Part 1 of 3
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Wiring/cargo door explanation/interview me
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear Mister Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede (Ret), Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim of NTSB, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter of FAA, and FBI agents at the New York office, 16 Jan 01
This is John Barry Smith responding with a rebuttal to Chairman Jim Hall of NTSB who states in a 14 December 2000 letter that the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 has been considered and ruled out. The NTSB, as represented by the Chairman, Jim Hall, and Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede (Ret), Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim states that the NTSB has considered the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 and ruled it out based upon evidence and has corresponded with me numerous times. That evidence is incomplete and NTSB has not corresponded with me numerous times. NTSB has written me a few times with short statements of opinion telling me they are right and I am wrong. In addition, the NTSB has failed to respond to the specific absolute refuting evidence to the center tank as the initial event and have consistently refused for over four years to discuss the wiring/cargo door explanation or even meet with me to allow me to present a decade of research and analysis which has led me to conclude that the same probable cause of faulty wiring leading to a ruptured/open cargo door in flight has caused four Boeing 747 accidents, including UAL 811 and TWA 800. The actual refuting evidence to the center tank explanation and the actual confirming evidence of the wiring/cargo door explanation is listed below in response to NTSB assertions.
NTSB: "Thank you for your October 2, 2000, letter regarding Mr. John Barry Smith's assertion that the TWA flight 800 accident was caused by a wiring/switch fault in the accident airplane's electrical system, which led to the rupture of the midspan latches of the forward cargo door in flight. He asserts that this rupture precipitated the sequence of events that led to the explosion of the fuel/air vapor in the center wing tank (CWT)."
JBS: Yes, that is my assertion with the clarification that it was wiring based upon new evidence of the faults of Poly X wiring in all aircraft, and in particular, early model Boeing 747s such as TWA 800, which shorted on the door unlatch motor.
NTSB: "As you know, on August 23, 2000, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the probable cause of the TWA flight 800 accident was an explosion of the CWT resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be determined with certainty, but the Board concluded that, of the sources evaluated by the investigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside of the CWT that allowed excessive voltage to enter the CWT through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system.
NTSB: "As you know, on August 23, 2000, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded..."
JBS: Concluded but not published. The final report is yet to be available to the public six months after the "National Transportation Safety Board concluded." Why is that?
NTSB: "The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be determined with certainty,..."
JBS: The NTSB does not have an ignition source for the center tank explosion which is conclusive evidence that the probable cause of initial event as center tank explosion is not confirmed and that all other reasonable alternative explanations are plausible until ruled out by proper and thorough evaluation. A reasonable alternative mechanical explanation that has precedent and supported by official documents should be thoroughly investigated. The wiring/cargo door explanation is mechanical, plausible, supported by Public Docket evidence, has precedent in a similar type aircraft and has not been thoroughly investigated to the standard set by the precedent, UAL 811 in NTSB AAR 92/02. To say an explosion happened and not have the ignition source positively identified after years of searching and tests is to say the current explanation is incomplete and very possible not the initial event. There are three essential factors for a fuel explosion; air, fuel, ignition source; to not have all three is to admit the current explanation may be wrong. In fact, the wiring/cargo door explanation does have an ignition source for the CWT explosion; a FODDed, on fire engine number three which ignited the center tank as the disintegrating wreckage fell after the explosive decompression caused by the ruptured/opened cargo door in flight allowed the nose to be torn off. This scenario is supported by wreckage debris locations, CVR and FDR data, and the precedent of UAL 811's FODDed and on fire engine number three. The actual refuting evidence of the center tank as the initial event is the absence of any sooted material on the passengers or the fuselage forward of the wing indicating the nose came off first in a generally straight tear line followed by the explosion of the tank which sooted those parts of the fuselage aft of the leading edge of the wing. In addition, the sudden loud sound on the CVR does not match the sound of a center tank explosion as compared with a known center tank explosion CVR sound in a NTSB chart. Also, the port side just forward of the wing is smooth while the starboard side is shattered which indicates a unilateral event and not the bilateral damage that a center tank event would show. The NTSB explanation as a center tank explosion is partly right because the center tank did explode, but the NTSB has the timing wrong, it was not the cause but a symptom.
