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A Few of FR's Finest.....
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Posted on 07/02/2002 7:19:33 AM PDT by Billie
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Super job, as usual!
Incredible, eh? hehehe Will the sun rise tomorrow? ;^)
Coffee, Tea or me?
Congratulations Julie!!
She is getting a full makeover....
By the morning of July 2, the Union army had established strong positions in a giant U-shaped line from Culp's Hill to Cemetery Ridge. Satisfied with the line, General Meade decided to wait for Lee to make the next move while the remainder of the Army of the Potomac hurried to the battlefield. Early that morning, General Lee surveyed the strong Union position and realized that a weakness might lay with the Union flanks. A simultaneous strike on both the right and left of Meade's position could roll up the Union line toward Cemetery Hill. The weakest flank was the Union left that did not appear to be anchored on any significant feature, including the Round Tops- two hills at the southern tip of Cemetery Ridge. Lee directed that A.P. Hill continue holding the Confederate center while General James Longstreet's Corps would make the main attack on the Union left and General Ewell's Corps would attack the right. Both had to strike at the same time to throw the Union off balance, not giving Meade time to shift troops to the threatened areas. Ewell's men were close to the field that morning, but James Longstreet's were not and it would take several hours before he could get his troops into position on Seminary Ridge.
Situated on the left of the Union line were troops under the command of Major General Daniel E. Sickles of New York. An audacious and sometimes belligerent commander, he did not like the position where his troops were placed and believed that the Confederates would use the woods on Seminary Ridge as a cover before attacking him. His suspicions appeared correct when a regiment of sharpshooters scouting Pitzer's Woods at the southern end of Seminary Ridge encountered several regiments of southern troops. Sickles was convinced that he had to take the higher ground ahead of his troops and without further word from General Meade, ordered his Third Corps to advance and occupy the Emmitsburg Road, centered around the Peach Orchard at the intersection with Wheatfield Road. Though Sickles' new line occupied high ground, he had moved away from the main Union line on Cemetery Ridge leaving his flanks, and the left of the Union army, open to attack.
The head of Longstreet's weary column finally reached the southern tip of Seminary Ridge at 3:30 PM after an exhausting 18 mile hike. The troops filed into positions where they dropped their blanket rolls and quietly sat to catch their breath. Some took short walks to find water and fill empty canteens before the signal guns were fired to start the assault, while the column kept passing by, moving south around Sickles' flank.
Longstreet's attack began at 4 PM with General John B. Hood's Division being the first sent into the attack. Line after line of Confederate infantry marched down the gentle slope towards the Union line that rapidly came to life. The fiery Hood encountered General Longstreet and asked for permission to change the battle plan, to strike around the two large hills that appeared to be the right of the strengthening Union line. Yet there was no time for such a change. Everything depended upon Lee's original plan and Longstreet ordered General Hood to attack as ordered. Soon after their encounter, General Longstreet again saw General Hood as he was being carried from the battlefield, his left arm swathed with bloody bandages. General Evander Law took command of the division.
Warfield Ridge was heavily wooded at the time of the battle and provided excellent cover for Longstreet's Confederate troops who sheltered here prior to going into the attack on the afternoon of July 2. The trees screened the southern line of march from any Union vantage point, including that of the signalmen on Little Round Top. The last troops into line were also the first to step off toward the Union left flank. Brig. General Evander Law's Alabama brigade of General John Bell Hood's Division marched nearly 18 miles to get to this point and then began the attack at 4 o'clock without the benefit of water. Thirsty soldiers handed over their empty canteens to several men who were detailed to find a well and fill them, but they had not returned before the attack began. (The canteen detail never did return; all were captured with the filled canteens while attempting to locate their regiments.) The lack of water would play a major role in fatigue and exhaustion during the ensuing fight.
Major General John Bell Hood was the division commander for the Confederate soldiers here. Brave and audacious, Hood did not like the assignment given him, especially after he surveyed the ground east of Warfield Ridge. Union signalmen on top of Little Round Top could easily see his troops move and a Yankee battery at Devil's Den had a clear field of fire on his formations. Supporting Confederate batteries on Warfield Ridge were not enough to suppress the Union artillery and his soldiers had no chance to defend themselves until they closed on the enemy positions. Encountering General Longstreet, Hood proposed a change of plans- He would move his division further south around Big Round Top, and attack behind the Union line to throw the Union guns off Devil's Den from the rear. Hot and frustrated by a day full of delays, a stubborn Longstreet replied that General Lee's orders to attack up the Emmitsburg Road had to be carried out as ordered. Hood protested. Again Longstreet stated, "We must obey the orders of General Lee." Hood turned to rejoin his troops as Longstreet rode to meet with his other division commander, General McLaws. Moments after the meeting, General Hood was seriously wounded near this location and carried from the field. General Law stepped into his place and directed the division for the remainder of the battle. The loss of General Hood was keenly felt; Law had no idea of the route of attack General Lee had ordered.
