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GALLIA COMATA What is now Provence in France was the original "Province" held by Rome since 122 BC and was peacefully established by Caesar's day and known as "GalliaNarbonensis." Stretching beyond its relatively narrow confines on the Mediterranean towards the Baltic lay a vast interior peopled by semi-civilized tribes of whom most were of Celtic heritage, dating from invasions over several centuries. Romans called it "Gallia Comata" or "long-haired Gaul." Although once ruled by kings, by the late Republic most Gallic tribes -including The Atrebates, Morini, Nervii and Eburones of what is now Belgium and Germany, the Bellovaci, Suessones, Lingones, Carnutes and Aedui of central France, and the Bituriges, Arverni, Allobroges and Aquitani of the south - were ruled by nobles or elected tribal leaders. Although not literate, the Celts often spoke Latin, traded with Rome and other nations, had their own established coinage, were adept at agriculture, mining, and metallurgy, and had a vivid tradition of decorative arts. The Druids - about whom Caesar is our primary source in ancient history - were the ruling elite, exempt from taxation and warfare and passing down the oral tradition of religious observance and law from the highest position in Celtic society. The aristocracy ruled. Much of the rest of the people were small farmers, many more or less in bondage to their chiefs. The Celts lived with the threat of the aggressive German tribes to the northeast, across the Rhine. When Caesar's uncle, the famous Gaius Marius, won his great victories against the invading tribes of the Germanic Cimbrii and Teutonii, their invasions were halted in Gaul. The Germans, as described by Caesar, were entirely warlike and despised the weakness of the settled Gallic tribes, frequently crossing the Rhine for plunder and to take territory if they could. It was to prevent the immigration of additional Germanic tribes that Caesar was first called to assist the Gauls; he never left. 
THE HELVETII AND ARIOVISTUS, 58 BC Caesar had, after much political maneuvering, received both the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul (roughly, northern Italy and the Adriatic coast) and Transalpine Gaul (France) following his year as Consul in 59, BC. Southern Gaul, largely pacified, had been a Roman province for almost a century, officially since 112 BC. There is strong evidence that, in the beginning, Caesar thought to make his reputation not in Gaul, but in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum. It left him close to political events in Rome and, particularly in Illyricum, offered opportunities for military fame and plunder. However, a Germanic tribe, the Helvetii, gave him an irresistible opportunity in the first months of his command which had far-reaching implications for the future. The Roman fear of the Gauls went back to the last great invasion of Italy by Gallic tribes in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC. Tribal movements led to Gallic invasions in Greece and Asia Minor (the "Galatians" of biblical fame). Around 400, Gallic tribes filtered into northern Italy towards the Etruscan settlements of the Po Valley; this was afterwards called "Cisalpine" Gaul ("Gaul this side of the Alps" whereas Gaul proper was known as "Gaul on the other side of the Alps"). On July 19, 386 BC, the Gallic army wiped out the Roman defensive forces at the river Allia, leaving Rome open to sack more severe than any suffered until Alaric six centuries later. The day was forever afterwards a black memorial in Rome's calendar. Matius' victories against the German Cimbri and Teutoni in Gaul in the 2nd century merely confirmed the threat of these northern invaders in popular fears.