NTSB: "...the most likely was a short circuit outside of the CWT that allowed excessive voltage to enter the CWT through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system."
JBS: So very vague as to be meaningless. A short circuit outside the CWT includes 98% of the aircraft. The wiring/cargo door explanation has precedent of bare wires in the cargo door area of the confirmed cargo door accident, UAL 811. TWA 800 wreckage has bare wires in that cargo door area:
The Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116:
"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."(Note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811. Water has been seen pouring out of a forward cargo bay of a Boeing airliner. Water and leaking electricity make a powerful conductor. Both are known to exist in Boeing cargo compartments.)
NTSB: "The Safety Board did consider the possibility that the TWA flight 800 accident might have been initiated by the in-flight separation of the forward cargo door. All eight of the latching cams along the bottom of the door were found in the latched position and, along with some pieces of the cargo door itself, remained attached to the pins along the lower door sill. There were no indications of preimpact failure of the hinge at the top of the door. Investigators verified that these cams, pins, and sill pieces were from the forward cargo door by matching the fractures to the attaching pieces of structure. This evidence indicates that the door was closed and locked at impact. Further, deformation and fracture patterns on the door matched damage to the adjacent fuselage structure, confirming that the door was in the closed position at the time of impact.
NTSB: "The Safety Board did consider the possibility that the TWA flight 800 accident might have been initiated by the in-flight separation of the forward cargo door."
JBS: Considered but not investigated nor evaluated to the standard set for confirmed ruptured/open cargo door in flight, UAL 811. The UAL 811 AAR 92/02 has a complete metallurgical examination of the entire door, latches, cams, pins, overpressure relief doors, manual locking handle, hinge, and torque tubes. The TWA 800 'consideration' of the forward cargo door consists of one sentence, Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill." A one sentence dismissal of a plausible mechanical explanation with precedent in a similar accident by an incomplete examination of eight of ten latches is not up to the aircraft accident investigation standards set by the NTSB in previous reports.
NTSB: "All eight of the latching cams along the bottom of the door were found in the latched position and, along with some pieces of the cargo door itself, remained attached to the pins along the lower door sill."
JBS: Misleading statement from NTSB of the word "all"; there are ten latches per cargo door for a total of twenty latches. Only eight have been recovered and were attached to a cargo door sill which was found in the aft debris field. The only two references to a 'sill' in the TAGS database refer to the aft sill, none for the forward:
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"C122",,,"40 39 46.90","-72 37 27.90","aft cargo door - lower sill latches and locks","RF45A","L16","Fuselage","Green","FS 1880",10/12/96 12:55:48,"8/05/96-70",0,0,,
8/25/96 0:00:00,,"C2155",,"C714","40 39 46.40","-72 37 27.80","FS 1810, outer frame aft cargo door panel STR 24R-28R (aft upper main cargo door sill)","RF98","16L","Fuselage","Green","FS 1810"There are no references to any aft or forward cargo door parts in the addendum to the TAGS database, Exhibit 21F Appendix 5: "Updated Wreckage Not Included in Tags Table."
Eight is not ten. Ten is complete for forward cargo door; eight is incomplete. The two missing latches are the midspan latches, the location of which is exactly where the outward peeled ruptures occur in the forward cargo door as confirmed by photographs of the actual shattered forward cargo door wreckage of TWA 800.
"X" marks the spot of the outward peeled rupture of the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Note hinge and red paint smears on fuselage skin above shattered door.
The large gaping hole to the left of the yellow tag marks the spot of the outward peeled rupture of the missing forward midspan latch of the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Also note red paint smears above hinge, inward pillowing of skin lower down on door pieces, and absence of most of recovered door pieces.NTSB: "There were no indications of preimpact failure of the hinge at the top of the door."
JBS: There were indications of failure at the top of the door with red paint smears that would only occur when the door ruptured/opened in flight. These paint smears match the style of paint smears of the UAL 811 cargo door area when the door ruptured/opened out and upward and slammed into the fuselage skin above leaving door paint on the fuselage.
