Posted on 08/19/2005 5:27:07 AM PDT by Libloather
MEGA FIX
N.Y. Times continues to avoid TWA 800 connection
Posted: August 18, 2005
1:00 a.m. Eastern
© 2005 WorldNetDaily.com
Yesterday, the New York Times reported that State Department analysts had warned the Clinton administration in July 1996 about the dangers of Osama bin Laden's impending move to Afghanistan.
Deep in the article, the Times reports that the State Department assessment was "written July 18, 1996." Nowhere in the article does the Times mentioned what happened the day before.
What happened on July 17, 1996, is that TWA Flight 800 exploded on a beautiful summer night only 12 minutes out of JFK along the affluent well-populated south shore of Long Island. By all accounts, this crash threw Washington into a virtual war footing. A State Department assessment produced on July 18, 1996, was as likely to have been routine as one produced on Sept. 12, 2001.
On July 18, the last day of official honesty, Times reporters were all over the place, and they were pressing for the truth. On that day, unnamed "government officials" – most likely the FBI – told the New York Times that air-traffic controllers had "picked up a mysterious radar blip that appeared to move rapidly toward the plane just before the explosion."
These officials and the Times unequivocally linked the radar to the multiple eyewitness sightings and the sightings to a missile attack. According to the Times' sources, "The eyewitnesses had described a bright light, like a flash, moving toward the plane just before the initial explosion, and that the flash had been followed by a huge blast – a chain of events consistent with a missile impact and the blast produced by an aircraft heavily laden with fuel." As one federal official told the Times that first morning, "It doesn't look good," with the clear implication of a missile strike.
This was the last day these officials were open with the media about the possibility of a missile. Once they changed the story, so did an oddly quiescent Times. The words "radar" and "eyewitness" would all but disappear from the Times' reporting after the first day. Nor, inexplicably, would the Times investigate the role of the military in the downing of TWA 800, not one paragraph, and not one word about satellites and what they might have captured.
As it happens, the Atlanta Olympics opened on July 19, the day the above stories were reported. Were the White House to acknowledge that an attack from outside the plane had caused its destruction, the Federal Aviation Administration might well have been compelled to shut down aviation on the East Coast. Accordingly, all missile talk ceased on that day. The investigation was forced into a false dialectic between bomb and mechanical. And the government, especially the FBI, would make the Times its unwitting messenger.
The day of the president's visit to Long Island eight days after the crash would prove to be something of a milestone. On that same day, for the first time, unnamed "law enforcement officials" – most assuredly the FBI – told the New York Times that they "supported the theory that the plane was destroyed by a bomb." At a separate briefing that day, FBI honcho James Kallstrom reinforced the theory. "We know there was a catastrophic explosion," he admitted, "It was caused by some kind of bomb, obviously, explosion." Yet, there was never any evidence of the same then, nor would there ever be, at least not a conventional bomb within the plane.
Besides, by this time the FBI had already interviewed hundreds of eyewitnesses – pilots, vacationers, fishermen, surfers – and they were all telling the same story. A typical sighting came from a Westhampton school parking lot, where school principal Joseph Delgado saw an object like "a firework" ascend almost vertically. The object had a "bright white light with a reddish pink aura surrounding it." The tail, gray in color, "moved in a squiggly pattern." From Delgado's perspective, the object "arced off to the right in a south-westerly direction."
Delgado saw a second object "glitter" in the sky and the first object move up toward it. He thought at first it was "going to slightly miss" the glittering object, TWA 800, but it appeared to make "a dramatic correction at the last second." Then Delgado saw a "white puff." Delgado and at least 750 other people – and probably thousands – watched as the plane's fuel tanks exploded, and Flight 800 morphed into what Delgado described as a "firebox" and others as a "fireball." Amazingly, the New York Times would only speak to one eyewitness, and not one of the 270 who saw the object's ascent.
