Would the U.S. Still Lose the Naval War of 2015?

Over the last few days I have begun the exhausting, yet wonderful process of moving. Considering the fact I have not moved in twelve years and I am relocating from a suburban single-family home to a small apartment urban setting in Washington D.C. I have some tough decisions to make on what to keep and what to trash.

In going through my endless collection of foreign policy, national security and defense articles (I print everything) I found quite the gem that needless to say made the save box. Instead of cleaning out our soon-to-be former home, I decided to take a small break (please don't tell my wife) and travel down memory lane.

The article in question is one you may know. From the Winter 2010 edition of Orbis, James Kraska's "How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015" was always a piece that I have gone back to over and over again. In fact, the article was one that sparked my interest in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and the DF-21D. Several years back, myself and fellow CSIS:PACNET WSD Handa scholar Daryl Morini had planned to write a follow-up piece -- but alas -- other projects always seemed to get in the way (I am still willing if you are my friend!).

The article creates a fictional scenario where China "sinks" a U.S. carrier. The scenario itself is rather, well, interesting:

"Americans woke up to a different world the day after the attack. The war was over almost as soon as it had started. Outmaneuvered tactically and strategically, the United States suffered its greatest defeat at sea since Pearl Harbor. The incident—could it really be called a 'war'?—had been preceded by a shallow diplomatic crisis between the two great powers. No one in the West expected the dispute to..."...

I would remind you that the Yamato heavily outclassed the aircraft carriers that sank it in both weaponry and armor, but it came up short in range.

If you are meeting an enemy in a flat barren desert, would you rather have a .30 carbine or a stub nose .44 mag revolver? I’d take the rifle all week long and twice on Sunday.

The Sovremenny DDGs can’t survive a USN airstrike, and they will be within range of airstrikes for well over 10 hours before they close within SS-N-22 range. As I said, anyone can conduct a surprise attack once, just as anyone can be murdered if the attacker acts without motive or warning, but it gets much harder after that first round.

I taught ASCM threats to the USN for many years. I'm somewhat limited on what I can share, but you are overstating the threat substantially, not so much concerning the arrows, but rather the archers.

The SS-N-22 and SS-N-26 cannot be launched from a submarine torpedo tube, not now, not ever. They are far too large. That is significant, because it limits their subsurface use to SSG(N)s, of which the Chinese have none.

To my knowledge, no one is making a vertical launch system for them (like an SSBN) although it would be possible (e.g. The Russian OSCAR SSGN carrying 24 SS-N-19 Shipwreck ASCMs in vertical tubes). The Chinese might someday have such capabilities, but they have nothing close to that now. The SS-N-25, SS-N-27, and Chinese ASCMs are tube launchable, but are not a real threat to a CVN strike group, which can handle or absorb that the small numbers that could be launched from submarine torpedo tubes. Mind you, a submerged submarine is going to require someone else to provide targeting at ASCM ranges.

Missiles can have enormous range, but they have to have targeting, and target movement during time of flight is an issue for the subsonic missiles. Without long range targeting that range is meaningless. Even with equal targeting, a CVNs reach is greater that the range of an SS-N-19 (Oscar class SSGN) Granite SS-N-19.

This brings us to a key element of the point I made, i.e. “blue water” operations. Blue water is a term that refers to areas beyond the range of normal land based systems. We would be tactically stupid to send a CVN into the Straits of Taiwan or within 200 nm of the Chinese coast, until their systems are taken out. The better ground to fight on, as it were, is blue water, and we can force that fight by putting a naval blockade on China.

Why take a CVN within 50 nm of the Chinese coast (in the straits) when you can do what is needed from hundreds of miles away? As for surviving 50-100 incoming ASCMs moving at Mach 2+, that would take 6 to 12 Sovremmeny class DDGs, the Chinese have 4 (those missile tubes are not reloadable at sea). But 32 incoming ASCMs is very serious, so let's look at that. With inorganic targeting, they would have to close inside of 150 nm to launch, if they are denied that targeting, they will have to close to less than 50 nm.

So, how does a surface group of DDGs close on a CVN strike group on the high seas? They will be discovered and attacked hundreds of miles away and they can't even chase the strike group down. The CVN and its escorts could put them aft and keep them at a constant 300 nm for days.

Nukes? If they fire a nuke, then its a totally different ball game. Only the expectation of total restraint on our part could explain the Chinese doing such a stupid thing. The response that could/should follow, would be USN SSBN nuclear strikes against all of their key military targets and their unhardened nuclear missiles, shortly followed by Chinese surrender as we threaten the next round of nuclear strikes.

As I used to tell my students. The Russians made/make the best ASCMs in the world, so DO NOT let an attack platform get within range. However, given the choice of fighting with what they have or what we have, I would take what we have hands down.

I watched ZULU DAWN last night, and the age old adage remains that a superior force is defeatable if it falls victim to over confidence and poor tactics. We definitely have to respect those Chinese ASCMs, but unless we engage foolishly, we have the clear upper hand... for now.

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