The opening charge was directed against Union troops occupying Devil's Den, but Law's men were forced to move further to the right toward Big Round Top to escape the concentrated artillery fire coming from there, the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard. The southerners rushed over farmland crossed by stout fences and fields scattered with large boulders and dense thickets. US Sharpshooters peppered the southern ranks with a deadly fire but the Confederates kept moving. Law's brigade split in half, one headed to flank the Union guns at Devil's Den and the other to strike Little Round Top. Instead of flanking Devil's Den, Law's left half was met by Union troops rushed into the small valley to stem the attack. Adjacent to Law's brigade, Robertson's Texas Brigade also moved swiftly down the slope of Warfield Ridge through the Bushman Farm and charged the Union battery posted on top of Devil's Den, applying deadly pressure to the New York artillerymen from front and flank. Law's right wing continued northward. His right regiment, the 15th Alabama, marched over the summit of Big Round Top before running smack into a Union brigade posted on the southern slope of Little Round Top.
Unlike the thickly wooded Big Round Top, this smaller hill had been partially cleared of trees a year or more prior to the battle. Strewn with loose rocks and large boulders, it offered a natural position from which to defend this important end of the Union line. Little Round Top had been manned by Union troops as early as the night of July 1. Yet, with the exception of a few soldiers from the Union army's Signal Corps, it remained largely unoccupied until late on the afternoon of July 2. From their signal station on the northern summit of Little Round Top, the flag wavers held a commanding view of the battlefield to the north and west. It was the occupants of this signal station who concerned General Longstreet as he marched his troops into position to attack the Union left that afternoon.
Swift action by Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren saved this key position. General Meade's chief engineer, Warren had been sent to survey the left flank of the army that afternoon. Climbing to the summit of Little Round Top, Warren was aghast at what he saw- General Sickles' had moved his entire corps out to the Devil's Den-Peach Orchard line, leaving this key hill unprotected. When southern batteries opened fire at 4 o'clock, Warren spotted Hood's Confederates as they swept from the cover of Warfield Ridge toward the Round Tops. Realizing they could easily flank the Union positions at Devil's Den and capture Little Round Top, Warren encouraged the signal men to remain on the hill and keep waving flags while an aide galloped off to find any Union troops he could locate to get them to the hill.
Colonel Strong Vincent, in command of a brigade from the Fifth Corps, was marching his soldiers toward the Peach Orchard when he was approached by the staff officer from General Warren. Vincent immediately realized the desperate situation. Despite his orders to go to the aid of Sickles, Vincent turned his infantrymen around and led them up Little Round Top where he posted his four regiments on the rock-strewn south side of the hill. Within minutes, two Alabama regiments of Law's brigade emerged from the tree covered slope of Big Round Top and rushed Vincent's men. With General Law commanding the division, his Alabama brigade was now commanded by Colonel William C. Oates who's dirty, gray-clad soldiers had marched over the summit of Big Round Top and now poured a deadly fire into the Union ranks. Vincent's men immediately responded. The 47th Alabama regiment arrived and increased the pressure on Vincent's line. The fight raged around the base of the hill.
Oates' 15th Alabama Infantry was locked into a contest with Vincent's left regiment, the 20th Maine Infantry commanded by Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain. Repeated southern charges made no headway against the stubborn soldiers from Maine who loosed volley after volley into the swarm of Confederates. "My men obeyed and advanced about half way to the enemy's position," Colonel Oates reported, "but the fire was so destructive that my line wavered like a man trying to walk against a strong wind, and then, slowly, doggedly, (bend) back a little. To stand there and die was sheer folly; either to retreat or advance became a necessity. My Lt. Col. I. B. Feagin, lost his leg; the heroic Capt. Ellison had fallen, while Capt. Brainard, one of the bravest and best officers in the regiment, fell exclaiming: 'Oh God! That I could see my mother', and instantly expired. Lieut. John A. Oates, my beloved brother, was pierced through with eight bullets and fell mortally wounded."
Great gaps also appeared in the ranks of the 20th Maine. Chamberlain's men were holding their own, though the position was becoming more precarious as minutes dragged by. Suddenly he spied Confederates moving toward the regiment's left flank: "I immediately stretched my regiment to the left by taking intervals. My officers and men understood my wishes so well that this movement was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up the fire, without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or even suspect their advantage. They renewed the assault on our whole front and for an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy broke through our line and the fight was literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled backward and forward like a wave." Cries for ammunition filled the air as cartridge boxes emptied. Some men had a few cartridges left while others had none. Knowing that the next charge would break his thin line, Chamberlain decided to take the initiative away from the 15th Alabama. "At that crisis I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line, from man to man and rose to a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy, now not 30 yards away."
The exhausted Confederates were caught off guard by this audacious move and quickly retreated or surrendered as the Union line of steel rushed down the body strewn slope. "We ran like a herd of wild cattle," Oates lamented. "On the top of the mountain I made an attempt to halt and reform the regiment, but the men were helping the wounded and disabled comrades and scattered in the woods among the rocks. The dead literally covered the ground, blood stood in puddles on the rocks. The ground was soaked with the blood of as brave men as ever fell on the red field of battle."
At the opposite end of Vincent's Line, the Confederate pressure was too great. The 4th and 5th Texas Infantry Regiments pressed back the Union line. Hearing the commotion, Vincent rushed to rally his men and was struck by a Confederate bullet and mortally wounded while directing the defense. The injured colonel was carried away just as reinforcements arrived. The 140th New York Infantry led by Colonel Patrick O'Rorke, appeared on the summit of the hill. Seeing the melee below him O'Rorke turned to his men and led them in a charge straight into the Texans. "Here they are, boys!" O'Rorke shouted, "Commence firing!" They were his last words. Seconds later a bullet struck him in the neck and O'Rorke fell without a sound among the boulders. A flurry of rifle shots and flash of bayonets sent the Texans down the hill.
