Posted on 12/27/2005 9:09:14 AM PST by Renderofveils
As those thinking of becoming soldiers arrive on the slushy doorstep of the U.S. Army recruiting station here, they cannot miss the message posted in bold black letters on the storefront right next door.
"Remember the Fallen Heroes," the sign reads, and then it ticks off numbers: the number of U.S. troops killed in Iraq, the number wounded, the number of days gone by since the war began.
The sign, put up by Scott Cameron, a former soldier, has stirred intense debate, though always polite, in this city along the western edge of Lake Superior. In a way, many of the nation's vast and complicated arguments about war are playing out on a single block here, around a simple piece of wood.
Cameron, who was shot in Vietnam in 1969 and says he has since undergone 46 operations to repair the damage, said he felt compelled to post his message to remind people of the soldiers now lost. The sign stands alongside campaign posters in the window of Kelley's office on Superior Street, a main thoroughfare in central Duluth.
Cameron did not speak his mind about Vietnam decades ago because he feared he might harm support for the troops, he said, but he has since decided that he is not "going to be silent again."
Although Cameron, 55, acknowledged that he opposes the war in Iraq, he said his sign was not about that at all. Its intent, he said, is simple and apolitical: to remember the troops, to care for veterans, to recognize what is being lost each day.
(Excerpt) Read more at iht.com ...
As the President stated, we don't "wiretap" (c.f. cordless communications) without a Court Order - not that there's anything wrong with that.
And, another thing: under Article II of the Constitution, including in his capacity as Commander in Chief, the President has the responsibility to protect the Nation from further attacks, and the Constitution gives him all necessary authority to fulfill that duty. See, e.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (stressing that if the Nation is invaded, "the President is not only authorized but hound to resist by force . . . . without waiting for any special legislative authority"); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("[T]he Prize Cases . . . stand for the proposition that the President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of force selected."); id. at 40 (Tatel, J., concurring). The Congress recognized this constitutional authority in the preamble to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF") of September 18, 2001, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) ("[T]he President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States."), and in the War Powers Resolution, see 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) ("The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities[] . . . [extend to] a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.").
This constitutional authority includes the authority to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States, as all federal appellate courts, including at least four circuits, to have addressed the issue have concluded. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 7 17, 742 (FISA Ct. of Review 2002) ("[A]ll the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held that the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information. . . . We take for granted that the President does have that authority. . . ."). The Supreme Court has said that warrants are generally required in the context of purely domestic threats. but it expressly distinguished, foreign threats. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). As Justice Byron White recognized almost 40 years ago, Presidents have long exercised the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for national security purposes, and a warrant is unnecessary "if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1967) (White, J., concurring).
The President's constitutional authority to direct the NSA to conduct the activities he described is supplemented by statutory authority under the AUMF. The AUMF authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, . . . in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States." § 2(a), The AUMF clearly contemplates action within the United States, See also id. pmbl. (the attacks of September 11 "render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad"). The AUMF cannot be read as limited to authorizing the use of force against Afghanistan, as some have argued. Indeed, those who directly "committed" the attacks of September 11 resided in the United States for months before those attacks. The reality of the September 11 plot demonstrates that the authorization of force covers activities both on foreign soil and in America.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the AUMF. At least five Justices concluded that the AUMF authorized the President to detain a U.S. citizen in the United States because "detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war" and is therefore included in the "necessary and appropriate force" authorized by the Congress. Id. at 518-19 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); see id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). These five Justices concluded that the AUMF "clearly and unmistakably authorize[s]" the "fundamental incident[s] of waging war." Id. at 518-19 (plurality opinion); see id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Communications intelligence targeted at the enemy is a fundamental incident of the use of military force. Indeed, throughout history, signals intelligence has formed a critical part of waging war. In the Civil War, each side tapped the telegraph lines of the other. In the World Wars, the United States intercepted telegrams into and out of the country. The AUMF cannot be read to exclude this long-recognized and essential authority to conduct communications intelligence targeted at the enemy. We cannot fight a war blind. Because communications intelligence activities constitute, to use the language of Hamdi, a fundamental incident of waging war, the AUMF clearly and unmistakably authorizes such activities directed against the communications of our enemy. Accordingly, the President's "authority is at its maximum." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981); cf: Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 (noting the absence of a statute "from which [the asserted authority] c[ould] be fairly implied").
The President's authorization of targeted electronic surveillance by the NSA is also consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). Section 2511(2)(f) of title 18 provides, relevant here, that the procedures of FISA and two chapters of title 18 "shall be the as exclusive means by which electronic surveillance... may be conducted." Section 109 of FISA, in turn, makes it unlawful to conduct electronic surveillance, "except as authorized by statute." 50 U.S.C. 1809(a)(1). Importantly, section 109's exception for electronic surveillance "authorized by statute" is broad, especially considered in the context of surrounding provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) ("Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who --(a) intentionally intercepts . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication[] . . . shall be punished . . . .") (emphasis added); id. § 2511(2)(e) (providing a defense to liability to individuals "conduct[ing] electronic surveillance, . . . as authorized by that Act [FISA]") (emphasis added).