To its credit, the FBI pushed to the terrorist side of the equation and pulled the Times with it. The Times' article on Aug. 14 – "Fuel Tank's Condition Makes Malfunction Seem Less Likely" – was the most provocative yet.
According to the Times, investigators "concluded that the center fuel tank caught fire as many as 24 seconds after the initial blast that split apart the plane, a finding that deals a serious blow to the already remote possibility that a mechanical accident caused the crash." One official was quoted as saying that parts of the tank were in ''pristine condition.'' Said another official who insisted on anonymity, ''It is clear that whatever set off the tank did not severely damage the tank. Something else, most likely later, blew up the tank.''
There was more. Investigators told the Times that the pattern of the debris "persuaded them that a mechanical malfunction is highly unlikely." From their analysis of the debris field, these investigators concluded the following, a summary that still has all the appearance of unvarnished truth:
The blast's force decapitated the plane, severing the cockpit and first-class cabin, which then fell into the Atlantic Ocean. The rest of the plane flew on, descending rapidly, and as it did thousands of gallons of jet fuel spilled out of the wings and the center fuel tank between them. At 8,000 feet, about 24 seconds after the initial blast, the fuel caught fire, engulfing the remainder of the jetliner into a giant fireball.
"Now that investigators say they think the center fuel tank did not explode," read the Times account, "they say the only good explanations remaining are that a bomb or a missile brought down the plane."
And then Richard Clarke got involved. About four weeks after the crash, based on his own rough timeline, Clarke visited the site of the investigation on Long Island. There he casually stopped to talk to a technician. Their presumed conversation, reported in Clarke's "Against All Enemies," is so utterly disingenuous it needs to be repeated in full:
"So this is where the bomb exploded?" I asked. "Where on the plane was it?"
"The explosion was just forward of the middle, below the floor of the passenger compartment, below row 23. But it wasn't a bomb," he added. "See the pitting pattern and the tear. It was a slow, gaseous eruption, from inside."
"What's below row 23?" I asked, slowly sensing that this was not what I thought it was.
"The center line fuel tank. It was only half full, might have heated up on the runway and caused a gas cloud inside. Then if a spark, a short circuit ..." He indicated an explosion with his hands.
The technician goes on to tell Clarke that these "old 747s" have an "electrical pump inside the center line fuel tank" and lays the blame on the pump. In fact, almost everything about the conversation is wrong. The tank was not half full, but virtually empty. The evening was a cool 71 degrees. The plane's pumps were all recovered and found blameless, and the fuel pump wiring is not even inside the tank. The National Transportation Safety Board admittedly never did find the alleged ignition source.
But pride goeth before a fall. In this one chance encounter, Clarke manages to sum up the essence of the "exit strategy" months if not years before the NTSB does, and he takes all credit for it. That same day, Clarke tells us that he returned to Washington and shared his exploding fuel-tank theory with chief of staff Leon Panetta and NSA Director Tony Lake, even sketching the 747 design.
"Does the NTSB agree with you," Lake reportedly asked Clarke? Clarke's purported response speaks to the priority politics would take over truth in this investigation – "Not yet."
Jamie Gorelick took the ball and ran. On Aug. 22, 1996, the deputy attorney general called the FBI's Jim Kallstrom to Washington and effectively put the TWA Flight 800 investigation to bed. Now, it was just a question of how best to explain away the explosive residue and the eyewitnesses.
Take a small amount of gasoline and place it outside, in the shade. It will evaporate, and the speed of the evaporation will depend on the air temperature. What the evaporation proves is that the vapor pressure of the components of the gasoline are higher than the air pressure.
This has got to be about General Science II level stuff. What I learned in 11th grade, and today they learn if they go for a PhD.
The way car (and aircraft) manufacturers counter that vapor/air pressure differential is to provide a tank that is prssurized. The tank pressure is determined by, amoung other things, the altitude of the tank.
You're lucky guy, I sure wish I'd a had a job like that.
You're still wrong though. See my post 101.
Fuel tanks operate continually at ambient air pressure.