The swift attack of the the New Yorkers stalled the last southern drive on Little Round Top, and the Confederates withdrew to the woods at the base of Big Round Top. Skirmishers took up positions to shoot at the Yankee troops who began to build stone defenses as day faded into night. One victim of a southern sharpshooter was Brig. General Stephen Weed.
While the battle raged on the slopes of Little Round Top, Confederate troops swarmed through the boulder-strewn pastures around Devil's Den, the left flank of General Sickles' battle line.
Smith's worse fears came true when Confederates struck the den from three directions at once. Southerners were awe struck by the terrible nature of the ground. One veteran of the battle described it as, "a wild, rocky labyrinth which, from its weird, uncanny features, has long been called by the people of the vicinity the 'Devils Den.' Large rocks from six to fifteen feet high are thrown together in confusion over a considerable area and yet so disposed as to leave everywhere among them siding passages carpeted with moss. Many of the recesses are never visited by the sunshine, and a cavernous coolness pervades the air within it." Pastures around the base of the Den were filled with piles of rocks and large boulders, causing battle formations to fragment. Officers lost control of their commands and soldiers lost their way in this wild garden of stone. Men scrambled behind boulders for protection from the shower of bullets, shell and canister.
There was only enough space on the summit of Devil's Den for Smith to place four of his guns, which overlooked a triangular field on the west side. The artillerymen initially dueled with Confederate batteries placed on the Emmitsburg Road three quarters of a mile to the west until Confederate infantry from Brig. General Jerome Robertson's brigade and Brig. General Henry L. Benning's brigade advanced toward them. Smith turned his attention from the artillery to the infantry. Repeated charges by the 15th Georgia and the 1st Texas Infantry wore down the gunners and the fighting was at close range. Smith's artillerymen held back the surge of Confederates for over two hours until a desperate counterattack by the 124th New York Infantry stalled the southern assault. General Robertson, believing that he was outnumbered six to one, reformed his Texans with the 3rd Arkansas for one last effort. With no help in sight and his infantry support withdrawing, Smith knew he would lose his guns. "The men are instructed to remove all implements if they are compelled to fall back, so that our pieces may not be turned against us. Alas, we are flanked by the enemy moving through the gorge (and) our pieces are now useless." Shouting the famous rebel yell, the 1st Texas charged up the triangular field to finally take the summit and capture three of Smith's guns. One enthused Texan stood upon one of the cannon and triumphantly waved the flag of the 1st Texas in the faces of the retreating northerners.
Between Devil's Den and Big Round Top, the valley narrowed into a boulder-choked gorge cut by a slow moving stream called Plum Run. Union infantry rushed to the scene battled Alabama and Georgia troops who had swept around the Den to threaten the Union rear. With sword in hand, Colonel William F. Perry ordered his 44th Alabama Infantry to charge through the gorge: "I received an order to capture the battery at the Devil's Den. I at once resolved to make the attack from the woods south of the battery. My regiment, which was near the center, was thrown to the left by an oblique march... wheeled so as to face to the north, and at once moved upon the point of attack. As the line emerged from the woods into the open space, a sheet of flame burst from the rocks less than a hundred yards away. A few scattering shots in the beginning gave warning in time for my men to fall flat, and thus largely escape the effect of the main volley. No language can express the intensity of the solicitude with which I surveyed the strange, wild situation which suddenly burst upon my view. Before the enemy had time to reload their guns a decision was made. Leaping over my prostrate line, I shouted the order 'Forward!' and started for the rocks. The response was a bound, a yell, and a rush..."
As southern troops swarmed over Devil's Den, Captain Smith raced to his two guns stationed on a small knoll in the Valley of Death: "I run with all speed in me and open fire with these two guns on the troops coming through the gorge. Their battle flag drops three times from the effect of our canister. Their line wavers and seeks shelter in the woods, but in a moment they return in a solid mass. The 6th New Jersey moves forward across my front, then the 40th New York passes through the park of horses and carriages stationed near (our) position and attacks Benning's Brigade."
The battle lines surged back and forth until the exhausted Union troops were forced to retreat. One wing of 44th Alabama rushed to the summit of Devil's Den and Major George Cary planted the regiment's flag among the boulders. "A few minutes later," Colonel Perry recalled, "the Major found me among the rocks near the foot of the hill, prostrated by heat and excessive exertion (and) exhibited an armful of swords as trophies of his victory." In the hands of the Confederates, Devil's Den soon became a haven for Confederate sharpshooters who practiced their deadly craft on Union targets on Little Round Top.
As the battle for Devil's Den raged, the last of General Hood's brigades charged toward the Wheatfield.
The Confederate attack swept up to the Wheatfield where over 6,000 officers and men were killed, wounded or captured in charge and counter-charge through the wheat. Included among the casualties were two generals.
Charge and counter charge on the afternoon of July 2 left this field and nearby woods strewn with more than 4,000 dead and wounded Union and Confederate soldiers. Thousands of troops fought in this area and veterans compared it to a whirlpool- a stream of eddies and tides that flowed around the 19 acres of wheat owned by farmer George Rose. This aerial view of the field is toward the west with the Peach Orchard at the central top. The woods that border the field were not as dense in 1863 as they are today, but they did provide cover for the Confederates as they maneuvered around Union positions here. Fighting began in earnest around 4:30 when a Georgia Brigade commanded by Brig. General George Anderson swept through the woods to the south and ran into Brig. General Regis deTrobriand's Union regiments stationed behind a stone wall on the southern end of the field. Some of deTrobriand's regiments had been peeled off to support the positions at Devil's Den, and though he was outnumbered by Anderson's larger regiments, his remaining soldiers kept the Confederates at bay for nearly an hour.
