Iraq mission was founded on truth

Stop the beat-up -- the Bush-Howard case for war with Saddam Hussein was strong and accurate

THE legal case for war against Iraq was strong. It remains as strong as ever, despite the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have yet been found and despite the huge beat-up about what George W. Bush and John Howard had to say about uranium from Africa.

The legal case was straightforward. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The Security Council authorised the use of force against it (Resolution 678). In 1991 the Security Council agreed to a ceasefire on condition that Iraq accepted destruction of its WMD (Resolution 687). Iraq did not comply with those ceasefire conditions. In the words of Resolution 1441 of 2002, Iraq failed to provide ``an accurate, full, final and complete disclosure as required by Resolution 687 of all aspects of its programs to develop WMD''.

Hans Blix, the UN Security Council weapons inspector from 2002-2003, recorded in his reports to the Security Council that Iraq had failed to account for its possession of the nerve agent VX, 6500 chemical bombs, at least 8500 litres of anthrax, 650kg of bacterial growth media, and 1000 tonnes of chemical agents. And these, he said, were only examples of ``many proscribed weapons and items not accounted for''.

It is this decade-long failure to account for its destruction of WMD that is the fundamental breach of ceasefire conditions that justified in 2003 the resumption of the military action originally authorised in 1990 by Resolution 678. It is argued by some lawyers that this is a ``legalistic and technical'' justification of the war in Iraq. The last time I looked the law was by definition ``legalistic''. And more often than not it is a great deal more technical than this relatively uncomplicated case.

What about the failure to find any WMD since the war? Strictly speaking that is not relevant to the legal duty of Iraq, which was to account for WMD it alleged it had destroyed. As Blix himself pointed out, this is not a matter of proving a negative. ``Iraq has all the archives of the government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports of how they have been used. It should also have letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of material.'' And if Iraq had in fact dismantled all its WMD programs as required, why on earth did it not account for that destruction, and thus avoid attack?

But if you think this is too technical and legalistic a response, let me refer you to an article of July 2, 2003 by Rolf Ekeus. Ekeus, chairman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, was the UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991-97.

Ekeus said that it is entirely to be expected that weapons have not been found. Because of the relatively low quality and instability of Iraq's chemical and biological materials, he says Iraq tended not to put them together as weapons until they were about to be used. It would blend its chemical weapons work and material with ``ordinary civilian production facilities and activities''.

Ekeus said: ``This combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat -- its chemical weapon. The rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the important question of WMD in Iraq and exposed the American and British administrations to unjustified criticism.''

Ekeus says that Iraq is still a ``republic of fear'' and will be until Hussein and his sons are apprehended and that is why ``few if any of those involved in the weapons program will provide information on their activities. The risk of terrible revenge against oneself or one's family is simply too great.''

Ekeus ended with the following. ``This is enough to justify the international military intervention undertaken by the US and Britain. To accept the alternative -- letting Hussein remain in power with his chemical and biological weapons capability -- would have been to tolerate a continuing destabilising arms race in the gulf, including future nuclearisation of the region, threats to the world's energy supplies, leakage of WMD technology and expertise to terrorist networks, systematic sabotage of efforts to create and sustain a process of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the continued terrorising of the Iraqi people.''

Ekeus, remember, is the opposite of a right-wing hard-line warrior. He is a former Swedish diplomat, is head of a famous Peace Research Institute, and all his instincts are against war.

But what about the alleged misleading by Howard and Bush over the uranium from Africa? It is not surprising that many are not prepared to accept their denials. Howard's record of breaches of solemn undertakings and his performance on the children overboard affair mean that the term ``Honest John'' no longer springs to the lips of any Australian. Bush is once again ruining a strong case by the blundering incompetence of his administration. Anyone who persists in retaining a Defence Secretary as erratic, vain, intolerant of disagreement and besotted by the press as Donald Rumsfeld really cannot complain.

But the truth has to be given its due. Both Bush and Howard, in their speeches, were accurate. They did not refer to the forged documents about uranium from Niger. Rather, according to a statement from the Office of National Assessments on July 10, they were referring to additional British intelligence about uranium from Africa, intelligence by which the British continue to stand. On this occasion at least, Bush and Howard are being given a bum rap.