Lana Padilla was Nichols' wife, not McVeigh's.
Yes, it will evaporate at a reduced rate.
However, it will still evaporate (until the temp is what?, 40 or 50 below F) because the vapor pressure some of the gasoline components is higher than atmospheric pressure.
When I was a kid, we would occasionally have a tractor or mower or some other machine that stood unused for 6 months or a year or more. This was back in the day when the fuel caps allowed the tank to vent to atmosphere; they simply had a hole in them. When we went to start it, we would have a problem because the fuel wasn't the same anymore, it was thicker and foul smelling, and wouldn't ignite properly in the engine.
Our farm fuel tanks used to just have a cast iron cap that didn't have any type of pressure seal. The local fuel company went around in the 60's selling everyone a pressure cap so that the tank would maintain a pound or two of pressure, to keep the more volatile compounds from evaporating before we used the gasoline.
Are the locals in Belle Harbor still complaining about the Dominicans leaving mementos at the "memorial?"
No idea that was happening.
Yep. It made the Post and "Live at 5" a few years back. The Dominicans were leaving photos and mementos at that spot and turning that part of Belle Harbor into a de facto cemetary, causing many locals to complain to the police. I never heard how the situation was resolved, however.
Mistakes happen. We've all made them from time to time. Saying "hi" to someone we thought we knew, only to realize immediately it's not the person we thought it was. What do you say then? Sorry, or go on your way?
In war, mistakes can happen and be either swept under the rug or, worst case, exposed as such by the other side. Remember Mi Lai? Clearly a mistake, and the result was a PR disaster for the US Army.
I will suggest that the downing of TWA800 was a mistake. From the passenger list released soon after, no important names could be found, certainly none that terrorists would want to target. There were a number of French citizens aboard, for whatever it's worth.
Flight 800 was late departing Kennedy that evening. It took the departure slot of an El Al 747 also bound for Paris. From a boat in the water beneath the flight path, who could tell the difference? They were both 747s. TWA was prominently painted on the tail, but you wouldn't see it from directly below.
I have no idea who shot down TWA800, if that indeed was the case. I only know that TWA was not in itelf a target for terrorists, unlike Pan Am and El Al which we all know is Israel's flag carrier.
Had an El Al 747 blown up on july 17, 1996, wouldn't you think the investigation might have taken a different turn?
The vapor pressure of any substance is characteristic of that substance and of its temperature.
The temperature at 13,000 is about 12 f and air pressure is about 18 inches.
Jet A and Jet A-1 (1950's -present) are the two fuels used by the commercial airlines and both fuels have a 100 oF (Min.) flash point temperature for safety reasons. Jet A has a freeze point of -40 oF whereas Jet A-1 has a freeze point of -53 oF. For this reason Jet A being more available and therefore more widely used. The commercial fuels in the US are not required to have the anti-static additive and generally do not have the additive.
TWA 800 (July 17, 1996) center wing tank flammability.
The temperature of the fuel in the center wing tank of TWA 800 was estimated at 115 oF. The Jet A fuel on board TWA 800 would have a typical flash point temperature above 115 oF. How could this tank explode if the fuel temperature is below the flash point temperature? This aircraft was at an altitude above 13,000 feet and had an open vent system. The reduced air pressure in the tank resulted in a reduced amount of fuel vapors necessary to form a flammable mixture. This in effect lowered the flash point of the fuel (i.e. If the ASTM flash point test was conducted at a pressure of 13,000 feet, the recorded fuels flash point temperature would be about 13 oF below the value recorded at sea level).
Now the report's conclusion was
The fuel/air vapor in the ullage of the TWA flight 800 center wing tank was flammable at the time of the accident.
Being a CE, I can ohly go Hmmm.
Nor, inexplicably, would the Times investigate the role of the military in the downing of TWA 800Two questions:
1) HOW many hours on the the 747-100 that was TWA800?
2) Had a forward cargo bay door EVER blown off a 747 before TWA800?