Anderson skillfully maneuvered his soldiers in front of the Union troops, conserving ammunition and manpower, while the overtaxed northeners stubbornly held their position. Re-enforcements were desperately needed as ammunition ran out. DeTrobriand's 17th Maine Infantry had used up all of their ammunition and ordered to withdraw, the regiment backed through the Wheatfield closely followed by Anderson's men who triumphantly swarmed over the wall. General David Birney, commanding this section of the line, ordered the 17th Maine to about face and led them in a desperate bayonet charge. Birney's counterattack temporarily swept Anderson's men from the field, but the southerners were not to be denied. Rallied by their officers, the Georgians renewed their attack as Union re-enforcements marched onto the scene.
As the fighting raged in the southern end of the Wheatfield, Union troops filtered into the woods to the east and west to slug it out with Confederates moving in from the southwest. General Joseph B. Kershaw's Brigade of South Carolina soldiers crossed the Rose Farm and attacked Union troops on a small rocky knoll that borders the west side of the field. The fighting swelled to a crescendo and raged steadily for a hour, when the Union troops began to pull out. The famous Irish Brigade arrived and tramped through the wheatfield to, in turn, push the Confederates off the knoll. A determined Kershaw threw his men back into the attack, re-enforced with a Georgia Brigade under Brig. General Paul Semmes. Semmes led two of his regiments into a gap on Kershaw's right in the lower part of the wheatfield, where he was seriously wounded and his men counterattacked by a fresh Union brigade under Colonel John Brooke. At the point of the bayonet, Brooke's small regiments drove Semmes' men back to the Rose Farm orchards south of the house and the two sides fought it out in a see-saw struggle. Southern pressure was relentless and the Union forces began to withdraw from the wheatfield and surrounding woods. The fighting was close and, for a time, hand to hand. Colonel Harrison Jeffords of the 4th Michigan Infantry was bayonetted by a Confederate soldier as he rushed to save the flag of his regiment from capture. Finally, Brig. General Wofford's brigade swept the field and all was quiet except for the groans of the thousands of wounded and dying. George Rose's wheatfield is truly one of the bloodiest sites on the battlefield.
Two generals were mortally wounded during the severe contest in the Wheatfield. Shot in the leg as he led his troops into the wheatfield, Brig. General Paul Semmes was carried back to a field hospital that night. Weak and pale from loss of blood, Confederate surgeons did all they could to save the general's life. After treatment by the surgeons, the general was taken by ambulance to Martinsburg, West Virginia for further medical care and he appeared to be improving. An unstoppable infection set in and there was little the doctors could do to stop it. Semmes lingered in great pain until his death on July 10. The blood-stained uniform coat the general wore at Gettysburg is preserved in the collection of the Museum of the Confederacy in Richmond, Virginia.
On the Union side, Brig. General Samuel Kosciuszko Zook was wounded in the abdomen as he led his men into the woods on the west side of the Wheatfield. Zook commanded one of the brigades in the Second Corps that was rushed to the scene that afternoon. To get his regiments into the field, General Zook ordered his soldiers to march over a line of disorganized Union soldiers. Like General Semmes, Zook was struck just as his men moved into action. Aides carried the general from the field to an ambulance that transported him to a Union field hospital on the Baltimore Pike, where he died after soon midnight.
The advanced Union line arranged by General Sickles stretched from Devil's Den to this point, then angled northward on the Emmitsburg Road. This orchard at the intersection of Wheatfield Road and the Emmitsburg Road was owned by Joseph Sherfy whose house sat on the west side of the Emmitsburg Road. Mr. Sherfy maintained a substantial orchard of peach and apple trees and operated a small fruit canning business from his home. Not only were Mr. Sherfy's orchards ruined during the battle, but his house was ransacked, his fences torn apart by Union troops and then COnfederate artillerymen, his fields were covered with the dead, and his barn burned to the ground at the height of the fighting. To make the Peach Orchard a strong position, four Union batteries were initially posted here. These guns bombarded southern forces on Warfield Ridge and fired on Kershaw's men crossing the Rose Farm to attack the Wheatfield. The batteries continued firing until about 6:30 P.M. when a final Confederate charge by General William Barksdale's Mississippi brigade shattered the position.
Barksdale's soldiers snapped through the thin Union line after overpowering two Union regiments placed just west of the Sherfy house. The house was riddled with bullets as the combatants swept around it. Wounded men crawled into the house and barn for protection. The fiery Barksdale whipped his men forward across the Emmitsburg Road, north of the Peach Orchard where Union gunners and infantrymen found themselves surrounded. In the melee that followed, Union General Charles Graham was knocked from his horse and captured as his line disintegrated. With the positions at the Peach Orchard crushed, Sickles' delicate line could no longer be held. Closely followed by General Wofford's Georgia brigade, the Mississippi brigade seemed unstoppable as they pushed through the Peach Orchard and into the valley toward Cemetery Ridge. The fields ahead were filled with confused, splintered Yankee regiments and retreating artillery, an inviting prize for the battle hardened men.