Based on thorough analysis, the [International Atomic Energy Agency] has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents -- which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger -- are in fact not authentic. We have concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.

-- UN nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei's report to the UN Security Council, quoted by the BBC on March 7

The intelligence documents, given to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, indicated that Iraq might have tried to buy 500 tons of uranium from Niger, but the agency said they were ``obvious'' fakes.

CIA officials now say they communicated significant doubts to the administration about the evidence backing up charges that Iraq tried to purchase uranium from Africa for nuclear weapons, charges that found their way into President Bush's state of the union address, a State Department ``fact sheet'' and public remarks by numerous senior officials. That evidence was dismissed as a forgery early this month by UN officials investigating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The Bush administration does not dispute this conclusion.

The intelligence officials offered a tantalising coda for conspiracy-mongers. They said the ``crude forgery'' received by UN weapons inspectors suggesting the Iraqis were trying to buy uranium from Niger as part of their nuclear program was originally put in intelligence channels by France. The officials wouldn't speculate on French motives.

PRESIDENTIAL REPORT PURSUANT TO USE OF FORCE RESOLUTION -- (House of Representatives - March 19, 2003)

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---

(Mr. HASTERT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include therein extraneous material.)

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, and for the information of all Members, I am in receipt of a report from the President pursuant to the Use of Force Resolution approved by the Congress last year.

This report summarizes diplomatic and other peaceful means pursued by the United States, cooperating with foreign countries and international organizations to obtain Iraqi compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding .

Pursuant to House Rule XII, I will refer this report to the Committee on

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International Relations. In addition, for the information of the Members, I will submit the document in its entirety for printing into the Congressional Record.

Let me remind Members that this document is pursuant to legislation and the statute that we passed last year. This is not a declaration that we are in any specific type of activity at this time. It only is the pursuit of the statute that was passed last year.

Any further announcement will be shared with the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, March 18, 2003.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with section 3(b) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), and based on information available to me, including that in the enclosed document, I determine that:

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic and other peaceful means alone will neither (A) adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by nor (B) likely lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding ; and

(2) acting pursuant to the Constitution and Public Law 107-243 is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Sincerely,
George W. Bush.

--

Report In Connection With Presidential Determination Under Public Law 107-243

This report summarizes diplomatic and other peaceful means pursued by the United States, working for more than a dozen years with cooperating foreign countries and international organizations such as the United Nations, in an intensive effort (1) to protect the national security of the United States, as well as the security of other countries, against the continuing threat posed by Iraqi development and use of weapons of mass destruction, and (2) to obtain Iraqi compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions regarding . Because of the intransigence and defiance of the Iraqi regime, further continuation of these efforts will neither adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by nor likely lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding .

This report also explains that a determination to use force against is fully consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Indeed, as Congress found when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), continues to harbor and aid international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the safety of United States citizens. The use of military force to remove the Iraqi regime is therefore not only consistent with, but is a vital part of, the international war on terrorism.

This document is summary in form rather than a comprehensive and definitive rendition of actions taken and related factual data that would constitute a complete historical record. This document should be considered in light of the information that has been, and will be, furnished to Congress, including the periodic reports consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).

1. THE GULF WAR AND CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

On August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein of initiated the brutal and unprovoked invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The United States and many foreign governments, working together and through the UN, sought by diplomatic and other peaceful means to compel to withdraw from Kuwait and to establish international peace and security in the region.

President George H.W. Bush's letter transmitted to Congress on January 16, 1991, was accompanied by a report that catalogued the extensive diplomatic, economic, and other peaceful means pursued by the United States to achieve U.S. and UNSC objectives. It details adoption by the UNSC of a dozen resolutions, from Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, demanding that withdraw from Kuwait, to Resolution 678 on November 29, 1990, authorizing member states to use all necessary means to ``implement Resolution 660,'' to implement ``all subsequent relevant resolutions,'' and ``to restore international peace and security in the area.''

Despite extraordinary and concerted efforts by the United States, other countries, and international organizations through diplomacy, multilateral economic sanctions, and other peaceful means to bring about Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions, and even after the UN and the United States explicitly informed that its failure to comply with UNSC resolutions would result in the use of armed force to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's regime remained intransigent. The President ordered the U.S. armed forces, working in a coalition with the armed forces of other cooperating countries, to liberate Kuwait. The coalition forces promptly drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, set Kuwait free, and moved into southern .

