Posted on 12/14/2011 4:59:02 AM PST by James Oscar
The question becomes one of how long the disease would remain viable, whether it would form spores, whether it would survive in a cadaver or dried bodily fluids, etc.
Perhaps someone who is better versed in virology can give us a guess.
Ping to an interesting article and the sections which follow as posts...
True. Some get that young, some don't ever.
But if ignorance is bliss, why aren't more people happy?
That which has been seen can be forcibly ignored (people do it all the time--denial), even rationalized away, but it cannot be unseen.
The pervading sense of something being terribly wrong has been felt by many, I among them.
Many can't put a finger on it, others blame it on the economy, the current political power structure, etc., but in a short phrase, people have been choosing sides. Not in the sense of standing on one sidewalk and hollering at the folks across the street, but in the sense of who they will follow in a spiritual sense, whether they will put their stock in the forces of good or whether they will sell out for a crust of bread.
The sale of firearms and ammunition--at record levels--is ongoing because of the perceived need to defend one's self, home, family, and community from something, any one (or more) of several possible threats, and preppers have felt a sense of quiet and growing urgency for years.
Even the Government has purchased a quarter billion freeze dried meals, allegedly in case of 'natural disaster', and it already has an army...
So while the grasshoppers play, the ants are getting ready, and have been, in growing numbers, archiving information, learning skills, caching supplies and materials, going off grid, establishing alternative power schemes for places as remote as they can get or afford.
Even then, in the face of a pandemic of the sort which would create a genetic bottleneck, 'luck', Divine Providence, (whichever you would attribute surviving the first month uninfected to), would play a large part in which portions of the population would survive--and which would not. An accident on the road to a survival retreat might delay someone sick enough that they never made it, and thus permit the rest to survive what would have been sure infection.
Riding out that storm would be no guarantee of survival, though, the real challenges would come afterwards.
Sustaining our present technical level would be highly unlikely in the event of a global pandemic. Even a level of technology from the 1940s would have to be largely reinvented before the current means of accomplishing things wore out, corroded, or simply ground to a halt. For a while, survivors would have to spend much of their resources simply surviving and 'wishing for more wishes'--something which would only be possible if and when the roving raiders had been wiped out by disease or defenders.
The very practical and technical education needed to sustain such would be fragile, too, with few enough possessing the knowledge, and the question of who would teach it, and to whom.
We live in interesting times indeed.
But the world as we know it has 'ended' many times in just the last couple of centuries, from steamships, to steel, to the aeroplane, antibiotics, vaccines, the computer, the bomb, cell phones, space travel and satellites, etc. All made seminal changes in our world and culture, but this time, many of the changes would be changes back down the technological ladder, how far depending on who where survived knowing what, and what resources they had to work with.
This gets back into the types of population growth/societies/cultures, reproductively. For a while, given that sooner or later it would be 'safe' to scavenge ruins, there would be an abundance of resources--canned and dried food, fuel, vehicles for the taking, heavy equipment and freight haulers for those who could use them, lumber, concrete, whatever inventory was present, in transit, or lay wrecked along the side of the road. Generators would be out there, and the grid might stay up in places for a while. After that, though, communities would have to find means to provide for themselves, be it fuel, food, power, labor, whatever, and with each diminishing level of technology would come a more labor intensive culture just to survive. Small groups would need people capable of doing much, not just with narrow skill sets--and the more they could teach to others, the better.
For a while, the population might hit a rapid growth curve, but without the nurturing, without raising those who were growing up to maintain the technology or even advance it, it would not survive.
In the meantime, those who chose to raid for sustenance would have a field day, with young replacements relatively rapidly available and a less fragile technical base, the raiders would do well unless the tech societies were adept at defense as well.
All this is speculation, of course, predicated on a 'bottleneck' event, but that is likely a question of what and when, not "if".
Q: And I assume this large scale outbreak is what overpowers the health care systems?
MA: There will never be a real opportunity for containment. This is not Hollywood. No hero will develop a magical antidote just in time to save the beautiful woman. No, this event is of such a consequence that, by the time the scale is apparent, the issue will be settled.