General A.A. Humphreys, in command of the Union division on the Emmitsburg Road, resolved to fight a stubborn withdrawal and slowly pulled his men back, stopping to turn and fire on Barksdale's men who were soon joined by two additional southern brigades from A.P. Hill's Corps. The field between the road and Plum Run was soon covered with blue-clad bodies as Humphreys' men stubbornly bought time with their lives.
Union batteries positioned on the Wheatfield Road had only seconds to spare to make their escape. South Carolinians rushed from the Rose Farm toward the road, shooting as they ran while desperate gunners dragged their heavy guns to the rear by hand. The 5th Massachusetts Battery had lost so many horses that guns, limbers and caissons had to be dragged off by man power, stopping only long enough to load and hastily fire canister at their pursuers. The last battery to leave was the 9th Massachusetts Battery. Horses and gunners pulled their guns through the pasture toward the Trostle Farm buildings, stopping just long enough blast rounds of canister into pursuing infantry. The South Carolina soldiers were soon joined by the 21st Mississippi of Barksdale's brigade who joined in the pursuit of the fleeing artillerymen.
Those units that attempted to resist the Confederate attack could only delay the inevitable. The collapse of the Third Corps line opened the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, and Union commanders had few precious moments to fill it. A handful of infantry and several Union batteries gathered from the artillery reserve were all that was available at this critical moment. Under the guidance of Lt. Colonel Freeman McGilvery, the excited artillerymen unlimbered their guns and opened fire on the Confederates as they swarmed through the Trostle Farm and into Plum Run.
Sickles' advanced battle line stretched from Devil's Den to the Peach Orchard, and then northward long the Emmitsburg Road. After the Confederate attack began at 4 o'clock and it was realized how perilous the new position was, Sickles remained busy passing orders to shore up the weaker parts of his line and hurry forward reinforcements from other commands arriving on the field. Confederate artillery zeroed in on this area and the scene around these buildings became chaotic as orderlies raced to and fro with messages while shells burst all about the group. At the height of the battle, the general was seriously wounded by a Confederate shell that crushed one of his legs. Pale and in shock, Sickles was quickly treated and then carried to the rear. Despite the incredible pain, the daunting officer gathered his wits, propped himself up on his stretcher, and waved his hat to the passing troops as he was carried to the rear. That evening, the shattered leg was removed by an army surgeon and General Sickles' career as a corps commander was over.
Command of the corps passed to Major General David Birney. Unaware of the impending crisis at the Peach Orchard, Birney was seeing to his battered units near the Wheatfield when a staff officer informed him that he was now the corps commander. By this time, the Union line was in great disarray and under attack all along its front. As the Confederate pressure mounted and the position at the Peach Orchard collapsed, retreating Union troops streamed through this farm toward Cemetery Ridge.
Once past the Trostle Farm, the southerners were in the doorway of a sizeable gap in the Union line between Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top, held by a handful of Union artillerymen and one regiment of Union infantry. The 1st Minnesota Infantry was about to do the impossible- stop the Confederate attack before they reached the center of Cemetery Ridge.
Reserve troops were rushed forward by General Meade, but none had arrived in time to establish an infantry line before it was threatened by the attack of Barksdale, Wilcox and Lang's brigades. Colonel Freeman McGilvery gathered the scattered batteries of his artillery brigade from the Artillery Reserve and placed them here. Many of these Union gunners had just survived the ordeal in the Peach Orchard, but they unlimbered their guns as line after line of Confederate infantry appeared in the valley below. McGilvery's artillerymen stood fast, firing canister into the southerners who briefly halted at Plum Run to reorganize their ranks. As General Cadmus Wilcox attempted to get his men started again, he was suddenly surprised to see a small formation of Union infantry appear in his front, take deliberate aim and fire into his lead regiments.
There was but one Union regiment stationed here, the 1st Minnesota Infantry. The soldiers watched developments in the shallow valley in front of them. Despite the artillery fire, the southerners had regrouped and were pushing forward. At this critical moment, General Hancock arrived at the scene, took in the situation and galloped to the only available Union infantry at hand, the 1st Minnesota Infantry. Reigning his horse in front of the regiment, Hancock shouted to Colonel William Colvill, Jr., "My God, are these all the troops we have here?!" Colvill replied in the affirmative. "Do you see those colors?", Hancock asked. Colvill peered through the battle smoke to see a large mass of gray-clad southerners with red battle flags defiantly waving above them. "Yes," Colvill replied. "Well, capture them!", Hancock ordered as he spurred his horse on to search for more troops to fill the gap. Without hesitation, Colonel Colvill led his 262 men forward toward Plum Run where they crashed headlong into General Wilcox's Alabama regiments. Within minutes the charge was over. Barely a handful of Minnesotans escaped to rally on Cemetery Ridge, but they had bought time for reinforcements to arrive and fresh Union troops quickly counterattacked. The 1st Minnesota Infantry suffered a staggering loss, with more soldiers being killed and wounded the following day in repulsing "Pickett's Charge". The regiment's 82% loss at Gettysburg was never equaled by any other Union regiment during the Civil War.
