A Look Back at History: A Reality Check for Those Who Deplore the Nuking of Japan

In the decades immediately following World War II, American public opinion generally supported President Truman's historic decision to unleash nuclear weapons on Japan. Everyone accepted that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an unfortunate necessity brought on by the unwillingness of Japan to surrender. Those two bombs, which killed over 140,000 civilians, were viewed as a way to avoid the obscene costs in men and materiel associated with invading the Japanese homeland.

Nowadays, many question whether those bombs were necessary. Given that they killed almost exclusively civilians and that the second of the two was dropped only two days after the first, many people have concluded that the attack was immoral. Today, the typical American is likely to react to the words "Hiroshima" and "Nagasaki" with a vague sense that our country did something wrong.

But the nuking of Japan was a moral act: war is hell for those who do the actual fighting, so those two bombs put an end to their suffering. This was true for the soldiers on both sides (even a Japanese soldier must have felt relieved to know he was going to survive unscathed). A purely theoretical model for explaining why dropping nukes was bad appeals only to those who have no skin in the game.

The Japanese war had already killed millions, most of whom were civilians. The two nukes killed 140,000. Do the math. It is a distasteful application of arithmetic, but it is an application that soldiers have to do all the time in their struggle to win a war.

For those who favor elegant ideas over ugly realism, I strongly recommend as a corrective the work of an ordinary Marine who, in 1981, published a book narrating his experience as a hand-to-hand combat soldier in the Pacific theater

"Second-guessing the decisions of those actually fighting the war, from a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen, three generations after the fact, secure and well-fed, toying with alternatives in a leisurely manner, casting painless moral pronouncements this way and that, smacks of hubris so towering it defies measurement."

"Douglas MacAruthur was annoyed because no one saw fit to read him in on the Manhattan Project. His picque - understandable in someone with an ego that big - differed little from that voiced at the time by a number of senior leaders in the Army Ground Forces and the US navy: plain old interservice rivalry."

Thanks for that! You totally made my day!

No one foresaw the moralistic misgivings that surfaced after WW2.

Incorrect.

Multiple misgivings about aerial bombardment of civilian populations existed and were widespread long before WWII, indeed before the first world war.

They surfaced in the Hague convention of 1899 (which was ratified by the US in 1902), were restated in the Hague convention of 1907 (ratified by the US Senate in 1908), again (and more specifically) in the Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, The Hague, February 1923 and again in the "Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From the Air in Case of War" adopted by the League of Nations, September 30, 1938.

These misgivings were considered common enough that FDR's statement on the topic is 1939 is framed not as a pronouncement of a new policy, but rather as a reflection of what he labels the "conscience of humanity":

"Appeal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Aerial Bombardment of Civilian Populations, September 1, 1939 The President of the United States to the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and His Britannic Majesty, September 1, 1939

The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers of population during the course of the hostilities which have raged in various quarters of the earth during the past few years, which has resulted in the maiming and in the death of thousands of defenseless men, women, and children, has sickened the hearts of every civilized man and woman, and has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity.

If resort is had to this form of inhuman barbarism during the period of the tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who have no responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, the hostilities which have now broken out, will lose their lives. I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every government which may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities, upon the understanding that these same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents. I request an immediate reply.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

“Incorrect.

Multiple misgivings about aerial bombardment of civilian populations existed and were widespread long before WWII, indeed before the first world war. ...” [edwinland, post 123]

My humblest apologies to edwinland and the other forum members.

I was referring solely to the goofball moralizing backlash that germinated among the nontechnical intelligentsia, in response to the employment of the atomic bombs against Imperial Japan.

edwinland deserves the thanks of the forum for summarizing the international agreements and related pronouncements publicized by the US government, concerning aerial bombardment. Helps us put the conception and use of air power in better perspective.

“... I have two questions, for which an opinion is neither required nor desired. ...

(1) Were you alive in 1945? (yes/no)

(2) Had you any part in writing the document concerning for the A-bomb targets selected for Harry Truman’s approval and decision? (yes/no)” [imardmd1, post 121]

My answer to both, of course, is “no.”

I do admit to mild curiosity, though, concerning why the esteemed poster believes the nature of my responses makes any difference.

“I do appreciate yur comments as they seem to be well-informed and well constructed. If I don’t happen to share one opinion with you, it may be that we do share several other ones. I have a great appreciation for those who have committed their lives to the service of our country, with no regrets.
I am very grateful for your answer to those questions. Whether or not you would, is one sign to me of your openness. The way you answered is to me an indication of character. I hope that we can be friends in this forum.”

Courteously phrased. Thanks for that; some forum members come all unbraced when their orthodoxies aren’t given sufficient obeisance.

But my counter-question still goes unanswered: what difference does it make, whether or not I was alive in 1945, or personally acquainted with senior USAAF leaders of the day?