Now the report's conclusion wasANY historical precedent for that happening?The fuel/air vapor in the ullage of the TWA flight 800 center wing tank was flammable at the time of the accident.
Being a CE, I can ohly go Hmmm.
Restorer:I love it; don't even BOTHER taking that one head-on huh ...
Nobody, as far as I know, ever claimed credit for shooting down an American airliner. From a terrorist's viewpoint, what is the point of successfully pulling off the most spectacular terror attack in history (till then) if people generally think it was an accident?logician2u:
Mistakes happen.
The NTSB set up tests over in England, conveniently out of sight, where they tried to recreate the fuel explosion scenario. They failedGot any sort of link to that?
Jet A is like kerosine, it vaporises at about 185 degrees and even then does not explode like gasoline.I guess a spark from FQIS wires entering the CWT is out of the question too huh ...
save
NOTE: I also recall that a group of Iranians claimed credit after the downing, which cite I am still working on.Iran once owned that airframe - didn't they - yeah, they did!
For about a year, then TWA bought it from them (Iran).
Does anybody else know about this fact?
I never used to believe in the black helicopter, Clinton era stuff either. Then I read Jayna Davis' book, "The Third Terrorist" about the OKC bombing.What is her air-tight 'evidence' anyway?
Ever read any of McVeigh's trial transcripts?
Or the book 'Ameican Terrorist'?
Yes, I haven't often gone Hmmm.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the TWA flight 800 accident was an explosion of the center wing fuel tank (CWT) resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be determined with certainty but, of the sources evaluated by the investigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside of the center wing tank that allowed explosive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system.
During the TWA hearing (Dec. 97), several potential ignition sources for the explosion that occurred in the center wing tank (CWT) were addressed. Many were eliminated and of the remaining (fuel pumps, fuel quantity indicating system and electrostatics), only one, the Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS), was discussed in any detail. For the FQIS to be a credible potential ignition source, two independent failures must occur. The leading scenario presented involved copper-sulfide deposits on the FQIS wiring inside the CWT and an induced voltage onto the FQIS system wiring outside the CWT created by switching on and off power in adjacent wiring. Although the supply test voltage used was much higher than available on the aircraft, only a maximum of 0.6 millijoules (mj) of energy at 1000 volts was induced into the CWT FQIS wires during the demonstration (Exhibit 9A, Page 8). Copper sulfide (CuS-covellite melting point is 103C and Cu2S-chalcocite is 1100C) and silver sulfide (Ag2S melting point is a maximum of 175C for acanthite and 825C for argentite) were identified as possible deposits creating a likely site for ignition inside the CWT. Specific knowledge of the melting temperature and boiling temperature of the deposits could be useful in assessing these deposits as possible ignition sources. These deposits must provide an electrical path to ground or to another wire for current to flow. The resulting energy at this location must either heat these deposits to well over 900C for hot surface ignition of the fuel vapors (See U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 680 dated 1985, Figure 49, A heated area of about two square cm assumed) or must vaporize the material into an incendiary arc (A "spark" is a high voltage event, whereas an "arc" is a low voltage event requiring much more total energy for ignition). Total energy and energy density of the spark/arc are both very important variables for ignition. As an example, a corona discharge may have more than the minimum ignition energy but not the energy density necessary to be an incendiary ignition source. Corona discharges occur quite often during refueling operations. A third scenario should also be considered involving the sulfide deposits heating the wire insulating material to its ignition temperature that in turn ignites the fuel vapors. I believe heat transfer calculations will show none of these three scenarios is possible with only 0.6 millijoules of total energy available. Another FQIS scenario needs some discussion. This scenario involves chafing of the FQIS wires both inside the CWT and outside the CWT. Either of these two events should independently provide some indication of a malfunction to the flight crew or maintenance personnel. The probability of these two events occurring simultaneously without some malfunction indication is astronomical. The probability of them occurring simultaneously for the first time when the CWT is flammable is even higher. In addition, inspection of the available TWA 800 FQIS wiring revealed no evidence of arcing. The final FQIS scenario involved chafing of the FQIS wires outside the CWT and copper sulfide deposits inside the CWT. During tests of a new fuel quantity indicator (Exhibit 9A, Page 107), over-voltages above about 85 volts were applied to the indicator and evidence of electrical stress resulted. No electrical stress or heat exposure was evident during detail inspection of the CWT fuel quantity indicators (Exhibit 9A, Page 108). Again, the question that must be answered is, can an over-voltage of less than 85 volts cause the copper sulfide deposits to produce hot surface ignition, an incendiary spark or ignition of the insulating material? For reference, the 0.6 mj discussed previously was the result of a voltage greater than 1000 volts in the FQIS wiring.
