Iraq's Response to U.S. War Plans

Summary

A second U.S.-Iraqi war now appears inevitable. The United States, as the attacker, has multiple war plan options; Iraq's choices for responding have a large political component. Saddam Hussein can attempt to avoid hostilities by negotiating an abdication or by manufacturing a major and credible threat to American cities in order to deter U.S. action. His final choice would be to maintain sufficient control over Iraq's armed forces to compel the United States into a battle of attrition in Baghdad.

Analysis

Hussein's fundamental war aim is regime survival. His premise is that the United States will begin operations at a time of its choosing and that the opening phase of that war will focus on air attacks. The air attacks will seek to destroy his air defenses, shatter his command, control and communications facilities and decapitate the regime, ideally by killing him and his senior leadership.

Hussein's premise includes Iraq's subsequent occupation by American forces or, alternatively, by a coup within his now leaderless army in collaboration with the Americans. The timing for these events potentially could be prior to the commencement of air attacks, depending on whether the Iraqi military believes (a) that the attack is inevitable and (b) that Hussein cannot survive the attack. It requires (c) that a plot within the military be executed without Hussein's awareness.

For Hussein, the essential strategy must be to survive the initial air attack and maintain control of sufficient elements of his armed forces to deter American ground operations against his core area of interest: the Baghdad region. Hussein's view is that if he can survive the extremely effective U.S. air operations, the United States will be cautious about engaging in attritional warfare and may avoid a conclusive battle on the ground.

Hussein must therefore:
1. Attempt to deter an attack.
2. If an attack is inevitable, he must maintain control over sufficient portions of his armed forces to represent a challenge to the United States,
3. And he must have sufficient resources available to threaten American interests outside of the region to prevent a final attack.

Hussein's primary means of deterring an attack by the United States has been diplomatic. Until last week, there was almost universal opposition among American allies in the Middle East and Europe against a war on Iraq. But at this point, Hussein appears to have lost that battle. Enormous American pressure on all allies has created powerful, if reluctant, movement to accede to American wishes. Hussein now must work to reverse this trend.

The key battleground has been the issue of inspections by the United Nations. In order to reverse the momentum that has built around this issue, Hussein will show an attempt to permit the inspections. However, while the "issue" may be inspections, the real force behind this movement has been enormous American pressure on its allies to accede to U.S. wishes. Ultimately, accommodating the Americans is more important to most of the world than protecting Iraq. Therefore, the diplomatic phase of Hussein's battle will fail.

Hussein's secondary mode of deterrence would be to demonstrate that Iraq does possess a significant weapon of mass destruction that could be delivered effectively and that the United States could not destroy it with any high degree of assurance. It is difficult to conceive of such a weapon, but one scenario might be:
1. To demonstrate by some means that he has chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
2. To announce that those weapons have been deployed in some American cities.
3. To announce that they will be used if the U.S. commences a war but not otherwise.

The key problem for Hussein is to demonstrate that he has a weapon of mass destruction. According to U.S. officials, he does not yet have such weapons but is in the process of developing them. Logic also argues that he does not yet have such weapons. Unless he is playing a tightrope act, waiting until the last possible minute in order to minimize U.S. reaction time, Hussein should have demonstrated his capability earlier. His ideal would have been to deter U.S. action from the beginning.

However, if he were to demonstrate that he does hold such weapons and claim that they are deployed in the United States, then the U.S. administration would be potentially deterred from action. Indeed, under one scenario, the mere bluff of having such weapons might be enough of a deterrent. Hussein will calculate that the United States would not take any risks with a major city simply to destroy the Hussein regime. In the end he may be right. Ultimately, it would come down to a test of the quality of U.S. intelligence regarding Hussein's capabilities and the confidence of U.S. leadership in the intelligence community. This is also one reason for the United States to initiate war as quickly as possible.

If deterrence failed, then Hussein would have to fight the war. Regardless of which war plan the United States used, Hussein's central problem would be political. While the Iraqis will do everything possible to maintain low-tech communications with their deployed military, there is a high probability that the center will lose contact with the periphery. Hussein must make certain that the periphery is as far away from Baghdad as possible. He must maintain command and control of formations within Baghdad as first priority, of those around Baghdad as a secondary requirement and of formations deployed away from Baghdad as lowest priority.

Hussein undoubtedly expects to lose the forces most distant from Baghdad. His greatest challenge is the forces closest to him. He must make certain that they are not destroyed by U.S. air attacks, that they do not turn on him and that they continue to fight for him.