NTSB: "Investigators verified that these cams, pins, and sill pieces were from the forward cargo door by matching the fractures to the attaching pieces of structure."
JBS: The items only refer to the eight pieces recovered and do not refer to the two missing midspan latches. Metallurgical examination and report of those "cams, pins, and sill pieces" is absent, unlike the two AAR of UAL 811.
NTSB: "This evidence indicates that the door was closed and locked at impact."
JBS: Absolutely false logic and refuted by the incomplete recovery of evidence and absolutely refuted by photographic evidence of the actual wreckage of the few recovered door pieces which show outward petal shaped ruptures, paint smears, and the location of wreckage debris in the ocean that indicated clearly the forward cargo door ruptured in flight as the initial event and separated in pieces which created the entire shattered area around the forward cargo door on the starboard side. The port side opposite the cargo door is smooth and unshattered which refutes the center tank explosion as the initial event since a 'center' event would cause equal bilateral damage, not the severe unilateral damage on starboard side, the cargo door side. A latched cargo door sill in which the rest of the door is shattered and tossed to the wind is not a door which is closed and locked at impact. The actual confirming evidence that the forward cargo door opened in flight is the photographs showing the outward peeled ruptures at the two midspan latches, the engine blade in the right horizontal stabilizer, and the sudden loud sound on the CVR which matches a previous ruptured cargo door in flight on a similar type aircraft.
NTSB: "Further, deformation and fracture patterns on the door matched damage to the adjacent fuselage structure, confirming that the door was in the closed position at the time of impact."
JBS: Absolutely incorrect and proven by photographic evidence. There is no "door'; there are dozens of pieces of the door with most of it still missing and unrecovered as shown by photographs and the recovered wreckage database. To say a 'door' is "in the closed position" when the manual locking handle has not been recovered and examined to determine if it in the proper position and stowed is to give a worthless opinion about the status of a door. A latched cargo door sill in which the rest of the door is shattered and tossed to the wind is not a door which is in the closed position at the time of impact. The few pieces of the forward cargo door which were recovered were found many hundreds of yards apart from each other according to wreckage plot and indicate the door did not shatter upon impact but before impact. The TAGS database lists all the pieces of the forward cargo door which were recovered and constitute less than 50% of the door and confirmed by the wreckage reconstruction: (Note 'white' tag which means it was later changed and contradicts the Chairman's statement below.)
8/4/96 0:00:00,,"B155",,,"40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","forward cargo door lift",,"L22","Fuselage","Yellow",
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"B189",,,"40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","FS 540-580 STR 24R-30R with top right corner of forward cargo door","RF3D","L21","Fuselage","Yellow","FS 540-580",
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"B221",,,"40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","small section of upper forward cargo door","RF3E","L21","Fuselage","Yellow",
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"B223",,,"40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","FS 600-720 STR 24R-26R with rear top part of forward cargo door","RF3C","L21","Fuselage","Yellow","FS 600-720",
8/8/96 0:00:00,,"B334",,,"40 39 04.70","-72 38 26.80","forward cargo door segment","RF3M",,"Fuselage","Yellow",,
8/26/96 0:00:00,,"B2015",,,,,"metal strap with internal cargo door switch for forward cargo door; FS 560; WL 164; RBL 96",,"L21","Fuselage","White","FS 560",
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"B2029",,"B223","40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","forward cargo door segment","RF3N",,"Fuselage","Yellow",
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"B2101",,"B223","40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","aft pressure limiting door forward cargo door","RF3K",,"Fuselage","Yellow",,
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"B2102",,"B223","40 39 04.30","-72 38 27.20","forward pressure limiting door forward cargo door","RF3L",,"Fuselage","Yellow",There are no references to any aft or forward cargo door parts in the addendum to the TAGS database, Exhibit 21F Appendix 5: Updated Wreckage Not Included in Tags Table.