While the 1st Minnesota battled Wilcox's Alabamians, Hancock was busily speeding forward a brigade of New York troops from the northern part of Cemetery Ridge. The charge of this brigade, commanded by General George Willard, drove back the exhausted southern troops. It was during this charge that several cannon taken from the 9th Massachusetts Battery were recaptured by the 39th New York Infantry and General Barksdale was shot from his horse and captured. Meanwhile, Brig. General Wright's Georgia Brigade assaulted Union troops around the Codori House and drove on toward the Angle on Cemetery Ridge. His troops were vigorously counter-attacked by Vermont troops- "Green Mountain Boys" of the 13th, 14th and 16th Vermont Infantry Regiments who had just entered their first and last action. The regiments were due to be mustered out two weeks after the close of the battle. For troops new to the field, the Vermonters performed brilliantly and overwhelmed the Confederates. Combined with the arrival of fresh batteries, the gap on Cemetery Ridge was now closed and the Confederates withdrew to Seminary Ridge.
July 2nd ended under a fiery red sunset, sympathetic to the blood that was spilled in the fields, pastures, and rocks of the Adams County countryside.
The left wing of Lee's army under General Ewell opened a cannonade on the Union right flank at 4 o'clock, but overwhelming Union artillery fire from Cemetery Hill delayed the infantry assault. To follow Lee's orders for the attack, Ewell had to strike Culp's Hill first and his troops encountered numerous difficulties getting into position. Night had fallen by the time Confederate infantrymen under General Edward Johnson splashed across Rock Creek and began the climb up the wooded slopes of Culp's Hill. New York troops under Brig. General George S. Greene quietly waited behind earthen defenses stretched southward from the summit of the hill to a small knoll above Spangler's Spring. Johnson's men forged ahead but were staggered by Union musketry and confused in the darkness of the woods. Some Confederates drove back a thin skirmish line of Union soldiers from the knoll above Spangler's Spring to discover the earthworks abandoned. Though his men successfully captured this portion of the line, they could go no further in the darkness. Believing that he was heavily outnumbered, General Johnson stopped his attack to wait for reinforcements before renewing his assault the next morning.
Culp's Hill was the anchor for the right flank of the Union line at Gettysburg. Occupied on the evening of July 1 by exhausted Union soldiers, the men spent the first quiet hours of that night felling trees to build a strong line of earthen and log defenses called breastworks. Trees and rocks were laid end to end into lines, and soil scooped upon them to form a network of trenches from the summit of the hill to Spangler's Spring. The remains of these works still exist at Culp's Hill. The hill is heavily wooded today, though most of the smaller trees and brush had been cleared by farmers prior to the battle and gave the Union a clear field of fire. Events remained quiet here until dusk on July 2nd. In the gathering darkness, the Union troops located here heard the tramp of thousands of feet on dry leaves and headed in their direction. This was Maj. General Edward Johnson's Division, finally making their way to cross Rock Creek, which runs at the eastern base of the hill. Johnson had been forced to delay his attack and it was not until around 8 P.M. that his men were close enough to make the attack on Culp's Hill, unaware of what they would find once they reached it.
Union troops of the Twelfth Corps who had manned the breastworks were moved from the hill to reinforce the embattled Union left that afternoon. These troops had not yet returned and only a single brigade composed of New York regiments under Brig. General George Sears Greene had been left behind to hold the hill. The 62 year-old Greene was determined not to give up any of this valuable ground. He ordered his officers to stretch the line as far as possible and to hold their positions at all costs. Greene completed his shifting of troops and not a moment too soon. Johnson's Confederates splashed across Rock Creek and began to ascend the hill. Silently, Greene's men waited behind their shallow defenses. The gray lines were within a hundred feet when the northerners stood and unleashed a perfect storm of musketry fire into the darkness. "It was a critical period in the history of the battle. Although this attack on Greene was made by vastly superior numbers, suddenly and without warning, under the cover of darkness, the gallant veteran promptly disposed his slender forces to the best advantage and held his line unbroken throughout the night."
Muzzle flashes lit up the hillside as the southerners surged ahead. The New Yorkers behind the stone and earth barricades at the summit of the hill blazed into the masses of Confederates who attempted to find cover behind the multitude of large boulders and trees on the rough hillside. Little could be seen in the darkness as each side took turns shooting at shadows. Greene's tactics worked. In the confusion of a night battle, General Johnson believed that he was facing a much larger force than expected. "The attack was made with great vigor and spirit," the general wrote. "It was as successful as could have been expected, considering the superiority of the enemy's force and position. Steuart's Brigade, on the left, carried a line of breastworks which ran perpendicular to the enemy's main line, captured a number of prisoners and a stand of colors, and the whole line advanced to within short range and kept up a heavy fire until late in the night." The firing died down around midnight, replaced by the dreadful groans of wounded soldiers. Clear objectives could not be determined in the darkness. With the belief that he was outnumbered, Johnson requested reinforcements and decided to wait until first light to renew his attack.
Returning to Culp's Hill after midnight, the Twelfth Corps deployed astride the Baltimore Pike and prepared to retake the Confederate-held positions at first light. Union guns stationed near the Baltimore Pike opened a furious bombardment at 4 A.M., which was quickly followed by the advance of line upon line of Union regiments that swept into the woods. Johnson's Confederates fought back, grimly holding their positions without the benefit of any artillery of their own for support. The fighting continued for several hours. Soldiers dodged behind rocks and trees. Wounded men lay in the woods, fearful that no one could get to them because of the intense rifle fire. A Union attack near Spangler's Spring was beaten back and countered with a charge in an adjacent small field by the 1st Maryland CSA. The Marylanders suffered heavily before they were forced back. Around the summit of Culp's Hill, Greene's New Yorkers faced Louisiana soldiers of General Nicholl's Brigade. At a critical moment of the fighting, one particular regiment stood out. The 66th Ohio Infantry swept the front of the hill and drove back Confederate skirmishers who had crept within 20 paces of the Union position.