Because the virus is airborne the first three days of outbreaks will saturate such a large population that all the wheels will rapidly come off even the best health care systems. The first task will be to understand what is happening and it will, all to rapidly, become apparent that it is a very hot bug and that it is pandemic.
But by the time the extent of what has happened is well known - there will be no recourse.
Child, there is no recourse even now. We cannot kill this creature. We have only kept it at bay for these many years and that era of detente is rapidly ending.
Q: But MA, you make it sound so hopeless. How could you believe such a thing?
MA: There are things that I believe and things that I know. This virus and its coming change are something I know. I know in detail and specificity that defies all common understanding - yet my knowledge remains.
And now you know.
Read that on the Kindle. Very interesting. Also remember that in the3 event of the big one, it is the second and third wave that get you. Also remember the black death isn’t quit what they say it was
I had just what you described. Didn’t need to be out in the hospital.
I follow pandemic news on the PFI Forum, daily, and have almost daily since Dec. ‘06. Currently there is very little news from Egypt and the moderators think it may be on account of the political disruption in Egypt (it’s getting worse daily, riots due to lack of bread recently). But in Indonesia the very recent news from Indonesian sites (and machine translated) is a lot of cases right now, looks like possible Tamiflu failure, it very, very well worth watching. The mods there know their stuff, there are a number of fanatically dedicated news hounds, and excellent commments to help non-technical people make sense of it.
Link to the PFI forum:
http://www.singtomeohmuse.com/viewforum.php?f=1&sid=69f9740dce65b107f8addf44de212f4c
I posted an article about this apparent Tamiflu resistance the other day on FR, much more evidence now, with several deaths in the last few days. Of people who were treated on time with Tamiflu and still died.
A commentary from Niman today, about Egypt. (BTW I am an ignoramous and can’t grasp deep scientific stuff, I keep trying to get the gist of stuff anyway.)
Commentary
H1N1pdm09 Recombination In Egypt H5N1 Raises Concerns
Recombinomics Commentary 21:00
January 25, 2012
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/01251203/H5_Transmission_H1N1pdm09.html
The recently released H5N1 sequences from Egypt contain H1N1pdm09 sequences in the PB1 and PB2 gene segments. The recent comments by Yoshihiro Kawaoka on the data in the censored Nature paper indicate H5 on an H1N1pdm09 genetic background transmits in ferrets. Although the paper remains censored, the comments suggest H5 was added to 7 gene segments from H1N1pdm11. However, an earlier study suggested that the H1N1pdm09 M gene was critical for the jump from swine to humans, so it is unclear if the other six gene segments are required for transmission.
However, the presence of H1N1pdm09 gene sequences in the H5N1 isolates raise concerns that additional combinations are likely and the status of such combinations are far from clear. The most recent human H5N1 sequence from Egypt are from cases in March 2010. More recently, clusters in Egypt have been confirmed and an increased case fatality rate has been noted, raising concerns that H1N1pdm09 internal genes may be present in human cases in Egypt.
NAMRU-3 typically generates H5 and N1 sequences for human cases in Egypt, while samples are frequently sent to the CDC in Atlanta for further analysis. These sequences should be released immediately. The presence of such sequences may signal and enhanced transmission in humans and may be related to the confirmation of clusters.
Although the H5 transmission in ferrets in the Kawaoka study did not produce a lethal H5N1 in the ferret model, the wide circulation of such sequences in human populations could have significant implications, as has been demonstrated for the H1N1pdm09 M gene in trH3N2 (H3N2v) and trH1N1 (H1N1v) cases in the United States in 2011.
The Kawaoka Nature paper highlights the need for full sequences from cases in Egypt. This need applies to other recent cases, such as the clusters in Indonesia. Only HA and NA sequences were released from the Bali cluster, which also had clear evidence of recombination. Similarly, no sequence data has been released for the cluster in North Jakarta.