NTSB: "You indicate that Mr. Smith claims that "only eight [of 20 door latches from TWA flight 800] have been recovered, and they are all from one sill found in the aft debris field" and that "[t]he only cargo door sill found in the aft fuselage debris field belongs to the rear cargo door, and is not the forward cargo door sill." The forward cargo door was found in the "yellow" wreckage recovery zone, which contained the nose portion of the airplane and pieces of the fuselage forward of about station 840. The aft portion of the airplane, including wreckage from the rear cargo door, was found in the "green" wreckage recovery zone, which contained most of the airplane wreckage, including pieces of the fuselage aft of about station 1000. Therefore, Mr. Smith is incorrect in asserting that the only recovered cargo door pieces were those from the rear cargo door."
NTSB: "The forward cargo door was found in the "yellow" wreckage recovery zone, which contained the nose portion of the airplane and pieces of the fuselage forward of about station 840."
JBS: The 'forward cargo door' was not found anywhere. It was shattered into many pieces (one found in 'white' zone) as shown by the reconstruction photographs and less than 50% of the total door was recovered as shown by the TAGS wreckage database. The important pieces to determine if the cargo door was properly latched/did not rupture in flight are missing to include the manual locking handle, and the two midspan latches. None of the recovered pieces of the forward door were sooted which refutes the center tank as initial event since the forward door is very near the center tank. There was only one cargo door sill recovered and it was found in the aft debris field.
In addition, the color of a tag was changed even though the piece landed in a different color zone which depicts the actual landing location of the debris.
"DOCKET NO. SA-516
EXHIBIT NO. 211
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Appendix 8: Tag Renumbering Procedure
(5 pages)
TWA 800 Tags System Procedure
Tag Re-Numbering
OTECH CAJ 9/25/96
Applicability:
When a tag number needs to be changed. Primarily reason: when the tag alpha designator (A B C or X
Y Z) or color code (RED, YELLOW, GREEN) is found to be at odds with the debris field in which the
object was actually found. Such tags are referred to as "out-of-area" tags.
Re-tagging may also be necessary for debris field locations which cannot be verified. If database
validation processes indicate that existing tag location information is not verifiable, then re-tagging to
WHITE will be accomplished using this procedure and associated documentation.
For those situations where documentation indicates that re-tagging would revise the debris field
location (i.e., the tag color should be changed), back-up documentation will be maintained to support the
re-tag action."JBS: At odds with the debris field? The debris field is reality. Pieces landed where they landed for a physical reason. Sophisticated location techniques were used and latitude and longitude locations were logged as the pieces were retrieved. Where the pieces landed is of paramount importance and to administratively change the landing location is very misleading and nonexcusable. The pieces were found to be at odds with the debris field only using the center tank as the initial event. The original location of the debris field pieces make sense when using the wiring/cargo door explanation to explain why fuselage pieces forward of the wing landed where they did. (The overall debris appraisal was made by Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing.") The center tank is not 'just forward of the wing' while the forward cargo door is. The center tank is aft of the leading edge of the wing and thus parts were not initially shed from that area which means it was not the initial event.
NTSB: "Therefore, Mr. Smith is incorrect in asserting that the only recovered cargo door pieces were those from the rear cargo door."
JBS: A completely wrong and ignorant statement by Chairman Hall of NTSB. I never said and do not assert now that "the only recovered cargo door pieces were those from the rear cargo door." In fact, I refer over and over to the forward cargo door pieces; they are conclusive proof that the forward door ruptured in flight. To say I assert "... the only recovered cargo door pieces were those from the rear cargo door," is to show conclusively that the NTSB does not understand the wiring/cargo door explanation, has not seriously considered the explanation, has not discussed the explanation with me, and is content with confused thinking about it.
The wiring/cargo door explanation does refer to the recovered pieces of the aft cargo door (also to many other parts of TWA 800) and asserts that the only cargo door sill of two which were on TWA 800 when it took off was found in the aft debris field and is most likely that of the aft cargo door, a door which is identical in size, function, and parts to the forward cargo door. All pieces of the aft cargo door recovered are listed below; (Note that that there are more pieces recovered for the aft door than for the forward door and no 'white' changed tags.)
8/4/96 0:00:00,,"C111",,,"40 39 46.90","-72 37 27.90","aft cargo door cutout (#1860)/seats/fuselage",,,,"Green",,.