The forces inside of urbanized areas will be the least susceptible to air attack. Apart from the political considerations involved in collateral damage -- which Hussein will try to maximize in hopes that they will be aired on CNN -- urbanization increases opportunities for camouflage and decreases the accuracy of air attacks. It is much easier to hide a force in a city than in the countryside.

The problem then will be to keep his troops loyal. There is a perception of the Hussein regime as a tiny group of leaders atop a hostile population. Hussein did not survive for decades on that basis alone. Iraq should be thought of as tri-leveled: a tiny group of leaders, a larger group of individuals terrified of Hussein yet benefiting greatly from his patronage and knowing that his fall also would spell their doom, and a large mass that is apathetic, frightened and demoralized. Hussein has survived all other attempts to overthrow him because the frightened beneficiaries were always too timid to strike and were aware that Hussein's fall would mean the loss of their own perks.

The commanders of the Republican Guard are very much members of this middle layer of Iraqi society. Away from Hussein, their behavior becomes unpredictable. However, Hussein is keeping his key units and their commanders close to Baghdad, under the relative safety of its urban environment and near enough that his control remains strong. If Hussein is killed early on, then this group is likely to capitulate. But if Hussein survives demonstrably, then betting against him becomes a dangerous move for these men.

The United States must show this group two things: first, that Hussein cannot survive and that the United States will win the war; second, that taking risks now on the part of the United States will pay handsome dividends later. Neither will be demonstrated easily.

Most of Hussein's senior military leaders experienced Desert Storm and the tremendous power of the United States. They also saw what they perceived as the limits of that power. From their viewpoint, President George Bush left office, but Saddam Hussein kept his job. Their views of other American operations do not necessarily lead them to the conclusion that, in the end, American troops will occupy the presidential palaces in Baghdad.

With that in mind, supporting the United States is a difficult move for the senior military leaders to make. Even if they believe that Hussein will lose and that the United States will pay off on its promises, they still face a major risk. If Hussein is alive, they have to make these bets knowing that if he finds out that they have been talking to the Americans, it will cost them their lives and the lives of their wives and children. They may decide that loyalty is the safer course.

If Hussein can win this political battle for the loyalty of his senior leaders, he will try to draw the Americans into an attack on Baghdad. He estimates that the U.S. administration will not spend thousands of American lives taking Baghdad. He also believes that the coalition will keep the Americans from imposing a siege, which will, under any circumstances, affect the Iraqi citizens more than it will Hussein.

Urban warfare does not require a high degree of coordination, but it does require a certain level of determination. If Hussein can keep his regional forces in Baghdad loyal, then the level of operational capability required is relatively low. If Hussein's security apparatus can make the Iraqi soldiers more frightened of it than of the Americans, then they can mount a strong defense. Urbanization is a tremendous force multiplier that enhances Iraqi numbers and its lack of mobility and plays against U.S. strengths.

If Hussein succeeds in drawing the United States into an urban battle, he may attempt to expand the fight to attacks on U.S. facilities around the world, particularly in the United States. A series of attacks -- even car bombs against American populations -- in parallel with a battle for Baghdad, might force the United States into a truce or a settlement. At least, that would be Hussein's plan.

Hussein also is quite aware that the United States should not be taken lightly and that its military has a tendency to produce unexpected successes. He may be confusing the U.S. desire to avoid casualties with an American unwillingness to suffer casualties. He certainly understands that the American goal will be to kill him early on and that this might well happen. If he does survive the first strike against him, he knows there will be continual follow-on attacks.

Therefore, Hussein might make an unanticipated opening move. If he determines that war is inevitable and he is likely to be killed in that war, he might seek to abdicate -- if he can find a third country that will guarantee him security.

However, there is a problem here. As the Augusto Pinochet case showed, a minor Spanish magistrate can upset delicate political accommodations in the current unstable environment of international law. It is not clear that any bilateral agreement between the United States and Hussein, assuring his safety in a third country in return for abdication, could be guaranteed. Nevertheless, if Hussein could be convinced that the choice is between death and abdication, something might be worked out. Who would be the lucky winner of the Saddam Hussein sweepstake is unclear.

The U.S. opening gambit must be to try to force Hussein to capitulate without going to war. Hussein's opening gambit, if he has one, will be to convince the United States that an attack on Iraq would have catastrophic results. If both of these maneuvers fail, then the real battle will be for the loyalty of Hussein's generals. If the United States loses that fight, it will be a battle for Baghdad. That is the battle Hussein is hoping for. He thinks he can win it.