oops
During the TWA hearing (Dec. 97), several potential ignition sources for the explosion that occurred in the center wing tank (CWT) were addressed. Many were eliminated and of the remaining (fuel pumps, fuel quantity indicating system and electrostatics), only one, the Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS), was discussed in any detail. For the FQIS to be a credible potential ignition source, two independent failures must occur. The leading scenario presented involved copper-sulfide deposits on the FQIS wiring inside the CWT and an induced voltage onto the FQIS system wiring outside the CWT created by switching on and off power in adjacent wiring. Although the supply test voltage used was much higher than available on the aircraft, only a maximum of 0.6 millijoules (mj) of energy at 1000 volts was induced into the CWT FQIS wires during the demonstration (Exhibit 9A, Page 8). Copper sulfide (CuS-covellite melting point is 103C and Cu2S-chalcocite is 1100C) and silver sulfide (Ag2S melting point is a maximum of 175C for acanthite and 825C for argentite) were identified as possible deposits creating a likely site for ignition inside the CWT. Specific knowledge of the melting temperature and boiling temperature of the deposits could be useful in assessing these deposits as possible ignition sources.
These deposits must provide an electrical path to ground or to another wire for current to flow. The resulting energy at this location must either heat these deposits to well over 900C for hot surface ignition of the fuel vapors (See U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 680 dated 1985, Figure 49, A heated area of about two square cm assumed) or must vaporize the material into an incendiary arc (A "spark" is a high voltage event, whereas an "arc" is a low voltage event requiring much more total energy for ignition). Total energy and energy density of the spark/arc are both very important variables for ignition. As an example, a corona discharge may have more than the minimum ignition energy but not the energy density necessary to be an incendiary ignition source. Corona discharges occur quite often during refueling operations. A third scenario should also be considered involving the sulfide deposits heating the wire insulating material to its ignition temperature that in turn ignites the fuel vapors. I believe heat transfer calculations will show none of these three scenarios is possible with only 0.6 millijoules of total energy available.
Another FQIS scenario needs some discussion. This scenario involves chafing of the FQIS wires both inside the CWT and outside the CWT. Either of these two events should independently provide some indication of a malfunction to the flight crew or maintenance personnel. The probability of these two events occurring simultaneously without some malfunction indication is astronomical. The probability of them occurring simultaneously for the first time when the CWT is flammable is even higher. In addition, inspection of the available TWA 800 FQIS wiring revealed no evidence of arcing.
The final FQIS scenario involved chafing of the FQIS wires outside the CWT and copper sulfide deposits inside the CWT. During tests of a new fuel quantity indicator (Exhibit 9A, Page 107), over-voltages above about 85 volts were applied to the indicator and evidence of electrical stress resulted. No electrical stress or heat exposure was evident during detail inspection of the CWT fuel quantity indicators (Exhibit 9A, Page 108). Again, the question that must be answered is, can an over-voltage of less than 85 volts cause the copper sulfide deposits to produce hot surface ignition, an incendiary spark or ignition of the insulating material? For reference, the 0.6 mj discussed previously was the result of a voltage greater than 1000 volts in the FQIS wiring.
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