Scientists Question Electronic Voting

SFGate ^ | March 3, 2003 | Henry Norr

[Shermy]

Oddly enough, Silicon Valley has been a laggard when it comes to applying the technology it's famous for to the election process. Now it's finally beginning to catch up, and it has suddenly become the locus of an overdue -- and profoundly important -- debate about the mechanics of democracy in the 21st century.

[Shermy]

Ping.

[bobg]

One "expert" said that it might be possible for some types of equipment for recording of votes at each voting machine to be electronically "fixed" or pre-determined even before the votes are cast. The account could be modified slightly at each precinct so as not to raise suspicion.

[Theyknow]

This is a very big deal if elections are to remain free. The Rats have dead people and felons voting imagine what they will do when they get their hands into this one. It is my understanding that Hillary even owns one of these companies, try to guess why. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure it out. We finally have the White House and Congress and this is how it will all be taken away.

[Darksheare]

The only reason the treasonous Cheatocrats want electronic voting is because it takes human error out of their system of cheating.
In short, bumbling oafs like those that got caught last time.

[Willie Green]

High-tech boondoggle.

The doggone things will only get used maybe 3~4 times a year MAX if you include local elections. Then they'll sit and gather dust, and become "obsolete" before the next election.

IMHO, the optical scanners are the best approach at the moment: they simplify the task of counting the ballots/votes, instantly reject a ballot if an error is made (allowing the voter to make "corrections") and will not confuse the senior citizens who are accustomed to marking paper ballots.

[supercat]

An electronic system, properly implemented, could provide better security against tampering than a conventional paper ballot box. Key requirements for such security would be:

1. The software and all configuration data are stored in memory which physically cannot be altered without such alteration being detectable, and which are never reused. Bipolar PROMs would be ideal for this, but OTPROMs could be used if they were enclosed in radiation-evident sealed cases. Once the system is configured, these devices should be secured against alteration. The media should be kept until there is no possibility of challenge to an election, and in any event never reused.
2. Votes must likewise be recorded in write-once media, which--as above--should never be reused.
3. The voting machine should have all plans and firmware published for anyone who wants them and should be built entirely of widely-available off-the-shelf parts.
4. The machine's design should allow anyone with a suitable machine to read out a copy of all code and data storage devices, with protection circuitry to prevent a surreptitiously-designed reader from altering them.

Unfortunately, I'm unaware of any machines that meet these criteria. Does anyone else know of any?

[xzins]

1. Why do we have to have our results overnight? Why can't it take a few days?

2. This says there's really no improvement on a paper ballot. At least with a paper ballot, you got to see what you wrote down. Then, in case of a close vote or other challenge, the ballots were there to check.

[supercat]

This says there's really no improvement on a paper ballot. At least with a paper ballot, you got to see what you wrote down. Then, in case of a close vote or other challenge, the ballots were there to check.

There are two weaknesses to a paper-ballot system:

• Counting votes requires breaking the seal on the ballot box. This necessarily means destroying evidence of possible ballot tampering.
• Because of cost and logistical considerations, and because of the necessity of keeping votes confidential, it is not possible to make individual paper ballots counterfeit-resistant and traceable.

A well-designed electronic system could overcome these weaknesses without adding new ones. Unfortunately, many electronic systems not only add new weaknesses, but they also fail to correct the problems of paper ballots.

[xzins]

Unfortunately, many electronic systems not only add new weaknesses, but they also fail to correct the problems of paper ballots.

Whereas previously there were 2 weaknesses, now there are 2+X.

Paper ballots win.

[uncbuck]

"Votes cast for the Democratic candidate for governor in one precinct during last fall's gubernatorial race were credited to Jeb Bush because of a "misaligned" touch screen. No one knows how many votes were misrecorded. "

They lost there credibility here. They don't know how many were "misrecorded', because they are not sure it really happened. This was an allegation, not a fact.

The rest of the 'non-partisan' organizations are suspisiously located in California, some at universities, non-partizan California universities? Come on.

[Spruce]

Computer-based voting is no more reliable than any other method. Never will be.

[expatpat]

I agree with you re optical scanners. We have 'em here and they work well.

I'm dead set against sytems with no paper-trail.

[Revel]

Thanks. This is a big issue. I am afraid that there are not too many people that get it though. I know how easy it would be to fix the vote electronically. It could even be done by a program that loads into memory via modem and quickly deletes itself after the voting. Or it could be done using programable Rom that would delete the corrupt part of the program after the vote. Of course since no one knows what the software contains then there are even more possiblilitys. The experts in this article know that better than anyone. They are ones who design stuff like this. There are to many non-experts arround who don't have a clue about the reality of this electronic voting system. Why the republicans would be pushing this has me a bit confused. The problem has not been with paper ballots. It has been with the people who are not smart enough to vote and vote in english. In my opinion there vote should not count anyways.
But as the experts say...if we are going to go to this electronic voting then there still needs to be a paper trail. They should know.

[Revel]

oops...we accidently deleted those votes.

[ChadGore]

Re: punch cards [ snip ] .. the technology that caused so much grief in Florida in the 2000 presidential election.

Tripe like this really yanks my chain. Gore never had a case, which is why he lost every case regarding his false assertion that the punch card was a problem.

If one, just one, of Gore assertions were true, he would have won one of these cases in court. He did not.

[ez]

oops...we accidently deleted those votes.

It was a bureaucratic snafu.

[supercat]

oops...we accidently deleted those votes.

Consider the following design: votes are stored on a bipolar 32Kx8 PROM encased in a clear tamper-evident package with serialized seals provided by both/all parties. Initially, the PROM is blank except for a header identifying it. Past the header (assume it's 768 bytes), the PROM is divided into one thousand 32-byte blocks (which, as noted above, are initially all blank).

Every time someone casts a ballot, the contents of their ballot are converted to a 192-bit blob organized as 32 6-bit bytes. These are run through a lookup table to convert them into 8-bit bytes which have exactly four "1" and four "0" bits. These 32 bytes are then stored in a randomly-selected vacant block in the PROM.

Tell me how anyone could delete any votes from such a system without the alteration being obvious.