On April 3, 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, which established conditions for a cease-fire to suspend hostilities. Among other requirements, UNSCR 687 required to (1) destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km; (2) not use, develop, construct, or acquire biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; (3) submit to international inspections to verify compliance; and (4) not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow others who commit such acts to operate in Iraqi territory. On April 6, 1991, communicated to the UNSC its acceptance of the conditions for the cease-fire.

2. BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE CONDITIONS: THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY

Since almost the moment it agreed to the conditions of the cease-fire, has committed repeated and escalating breaches of those conditions. Throughout the first seven years that accepted inspections, it repeatedly obstructed access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On two occasions, in 1993 and 1998, Iraq's refusal to comply with its international obligations under the cease-fire led military action by coalition forces. In 1998, under threat of ``severest consequences,'' signed a Memorandum of Understanding pledging full cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA and ``immediate, unconditional and unrestricted'' access for their inspections. In a matter of months, however, the Iraqi regime suspended cooperation, in part as an effort to condition compliance on the lifting of oil sanctions; it ultimately ceased all cooperation, causing the inspectors to leave the country.

On December 17, 1999, after a year with no inspections in , the UNSC established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor to UNSCOM, to address unresolved disarmament issues and verify Iraqi compliance with the disarmament required by UNSCR 687 and related resolutions. refused to allow inspectors to return for yet another three years.

3. RECENT DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS REJECTED BY

On September 12, 2002, the President addressed the United Nations General Assembly on . He challenged the United Nations to act decisively to deal with Iraq's systematic twelve-year defiance and to compel Iraq's disarmament of the weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems that continue to threaten international peace and security. The White House background paper, ``A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations'' (September 12, 2002), summarizes Iraq's actions as of the time the President initiated intensified efforts to enforce all relevant UN Resolutions and demonstrates the failure of diplomacy to affect Iraq's conduct: ``For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has deceived and defied the will and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by, among other things: continuing to seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and prohibited long-range missiles; brutalizing the Iraqi people, including committing gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity; supporting international terrorism; refusing to release or account for prisoners of war and other missing individuals from the Gulf War era; refusing to return stolen Kuwaiti property; and working to circumvent the UN's economic sanctions.''

The President also summarized Iraq's response to a decade of diplomatic efforts and its breach of the cease-fire conditions on October 7, 2002, in an address in Cincinnati, Ohio: ``Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith.''

In response to the President's challenge of September 12, 2002, and after intensive negotiation and diplomacy, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSCR 1441 on November 8, 2002. The UNSC declared that ``has been and remains in material breach'' of its disarmament obligations, but chose to afford one ``final opportunity'' to comply. The UNSC again placed the burden on to comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to try to find what is concealing. The UNSC made clear that any false statements or omissions in declarations and any failure by to comply with UNSCR 1441 would constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations. Rather than seizing this final

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opportunity for a peaceful solution by giving full and immediate cooperation, the Hussein regime responded with renewed defiance and deception.

For example, while UNSCR 1441 required that provide a ``currently accurate, full and complete'' declaration of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') and delivery programs, Iraq's Declaration of December 7, 2002, failed to comply with that requirement. The 12,000-page document that provided was little more than a restatement of old and discredited material. It was incomplete, inaccurate, and composed mostly of recycled information that failed to address any of the outstanding disarmament questions inspectors had previously identified.

In addition, since the passage of UNSCR 1441, has failed to cooperate fully with inspectors. It delayed until two-and-a-half months after the resumption of inspections UNMOVIC's use of aerial surveillance flights; failed to provide private access to officials for interview by inspectors; intimidated witnesses with threats; undertook massive efforts to deceive and defeat inspectors, including cleanup and transshipment activities at nearly 30 sites; failed to provide numerous documents requested by UNMOVIC; repeatedly provided incomplete or outdated listings of its WMD personnel; and hid documents in homes, including over 2000 pages of Iraqi documents regarding past uranium enrichment programs. In a report dated March 6, 2003, UNMOVIC described over 600 instances in which had failed to declare fully activities related to its chemical, biological, or missile procurements.

Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, reported to the UNSC on January 27, 2003 that `` appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.'' Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, reported that Iraq's declaration of December 7 ``did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.'' Both demonstrated that there was no evidence that had decided to comply with disarmament obligations. Diplomatic efforts have not affected Iraq's conduct positively. Any temporary changes in Iraq's approach that have occurred over the years have been in response to the threat of use of force.

On February 5, 2003, the Secretary of State delivered a comprehensive presentation to the UNSC using declassified information, including human intelligence reports, communications intercepts and overhead imagery, which demonstrated Iraq's ongoing efforts to pursue WMD programs and conceal them from UN inspectors. The Secretary of State updated that presentation one month later by detailing intelligence reports on continuing efforts by to maintain and conceal proscribed materials.

Despite the continued resistance by , the United States has continued to use diplomatic and other peaceful means to achieve complete and total disarmament that would adequately protect the national security of the United States from the threat posed by and which is required by all relevant UNSC resolutions. On March 7, 2003, the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain presented a draft resolution that would have established for a March 17 deadline to cooperate fully with disarmament demands. Since the adoption of UNSCR 1441 in November 2002, there have been numerous calls and meetings by President Bush and the Secretary of State with other world leaders to try to find a diplomatic or other peaceful way to disarm . On March 13, 2003, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN asked for members of the UNSC to consider seriously a British proposal to establish six benchmarks that would be used to measure whether or not the regime in is coming into full, immediate, and unconditional compliance with the pertinent UN resolutions. On March 16, 2003, the President traveled to the Azores to meet with Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar to assess the situation and confirm that diplomatic and other peaceful means have been attempted to achieve Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSC resolutions. Despite these diplomatic and peaceful efforts, remains in breach of relevant UNSC resolutions and a threat to the United States and other countries. Further diplomatic efforts were suspended reluctantly after, as the President observed on March 17, ``some permanent members of the Security Council ha[d] publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of .''

The lesson learned after twelve years of Iraqi defiance is that the appearance of progress on process is meaningless--what is necessary is immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation in the complete disarmament of Iraq's prohibited weapons. As a result of its repeated failure to cooperate with efforts aimed at actual disarmament, has retained weapons of mass destruction that it agreed, as an essential condition of the cease-fire in 1991, not to develop or possess. The Secretary of State's February 5, 2003, presentation cited examples, such as Iraq's biological weapons based on anthrax and botulinum toxin, chemical weapons based on mustard and nerve agents, proscribed missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and mobile biological weapons factories. The Secretary of State also discussed with the Security Council Saddam Hussein's efforts to reconstitute Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

The dangers posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles are clear. Saddam Hussein has already used such weapons, repeatedly. He used them against Iranian troops in the 1980s. He used ballistic missiles against civilians during the Gulf War, firing Scud missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. He used chemical weapons against the Iraqi people in Northern . As Congress stated in 1998 in Public Law 105-235, `` Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threaten vital United States interests and international peace and security.'' Congress concluded in Public Law 105-338 that ``[i]t should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.''

In addition, Congress stated in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), that: `` both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations.''

Nothing that has occurred in the past twelve years, the past twelve months, the past twelve weeks, or the past twelve days provides any basis for concluding that further diplomatic or other peaceful means will adequately protect the national security of the United States from the continuing threat posed by or are likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding and the restoration of peace and security in the area.

As the President stated on March 17, ``[t]he Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage.'' Further delay in taking action against will only serve to give Saddam Hussein's regime additional time to further develop WMD to use against the United States, its citizens, and its allies. The United States and the UN have long demanded immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation by in the disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction. There is no reason to believe that will disarm, and cooperate with inspections to verify such disarmament, if the U.S. and the UN employ only diplomacy and other peaceful means.

4. USE OF FORCE AGAINST IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR ON TERROR

In Public Law 107-243, Congress made a number of findings concerning Iraq's support for international terrorism. Among other things, Congress determined that:

Members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in .

continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens.

It is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary.