Thus when Caesar learned that a great folk migration of a northern Celtic tribe, the Helvetii (originally from what is now Switzerland) planned to pass through Gaul to obtain land in the west, he was given the ideal excuse for action. The Gauls, naturally, feared that the Helvetii would plunder en route, if not take over their lands outright. Caesar forbade the Helvetii to pass through lands so close to Rome's territory. He took five hastily assembled legions into battle against a vastly superior horde, estimated as nearly 270,000 people. However, the Helvetii had their woman and children with them, which severely restricted their mobility. In a series of skirmishes and the final battle near Toulon, Caesar claims only 130,000 of the tribe were left alive. They were forced by Caesar to return to their original lands in Switzerland after a brief but definitive campaign. Almost immediately, the leaders of several tribes, including the Aedui, Rome's allies, called on Caesar for help against the Germanic Sequani tribe under their leader, Ariovistus. One of the reasons for the Helvetian migration had been pressure from Ariovistus, whose people were filtering into northern Gaul and threatening their lands. The tribes begged Caesar to stop Ariovistus. Since the German was titled as a "Friend and Ally of the Roman people," Caesar tried to handle him diplomatically but his overtures only received defiant denials. When he moved against the German troops (near modern-day Besancon), Caesar was dumbfounded to find his own troops panic-stricken about fighting the Germans. He had to exhort the army to remember that Marius had beaten the Germans before and they would again. In a great battle (in which Caesar routed the German right wing), the Germans broke and streamed back across the Rhine. As Caesar wrote with understandable pride, "Two campaigns were thus finished in a single summer." He retired his army to winter quarters among the Sequani and returned to his duties in Cisalpine Gaul for the winter with the praises of those Gauls who had asked for Rome's protection.
57 BC: CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE BELGAE Many scholars believe that it was not until the end of his first year in Gaul that Caesar fully realized that, having once begun, he could not safely withdraw his forces until the whole of Gaul was pacified. He was particularly aware that, before he could move into Gaul's interior, he had to secure his rear (northeastern Gaul) from German incursions, in the area of the Belgic tribes between the Moselle and the North Sea, many of which were ethnically German. He also heard while in Cisalpine Gaul that the Belgae, fearful that Caesar would turn on them after he had pacified Celtic Gaul, were arming and preparing for war. Raising two new legions (the 13th and 14th), he moved quickly to the borders of the Belgae on the Marne River. Upon arrival, Caesar learned that fifteen tribes had united under Galba, king of the Suessiones, and planned to field 300,000 warriors. When the Belgic Remi tribe agreed to aid Caesar, the Belgae attacked their chief towns and pillaged their lands. In protecting the Remi, Caesar forced the assembled tribes to withdraw to within miles of the Sambre river. There he learned that the Nervii, fiercest of the Belgic tribes, the Atrebates and Aduatuci were waiting on the far side. The Battle of the Sambre was touch-and-go for Caesar: in the first of many battles, he was forced to personally rally his men, turning a near-defeat into victory, vitally assisted by Titus Labienus and his cavalry. The Nervii surrendered and were permitted to retain their lands. The Aduatuci, however, surrendered and then attempted to escape. In the first of many harsh retaliations upon Gauls who (in his mind) broke their word, Caesar sold the whole 53,000 men, women and children of the tribe into slavery. Meanwhile, Marcus Crassus' son had successfully moved into Normandy and Brittany and subdued the Armorican tribes. Caesar wrote that he believed his two years' campaigns had pacified Gaul and again returned to northern Italy. He was over-optimistic. It should be noted before going further, that Caesar's brutal actions in Gaul are sometimes distinguished as singular in ancient warfare. This is untrue. The history of Roman conquest generally involved either surrender or annihilation; by definition, to be conquered meant dead warriors and enslaved women and children, with pillage of all they owned. It was only during the Civil War, when Caesar did not apply this normal standard to fellow-Romans, that his clemency was considered remarkable. His harshness towards the Gauls when they refused to accept their conquest would increase over time.