The censored papers at Nature and Science highlight the dangers of a transmitting H5N1 and demand more timely and transparent release of H5N1 sequences.
It was reading about SARS and Mother Abigail’s comments on FR that caused my non-stop obsession with flu pandemic stuff.
“Immunity is not the issue - dropping your tools and running to the hills is the issue.”
In general survival terms I would agree with that. I really was just indicating that after it runs it’s course there will be some that won’t get sick even when exposed. who knows what the percentage would be. Problem with that theory is that one will never know until it comes to pass and those that end up left will have no idea why they were spared.
When you mention Egypt and this topic I cannot but think of the pale horse seen there earlier in 2011.
It was reading about SARS and Mother Abigail’s comments on FR that caused my non-stop obsession with flu pandemic stuff.
I think it was at that time that I first came in contact
with you on FR.
I followed those threads for some time but my science in
not that complete so as to be able to understand it
with any exactness.
The horror, that I can glimpse.
I have moved from the city into the mountains, not as
far as I would have liked but it will have to do and I
pay attention to viral outbreaks much more closely now.
Just one more reason for us to get off this ball of dirt.
My best to you.
t.
I am sure that whatever science you understand is miles beyond what I grasp. I limp along (and as I have said before) dragging my brain behind me...
I already lived rural but we have sort of gone into the prep mode pretty seriously and last week got a solar well pump, need to get another solar panel for it, it only needs 2. Have basic from scratch foods that could easily last us 2 years, give or take this or that. It’s not that “surviving” is so goldurn important - I already saw 60 not long ago - but God may have something He wants me to do yet (no doubt small but still it’s up to Him) so it’s my job to be ready. Getting less attached to the ball of dirt - wondering where He’ll put me next.
Never a dull moment!
And the very best to you, friend.
IIRC, resistance to Tamiflu was noted in the H1N1 outbreak, and may well be increasing. Much like teasing bacteria with an antibiotic and stopping the meds in mid course, there is a resistant strain which goes on.
Thanks for the lengthy heads up. Best wishes for the new year.
How about this?
Pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus gives wings to avian flu
25 Jan 2012 | 18:17 GMT
Has the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic increased the risk that the H5N1 avian flu virus could evolve to create a human pandemic?
That’s a possibility raised by the work of Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the main conclusions of which — but not the details — are revealed in a Comment article in Nature today. His team created a virus that has the H5 haemagglutinin (HA) surface protein from the H5N1 virus, with all the remaining genes coming from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus. The resulting virus proved to be highly transmissible in ferrets, and is therefore likely to have the same behaviour in other mammals, including humans.
What’s intriguing is that before the 2009 pandemic, several research groups had tried the same experiment, using the garden-variety seasonal H1N1 flu, but without success. The difference is that the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus, which is a triple reassortant of pig, avian and human viruses, contains the triple reassortant gene (TRIG) cassette, which is believed to make it far easier for a flu virus to swap genes with those from other species. This suggests that H5N1 may find it much easier to reassort with pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus circulating in the wild to create a pandemic virus, whereas it had coexisted with seasonal flu since 1997 without evolving into a pandemic strain, explains Bruno Lina, a virologist and flu researcher at the CNRS, France’s basic-research agency, who works at the University of Claude Bernard Lyon-1.
The study by Kawaoka’s team, which has been accepted for publication by Nature, is one of two studies that have succeeded in creating H5N1 strains capable of transmitting between ferrets. The other, by a team led by Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, has been submitted to Science. The papers have been at the centre of controversy since 20 December, when the United States government — acting on advice from the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) — asked both journals to publish only the main conclusions of the two flu studies, but not to reveal details. Insights from the research might help to improve pandemic preparedness in the future, but some are concerned that the publication of such work would amplify the risk of an accidental, or intentional, release of the virus that could spark a human pandemic. Flu researchers working on such studies last week declared a 60-day voluntary pause to allow governments and other bodies “time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work” (see ‘Pause on avian flu transmission studies‘).