[Instead of playing coy games, I can admit that I did meet many of those leaders, in the latter day. Even got to meet Curtis LeMay. He did not share any thoughts on doctrine nor policy - I was a lowly aircrew member then - but what many citizens do not know is that general officers never really retire: almost all maintain some sort of contact, and receive periodic update briefings, after which we deduced that their impact on policies could still be felt.]

I spent almost the entire duration of my active-duty stint involved with what are now called long-range strike aircraft: B-52 aircrew and, later, B-1B initial cadre. Flight evaluator in both systems. After becoming medically grounded, I served in various staff positions providing technical and analytical support for these systems, and many others, including formulation and evaluation of strike plans. For every system, not merely the bombers.

But any such “inside information” that I might happen to possess isn’t required to grasp the intent and details of targeting of USAAF strategic bombers. Army Air Corps leaders of the period 1919-1947 had to work hard to develop system capabilities, acquire sufficient numbers of systems, and invent bombardment doctrine. They took on a serious task and were forced to compete at almost all levels against the senior armed services, who resisted any independent role for air power (and still do). Thus, they committed their thoughts - and policy positions - to paper with the utmost force and clarity, to bolster their positions, inside the military, with the rest of the government, and with the general public.

Therefore, what imardmd1 is asserting or denying about targeting can easily be verified. Or not.

I asserted that the sites receiving the favors of A-bombers' attention were far from the most populous centers, and that some level of compassion was involved.

I was alive in 1945, eight going on nine, to be exact; and some of my friends many decades later on included a couple of guys that walked the terrain of Hiroshima within days subsequent to the incident.

One of them was a Pensacola-trained Navy photographer (wounded in the kamikaze raids off Okinawa) tasked with recording it, and the other was a Marine veteran who had fought in the front line of Edson's/Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal, later sent to Guam, then to guard the bombing site, IIRC. They had their own opinions about the outcome.

As to snooping about your background, I realized that your service involvement might be of a privileged nature, not for disclosure, so I did not wish to press. I see that your FR profile is quite blank, perhaps for a reason.

My interests through the years has run to learning as much as I could about the conflict that consumed our national conscience daily in my formative years. I've read both fictional and factual accounts. One that struck me was the layman's version of Robert Eichelberger's account for the island-hopping strategy of the Pacific Theater campaign. Another was reading through completely, about twenty-five years ago, George Feifer's "Tennozan: the Battle of Okinawa and the atomic bomb," with a view toward what was still going on in the mind of a very close friend, who with the 6 Mar Div went through the entire Okinawa fracas (Silver Star) and saw the adversaries committing suicide by jumping off the cliffs as they were driven off the island. But when that was over, very shortly the A-bombs were deployed. Regarding that decision, a sample of the available information available now reads like this:

Harry S Truman’s Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

Harry S Truman National Historic Site, Manhattan Project National Historical Park

Excerpts:

Finally, Truman stipulated it should not be a city of traditional cultural significance to Japan, such as Kyoto. Truman did not seek to destroy Japanese culture or people; the goal was to destroy Japan’s ability to make war.

Truman responded, “I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring myself to believe that because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in that same manner. For myself I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the ‘pigheadedness’ of the leaders of a nation, and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless absolutely necessary.”

Without discussing the effects of a nation that regarded their Emperor to be truly a God, nor of his forcing the nation to commit an ignoble, dishonorable form of self-destruction, I do not know why you want to discredit my contentions that seem to be founded on, and supported by facts, when I only said that some compassion was exerted in terminating the war by the particular choices of where to bomb.

You may be right from the tactical view, but the objective was to totally quench the Japanese will to resist. In the end, the will of the people was vested in Hirohito (or vice versa), and to kill him would have left them without a decision except to go forward as a headless corpse until they were all dead. I would have thought that the Psywar experts wold have seen that, and met the proper objectivial need with the correct strategic decision. Which, apparently, they did, though it finally had to be effected by Truman.

Verify that. Or not.

“...I do not know why you want to discredit my contentions that seem to be founded on, and supported by facts, when I only said that some compassion was exerted in terminating the war by the particular choices of where to bomb. ...

... the will of the people was vested in Hirohito (or vice versa), and to kill him would have left them without a decision except to go forward as a headless corpse until they were all dead. I would have thought that the Psywar experts would have seen that, and met the proper objectivial need with the correct strategic decision. Which, apparently, they did, ... “

Hadn’t seen compassion cited as a factor before this, in air strike targeting decisions of that bombardment campaign. Considering the nature of the target base, and the limits on strike precision, and the limits of available target intel, I’m not at all confident it would be possible to select this or that city as a target, based on compassion - whatever that might mean in the context.