56 BC: CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE MARITIME TRIBES Caesar had already decided that he would invade Britain; the tribal kinships between British tribes and Gallic ones meant continual escape from Gaul to Britain of "troublemakers" and aid from Britain to rebellious tribes. To do so, he had to secure the Channel tribes, particularly the Veneti, a seagoing people. The campaigns of 56 began with Caesar, unusually, dividing his forces, stationing legions under Labienus, Crassus, Sabinus and others throughout Gaul to prevent tribes aiding his efforts against the seagoing peoples. The Veneti, with a body of British auxiliaries, had prepared for war and amassed a fleet of light, maneuverable sailing ships far more expert than the lumbering Roman galleys. Decimus Brutus - one of Caesar's future assassins - was given command of the Roman fleet. Initial contacts were unsuccessful until the Romans realized that the use of archers permitted them to row closely to the Veneti vessels and that long "hooks" could then grapple the masts of the vessels and tow away so that the masts and sails were broken off, permitting boarding. This was so successful against the fleet - aided with a calm in which the sailing vessels were helpless before Caesar's galleys - that the entire fleet was decisively defeated and the Veneti overrun. This tribe, too, was sold into slavery. The campaign took all summer and Caesar once again put his troops into winter quarters and began building his own fleet with which to conquer Britain, while he returned to Cisalpine Gaul to administer that province.
56 BC: CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE MARITIME TRIBES Caesar had already decided that he would invade Britain; the tribal kinships between British tribes and Gallic ones meant continual escape from Gaul to Britain of "troublemakers" and aid from Britain to rebellious tribes. To do so, he had to secure the Channel tribes, particularly the Veneti, a seagoing people. The campaigns of 56 began with Caesar, unusually, dividing his forces, stationing legions under Labienus, Crassus, Sabinus and others throughout Gaul to prevent tribes aiding his efforts against the seagoing peoples. The Veneti, with a body of British auxiliaries, had prepared for war and amassed a fleet of light, maneuverable sailing ships far more expert than the lumbering Roman galleys. Decimus Brutus - one of Caesar's future assassins - was given command of the Roman fleet. Initial contacts were unsuccessful until the Romans realized that the use of archers permitted them to row closely to the Veneti vessels and that long "hooks" could then grapple the masts of the vessels and tow away so that the masts and sails were broken off, permitting boarding. This was so successful against the fleet - aided with a calm in which the sailing vessels were helpless before Caesar's galleys - that the entire fleet was decisively defeated and the Veneti overrun. This tribe, too, was sold into slavery. The campaign took all summer and Caesar once again put his troops into winter quarters and began building his own fleet with which to conquer Britain, while he returned to Cisalpine Gaul to administer that province.
54 BC: BRITAIN AND DISASTER When Caesar returned in the spring, he found 600 new transports and 28 galleys and ordered an assembly at Portius Itius (near modern-day Boulogne). He also found that the Treveri were treating with the Germans beyond the Rhine to attack while he was in Britain and had to march to the Ardennes to intimidate the Treveri and take hostages (many of whom he took with him to Britain). The second expedition to Britain sailed with five legions, 2,000 cavalry, and eight hundred ships. The size of the fleet - the largest until D-Day in 1944 - terrified the Britons and Caesar's landing was unopposed. Leaving ten cohorts to protect the ships, Caesar's army moved inland and rapidly overcame the British tribes, when Caesar received word that - again - his ships had been badly damaged by a freak storm. Caesar instantly recalled his men and returned to the beach to find 40 ships lost and many more damaged. He diverted men for repair and beached the ships behind entrenchments; meanwhile, Caesar learned that the British (convinced the Romans had turned back through fear) had elected Cassivellaunus their leader. He immediately set out against him, leaving his ships heavily guarded.