It is difficult to conceive of such a weapon, but one scenario might be:
1. To demonstrate by some means that he has chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
2. To announce that those weapons have been deployed in some American cities.
3. To announce that they will be used if the U.S. commences a war but not otherwise.

If that's where we're headed, then this'll get real ugly, real quick...

Too sanguine. Hussein invades Jordan to 'save' it from 'an Israeli-backed US coup'. Because we have only a few thousand troops in country they are rolled up; at least until Israeli forces intervene, which they surely will.

This leaves Hussein with partial control of Jordan, American POWs in hand and a war which has been transmuted from US-Iraq to Arab-Israeli. It leaves the US with Iraqi-held hostages, NO access to the theater of operations except through Israel, and a whole lot of surrounding countries which will be undependably neutral at best.

At that point, it's hard to see how the US could prosecute the war further, short of nukes.

I am not making predictions. Merely speculating on what we (the public) and Saddam do not know about the plans against him. StratFor, and according to them, Saddam expects weeks of air attacks before a ground assault.

IMO, there will be extensive use of air power, but also a very quick initial ground campaign as well to at least secure the waterways and oil fields in the south (to prevent him torching the fields as in 91), and the route to Jordan and the SCUD launch sites to the west (to keep Israel from coming under fire). This initial campaign completely isolates his forces and Bagdad becomes a city under siege.

There will then be LOTS of SOF activities in facilities located all over the country looking for WMD and terrorist activities in both areas he did and did not exercise control over.

In and around Bagdad, precision airstrikes, SOF, and bunker busters will continue to take out his resisting forces, palaces, govt buildings, bunkers, command structures, etc, until he is either dropped in one of the attacks or someone puts a bullet in his head for him. And yes, eventually we (and some Northern Alliance equivalent) roll downtown, but only after the Iraqis would be ashamed to ever admit to wearing a uniform for Saddam.

It is difficult to conceive of such a weapon, but one scenario might be:
1. To demonstrate by some means that he has chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
2. To announce that those weapons have been deployed in some American cities.
3. To announce that they will be used if the U.S. commences a war but not otherwise.

The above, and not diplomacy, is the most likely scenario we shall face in the coming weeks. All of Saddam's energies in the past 8 years must have been devoted to precisely this end. All of the UN Inspections have been devoted to preventing precisely this outcome. The entire premise of President Bush's decision to attack Iraq is that the scenario described above is imminent, if not actual.

Will a failed Iraqui diplomacy be supplanted by Iraqui deterrence? No, because of September 11. The events of September and the succeeding anthrax attacks showed that American deterrence has failed. Saddam dares attack, despite our nuclear weapons. It is axiomatic that when deterrence fails, it fails symmetrically; that is, in both directions.

Weapons of mass destruction possess a deterrent effect, paradoxically, when there is a chance that they will not be used. Saddam's behavior, his consorting with Al-Qaeda, the lack of a stable command and control in Baghdad, the certain loss of these weapons to terrorists when Saddam, who is mortal, finally dies, means that the Iraqui devices have been virtually fired. Good as gone, without a regime chance. Good as gone, in flight toward us, unless we seize them.

The world has lived under stable deterrence for so long that we have forgotten what a world witout deterrence looks like. It is a world which an American general, never having known it, understood intuitively. It is a world under which there is no substitute for victory.

Any invasion of Jordan would stretch his supply lines too thin.

In my scenario, his supply lines are protected by a 'neutral' Saudi Arabia and a 'neutral' Syria on either side; the actual 'front' through which US airpower could be applied would only be maybe 75 miles wide, which would simplify his defense. Besides, the length of Hussein's supply lines is a function of where his supplies are, and what are we really sure of there?

Hussein's secondary mode of deterrence would be to demonstrate that Iraq does possess a significant weapon of mass destruction that could be delivered effectively and that the United States could not destroy it with any high degree of assurance. It is difficult to conceive of such a weapon, but one scenario might be:
1. To demonstrate by some means that he has chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
2. To announce that those weapons have been deployed in some American cities.
3. To announce that they will be used if the U.S. commences a war but not otherwise.

Interesting that Iraq is planning a 'major' announcement soon. The Iraqi ultimatum may be forthcoming shortly.

First point: Fahd & Assad will either (a) be very smart and not notice those US aircraft violating their airspace, or (b) we'll say f*** it and take everyone on. Second point: if we don't know where his supply dumps are (unlikely), we'll know quickly enough when he starts moving. Large columns of fuel trucks are rather easily discerned in Western Iraq.

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