In addition, the Secretary of State's address to the UN on February 5, 2003 revealed a terrorist training area in northeastern with ties to Iraqi intelligence and activities of al Qaida affiliates in Baghdad. Public reports indicate that is currently harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close al Qaida associate. In addition, has provided training in document forgery and explosives to al Qaida. Other terrorist groups have been supported by over past years.

has a long history of supporting terrorism, and continues to be a safe haven, transit point, and operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States and our allies. These actions violate Iraq's obligations under the UNSCR 687 cease-fire not to commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow others who commit such acts to operate in Iraqi territory. has also failed to comply with its cease-fire obligations to disarm and submit to international inspections to verify compliance. In light of these Iraqi activities, the use of force by the United States and other countries against the current Iraqi regime is fully consistent with--indeed, it is an integral part of--the war against international terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Both because harbors terrorists and because could share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists who seek them for use against the United States, the use of force to bring into compliance with its obligations under UNSC resolutions would be a significant contribution to the war on terrorists of global reach. A change in the current Iraqi regime would eliminate an important source of support for international terrorist activities. It would likely also assist efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and capture terrorists around the globe. United States Government personnel operating in may discover information through Iraqi government documents and interviews with

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detained Iraqi officials that would identify individuals currently in the United States and abroad who are linked to terrorist organizations.

The use of force against will directly advance the war on terror, and will be consistent with continuing efforts against international terrorists residing and operating elsewhere in the world. The U.S. armed forces remain engaged in key areas around the world in the prosecution of the war on terrorism. The necessary preparations for and conduct of military operations in have not diminished the resolve, capability, or activities of the United States to pursue international terrorists to protect our homeland. Nor with the use of military force against distract civilian departments and agencies of the United States Government from continuing aggressive efforts in combating terrorism, or divert resources from the overall world-wide counter-terrorism effort. Current counter-terrorism investigations and activities will continue during any military conflict, and winning the war on terrorism will remain the top priority for our Government.

Indeed, the United States has made significant progress on other fronts in the war on terror even while and its threat to the United States and other countries have been a focus of concern. Since November 2002, when deployments of forces to the Gulf were substantially increased, the United States, in cooperation with our allies, has arrested or captured several terrorists and frustrated several terrorist plots. For example, on March 1, 2003, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan by Pakistani authorities, with U.S. cooperation. The capture of Sheikh Mohammed, the al Qaida ``mastermind'' of the September 11th attacks and Osama Bin Laden's senior terrorist attack planner, is a severe blow to al Qaida that will destabilize the terrorist network worldwide. This and other successes make clear that the United States Government remains focused on the war on terror, and that use of force in is fully consistent with continuing to take necessary actions against terrorists and terrorist organizations.

5. CONCLUSION

In the circumstances described above, the President of the United States has the authority--indeed, given the dangers involved, the duty--to use force against to protect the security of the American people and to compel compliance with UNSC resolutions.

The President has full authority to use the armed forces in under the U.S. Constitution, including his authority as Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces. This authority is supported by explicit statutory authorizations contained in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).

In addition, U.S. action is consistent with the UN Charter. The UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provided that member states, including the United States, have the right to use force in to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Council authorized the use of force in UNSCR 678 with respect to in 1990. This resolution--on which the United States has relied continuously and with the full knowledge of the UNSC to use force in 1993, 1996, and 1998 and to enforce the no-fly zones--remains in effect today. In UNSCR 1441, the UNSC unanimously decided again that has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions and would face serious consequences if it failed immediately to disarm. And, of course, based on existing facts, including the nature and type of the threat posed by , the United States may always proceed in the exercise of its inherent right of self defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Accordingly, the United States has clear authority to use military force against to assure its national security and to compel Iraq's compliance with applicable UNSC resolutions.
--H.J.Res.114-- Public Law 107-243

H.J.Res.114

One Hundred Seventh Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two

Joint Resolution

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;

Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;

Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in `material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations';

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);

Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677';

Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and `constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688';

Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable';

Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002'.

SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to--

(1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and

(2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to--

(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and

(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that--

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and

(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements-

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) REPORTS- The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338).

(b) SINGLE CONSOLIDATED REPORT- To the extent that the submission of any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated report to the Congress.

(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- To the extent that the information required by section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) is included in the report required by this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of such resolution.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.

END

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