Caesar for the first time experienced the only type of warfare which truly threatened his successful career; the guerrilla warfare of an enemy who would not stand and fight. The very close-order drill and discipline that taught the Roman legions to battle according to plan was a hindrance in dealing with an enemy that "...never fought in close array": "Throughout this peculiar combat, which was fought in front of the camp in full view of everyone, it was seen that our troops were too heavily weighted by their armor to deal with such an enemy: they could not pursue them when they retreated and dared not get separated from their standards. The cavalry, too, found it very dangerous work fighting the charioteers; for the Britons would generally give ground on purpose and after drawing them some distance from the legions would jump down from their chariots and fight on foot, with the odds in their favor." B.G., V, 16. Eventually Caesar advanced to the Thames, possibly near Brentford, crossed to the left bank against strong opposition, and advanced deep into the country of the Trinobantes where he stormed the fortress of Cassivellaunus, who proposed surrender. But again, time and Gallic developments called him away from completing the campaign. The British surrender, hostages, and tribute was fixed before Caesar returned to Gaul upon word that "sudden commotions" required his presence. The conquest of Britain would have to wait almost a century for completion. Upon his return, Caesar called a convocation of tribes at Samarobriva (Amiens); a bad harvest, and Roman requisitioning, showed discontent simmering beneath the surface. As supplies were difficult, he divided and quartered his legions at strategic points throughout Gaul, remaining himself at Amiens in case of speedy action. He delayed leaving for northern Italy. It was prescient he did so. With the encouragement of Ambiorix, the Belgic Eburones were persuaded to attack the newly-formed legion stationed near Liege under Titurius Sabinus and Cotta, 50 miles from Cicero's supporting legion. The Gauls frightened Sabinus and his men by painting a terrifying picture of upcoming surprise attacks by both Gauls and Germans, suggesting that Sabinus evacuate to join Cicero's forces. Inevitably, as soon as the legion left its defensive fort, it was attacked and slaughtered by the exultant Gauls. Immediately, Ambiorix convinced the Nervii and their allies to attack Quintus Cicero's position, probably near Namur. In one of the most dramatic episodes in the Gallic War, Cicero was unable to get a messenger through to Caesar while he was besieged by Gauls who began to besiege him using what they had learned from Roman siege tactics. Finally a messenger managed to get through to Caesar, almost 170 miles away near Amiens, and Caesar raced to Cicero's rescue with two legions against the enemy's nearly 60,000 men. As Caesar approached, the Gauls raised the siege and fell on Caesar's legions. Entrenching and resorting to craft, Caesar persuaded the Gauls to attack and routed them with a cavalry charge. News of the victory caused Indutiomarus, who had planned a related attack on Labienus' legion, to desist. With the loss of one complete legion and serious casualties to a second, Caesar settled down to raise new new legions from Cisalpine Gaul and borrow a third from Pompey, which arrived before the end of winter. He ordered another convocation of Gallic chiefs in Lutetia (Paris), attended by all but the Senones, Carnutes and Treveri who were obviously planning continued resistance.
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for joining us today.
is that why most men fail in practicing random acts of intelligence and senseless acts of self control? Yikes!
In an historic move, the tribes had elected Vercingetorix their commander in chief and, some sources claim, King of Gaul. In this anxious summer of 52, he was maintaining his leadership position with the now-swollen confederacy with some difficulty. The tribes, long used to warring against each other for territory and plunder, cooperated only with difficulty. Vercingetorix had become convinced that a "scorched earth" policy would best succeed against the legions since, as both an intelligent and perceptive leader, he knew that numbers had not in the past succeeded against legionary discipline. He pleaded with the tribal leaders to have their people destroy their grain and all foodstuffs which might support the Romans as well as themselves during the campaign. As Caesar himself quotes the great Gaul, All you have to do...is to destroy your corn crops without hesitation and burn your granaries, knowing that this sacrifice will make you free men for ever and rulers over others." This pragmatic advice was, however, directly contradictory to the Gallic warrior tradition and was not universally followed. After inconclusive contests with Caesar at Gergovia, Vercingetorix was persuaded to invest the citadel of Alesia, the capital of the Mandubrii, as his base, and to attack Caesar's army (en route to the lands of the Sequani) with his vastly superior cavalry forces. Caesar's legions were, however, able to completely repulse the attack with the frightening aid of their new German cavalry: they proved not only of signal support to Caesar but were greatly feared by the Gauls themselves. This quite unexpected defeat led Vercingetorix to retire his army (allegedly 80,000 strong) to the great hilltop fortress of Alesia.