
spoke to him on Monday, September 6, by which time Mapes had received the rest of the Killian
documents. Lockhart said the call lasted less than five minutes and that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett gave his opinion on how the campaign should address the Swift Boat issue. Lockhart
stated that he said very little during the call and the subject of documents never came up.
The Panel is unable to resolve definitively the conflict between the accounts of Howard
and Mapes concerning whether permission was given to speak with a representative of the Kerry
campaign in connection with the TexANG story. Whether or not permission was given to
Mapes, the Panel finds this contact to be highly inappropriate. The September 8 Segment had a
strong political focus and it was to air in the middle of a hotly contested presidential campaign.
While it is certainly proper to receive information from a variety of sources, this contact crossed
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the line as, at a minimum, it gave the appearance of a political bias and could have been
perceived as a news organization’s assisting a campaign as opposed to reporting on a story.
The Panel is aware that some have ascribed political motivations to 60 Minutes
Wednesday’s decision to air the September 8 Segment just two months before the presidential
election, while others further found political bias in the program itself. The Panel reviewed this
issue and found certain actions that could support such charges. However, the Panel cannot
conclude that a political agenda at 60 Minutes Wednesday drove either the timing of the airing of
the Segment or its content.
Given that the Panel does not believe that political motivations drove the September 8
Segment, questions likely will be raised as to why these massive breakdowns occurred on this
story at an organization like CBS News with its heritage and stated commitment to the highest
standards of journalism. The Panel heard from many that the Rather/Mapes team was a
formidable force at 60 Minutes Wednesday. Great trust was placed in Mapes, a highly respected
producer who had just produced a widely acclaimed segment on the Abu Ghraib prison abuses,
and vast deference was given to Rather, the “face” of CBS News. These factors, along with the
“crash” of the production, contributed greatly to the failures of the September 8 Segment and the
Aftermath.
The Panel concludes that the September 8 Segment reflected a widespread breakdown of
fundamental processes at 60 Minutes Wednesday. CBS News has an historic and deep-seated
commitment to accurate and fair reporting, and the Panel was impressed by the fact that so many
of its personnel have been with CBS News for many years and appear fully committed to the
Standards of accuracy and fairness that CBS News has articulated. That makes it all the more
difficult for the Panel to understand how this breakdown could have occurred.
While the Panel was not asked to look at any other segments of 60 Minutes Wednesday, it
did not find any evidence that the flaws of the September 8 Segment carried over to any other
segment. More than a few of the staff members interviewed by the Panel likened this breakdown
in the production of the September 8 Segment to a “perfect storm,” in which a confluence of
factors came together and led to the failures. The Panel believes that there is some basis for this
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analogy, as the combination of a new 60 Minutes Wednesday management team, great deference
given to a highly respected producer and the network’s news anchor, competitive pressures, and
a zealous belief in the truth of the Segment seem to have led many to disregard some
fundamental journalistic principles, including but not limited to: tracking down the chain of
custody for the Killian documents;