8/5/96 0:00:00,,"C122",,,"40 39 46.90","-72 37 27.90","aft cargo door - lower sill latches and locks","RF45A", "L16","Fuselage","Green","FS 1880",
8/21/96 0:00:00,,"C644",,,"40 39 46.89","-72 37 26.59","aft cargo door lower aft section","RF45F","L15.5","Fuselage","Green","FS 1910",
8/25/96 0:00:00,,"C2155",,"C714","40 39 46.40","-72 37 27.80","FS 1810, outer frame aft cargo door panel STR 24R-28R (aft upper main cargo door sill)","RF98","16L","Fuselage","Green","FS 1810"
8/9/96-37" ,,"C2133",,"C673","40 39 47.04","-72 37 26.90","aft cargo door fragment","RF45G","L16","Fuselage","Green","FS 1810",
8/25/96 0:00:00,,"C1080",,,"40 39 46.40","-72 37 27.80","FS 1900-1940 aft cargo door surround, STR 41R-44R","RF45E","L 15.8","Fuselage","Green","FS 1900-1940",
8/4/96 0:00:00,,"C2252",,"C114","40 39 46.90","-72 37 27.90","FS 1820-1840 STR 23R-27R with aft cargo door hinge","RF30A","L16","Fuselage","Green","FS 1820-1840"
8/19/96 0:00:00,,"C2336",,"C932","40 39 47.36","-72 37 27.71","FS 1780-1840 STR 38R-46R forward lower corner of aft cargo door cut-out","RF54E","L16","Fuselage","Green","FS 1780-1840",
8/4/96 0:00:00,,"C2340",,"C112","40 39 46.90","-72 37 27.90","FS 1810-1836 STR 27R-30R, forward right upper corner of aft cargo door","RF99","L16","Fuselage","Green","FS 1810-1836",
8/4/96 0:00:00,,"C111",,,"40 39 46.90","-72 37 27.90","aft cargo door cutout (#1860)/seats/fuselage",,,,"Green",,
8/21/96 0:00:00,,"C644",,,"40 39 46.89","-72 37 26.59","aft cargo door lower aft section","RF45F","L15.5","Fuselage","Green","FS 1910",There are no references to any aft or forward cargo door parts in the addendum to the TAGS database, Exhibit 21F Appendix 5: Updated Wreckage Not Included in Tags Table.
NTSB: "You also state that Mr. Smith asserts that "all ten locking latches, the manual locking handle, the viewing ports, and two 'overpressure relief doors' have not been fully accounted for in the investigation and are not in the wreckage database." The Safety Board recovered and accounted for all of the closing hardware for the forward cargo door. All ten of the closing cams and pins are in the recovered structure database and are physically located on the reconstructed portion of the airplane. (A metallurgical report on the forward cargo door discusses only the eight latching cams and pins on the bottom of the door and does not discuss the two alignment pins and cams on the sides of the door.)
NTSB: "The Safety Board recovered and accounted for all of the closing hardware for the forward cargo door."
JBS: Absolutely not true: 'all the closing hardware' is missing from all of the wreckage pieces databases, from the public docket, from examination and evaluation in Exhibits, and the actual wreckage reconstruction. In fact, all of the forward cargo door has not been recovered, accounted for, or evaluated, with less than 50% recovered and those few consist of 'segments' 'pieces' and 'parts.' The closing hardware is extensive and included, torque tubes, bellcranks, manual locking handle, ten cams, pins, latches, and overpressure relief doors within the door. To claim that all closing hardware for the forward cargo door was recovered and accounted for is a falsehood.
NTSB: "All ten of the closing cams and pins are in the recovered structure database and are physically located on the reconstructed portion of the airplane.
JBS: There is no documentation that of the twenty identical closing cams and pins, the alleged ten belong to the forward cargo door and not the aft. There is no documentation of the missing two midspan latches from the forward cargo door being found. There is no evaluation of the condition of any of the cams and pins of either door. In the entire wreckage databases there is no report of any 'cams' nor 'pins' in the recovered structure database. The two midspan latches of the forward door are not physically located on the reconstructed portion of the airplane as proven by photographs.