By expressly and broadly excepting from its prohibition electronic surveillance undertaken "as authorized by statute," section 109 of FISA permits an exception to the "procedures" of FISA referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) where authorized by another statute, even if the other authorizing statute does not specifically amend section 2511(2)(f). The AUMF satisfies section 109's requirement for statutory authorization of electronic surveillance, just as a majority of the Court in Hamdi concluded that it satisfies the requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) that no U.S. citizen be detained by the United States "except pursuant to an Act of Congress." See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (explaining that "it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention"); see id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Some might suggest that FISA could be read to require that a subsequent statutory authorization must come in the form of an amendment to FISA itself. But under established principles of statutory construction, the AUMF and FISA must be construed in harmony to avoid any potential conflict between FISA and the President's Article II authority as Commander in Chief. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 v. (2001). Accordingly. any ambiguity as to whether the AUMF is a statute that satisfies the requirements of FISA and allows electronic surveillance in the conflict with al Qaeda without complying with FISA procedures must be resolved in favor of a n interpretation that is consistent with the President's long-recognized authority.
The NSA activities described by the President are also consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the protection of civil liberties. The Fourth Amendment's "central requirement is one of reasonableness." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). For searches conducted in the course of ordinary criminal law enforcement, reasonableness generally requires securing a warrant. See Bd. of Educ, v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002). Outside the ordinary criminal law enforcement context, however, the Supreme Court has, at times, dispensed with the warrant, instead adjudging the reasonableness of a search under the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). In particular, the Supreme Court has long recognized that "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," can justify departure from the usual warrant requirement. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (striking down checkpoint where "primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing").
Foreign intelligence collection, especially in the midst of an armed conflict in which the adversary has already launched catastrophic attacks within the United States, fits squarely within the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement. Foreign intelligence collection undertaken to prevent further devastating attacks on our Nation serves the highest government purpose through means other than traditional law enforcement. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 745; United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment implications of foreign intelligence surveillance are far different from ordinary wiretapping, because they are not principally used for criminal prosecution).
Intercepting communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda in order to detect and prevent a catastrophic attack is clearly reasonable. Reasonableness is generally determined by "balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Earls, 536 U.S. at 829. There is undeniably an important and legitimate privacy interest at stake with respect to the activities described by the President. That must be balanced, however, against the Government's compelling interest in the security of the Nation. see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). The fact that the NSA activities are reviewed and reauthorized approximately every 45 days to ensure that they continue to be necessary and appropriate further demonstrates the reasonableness of these activities.
As explained above, the President determined that it was necessary following September 11 to create an early warning detection system. FISA could not have provided the speed and agility required for the early warning detection system. In addition, any legislative change, other than the AUMF, that the President might have sought specifically to create such an early warning system would have been public and would have tipped off our enemies concerning our intelligence limitations and capabilities.
What have you done that you should worry if the government is spying on you or not?
Nothing, unlike this protester.
Probably the first thing is to authenticate his story....then to from there.....
So it's cool if the next Dem president spies on you, because you'll be protesting him, right?
And what did the protester do to warrant being spied on? Protest? Did we abolish the Constitution somewhere and I missed it?
Not a problem. My brother was killed, I still enlisted. I have a mind of my own.
Did you read the prior thread: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1537049/posts
There is a full account of what the military recruiters asked, and how suspicious he is acting. Sorry if you think treason is acceptable during war.
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Really, how?
You seem to be carrying a lot of baggage. Want to tell us about it?
My baggage all has to do with salesmen, not the military.
The internet has been a blessing. I almost never have to encounter one anymore.
So9
I don't believe protest is treason. He is entitled to his opinions on the war and any other issue, and just because you disagree with him doesn't make it criminal.
I don't believe protest is treason either. What he's doing, however, goes far beyond legitimate protest and diminishes the sacrifice of our troops - it's called "adherence to the enemy and rendering him aid and comfort" - that's "treason" in my book.
The recruitment officer politely asked that the sign be taken down, especially since one of the workers recently came back from Iraq and she doesn't need to see that sign everyday. The poll I cited to above had an overwhelming majority in Duluth against the sign. He refuses, but instead says it is "apolitical" - I call BS, but if you want to ask him, go ahead:
Scott Cameron, (218) 525-6799, 6302 E Superior St, Duluth, MN 55804
You're definition is colorful, to say the least. But someone is not comitting treason merely because you disagree with their position.
Cool, so all he has to do in order to completely circumvent the Constitution is claim something has relevance to national security. Let's see, they've already tied drugs to the terrorists. Now we won't need any pesky warrants when investigating drug crimes. What else?
Why do so few people see how dangerous this power is, even when the precedent of abuse is right there in the history books?
... with the proven inherent danger of abuse of the power. Yep, Prez Hillary won't abuse it. No way. NEVER give to a government a power that you don't want all possible succeeding governments to have.
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