Defeatists On Free Republic Who Are Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

The most lasting tragedy of the Vietnam War is that it has legitimized “giving aid and comfort to the enemy”. We are seeing the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy running wild in this war on terror and sadly not only among liberals and their media but also among some conservatives who some of them are right here on this great Free Republic.

When Al Qaeda terrorists, or the terrorist regimes in Iran and Syria, or the Iraqi insurgent terrorists whether they are Sunnis or Shia hear the speeches of defeatism coming from liberals and their media, or unfortunately coming from some conservatives who some of them are right here on Free Republic, will they feel comforted and aided by these speeches? Of course they will be comforted, and they will be embolden to fight more and more, kill more and more, destroy more and more, because they realize that many Americans do not have the will to fight a long and hard war.

Defeatism and providing aid and comfort to the enemy was something that we expected from liberals and their media because their hate to President Bush and the Republican Party is hundred of times more than their hate to the terrorists. However it is really sad that some conservatives and some members on this great forum are doing their share in providing aid and comfort to the enemy through their defeatist attitude.

Do the defeatists want to amend the Constitution so we will have the following? Stop the war and leave if we lose more than one thousand troops, or stop the war and leave if it lasts more than one year, or stop the war and leave if it costs more than 50 billions dollars, whichever comes first. Do they want to do this?

The defeatists who argue that Iraq is not part of the war on terror but rather it is just a civil war between Sunnis and Shia are wrong and naive beyond belief. Iraq is most definitely the central and most important front in the war on terror. It is in Iraq where Al Qaeda and their local Iraqi allies decided to fight the US. It is in Iraq where the islamic terrorists from all over the world are pouring in to fight the Americans. It is in Iraq where the terrorist regimes of Iran and Syria and their local Iraqi allies want to defeat the US so they can have total control of the Middle East. Since the terrorists are all over the world, then the best way to fight them is to attract them to one place to kill them. Whether it was planned or not, Iraq turned out to be the magnet that has been attracting the terrorists from all over the world, and that is the ultimate way to fight the war on terror and to kill as many terrorists as we can.

Every defeatist who is giving aid and comfort to the enemy should ask himself or herself this question: What will happen if we leave Iraq before we achieve complete victory? The First thing that will happen is that the enemy will be embolden beyond belief and the terrorists whether they are Sunnis or Shia, whether they are Al Qaeda, or Iran or Syria, will be given the ultimate victory that will embolden them thousands more time then when they were emboldened when the US left Beirut after the Marines barracks terrorist attack in 1983, or when the US left Somalia in 1993 after the terrorist killed 19 troops, or when no reprisal happened against the terrorists when they attacked many American targets through out the Clinton years. If our passiveness to the past terrorist attacks emboldened them in such a way to attack us on 9/11, think about what they can do to us if we give and leave Iraq and thus handle them the ultimate victory that they have been dreaming about for decades.

The defeatists must understand that if few terrorists sitting in a cave in Afghanistan with a small budget and few volunteers were able to do the 9/11 terrorist attacks, killed 3000 Americans, and caused over one trillion dollars in economic damages, then the terrorists control of Iraq and of the whole Middle East, and its vast oil resources will allow them to conduct terrorist attacks against us that we cannot imagine even in our worst nightmares. By controlling Iraq and the Middle East the terrorists will have hundreds of billions of dollars under their control that they will use it to attack us everywhere in the world and the US and cause unimaginable death, destruction and economic losses that will make 9/11 terrorist attacks look like a picnic in comparison. They will also use the oil weapon to bring the world economy to a disaster that will be many folds worse than that of the 1929 Depression.

Fellow Free Republic members, we are fighting the most important war since WW II. We are not fighting for the Iraqis in Iraq but we are fighting for ourselves, for our freedom and for our way of life. Let us all support our President and our brave troops because they need our support now more than ever.

I've been giving this a great deal of though and would like to quote some thinking of another.

The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.

The United States has encountered serious problems in creating the coalition government. The Iranians have been primarily responsible for that.

So long as the Iranians continue to follow this policy, the U.S. strategy will have a hard time succeeding. The difficulty of the American plan is that it requires the political participation of three main ethnic groups that are themselves politically fragmented . Virtually any substantial group can block the success of the strategy by undermining the political process.

It is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of Iranian foreign policy. As a general principle, this should be done with all countries. As in business, rhetoric is used to shape perceptions and attempt to control the behavior of others. It does not necessarily reveal one's true intentions or, more important, one's capabilities.

Now, the Iranians supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; they wanted to see their archenemy, former President Saddam Hussein, deposed. But they did not want to see him replaced by a pro-American regime. Rather, the Iranians wanted one of two outcomes: the creation of a pro-Iranian government dominated by Iraqi Shia (under Iran's control), or the fragmentation of Iraq. A fragmented Iraq would have two virtues. It would prove no danger to Iran, and Iran likely would control or heavily influence southern Iraq, thus projecting its power from there throughout the Persian Gulf.
Therefore, Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table. Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are unlikely to get into the game.

Logic would seem to favor the Iranians. But in the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.

The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behavior of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous.

These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual buildup of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf.

The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears. The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent.

We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.

Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can drive responses. Therefore, the rhetoric should not be discounted as a driving factor in the geopolitical system. But the real debate in Iran is over what to do about Iraq. No one in Iran wants a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and blocking the emergence of such a government has a general consensus.
But how far to go in trying to divide Iraq, creating a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and projecting power in the region is a matter of intense debate. In fact, cautious behavior combined with extreme rhetoric still appears to be the default position in Tehran, with more adventurous arguments struggling to gain acceptance.

The common ground between the United States and Iran is that neither is certain it can achieve its real strategic interests. The Americans doubt they can create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and Iran is not certain the United States is as weak as it appears to be.

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