Kawaoka and Fouchier succeeded in creating the transmissible virus in completely different ways. Fouchier used mutation, taking a H5N1 virus and then mutating it until it became transmissible. He initially introduced three mutations, using a technique called reverse genetics, but the resulting virus was not transmissible, so he then took that virus and passaged it through multiple ferrets, a procedure that is known to allow viruses to adapt to their host. The result was a virus with just five mutations, which were enough to make it highly transmissible.
Kawaoka instead used reassortment, which occurs in the wild. He took an HA protein from H5N1 and inserted it into a virus made of up genes from the pandemic 2009 H1N1. The flu virus has eight genes. Two code for the surface proteins HA and neuraminidase (NA), and six code for internal proteins. The eight genes are on separate segments, which means that when two different flu viruses infect the same host, they can swap genes and create new viruses in a process known as reassortment. An H1N1 human and H5N1 avian virus, for example, would generate a new virus that has most of the genes from the human virus, making it transmissible in humans, but an avian haemagglutinin and/or neuraminidase. A largely human virus carrying an H5, to which humans have no previous exposure of immunity, could cause a pandemic if it retained the transmissibility of the human virus, and the lethality of H5N1.
Fouchier’s virus was lethal in ferrets, whereas Kawaoka’s was “no more pathogenic than the pandemic 2009 virus”, and killed none of the animals. A reassortant that occurred in the the wild might have different pathogenicities. But two independent groups have now shown that H5N1 can transmit in ferrets, and so such human-transmissible viruses could potentially arise naturally in avian and other animal populations. What controls the exchange of genes between viruses is poorly understood, says Lina, who himself failed in the past to create highly transmissible reassortants of H5N1 and seasonal H1N1. Triple-reassortant viruses that have this TRIG cassette, of six highly conserved internal genes, seem capable of capturing various HA and NA genes from multiple species, he says. “The pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus has a flexibility of function which makes it capable of associating at the molecular level with virus and gene segments from pig, bird and humans.”
The 2009 pandemic H1N1 is circulating in humans in countries such as Indonesia, China and Egypt, where H5N1 cases in human continue to occur. Co-infection of a person with both viruses would give them opportunities to reassort. Pandemic H1N1 also infects pigs, from which it originally emerged, which could provide further opportunities for reassortment. This emphasizes the need for better surveillance to detect human cases of H5N1 infection.
Monitoring of human cases could also help to prevent flu viruses acquiring human transmissibility. There has been some evidence of limited human-to-human transmission of H5N1 in clusters of human cases, and a virus that passes along even a small chain of human hosts has opportunities to adapt to its host, just as H5N1 did in Fouchier’s ferrets.
But as a news article in this week’s edition of Nature shows (see ‘Caution urged for mutant flu work‘), surveillance of H5N1 in birds worldwide is patchy, particularly in poorer countries, where the virus is prevalent. It is also largely geared towards simply detecting and monitoring outbreaks, and few of the viral samples collected are ever sequenced, with just 160 H5N1 isolates submitted to the GenBank database last year. Moreover, if H5N1 surveillance in birds is poor, the situation is far worse in pigs, where there is virtually no systematic surveillance, even in richer countries. H5N1 infections in pigs are uncommon and cause only mild illness, creating little economic incentive to monitor them — GenBank contains partial sequences from just 24 pig H5N1 isolates in total.
http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/01/pandemic-2009-h1n1-virus-gives-wings-to-avian-flu.html
not sure I can process tho tonight, so bookmarking it for the morning, when my head just might be clear.
But, then, who knows, maybe I will be just as confused as I am tonight.
Thanks for the ping!
Thank you so much for the ping! This is fascinating reading so far. I’ve long been a believer of some form of what I like to call “God-designed Evolution” or something along those lines, but my thoughts are nowhere near as thoroughly reasoned out as her thesis appears to be. I’m looking forward to finishing this later. Of course, her choice of the screen nic “Mother Abigail” is a great hook to me as well - I love The Stand. Thanks again.
Fascinating reading so far. Thank you so much for sharing it here. I have bookmarked this to finish it in the morning!
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.