Posted on 02/20/2004 9:01:42 PM PST by RWR8189
Thanks for the ping ! ...
A RECENTLY INTERCEPTED MESSAGE from Iraq-based terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi asking the al Qaeda leadership for reinforcements reignited the debate over al Qaeda ties with Saddam Hussein's fallen Baath regime. William Safire of the New York Times called the message a "smoking gun," while the University of Michigan's Juan Cole says that Safire "offers not even one document to prove" the Saddam-al Qaeda nexus. What you are about to read bears directly on that debate. It is based on a recent interview with Abdul Rahman al-Shamari, who served in Saddam's secret police, the Mukhabarat, from 1997 to 2002, and is currently sitting in a Kurdish prison. Al-Shamari says that he worked for a man who was Saddam's envoy to al Qaeda.Before recounting details from my January 29 interview, some caution is necessary. Al-Shamari's account was compelling and filled with specific information that would either make him a skilled and detailed liar or a man with information that the U.S. public needs to hear. My Iraqi escort informed me that al-Shamari has been in prison since March 2002, that U.S. officials have visited him several times, and that his story has remained consistent. There was little language barrier; my Arabic skills allowed me to understand much of what al-Shamari said, even before translation. Finally, subsequent conversations with U.S. government officials in Washington and Baghdad, as well as several articles written well before this one, indicate that al-Shamari's claims have been echoed by other sources throughout Iraq.
We are taking the fight to the enemy, to prevent their bringing it here.
From your link to Daniel Pipes article:
The MEK is not your typical anti-Western group, but an organization with a strong political presence in Western capitals and over 3,000 soldiers stationed in Iraq, singularly dedicated to one goal: overthrowing its "archenemy," the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, during its 17 years in Iraq, it also had to do Saddam Hussein's bidding. This situation raises several questions:
Is the MEK a terrorist group? No. It used terrorism decades ago, when its members attacked Americans. For the last 15 years, however, the MEK has been organized as an army, and its only violent actions have been directed against the Iranian regime.
Unlike Hezbollah (which targets Jewish community centers and shoots rockets into civilian areas), the MEK attacks specific regime targets. Unlike the PLO (whose leaders were terrorists more recently and arguably still are), the MEK really has foresworn this barbaric tactic.
Can the MEK liberate Iran? No. Its strategy of invasion by an army can't work. The foul theocracy in Tehran will come to an end when the democratic forces in Iran finally manage to push it aside. Foreigners can best help them by encouraging satellite-television transmissions from Iranians living in free countries (as U.S. Sen. Sam Brownback has recently proposed).
Can the MEK be useful? Yes. Western spy agencies are short on "human intelligence" -- meaning spies on the ground in Iran, as distinct from eyes in the sky. Coalition military commanders should seek out the MEK for information on the Iranian mullahs' agents in Iraq.
The MEK can also supply key information on developments in Iran -- where, despite a tendency toward exaggeration, it has had some major scoops. Its information in mid-2002 about Iran's nuclear program, for example, was better than what the International Atomic Energy Agency knew, thereby leading a shocked U.S. government to kick off an investigation that confirmed just how far advanced the Iranians are toward building a nuclear bomb.
Policy toward the MEK has long been quietly but intensely and bitterly debated in Washington. To curry favor with Iranian "moderates," the State Department in 1997 designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Although 150 members of Congress publicly opposed this designation, a U.S. court of appeals recently upheld it.
This stark difference of views helps explain Washington's erratic policies of late. On April 15, the U.S. Army signed a cease-fire permitting the MEK to keep its weapons and use them against Iranian regime infiltrators into Iraq. This deal infuriated the State Department, which then convinced the president to undo it, leading to the strange sight of U.S. troops surrounding MEK camps on May 9, disarming its fighters and taking up positions to protect them.
That's a bad idea. Coalition forces are urgently needed to restore order elsewhere in Iraq. And State is dreaming if it thinks the sight of U.S. troops guarding the MEK will mollify Iran's mullahs.