By 10 o'clock that morning, the Union counterattack had succeeded in driving out Johnson's men and the hill was securely in Union hands. The battle for Culp's Hill ended as Johnson's exhausted soldiers retreated across Rock Creek, leaving the woods filled with dead and wounded. Among the dead was a young soldier who grew up in Gettysburg and had spent his youth exploring his uncle's hill. Wesley Culp had moved to Shepherdstown, Virginia with his employer who specialized in harness making. Adopting his new southern home and acquiring the southern spirit, Culp enlisted at the outbreak of the Civil War and served in the 2nd Virginia Infantry of the famous "Stonewall Brigade". Little could he have known that one day he would be fighting on his uncle's farm in Adams County.
Sometime during the battle on July 3, Private Culp was killed. Comrades buried him near the hill and marked his grave. After the battle a shattered remnant of his rifle was found, a portion of the wooden rifle stock with his name carved in it. What happened to Wesley Culp's remains are a mystery, though it was rumored that his grave was located by family members who secreted his body to the family cemetery plot.
While the battle raged around the summit of Culp's Hill, there was also severe fighting at the southern end near Spangler's Spring.
The earthworks captured by Johnson's men overlooked a meadow and clear flowing spring from which countless thirsty men filled their canteens. Not far away, a heavy column of Union troops marched through the night and halted just south of the meadow where they prepared to recapture the lost positions at first light of July 3.
A natural spring that flows at the southern end of Culp's Hill, Spangler's Spring is adjacent to a large meadow that was also owned by the A. Spangler family. For years it had provided water to quench the thirst of man and animal alike. Adjacent to the spring was a large meadow, bordered on one end by Rock Creek and at the other by the Baltimore Pike. Union troops occupied the area and constructed earthworks on the knoll north of the spring. Once the Twelfth Corps temporarily left this area on July 2, General Greene was forced to leave much of it unoccupied. His thin line of troops could not reach the section of works above Spangler's Spring. In the darkness of night, members of Brig. General George "Maryland" Steuart's Brigade came upon these abandoned earthworks and while Steuart's men were unopposed, adjacent Confederates ran into Greene's men and fighting broke out. Sensing that more Union opposition may lay in wait if he pursued his attack, Major General Edward Johnson ordered Steuart to halt and occupy the works while he requested reinforcements be sent to renew the attack the next morning. Steuart posted his nervous men on the reverse side of the works and sent skirmishers forward into the black woods.
The next morning when Johnson's men were counter-attacked by returning Twelfth Corps troops, Steuart's men found themselves trapped in a cross fire on the small knoll. His right regiments, the 1st and 3rd North Carolina were pinned down by strong Union rifle fire coming from the summit and Yankee regiments that slipped into the woods immediately west of the knoll. Union artillery on the Baltimore Pike blasted the trees around his men, defenseless against this terrible fire. At the height of the fighting, two Union regiments- the 2nd Massachusetts and the 27th Indiana, made a disastrous charge against Steuart's left flank through the meadow just south of the spring. Both regiments were thrown back with heavy loss. North of Spangler's Spring, the 2nd Maryland Infantry CSA left the protection of the earthworks to charge two Union regiments that held a commanding position in their front. Deadly Union volleys stalled the charge and the southerners were thrown back with heavy loss.
After seven hours of continuous fighting with no possibility of achieving any success, General Johnson ordered Steuart to withdraw his men from the positions near here. A tearful Steuart withdrew his regiments, worn down to mere handfuls of exhausted survivors. The earthworks were soon reoccupied by Union troops who spent the remainder of the day recovering wounded soldiers and burying the dead of both armies. "We have just concluded the most severe battle of the War," Colonel George Cobham, 111th Pennsylvania Infantry wrote to his brother on July 4th, "which has resulted in a complete victory on the Union side. The fighting has lasted two days and been desperate on both sides. All round me as I write, our men are busy burying the dead. The ground is literally covered with them and the blood is standing in pools all round me; it is a sickening sight."
Northwest of Culp's Hill, two Confederate brigades under General Jubal Early momentarily penetrated the Union defenses at Cemetery Hill. In the gathering gloom of night, the southerners made a brilliant charge to the eastern base of the hill, overran Union troops stationed behind stone walls, and poured through the gap to attack Union artillery on the summit. But without reinforcements, Early's men could not hold the hill. Union reinforcements rushed to the scene and immediately attacked with rifles and bayonets. The Confederates were thrown off Cemetery Hill and the Union line was restored by midnight.
Cemetery Hill stand on the southern edge of Gettysburg and overlooks the town and immediate area south of it. Originally known as "Raffensberger's Hill", it acquired the name "Cemetery Hill" when Evergreen Cemetery was established there in 1858 and the term was used by Union officers and soldiers during the battle. As it was in 1863, Cemetery Hill is one of the premier landmarks of the Gettysburg Battlefield. It was on this hill that General Hancock rallied beaten Union troops on the first day of the battle. The hill is marked by small pastures, bordered with stone fences that were used by troops of the Eleventh Corps when ordered to take up positions there. Overnight the stone walls took on a new appearance of heavily armed defenses while artillerymen dug barricades or "lunettes", for protection. By the morning of July 2nd, Cemetery Hill was one of the most heavily fortified positions on the field, its base ringed with infantry and three artillery batteries crowning the summit. Despite the strength of this position, a Confederate attack here briefly shattered this important position in the Union line.