Whatever the accuracy of the direct quotes posted on the NPS websites, I am wary of the attendant text. Like a great many excerpts from historical-site explanatory signage, it hints that the NPS curators and/or whoever supervises them are attempting to inject a sense of moral struggles within the conscience of President Truman and other senior US/Allied leaders at the time. It has all the nuances of after-the-fact excuse-mongering, something US leaders engaged in to a degree I find less than praiseworthy. I can only surmise that Presidents, Cabinet secretaries, generals, admirals, and the like saw Samuel McCrea Cavert coming, and they shrank from the moralistic thrashing he and his colleagues were bringing. Can’t say I blame them.

I suspect that in theorizing how psyops types might have assessed the situation, imardmd1 goes a step beyond what can be believably defended. Point of jargon: no one in the trade calls it “Psywar,” by the way. Not that anyone takes that sort of psychologizing about the enemy seriously: it’s never amounted to anything more substantive that a collection of possibly plausible notions, which are seized on in desperation - because our capabilities are otherwise insufficient to the task, or we don’t dare use them, for reasons of power politics originating outside the problem at hand.

Take a look at a map of Japan Home Islands population density. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Kokura do lie at a fair remove from the Tokyo/Yokohama region, but they are much closer to Nagoya and the Osaka/Kobe regions. And the are not in any sense removed from populated areas: they are merely part of the most densely populated region in the Home Islands - a belt running along the south shores of Honshu, north shores of Shikoku, and the northern tip of Kyushu.

Thank you for your comments.

In dealing with things I read, it is clear that no one writes without injecting some degree of their own opinion, eh? It is true that I found the reference to the Manhattan Project history site just to look up what has been said regarding the strategic options considered, the choices made, and Truman's reported comments on them. The appropriate hermeneutical rule to use in interpreting the text here is the number one consideration, which is this: If the plain sense of the narrative is authoritative and makes common sense, then seek no other sense. The summary did make common sense to me, so I took it that way.

If your experience leads you to other conclusions, these are just yours (who could not have been a participant) versus somebody(s) who was there and whose point of view is set down in clear, simple terms.

I do not feel that I have the freedom to invent a different scheme than the one presented, so until a more credible first-hand eyewitness is found who contradicts the record, I'm inclined to take it as it has been presented for now.

Maybe there'll be other topics that we can discuss without getting into the old "my way or the highway" mode.

“...The appropriate hermeneutical rule ... If the plain sense of the narrative is authoritative and makes common sense, ... seek no other ... until a more credible first-hand eyewitness is found who contradicts the record, I’m inclined to take it as it has been presented for now. ...” [imardmd1, post 134]

Yikes. Much to chew on here, but as I’m no theological authority, nor philosophical authority, I’m not presuming to question it.

Theologians, philosophers, politicians, academics, journalists are latecomers; as chattering classists they seek power without any equivalent merit. Mostly, I defer to their pronouncements, but when they insist on dictating how I must discharge professional responsibilities about which they know nothing, they are in essence making my job more difficult. I refuse to thank them for it.

“... No one is telling you how to discharge your professional responsibilities, ...” [imardmd1, post 137]

The esteemed poster might benefit from a little more contact with the workaday world of the country’s military establishment. Not that that would assure any particular outcome: some folks spend decades in it up to their necks, but still fail to get a clue.

The greenest recruit in the nation’s armed services does more for the country over the course of their first week on active duty, than any stray member of the chattering-class groups I mentioned can possibly do, in the course of an entire lifetime.

Get this: I claim no credit for myself. Without the troops & technicians I had the privilege to supervise and lead, without their understanding and ability and courage, I was nothing. Except a balding, nearsighted guy sitting at a desk, pushing papers around, and annoying some other people on occasion.

The nation stands, and our fellow citzens live as freely as they do, because my erstwhile colleagues stand at the walls and point big guns at our adversaries. And for that reason only. Our self-appointed moral arbiters have been getting a free ride all along.

I've done my own bit by fulfilling my national obligation, with an Honorable Discharge from AUS as Sgt.E5 MG squad leader, 1962. And I consider it very, very miniscule as compared to the veterans who trained me as well as those who have since made me both friend and confidant.

Many of them are members of the DAV (to whom all my hours of time in the VAVS are credited), and others are those who are residents of the VA hospital around the corner. Several have gone on to Glory, as I will be, not to far from now.

But none of them are chattering on and on about themselves as you have done in the course of the continuing exchange in this topic. Most of them share their experiences only when they have found out they can place trust in someone who understands and hasn't abused the relationship.

You can stop playing the false humility role in which you address me in the third person. I'm not impressed with that plebe line of approach, either; nor is it moving when you essentially call the people who wrote about their participation in the A-bombing of Japan a bunch of liars, according to your way of reading their intents.

I was thinking that it might be possible to respect your claims, but its beginning to look like that was a mistake.

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