Instead, as the U.S. Army recommends, MEK members should (after giving assurances not to attack Iranian territory) be permitted enough arms to protect themselves from their Iranian opponents. And in November, when the secretary of state next decides whether or not to re-certify the MEK as a terrorist group, he should come to the sensible conclusion that it poses no threat to the security of the United States or its citizens, and remove it from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Finally, because Iran's mullahs irrationally fear the MEK (as shown by their 1988 massacre in the jails of Iran of 10,000 long-imprisoned MEK members and supporters), maintaining the MEK as an organized group in separate camps in Iraq offers an excellent way to intimidate and gain leverage over Tehran.
To deter the mullahs from taking hostile steps (supporting terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq, building nuclear weapons), it could prove highly effective to threaten U.S. meetings with the MEK or providing help for its anti-regime publicity campaign."
The 9/11 congressional inquiry in the most comprehensive inquiry to date into the attacks makes no link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, except for a passing reference in the testimony of CIA director George Tenet to the possibility that hijacker Mohammed Atta may or may not have met in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence agent. Czech authorities had originally alerted the U.S. to such a possibility, but later withdrew the claim, which was always doubted by FBI officials who had information placing Atta in the U.S. on each of the days either side of the purported Prague encounter. Claims of an Atta meeting with an Iraqi agent were never considered sufficiently strong to include either in President Bush's State of the Union address or in Secretary of State Powell's UN testimony. And U.S. authorities are now in a position to definitively answer the question of just who the Iraqi agent met that day in Prague, since he's recently been detained in Iraq. But the claim of Iraqi involvement in the attack or with the organization responsible simply does not feature in the report.
Prior to joining the Institute, Mr. Schanzer was a research fellow at the Middle East Forum, a Philadelphia-based think tank. He was also a research assistant at the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace in Jerusalem, a journalist at the Atlanta Journal Constitution, an associate producer for Cable News Network, and an information officer at the Consulate General of Israel in Atlanta.
Mr. Schanzer has published Middle East-related work in the Wall Street Journal, New Republic, Los Angeles Times, New York Post, Jerusalem Post, and Investors Business Daily. He has also appeared on CNN, al-Jazeera, and the Fox News Channel as a Middle East expert.
Mr. Schanzer is currently working on a study entitled Al-Qaeda's Affiliates: Exploiting Weak Central Authority in the Arab World.
Mr. Schanzer has traveled extensively in Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, the Palestinian territories, and Israel. He speaks Arabic and Hebrew.
Published articles include:
"Al-Qaeda," "Osama Bin Laden," and "Militant Islam," Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Harvey W. Kushner, ed), Sage Publications (2003)
"What the War Means . . . for the Middle East," Doublethink Journal (Winter 2003)
"The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah," Middle East Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 2003)
"A Gaza-West Bank Split? Why the Palestinian Territories Might Become Two Separate States," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 7 (July 2001)
"At War with Whom? A Short History of Militant Islam," Doublethink Journal (Spring 2002)
"Palestinian Uprisings Compared," Middle East Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3 (Summer 2002)
"The evidence is steadily mounting terrorist links to Saddam. One must look at all the evidence to come to an honest conclusion.
Just because you dont like the source, or it doesnt line up with your personal beliefs, doesnt change the evidence.
If the Weekly Standard had a story about the lack of WMDs in Iraq, then you would probably be the first to praise them. Thats not very intellectually honest."
Regards
But the fact is they won't. Not until the neocons are tired of using the Republican party for their best interests. The evidence is not mounting. What the evidence, contrary to the Weekly Standard and 24 hours of Fox News, shows is that Al Qaeda is entering into Iraq after the fall of Hussein and that Hussein did not want his troops to work with the Islamic crazies. Fox News even stated that back when he was caught in some released letter IIRC.
An honest conclusion would accept that David Kay is not a turncoat and that the WMDs were destroyed, are no longer there, and probably weren't there in the levels we were told in the first place. A partisan answer would believe that against mounting evidence that WMDs can't be found they must still be there or shipped off to Syria or Iran
I tend to stay away from the FR discussions.
I'm not sure I want to know my fellow Americans who still think we should have left the monster Saddam (pal of Al Qaeda, torturer of babies, financier of suicide bombers, evildoer) in power.
8 TEXT FROM INTERCEPTED LETTER WRITTEN BY SUSPECTED TERRORIST LEADER ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI ~ CENTCOM | 2/19/04 | sore loser
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