Soon after dusk on July 2, two Confederate brigades under General Harry Hays and Colonel Isaac Avery made their way over a half-mile of open ground toward the hill from the direction of the Culp Farm. The rolling farmland was blocked out by stone and rail fences, each being an obstacle to the advancing southerners. Many of these walls still exist today, leading up to the avenue at the base of the hill. That evening, the stone wall and shallow road at the eastern base was filled with nervous Union troops who could hear the southerners tramp through the tall grass and knock over fences as they approached. Despite cannon fire from the summit of the hill, the Confederates made their way to the hill. In the darkness, the Union line could only be determined by muzzle flashes along the stone wall at the bottom of the hill. Confederates seemed to suddenly rise from the ground in front of the Union soldiers, a ghostly spectre in the darkness and thick smoke.
With a yell, Hays' and Avery's soldiers leapt upon the walls and into the Union troops, routing them from their positions. The northerners ran up the hill with the members of the 6th, 7th, and 9th Louisiana Regiments, nicknamed "Louisiana Tigers", in hot pursuit. At the summit, the Confederates rushed into the Union artillery positions. The artillerymen fought back with everything at their disposal- bayonets, clubs, rocks and fists, the fighting was hand to hand over the precious guns. Major Samuel Tate of the 6th North Carolina wrote afterward that, "75 North Carolinians of the Sixth Regiment and 12 Louisianians of Hays' brigade scaled the walls and planted the colors of the Sixth North Carolina and Ninth Louisiana on the guns. It was now fully dark. The enemy stood with tenacity never before displayed by them, but with bayonet, clubbed musket, sword, pistol, and rocks from the wall, we cleared the heights and silenced the guns." Though the guns were silenced, Major Tate realized that his men were out too far and could not hold on without help. Little did he know that Union reserves were just then approaching East Cemetery Hill.
Not far away, General Hancock heard the roar of battle and ordered a brigade of troops from his own Second Corps to march to the hill. Colonel Samuel S. Carroll's brigade of Ohio, Indiana and West Virginia regiments rushed toward the threatened position and formed a battle line in the cemetery. Confusion reigned in the darkness ahead of Carroll's soldiers. "We found the enemy up to and some of them among the... batteries on the road," Carroll reported. "It being perfectly dark, and with no guide, I had to find the enemy's line entirely by their fire. For the first few minutes they had a cross fire upon us from a stone wall... but, by changing the front of the Seventh West Virginia, they were soon driven back from there." With lowered muskets, Carroll's regiments pushed one by one into the mass of Confederates at the crest of the hill. Leading the 14th Indiana into the fighting, Colonel John Coons recalled, "I immediately formed my regiment into line and advanced upon them with fixed bayonets, driving them from the gun they had taken down the hill over a stone fence in front of the battery. At this point we gave them two or three volleys, when they fell back. My regiment captured 1 stand of colors, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 2 lieutenants, and 14 privates."
The losses of both sides was severe, including Colonel Avery of the 6th North Carolina who was mortally wounded, "in front of the heights." Unable to speak, Avery scribbled out a last note: "Tell my father I died with my face to the enemy."
The Union counterattack threw back the briefly victorious southerners and Cemetery Hill was secure. Both flanks of the Union army had been attacked and both held. During a council of war with his corps commanders that evening, General Meade decided that the army should remain in their current positions. The Cemetery Ridge position was very strong and Meade's commanders felt that to attack may prove folly. Without hesitation, Meade ordered his army to stay and fight through the next day, retake the ground lost at Culp's Hill and wait for Lee's next move. On the other side, Lee briefly conferred with his officers and planned for another day of battle. Like Meade, he would not quit the field despite the setbacks his army suffered that afternoon. He would attack Meade again, and hit him in his weakest part- the center of his line.
Evaluating his gains at day's end, Lee realized that the gamble of attacking the Union flanks simultaneously had not been as successful as he had hoped. The capture of Culp's Hill was still in doubt though the Union position on Cemetery Hill would be threatened if it could be taken in the morning. Soon after nightfall, Confederate cavalry chief JEB Stuart arrived at headquarters where a disgusted Lee admonished him for being absent for so long. Yet Stuart's cavalry would fit into Lee's strategy for the next day of the battle. Meanwhile, General Meade met with his generals in a "Council of War" at his headquarters on the Taneytown Road. Almost to a man, his officers agreed to stay at Gettysburg and wait for Lee to attack. If he did not, then Meade should order a counterattack and force Lee to fight or flee. The Gettysburg Campaign was about to reach its climax.
Julie, you better start packing. $;-)
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I first met Julie on another political board before either of us found FR. If you're fortunate enough to be on her mailing list, you won't miss a good article on FR, a poll that needs bumping, or a petition that needs to be signed. Julie has been affectionately dubbed "The General" by one of her good friends, ST.LOUIE1, because of this photo, right, which was used in a collage for another thread. (BTW, Louie says she's the only one in all of FReeRepublic who can keep him in line.) : ) 